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SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 
This report analyses labour market and wage 
developments as the worst economic and financial 
crisis since World War II hit the European Union 
and its labour markets.  The report focuses on how 
the crisis is affecting employment trends and the 
functioning of the labour market, analysing the 
interaction with key macroeconomic variables 
such as productivity, wages and GDP. It aims to 
contribute to the overall efforts to upgrade the 
monitoring of macroeconomic developments in the 
EU and the euro area as recommended by the 
EMU@10 communication. (1) To this end, it 
presents an analysis of the most recent trends and 
prospects on participation, unemployment and 
employment rates on the one hand and labour costs 
on the other. Although the report concentrates on 
developments at euro area and EU27 levels, it also 
examines the situation in individual countries and 
specific measures taken to minimise the impact of 
the crisis on labour market and the challenges 
ahead. The report looks mainly at labour market 
trends in 2008, against the background of 
developments earlier this century, but  also covers 
recent developments as far as available figures 
allow (i.e. July 2009),  given that the economic 
crisis has had a rapid and significant impact on 
labour market conditions, which are continuing to 
deteriorate fast.      
Employment and unemployment developments 
Before the financial crisis broke out in summer 
2007, European labour markets had been in a 
relatively good shape. The employment rate had 
reached about 68% of the workforce - close to the 
target set in the Lisbon strategy for 2010, owing 
mainly to significant increases in the employment 
rates of women and older workers. Between 2000 
and 2008 the female and older worker employment 
rates had increased by about 5½ and 9 percentage 
points respectively. Furthermore, the decline in 
unemployment brought the unemployment rate 
down to 7%, despite a very substantial increase in 
the labour force, especially of non-EU foreigners 
and women.  
But by the end of November 2008, it was clear that 
the world economy was cooling rapidly and the 
financial crisis was increasingly having an impact 
(1) Commission Communication: "EMU@10: successes and 
challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary 
Union", COM(2008) 238, of 7.5.2008.  
on the real economy. International trade began 
falling at an alarming rate.  Although there was 
considerable variation across Member States in 
terms of their direct exposure to either shocks or to 
international trade, economic activity in the EU 
began to decline strongly, which, after some delay, 
started feeding through to labour markets.  
Between 2008Q2 (when unemployment reached its 
lowest level) and 2009Q2, GDP fell by about 5%, 
and the unemployment rate increased by 2 
percentage points (from about 7% to 9%). The first 
signs of the impact on the labour market emerged 
in several Member States during the second half of 
2008, although EU-wide labour market outcomes 
were not much affected. But thereafter 
unemployment started to increase strongly, despite 
several effective short term policy measures being 
implemented. 
Sign of a weakening in employment growth 
gradually emerged in the course of 2008. Total 
employment in the EU27 grew at a much lower 
rate than in 2007 (1%, down from 1.8%), and the 
situation was even worse in the euro area, where 
employment growth halved to 1.4 per cent. 
Average employment rates still rose slightly in 
2008, to 68% of the working age population, ½ 
percentage point above the 2007 average. 
Consequently, the full effect of the crisis on 
employment and unemployment will become clear 
only in 2009 and 2010.  
Socio-economic groups with relatively weak work 
contracts (temporary contracts), the self-employed 
and the low- and medium-skilled have so-far borne 
much of the brunt of the current recession. The 
advent of the crisis has had only minor effects on 
the employment of high-skilled workers, but it 
significantly hit  the medium- and low-skilled, 
with annual employment growth in those groups 
falling to 1.3% (from 2.1% in 2007) and -2.5% 
(from -0.6% in 2007).  
On average, over 2008, the number of unemployed 
was already up from 2007 in the euro area  (by 
almost 200 thousand, to 11.7 million), though it 
was still declining in the EU27 (also by almost 200 
thousand to 16.6 million). By 2009Q2, the EU27 
harmonised unemployment rate had risen to 8.8% 
(and to 9.3% in the euro area) from about 7% one 
year earlier and also considerably up on the rate in 
2008Q4 (7.4% for the EU and about 8% for the 
euro area), owing mainly to weaker demand for 
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labour. A considerable increase in unemployment 
was registered among craft workers and those 
previously employed in elementary occupations, 
which are mainly in services. The increase in the 
overall unemployment rate was driven mainly by 
the rise in the rate of male unemployment, 
reflecting the deep downturn in some male-
dominated sectors. However, although women 
have been less affected than men overall, in 
2009Q1 their rate of employment finally started to 
fall for the first time since 2005Q4. 
More recently, the increase in unemployment has 
been limited by a fall in the labour force over two 
consecutive quarters (-0.3% in 2008Q4 and -0.5% 
in 2009Q1), reflecting some discouraged worker 
effects. The growth of nationals in the labour force 
was very low in recent years and became negative 
in 2008. On the other side, the growth of non-
nationals (about 5% of the total labour force), 
which has been very strong in the recent years, 
almost halved to 4% on a year-on-year basis in 
2009Q1. The activity rate (the rate of participation 
in the labour market) for the population aged 
between 15 and 64 hovered around 71% for the 
EU and 71.5% for the euro area, up by about ½ 
percentage point.  
While there may be some concerns about the 
effects of the crisis on total labour supply, it must 
be kept in mind that recent reforms in many 
countries have strengthened the labour market 
attachment of the working-age population. As a 
consequence, any big reduction in the overall 
activity rate is unlikely, so that job losses are likely 
to show up primarily in a higher unemployment 
rate. Maintaining labour supply is an important 
objective in view of ageing populations; achieving 
this has long run benefits, even if it poses a 
formidable challenge in the near future. Against 
this background, recourse to early retirement 
schemes should be avoided as much as possible.  
The decrease in economic activity is thus likely to 
mainly feed through into lower labour utilisation. 
So far unemployment has gone up by some 2 
percentage points, with the bulk of the remaining 
adjustment (2 to 3 percentage points) consisting of 
reductions in hours worked per person. This is 
partly caused by employers holding on to labour 
after a period in which labour shortages in some 
Member States had become significant (e.g. 
Denmark). However, in a number of Member 
States (notably Italy, Germany) measures to 
facilitate short term work and part time 
unemployment seem to have played an important 
role. These short-time compensation schemes 
supported by public funds to prevent mass layoffs 
can be an effective instrument to contain wasteful 
labour shedding due to a temporary demand shock, 
in particular when inflows to unemployment 
exceed outflows from unemployment. However, if 
potential output is affected, (2) then these schemes 
to some extent smoothen the downward adjustment 
in employment levels. This presents some 
advantages and disadvantages which vary across 
Member States – depending on the structure and 
functioning of their labour markets.    
Given the sluggish outlook for economic growth in 
2010, the above analysis suggests that 
unemployment is still set to rise significantly until 
the end of 2010.  A major challenge is the risk that 
unemployment may not easily revert to pre-crisis 
levels once the recovery sets in. In particular, in 
the absence of adequate policy measures, the skills 
of the unemployed may deteriorate, lessening their 
human capital. A temporary increase in 
unemployment could thus become persistent 
(hysteresis effect). Persistently high 
unemployment, with potentially long-lasting 
effects on the labour markets and potential growth, 
could threaten the European models of social 
welfare which are already strained by ageing 
populations. 
It is important to point out that there is a 
considerable variation in developments across 
Member States on account of the severity of the 
shocks affecting them, in their labour market 
performance and policy reaction. In the Baltic 
States and Ireland, the deep shock had a major 
impact on employment as of mid 2008 and the 
same holds true for Spain where labour shedding 
of workers on fixed term contracts occurred 
without much delay. As a result, already high 
levels of unemployment shot up to 18% in the 
summer of 2009, illustrating the problems caused 
by strongly segmented labour markets. On the 
other hand, countries like Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, have largely contained the rise in 
unemployment so far through a very strong 
(2) See EC-DGECFIN (2009), "Impact of the current 
economic and financial crisis on potential output", 
European Economy - Occasional Paper No.49, June.  
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emphasis on policies to support short-term work 
and part-time unemployment.  
Recent trends in wages and labour costs 
There was a delay before the crisis started to 
impact wage developments in 2008, particularly 
since labour markets had been tightening for 
several years. As a result, wage growth started to 
slow down only in the last quarter. The annual 
growth of hourly labour costs in the euro area 
actually accelerated from 3.4% in 2008Q3 to 4% 
in 2008Q4 – largely on account of reductions in 
hours worked per employee.  However, this 
increase was short-lived and was followed by clear 
signs of abating wage and costs pressures in 
2009Q1, when the year-on-year increase in 
negotiated wages and the Labour Cost Index 
slowed to 3.2% and 3.7% respectively. 
Nevertheless the increase in the hourly labour 
costs remained high, owing to the large downward 
adjustment in hours worked. Growth in 
compensation per employee fell sharply, from 
3.5% in the third quarter to 2.7% in 2008Q3 and 
1.8% and 2008Q4. Taken together with the gradual 
deterioration in employment and the relative 
stability in the basic pay, this could suggest that, in 
the face of tight financial conditions, firms are 
actively reducing the variable pay component of 
compensation. 
The acceleration in unit labour costs was 
widespread across euro-area Member States up to 
4.5% and 5.5% in the last two quarters available 
(2008Q4 and 2009Q1) - marking the strongest 
growth in over a decade.  This is the result of a 
severe contraction in labour productivity, which is 
mainly attributable to – often policy induced – 
decisions by firms not to adjust the size of their 
workforce to the depressed economic activity in 
the short run. Only in Spain did productivity 
experience a sizeable increase, in line with the 
sharp drop in employment. 
Lowering labour costs has gained relevance in the 
framework of the crisis. As unemployment surges, 
the most disadvantaged labour-market groups are 
the first to lose their jobs and, since they also face 
serious difficulties in finding a new job, they are at 
high risk of becoming long-term unemployed. To 
support the most vulnerable, Member States have 
cut social security contributions, especially for 
low-wage earners. Rebates on social security 
contributions to boost labour demand were made 
conditional on job creation in some Member 
States. 
Although wage behaviour in the public sector 
varied across euro-area countries in 2008, a 
moderation in public wages can be expected, 
which will orient pay practices in the private 
sector. In 2008, the strong wage growth in public 
wages continued in Italy and Portugal but 
substantially reversed in Ireland and Spain, the two 
countries worst affected by the economic crisis. 
For the euro area as a whole, labour costs and 
wage pressures are expected to dissipate in line 
with the weakness in employment developments, 
the steep rise in the unemployment rate, low 
inflation expectations and the general deterioration 
of confidence. As employment reacts only with a 
lag to the economic downturn, labour productivity 
growth should decrease sharply in 2009 before 
recovering in 2010. Consequently, unit labour 
costs are foreseen to continue increasing steadily 
in 2009 and to remain relatively muted in 2010 in 
most euro area countries. 
For the first time since 1999, real wages deflated 
by the consumption price deflator grew at the 
modest rate of 0.4% in the euro area in 2008. This 
helped keep aggregate consumption relatively 
resilient. In addition, other factors may have 
played a role as well, such as lower inflation 
expectations, together with improved household 
confidence about recovery packages and social 
protection safety nets that are playing their role as 
automatic stabilisers.  
Given the nature of this crisis, the situation differs 
considerably across Member States, both in terms 
of labour market outcomes and institutions, and in 
terms of constraints on account of the external 
competitiveness. Since the latter will be of 
particular importance, a number of Member States 
will need to intervene to improve their competitive 
position (3), notably by allowing for relative wage 
(3) Looking at the real effective exchange rate based on 
relative unit labour cost (REER) in the euro area, Member 
States have accumulated a divergence of almost 34 
percentage points over the period 1999-2008, with 
Germany's REER depreciating by 15.2 percentage points  
in contrast with the sharp appreciation movement recorded 
in Ireland, equivalent to 18.6 percentage points, Italy (11.8 
pps.) and Spain (11.6 pps.). For details see Chapter 2, 
section 2.1.3 ("Competitive developments within the euro 
area") in this report. 
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flexibility. Given the considerable downward wage 
rigidity recorded in the past crises, reforms in this 
respect will be essential in a number of cases. 
The policy response to the crisis 
Member States, the European Union, and central 
banks have taken strong policy action in the face 
of a crisis of unprecedented severity. The 
December European Council endorsed the 
Commission’s proposal for a co-ordinated 
European response in the form of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). (4)  The Spring 
European Council reported on the implementation 
of the EERP and agreed that Member States’ 
recovery programmes constitute a robust response 
to the crisis and are broadly in line with the 
principles enunciated in the EERP, in that they 
encompass financial rescue packages, fiscal 
stimuli, temporary support to hard-hit sectors and 
targeted support to vulnerable groups. EU-wide 
discretionary fiscal stimulus package is sizeable, 
amounting to some 2% of GDP, while the size of 
national discretionary fiscal stimuli varies 
considerably across Member States, depending on 
the degree of fiscal space available and the 
external competitive position. The overall fiscal 
stimulus, including the effects of automatic 
stabilisers, amounts to 5% of GDP in the EU. 
The EERP called for priority to be given to those 
reforms which could support aggregate demand, 
employment and/or household income during the 
crisis, whilst at the same time improving 
adjustment capacity to raise the growth and jobs 
potential in the longer run, and therefore facilitate 
a faster recovery when conditions improve. The 
EERP also called for these measures to be 
consistent with long-term public policy objectives 
such as those found in the Lisbon strategy, the 
smooth functioning of the single market, and a 
move towards a low-carbon economy. In line with 
this overall approach, the Commission has 
identified a number of principles for the short 
term, to direct the labour market policy response to 
the crisis.  
(4) See the Commission Communications: "From Financial 
crisis to recovery: A European framework for action", 
COM(2008) 706, of 29.10.2008 and "A European 
Economic Recovery Plan", COM(2008) 800, of 
26.11.2008. 
The March 2009 Communication for the Spring 
European Council (5) suggests that Member States 
should focus on: 
• Keeping people in viable employment, notably 
by providing financial support to temporary 
flexible working time arrangements ("short-
time work") in line with production needs, 
combined with measures to support 
employability and ease transitions to new jobs; 
• Providing adequate income support and 
reinforcing activation for those most affected 
by the economic slowdown; 
• Considering supporting measures to boost both 
labour demand and labour supply, such as 
lowering non-wage costs for low-skilled 
workers, bearing in mind that wage 
developments and fiscal measures should take 
account of each Member State's competitive 
position and productivity growth; 
• Investing in training and skills upgrading and 
enhancing employment services to cope with 
increasing unemployment, there including 
extra-support to tackle youth unemployment 
and early school leavers. 
By contrast, measures such as indiscriminate tax-
funded support for jobs in declining sectors or 
regions, which could delay necessary restructuring, 
large direct job-creation schemes in the public 
sector not sufficiently targeted at specific 
vulnerable groups, and early retirement or other 
policies that push workers out of the labour 
market, would be better avoided. 
The labour market and social policy response to 
the crisis appears to be broadly in line with the 
guiding principles above. (6) The majority of 
policy interventions are intended to improve job 
placement and investment in lifelong learning, and 
therefore to increase the employability of those hit 
by the crisis, improve the matching process and 
ultimately facilitate labour market transitions. Also 
high on the reform agenda are measures to get 
(5) Commission Communication: "Driving European 
recovery", COM(2009) 114, of 4.3.2009. 
(6) See EC-DGECFIN (2009), "The EU response to support 
the real economy during the economic crisis: a review of 
Member States recovery measures", European Economy -   
Occasional Paper No 51, July.  
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people into work and keep them there, notably by 
cutting labour costs, which stimulates labour 
demand while maintaining the incentive not to 
withdraw from the labour market during the crisis. 
The measures adopted to encourage flexible 
working time have also positively contributed to 
the stimulus effort.   
Temporary working time reductions, temporary 
production site closures and other forms of short-
time work implemented by firms to prevent mass 
layoffs are being largely supported by public funds 
in many European countries. So far, these schemes 
have proved effective in containing wasteful 
labour shedding due to the demand shock, thus in 
cushioning the employment impact of the crisis in 
the short-term. However, the major risk associated 
with these schemes is that of overstaffing, and 
hence a delayed dramatic impact on 
unemployment once the schemes end. In 
particular, the depth and nature of the crisis makes 
it particularly likely that restructuring will be 
necessary as the economy emerges from it (e.g. in 
the construction, financial services or automobile 
industries). 
To be effective, therefore, short-term measures 
need to be complemented by measures supporting 
employability (such as vocational training) and 
labour market transitions, as well as strong 
interventions in other fields. The large majority of 
European countries have also intervened to 
improve the design and capacity of their active 
labour market policies (ALMPs) and training offer 
to respond to the new, pressing needs resulting 
from the spreading out of the crisis.  
Lowering labour costs for both employers and 
employees already featured in some medium-term 
national reform programmes, but has become 
increasingly important since the start of the crisis. 
Rebates on social security contributions to boost 
labour demand during the crisis were typically 
made conditional upon job creation. Measures 
were often targeted to those most difficult to 
employ, sometimes to SMEs or to the self-
employed. While important, these measures have 
not offset the steep rise in unit labour cost on 
account of falling productivity levels. 
Improving the incentives to work embedded in the 
tax and benefit system was also high on the policy 
agendas, and in line with the long term goals of 
most countries. At the same time, most Member 
States also took action to support incomes, 
although to different degrees. Measures included 
the increase in the level of the guaranteed 
minimum income or minimum wage, the 
temporary extension of the coverage or the 
generosity (level and/or duration) of 
unemployment benefits, the enhancement of other 
social benefit, the introduction of tax rebates or 
exemptions for specific groups, especially the most 
vulnerable.  
Overall, short-term policies seem to largely 
contribute to long-term reform challenges. Yet, 
many are rather isolated initiatives (e.g. limited 
changes in the eligibility conditions/ generosity of 
unemployment benefits in some countries), which 
could gain in effectiveness if they were inserted in 
a more comprehensive framework. Improved 
coordination of a number of policies, notably those 
aimed at avoiding large-scale redundancies and at 
cutting non-wage labour costs, may prove 
necessary to avoid spill-over effects across 
borders.  
To sum up, although there are signs that the 
recession is bottoming out, unemployment is set to 
continue rising, reversing the downward trend 
which started a decade ago. Nonetheless, there is 
some cause for hope. Member States have 
allocated considerable budgets and attention to 
addressing employment issues. Moreover, most of 
the measures implemented thus far seem to be 
temporary, targeted and timely. Such measures 
have helped lessen the impact of the crisis on 
unemployment. They now need to be embedded in 
a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to prevent 
the rise in unemployment from becoming 
structural. As the deterioration in economic growth 
bottoms-out and fiscal space diminishes, the 
emphasis in the policy agenda will need to switch 
from policies aimed at avoiding mass labour 
shedding to policies focused on improving the 
functioning of the labour markets, in order to raise 
employment and economic growth. 
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1.1. EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT RATES 
1.1.1. Overall employment performance 
In 2008, GDP growth in the EU27 strongly 
decelerated from 2.9% in 2007 to 0.9% on an 
annual basis, as a result of the current financial and 
economic crisis. Indeed, on a quarterly basis,   
output shrank at an increasing rate, from -0.1% in 
the second quarter up to -1.5% in the fourth 
quarter. Signs of labour market deterioration had 
already gradually started to emerge in 2008, yet 
the full effect of the crisis on employment and 
unemployment will become clear only in 2009. 
Even so, 2008 annual averages are already 
providing some indications of the severity of the 
current crisis for the labour market. According to 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS), total employment 
(Table I.1.1) grew at a much lower rate than in 
2007 (1.2% against 1.9% in EU27) - especially in 
the euro area, where employment growth halved to 
1.4%. Employment growth in the Member States 
(Graph I.1.1) has differed according to how strong 
and quick they have been affected by the global 
economic slowdown. Only four Member States 
(Slovak Republic, Denmark, United Kingdom and 
Portugal) had an employment growth higher than 
in 2007 (Graph I.1.1). All the others experienced a 
steep deceleration in employment expansion and 
there was even negative employment growth in 
countries that had experienced buoyant growth in 
previous years - e.g. Spain (-0.5%), Ireland (-
0.6%), Luxembourg (-0.4%) and Lithuania (-1%). 
The worst performer was Hungary (-1.2%), but in 
this case employment growth had already been 
negative in 2007. The largest euro-area economies 
still showed some positive employment growth, 
thus contributing to the EU27's positive 
employment developments on an annual basis.  
As Table I.1.1 shows, the crisis has not hit 
different socio-economic groups in the same way. 
With employment growth of 1.7% in 2008 
compared with 2.2% one year earlier, women 
appears less affected than men, as the crisis first 
and foremost involved male-dominated sectors 
such as construction and related industries. Also, 
the number of employees continued to grow, albeit 
at a lower rate, while the self-employed declined 
significantly (-0.8%). This may have many causes. 
Firstly, since the self-employed need capital, the 
financial crisis might have reduced access to bank 
credit for potential new self-employed workers, 
which may have made exits from self-employment 
more prevalent than entries. Secondly, in many 
countries (especially the Southern ones) the self-
employed are often in a quasi-dependent 
relationship with a single company, which can in 
this way more flexibly manage its production 
process (and its workforce). In response to a fall in 
their orders, such firms may be much quicker to 
reduce employees with this type of relationships to 
them. Similarly, more flexible manning strategies 
help to explain the different pattern seen between 
permanent and temporary employment, the first of 
expanded at a rate slightly below that of 2007 
while the second fell for the first time - by 1.4% 
after years of positive growth. 
Consequently, the share of temporary contracts fell 
to 14% (16.4%) of total employment in the EU27 
(Euro area). Consistently with the pro-cyclical 
pattern identified in the 2007 Report, the number 
of those involuntarily in a temporary job fell to 
about 59%, which is still above the average of the 
2001-2007 period (57%). Despite the decline in 
many Member States, the share of people with a 
temporary job remains high in countries where the 
core of permanent workers is protected by 
employment legislation while flexibility is 
achieved through an external group of peripheral 
workers.  
The sunrise of the crisis had not effect at all on the 
employment of highly-skilled workers (which even 
accelerated in 2008), while it had a significantly 
negative effect on the medium- and low-skilled, 
with annual employment growth falling to 1.3% 
(2.1% in 2007) and -2.5% (-0.6% in 2007). 
While relevant for distributive consequences, 
differentiated employment patterns for various 
skills and age groups also have a bearing on 
overall employment growth on the basis of the 
relative weight of each group in total employment 
(Table I.1.2). As for contract types, the positive 
contribution of temporary workers - on average 
36% of the total employment growth in EU27 in 
the 2001-2007 period - reversed its trend in 2008, 
when the decline in temporary employment caused 
a reduction in overall employment growth. At the 
same time, permanent workers in 2008 grew more 
European Commission 
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than overall employment, mainly for prime-age 
workers. 
The data suggest that the crisis has so far mainly 
affected those with relatively unstable work status 
(i.e. temporary contract, low-skilled and self-
employed). 
In particular, low-skilled workers accounted for 
more than half of the reduction in employment 
growth. The prime-age low-skilled are the group 
that most negatively contributed to the overall 
employment growth. 
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Table I.1.1: Key labour market indicators in the EU-27 – 2008
Total employment (age 15-64) 217846 1,9% 1,2% 8,6%
of which women 97801 2,2% 1,7% 11,9%
   men 120045 1,6% 0,7% 6,1%
of which Employees 183624 2,1% 1,6% 10,5%
  Self-employed 21272 1,0% -0,8% 11,8%
of which Permanent Employment 192164 1,7% 1,5% 6,8%
  Fixed-term and temporary employment 25681 2,7% -1,4% 24,8%
of which Full-time employment 179422 2,6% 1,5% :
  Part-time employment 38359 2,8% 1,7% :
of which High-skilled 58569 3,7% 4,1% 32,8%
  Medium-skilled 108150 2,1% 1,3% 12,9%
  Low-skilled 50600 -0,6% -2,5% -11,1%
Unemployed (age 15-64) 16544 -12,1% -1,2% -13,3%
women 8563 -12,7% 0,9% -11,2%
men 7981 -11,5% -3,3% -15,5%
Labour force (age 15-64) 234389 0,7% 1,0% 6,7%
women 128608 0,5% 0,7% 4,7%
men 105781 0,9% 1,3% 9,2%
Participation rate (age 15-64) 70,9 0,2 0,4 2,4
women 63,9 0,3 0,6 3,8
men 78,0 0,1 0,3 1,1
Employment rate (age 15-64) 65,9 0,9 0,5 3,4
women 59,1 1,0 0,8 4,8
men 72,8 0,9 0,3 1,9
Unemployment rate (age 15-64) 7,1 -1,1 -0,1 -1,6
women 7,6 -1,1 -0,3 -2,2
men 6,7 -0,9 0,0 -1,2
Long-term unemployment rate (age 15-64) 37,0 -2,8 -5,7 -9,8
women 37,2 -2,8 -5,3 -10,7
men 36,8 -2,8 -6,2 -8,9
Youth unemployment rate (age 15-24) 15,5 -1,8 0,1 -1,8
women 15,5 -1,9 -0,3 -2,5
men 15,6 -1,8 0,4 -1,2
Structure of employment - EU27 - 2008
Percentage 
change 2001-
2008
Percentage 
change 2007-
2008
Percentage 
change 2006-
2007
Thousand of
persons or %
Source: Commission services, based on Labour Force Survey (Eurostat).
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Graph I.1.1: Employment growth in the European Union 
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Table I.1.2: Employment contribution to changes by different groups 
Growth 
rate
Contributi
on
Growth
rate
Contributi
on
Growth
rate
Contributi
on
Growth
rate
Contributi
on
Employment growth: 1,2 (100%) 1,4 (100%) 1,2 (100%) 1,5 (100%)
Young (15-24) -0,2 -2% -0,1 -1% -0,1 -1% 0,3 2%
Prime  age (25-54) 0,9 60% 1,1 63% 0,9 61% 1,3 66%
Older (55-64) 4,1 42% 4,6 37% 4,7 40% 5,2 32%
MALE: 0,7 34% 0,8 30% 0,9 41% 1,0 36%
Young (15-24) -0,7 -3% -1,1 -4% 0,1 0% 0,2 1%
Prime  age (25-54) 0,4 15% 0,5 16% 0,5 21% 0,7 20%
Older (55-64) 3,8 23% 3,8 19% 3,9 20% 3,9 15%
FEMALE: 1,7 66% 1,8 70% 1,6 58% 1,8 63%
Young (15-24) 0,4 2% 1,0 3% -0,2 -1% 0,4 1%
Prime  age (25-54) 3,8 45% 1,9 48% 3,9 40% 2,1 45%
Older (55-64) 4,5 19% 5,6 19% 5,9 19% 7,2 16%
Permanent (15-64) 1,5 115% 1,7 106% 0,8 66% 1,3 73%
Young (15-24) 1,1 6% 1,4 5% -1,5 -10% -1,2 -5%
Prime  age (25-54) 1,1 68% 1,3 64% 0,5 34% 1,0 45%
Older (55-64) 4,1 40% 4,6 36% 4,6 37% 5,1 30%
Temporary (15-64) -1,4 -15% -0,6 -6% 4,0 36% 3,5 29%
Young (15-24) -2,4 -8% -1,7 -6% 2,6 8% 2,1 6%
Prime  age (25-54) -1,3 -9% -0,1 -1% 4,6 25% 4,2 20%
Older (55-64) 4,3 2% 2,8 1% 6,0 2% 7,2 2%
High skilled (15-64) 4,1 93% 4,6 85% 4,1 79% 4,0 59%
Medium skilled (15-64) 1,3 57% 1,7 53% 1,8 75% 2,3 65%
Low-skilled (15-64) -2,5 -53% -2,1 -43% -1,5 -37% -0,8 -17%
Employees (15-64) 1,6 113% 1,8 110% 1,4 102% 1,7 92%
Self-employed (15-64) -0,9 -13% -0,9 -10% 0,0 1% 1,0 10%
2001 - 2007
EU27 Euro area
2008
EU27 Euro area
Source: Commission services, based on Labour Force Survey (Eurostat).
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Graph I.1.2: Employment growth (15-64) 
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Graph I.1.3: Employment growth (15-24) 
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Graph I.1.4: Employment growth (25-54) 
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Graph I.1.5: Employment growth (55-64) 
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Graphs I.1.2-I.1.5 show average employment 
growth in the 2000-2007 period on the horizontal
axis and the employment growth in 2008 on the
vertical axis. The most divergent behaviour of
employment growth in 2008 was registered in
Spain and Ireland, both countries hard hit by the
crisis (Graph I.1.2) and owing mainly to the large 
decline in employment growth for the young. In
other countries (Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Luxembourg), employment growth fell
short of the 2000s average. On the positive side, in 
2008 employment actually accelerated in Poland 
mainly because of the dynamism of the prime age 
and older worker age groups. As for young
workers (Graph I.1.3), their employment fell 
sizeably compared to the average in Ireland, Spain, 
Latvia and Slovakia. Employment growth of older 
workers (Graph I.1.5) appears closer to the 2000-
2007 average. This can be explained by many 
factors. Until now older workers have been less 
affected by the crisis, either because legislation 
protects workers with longer tenures or because 
older workers have access to supplementary wages 
for reduced working hour schemes. In addition,
flexible contracts are more common among young 
workers, implying that not renewing temporary
contracts is the easiest option firms have when
they need to cut their labour costs. 
1.1.2. Working age population
In 2008, the working age population increased 
roughly at about the same rate as in 2007 (0.4% or 
about 1.2 millions). As in previous years, the 
increase in the working age population was mainly
due to the expansion of the resident foreign
population (+1.3 million against 1.5 million in
2007). From the EU perspective, it is appropriate 
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Graph I.1.6: Changes in the employment rates relative to the previous years' average changes 2000-2007
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Source: Commission services.
to distinguish between nationals from other
Member States, for whom free movement within 
the EU generally applies, and nationals from third
countries, who are subject to the immigration and 
asylum legislation of each individual country. In
2008, both components grew, with citizens from
third countries accounting for 57% (59%) of the
increase in the EU (euro Area) working age 
population.
1.1.3. The overall and youth employment rate 
In 2008 the employment rate reached 66% of the
working age population, up by 0.5 pp. with respect
to the previous year - almost half of the increase
recorded in 2007 (0.9 pp.). The increase in the 
employment rate was sizeable in Bulgaria and 
Poland (+2.2 pps.), Slovak Republic (+1.6 pps.),
Germany (+1.4 pps.) and the Netherlands (+1.2 
pps.), while those countries which were hit first
and most strongly by the crisis already started to 
see a sizeable contraction in their employment rate, 
with Ireland at -1.5 pps., Spain at -1.3 pps. and 
Lithuania at -0.6 pps.  
While the employment rate of foreigners from EU
countries remained largely unchanged (up by 0.1 
pp. to 69.7%), that of foreigners from non-EU 
countries increased by 0.8 pp. to 59.2% of the 
relevant population. Despite an acceleration in the 
decline of the young (15-24) population (-0.8% in
2008 compared with -0.6% of one year earlier), the
employment rate of young individuals grew by
only 0.2 pp. to 37.6%, while in 2007 it increased
by 0.8 pp., which confirms that it is the young who
are the most exposed to the deterioration in the 
labour market. 
Table I.1.2 reveals the importance of specific age 
and/or gender groups for total employment growth.
Despite the smaller increase in the employment
rate of older workers' in 2008 compared to the
2000-2007 period, their contribution to total 
employment growth, at 42% for the EU and 37% 
for the Euro area, remained high. Moreover, owing
to the different intensity with which the recession
is hitting sectors where one gender is over-
represented, male and female employment respond
differently. In particular, male employment growth
is already declining in EU27 (+0.7%) and in the
euro area (+0.8%) down by 0.2 pp. in both areas as 
males are relatively over-represented in sectors
(like the building sector) that were hit first and 
hardest by the crisis. This different behaviour in
male and female employment in 2008 also 
explains the high contribution growth of female
employment compared to previous years (66% in 
EU27 and 70% in the euro area).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in 2008, prime-
aged women were the main contributors to total 
female employment, while older men accounted 
for the largest increase in the male employment 
rate. This difference may be a consequence of
firms adjusting their labour force at the early stage
of the crisis by cutting (male) temporary contracts, 
which are less common among older workers than
other age groups. 
As Graph I.1.6 points out, the annual change in the 
employment rate in 2008 is below the historical
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averages, especially in Spain, Ireland, Lithuania
and Latvia. Compared with the average changes of 
previous years, the graph also shows evidence of
the different behaviour in the last year of total, 
female and older worker employment rates. The
case of Spain is particularly interesting, as it
presents very different responses across age groups
- with the older worker employment rate
expanding at the same rate as the previous years - 
and gender, with the female rate falling much less 
than the male rate. This implies that in this 
country, young and prime-age males are the
hardest hit by the crisis. The labour market
response appears more homogeneous in Ireland
despite sharing with Spain a dramatic contraction 
in GDP owing to the burst of two related bubbles 
in Construction and Finance. The older workers' 
employment rate presents a behaviour that deviates 
from that of the previous years, particularly in
Hungary, Slovenia, Denmark, Lithuania and 
Cyprus on the negative side and Romania, Poland,
Slovak Republic and Luxembourg on the positive 
side. The fact that there are so many positive and
negative deviations from trend can be explained by
the fact that the reforms implemented in the recent 
years by many countries have had an impact on the
level and not on the rate of change of employment
rate. For example, in response to an increase in the 
retirement age, the employment rate of older 
workers changes significantly until a new level 
compatible with the new retirement age is 
achieved. 
Graph I.1.7: Differences in employment rates by nationality
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As for employment rates by nationality, Graph
I.1.7 shows two simple indicators: the difference 
between nationals' and EU27 foreigners'
employment rates and the difference between 
nationals' and other foreigners' employment 
rates(7). On average the differences in employment 
rates between nationals and EU27 foreigners are 
much less pronounced than those between 
nationals and non-nationals from third countries. 
Furthermore, only in Germany (+3.3 pps.),
Sweden (+2.0 pps.), Austria (+1.2 pps.), Belgium
(+0.7 pp.), Denmark (+0.1 pp.) is the difference 
between nationals' and EU27 foreigners'
employment rates positive. In all other countries, 
EU27 foreigners have higher employment rates
than nationals; this is particularly true for Portugal 
(-11.2 pps.) and Italy (-11.4 pps.). Finally, the 
difference between nationals' and outside-EU27 
foreigners' employment rate is negative only in
Greece (-9.0 pps.), Italy (-8.1 pps.), Portugal (-4.3 
pps.) and Spain (-0.9 pp.), while it is positive and 
very large in all other countries, exceeding 22 pps. 
in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Sweden. There also seems to be a difference
between countries with relatively recent migration
flows from outside-EU27 (as in Southern Europe)
and countries with a longer tradition of migration.
In the latter, foreigners have lower employment 
rate than nationals. (8)  
The contribution of different gender and age
groups to the changes in total employment and 
participation rates is shown in Table I.1.3, along 
with the contribution provided by the demographic 
component. (9)  In 2008, women played a stronger
role than in the recent past in accounting for total 
employment growth, especially in the euro area, 
where countries (like Spain and Ireland saw a
stronger negative effect of the crisis over sectors
(7) The analysis is restricted to EU15 due to lack of reliability 
for foreigners' employment rates data in RAMS. 
(8) This does not imply a trade-off between national and
foreigners' employment. For an extensive analysis and
evidence on the economics of immigration see the focus 
chapter of the 2008 Annual Labour Market Review.
(9) The change in employment (participation) rate in 2007 is 
decomposed in three components: the shifts in employment 
(participation) rates of different gender/age groups, the 
demographic effects and the interaction between the 
previous two. In particular, as for the first component, each 
row of the second column reports how the change in total 
employment (participation) rate would be if only the 
employment (participation) of the relative age/gender 
group had changed, the other ones remaining fixed.
Furthermore the third column (in italics) reports the 
percentage contribution of each group's shift to the pps. 
change in total employment (participation) rate. The fourth 
and fifth columns show the same data but referred to
average annual contribution in the 2000-07 period.
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with a prevalence of male occupation. As already 
noted in 2007, the reduction in the contribution of 
older workers to the improvement in the 
employment rate also continued in 2008. As for 
the demographic effects, the negative (positive) 
contribution of young (older) workers was in 2008 
stronger than in the past, implying a share of 
young (old) workers over the active population 
shrinking (expanding) at a higher rate.  
The participation rate increased more than in 2000-
2007, mainly owing to stronger participation 
among young workers, while the contribution of 
older workers' participation was lower than in the 
past. The contribution of male workers to change 
in the participation rate went up in EU27 (but not 
in the euro area). Finally, the total demographic 
effects became negative in the euro area. 
16 
Part I
Employment and wage developments 
Table I.1.3: Employment and participation rate contribution to changes by gender and age groups 
Rate in:
0,51 100% 0,47 100,0% 0,39 100,0% 0,62 100,0%
Young 0,04 7,5% 0,01 1,9% 0,00 1,0% 0,03 4,4%
Prime  age 0,31 60,4% 0,29 62,3% 0,21 54,3% 0,34 55,7%
Older 0,17 32,7% 0,18 38,9% 0,18 46,8% 0,23 37,0%
MALE: 0,12 23,2% 0,14 29,5% -0,02 -5,3% 0,14 22,5%
Young 0,01 1,1% 0,00 0,4% -0,03 -7,1% 0,01 1,4%
Prime  age 0,03 5,0% 0,06 12,1% -0,07 -18,6% 0,03 5,4%
Older 0,09 17,2% 0,08 17,0% 0,08 20,4% 0,10 15,8%
FEMALE: 0,40 77,3% 0,34 73,0% 0,42 107,5% 0,46 74,3%
Young 0,03 6,5% 0,01 1,2% 0,03 8,3% 0,02 2,8%
Prime  age 0,28 55,1% 0,24 49,9% 0,28 72,4% 0,31 50,2%
Older 0,08 15,8% 0,10 21,9% 0,10 26,8% 0,13 21,2%
TOTAL: -0,01 -1,0% 0,00 -5,3% -0,01 -2,0% 0,01 2,1%
Young -0,08 -15,1% -0,04 -8,1% -0,07 -17,4% -0,05 -7,4%
Prime  age -0,05 -9,1% -0,05 -10,2% -0,04 -9,7% 0,03 4,9%
Older 0,12 23,2% 0,06 13,0% 0,10 25,2% 0,03 4,6%
0,00 0,4% 0,01 2,3% 0,00 -0,1% 0,01 0,9%
Rate in:
0,43 100,0% 0,28 100% 0,46 100% 0,49 100%
Young 0,05 12,1% -0,03 -11,0% 0,05 10,1% 0,00 0,5%
Prime  age 0,25 58,4% 0,16 55,7% 0,28 60,1% 0,26 52,0%
Older 0,14 32,7% 0,18 62,5% 0,15 33,5% 0,22 44,6%
MALE: 0,14 31,9% 0,05 19,1% 0,09 20,2% 0,09 18,9%
Young 0,03 6,6% -0,02 -6,0% 0,02 4,0% 0,00 -0,1%
Prime  age 0,04 8,1% 0,00 -0,8% 0,01 1,1% 0,00 1,0%
Older 0,07 17,1% 0,07 26,0% 0,07 15,0% 0,09 18,1%
FEMALE: 0,31 71,3% 0,25 87,2% 0,38 83,6% 0,38 77,8%
Young 0,02 5,6% -0,02 -5,4% 0,03 6,3% 0,00 0,4%
Prime  age 0,22 49,9% 0,16 56,2% 0,27 58,5% 0,25 50,9%
Older 0,07 15,9% 0,10 36,5% 0,09 18,8% 0,13 26,5%
TOTAL: -0,02 -3,6% -0,03 -11,7% -0,02 -4,0% 0,01 1,3%
Young -0,09 -21,1% -0,05 -16,6% -0,08 -16,8% -0,05 -10,4%
Prime  age -0,05 -11,4% -0,05 -18,6% -0,05 -10,0% 0,03 5,5%
Older 0,13 29,0% 0,07 23,5% 0,10 22,9% 0,03 6,2%
0,00 0,3% 0,01 4,5% 0,00 0,3% 0,01 1,7%
due to shifts in participation  rates  of:
due to demographic effect:
due to interaction effect:
Employment rate
Participation rate
 p.p. change in  p.p. change in 
2007-2008 2000 -    2007 2007-2008 2000 -    2007
70,9 70,5 71,5 71,1
EU27 Euro area
due to shifts in employment rates  of:
due to demographic effect:
due to interaction effect:
 p.p. change in  p.p. change in 
2007-2008 2000-2007 (annual 2007-2008 2000-2007 (annual
65,9 65,4 66,1 65,7
EU27 Euro area
Source: Commission services.
1.2. UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
In an economic downturn it is very important to
look jointly at unemployment and labour supply. 
Indeed, a worker loosing a job can either give up
searching, thus entering inactivity, or actively look
for other employment opportunities, thus entering
unemployment. The social outcomes of this choice
are very different. In the first case, the active
population shrinks and more and more individuals 
depend on social assistance; if social policies are
not properly designed, many of them will
subsequently remain outside the labour market. A 
shortage of supply may occur when the economy 
rebounds, which could lead to higher wages that
can curb the recovery. In the second case, labour 
supply remains more or less constant and does not 
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Table I.1.4: Labour force by nationality 
Thousands Growth rate Thousands Growth rate Thousands Growth rate
Total 234041,5 1,1 235910,7 0,8 238366,2 1,0
Nationals 219726,3 1,6 220004,6 0,1 219834,9 -0,1
Non-nationals 13906,8 6,9 14987,9 7,8 16118,4 7,5
of which:
from EU27 5131,1 8,9 5570,1 8,6 6027,6 8,2
from ouside EU27 8775,7 5,8 9417,8 7,3 10090,8 7,1
Total 152521,6 1,3 154154 1,1 155915,7 1,1
Nationals 140871,8 2,2 141180,7 0,2 140565,5 -0,4
Non-nationals 11247,8 5,6 12063,9 7,3 12950,1 7,3
of which:
from EU27 4073,5 8,0 4302,3 5,6 4640,3 7,9
from ouside EU27 7174,3 4,4 7761,7 8,2 8309,7 7,1
Labour Force by nationality
2006 2007 2008
EU27
EA16
Source: Commission services.
put a break on the recovery when it comes, giving
more resilience to the economic system while 
keeping wage inflation in check. 
The outcome depends on a series of factors,
including early retirement measures, welfare and 
social benefits, and the depreciation of skills 
during the recession. In the recessions of the 1980s 
and 1990s the labour supply was cut in Europe to 
address persistently high unemployment rates (the
so-called lump-of-labour fallacy). Since the mid- 
1990s, a consensus emerged among policymakers 
and economists that policies which shrink labour 
supply impair potential output growth while 
creating a distortion in the allocation of public 
money between the old and the young. Early 
retirement policies were gradually discontinued, 
while activation and 'making work pay measures' 
became the main focus of labour market policies. 
In order to assess whether the new approach is 
yielding results in the crisis, the remainder of this 
section cross-checks unemployment and the
activity rate. 
1.2.1. The dynamics of labour supply
The EU27 labour force expanded in 2008 by 
almost 2.3 million or 1%. This increase is due to a
large extent to the EA16, where the labour force 
went up by almost 1.7 million (1.1%). Yet,
compared to the change observed in 2007 - +1.6
millions (0.8%) in the EU27 and +1.5 million 
(1.0%) in the EA16- the labour force expanded at a
higher rate in 2008 only in the EU27, while in the 
EA16 it expanded at the same rate as in 2007. This 
difference is due to higher increase in the working 
age (15-64) population in the EU27 (1.2 million
against + 900 thousands in the EA16) while the 
increase in the activity rate was about the same (by 
0.4 pp. to 70.9% in the EU27 and by 0.5 pp. to
71.5% in the EA16). As in recent years, the female
labour supply was the more dynamic component,
especially in the euro area (0.5 pp. and 0.7 pp. for
females and 0.3 pp. and 0.2 pp. for males in the 
EU27 and in the EA16 respectively). 
Table I.1.4 shows the composition by nationality
of the labour supply and the relative performance 
of nationals versus non-nationals. It is evident that 
the growth rate of nationals' labour supply has 
been very low in recent years and that it became
negative (-0.1%) in 2008. Conversely, non-
nationals strongly increased their labour supply, on 
average by more than 7% year-on-year over the 
last three years. In the EA16, the decrease in 
labour supply by nationals was more pronounced
in 2008 than in the rest of EU27 but the higher 
incidence of non-nationals in total labour supply, 
combined with their strong labour supply's growth
rate, allowed a sustained increase in total labour 
supply. Even if further analyses are needed, these 
findings raise some preliminary concerns about the 
effect of the crisis on total labour supply. Indeed, 
with the downturn most heavily hitting those 
sectors with a prevalence of immigrant 
employment and the consequently higher
unemployment having a discouragement effect
over immigrants' labour supply, total labour
supply, which in recent years has been sustained 
mainly by immigrants, may be strongly affected. 
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1.2.2. The dynamics of unemployment 
The number of unemployed persons in the EA16 
rose to 11.7 million in 2008, up by almost 200,000 
from 2007; over the same period it declined by 
almost 200,000 to 16.6 million in the EU27. This 
implies that the decrease in unemployment was 
quite strong outside the euro area. The euro area 
unemployment rate moved up to 7.6% from 7.5% 
in 2007, owing to a weaker labour demand and a 
still growing labour supply. Conversely, the 
unemployment rate in the EU27 fell by 0.1 pp. to 
7.0%, implying that in countries outside the euro 
area the unemployment rate went down by much 
more as a result of more moderate growth in the 
labour supply and a still sustained growth in labour 
demand. 
Looking at unemployment rates by gender, while 
the EU male rate hovered around the 2007 level 
(6.6%), female unemployment fell to 7.5% (0.3 pp. 
less than the previous year). Together with the 
female labour supply growing more than male, this 
implies that the beginning of the recession hit more 
typically male- than female-employment sectors. 
Crossing the gender dimension with the age 
dimension, young (15-24) males appears to be the 
only group that had already started to experience 
an increase in unemployment in 2008 (+0.5 pp. to 
15.6%), as a consequence of an increase in the 
labour supply (as the activity rate went up by 0.3 
pp. to 47.9%) not being followed by a rise in 
labour demand.  
Graph I.1.8 shows the 2008 unemployment rates 
and their 2007-08 change in all EU27 countries. 
Spain has the highest rate while the Netherlands 
has the lowest. In 2008, 10 out of 27 countries 
experienced an increasing unemployment rate, 
with Spain having by far the highest variation 
(+3.1 pps.), followed by Latvia (+1.6 pps.), 
Lithuania and Ireland (both +1.5 pps.). All these 
are countries in which the crisis had already had a 
very strong impact in 2008. 
In order to look at the relationship between the 
activity rate and the unemployment rate, a 
counterfactual analysis was conducted. Taking the 
effective number of employed persons, the number 
of unemployed that would have kept the activity 
rate fixed at the previous year's level is 
calculated (10). From this number the 
corresponding constant-participation 
unemployment rate (CPUR) is easily deducted - 
always keeping the number of employed persons 
fixed. As long as labour demand determines 
employment, when the actual unemployment rate 
is higher than the constant-participation 
unemployment rate, it means that workers without 
jobs will prefer to stay on the market and search 
for work instead of becoming inactive. In other 
words, the difference between the actual 
unemployment rate and the constant-participation 
unemployment rate is a proxy of the 
discouragement effect of unemployment, for a 
given level of employment. Thus, when actual 
unemployment is lower than the CPUR, some 
discouragement effects are at play.  
(10) The following calculations have been used. Let's indicate 
with pt the participation rate at time t, which equals to 
LSt/Pt where LSt is the labour supply at time t and Pt is the 
population at time t. We want to keep the participation rate 
constant between two successive periods, namely pt= pt+1. 
Substituting the definition of pt given above, we have the 
following relationship: Pt+1/ Pt= LSt+1/LSt= (Et+1+Ut+1)/LSt 
where Et+1 is the number of employed persons at time t+1  
Ut+1 is the number of unemployed persons at time t+1. The 
last expression can be rearranged to give: Ut+1 = ( Pt+1 LSt / 
Pt - Et+1). Taking for given the value of Et+1, this calculated 
Ut+1  can be interpreted as the number of unemployed 
persons that would have kept constant the participation 
rate. Dividing it by LSt+1 returns the corresponding 
unemployment rate. 
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Graph I.1.8: Unemployment rates (levels and changes) 
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Graph I.1.10: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - Germany 
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Graph I.1.9: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - France 
France
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Graph I.1.11: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - Italy 
Italy
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Graph I.1.12: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - Spain 
Spain
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Graph I.1.13: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - United-Kingdom 
United Kingdom
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Graph I.1.14: The relationship between unemployment and
activity rates - EU27 
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Graphs I.1.9-I.1.14 also helps us to understand 
how different the current downturn is from the 
previous ones for the largest European countries. 
With the exception of Spain, the first year of the 
downturn of the 1990s' (1992) was characterized 
by an increasing inactivity rate, hence a CPUR
higher than the effective unemployment rate. This
implies that the discouragement effects of the
recession were high, probably because the design 
of the labour market institutions was distorting the 
incentives to supply labour. Spain was an 
exception, given the evident positive long-term
trend in participation that may mainly reflect 
catching up with the EU.  
After the recession of the early 1990s, labour
market reforms were implemented in many
countries. Together with an increase in flexibility
at the margins, many countries introduced 
measures that tightened access to non-employment 
benefits. The higher probability of losing a job for
the main earner (usually a man) of the household 
together with much less generous benefits may
have crowds in the labour supply, as the income
effect of more labour supply prevailed on the
substitution effect.   
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These reforms may have changed the participation
behaviour of those less strongly attached to the 
labour market (mainly women).(11) Indeed, in the 
recession of 2001 the discouragement effect was
not seen at all in the data. Although only 2008 data
are now available and it is arguably too early to
draw conclusions, it is possible to argue that, so
far, the discouragement effect in this downturn has
not been apparent. If this is indeed the case, it can 
be said that labour supply will not shrink so much
as previously thought and this can be taken as
positive news for the future recovery. Indeed, a 
shrinking labour supply would put pressures on
wages and thus on prices. 
Graph I.1.15: Beveridge curve and aggregate demand 
constraint (labour) in the euro-area
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In order to understand the developments of the
interaction between labour demand and labour 
supply and to highlight the possible future 
developments in the unemployment rate, the 
Beveridge curve for the euro area (starting from 
1995Q1 and ending with 2009Q2) is reported in
Graph I.1.15 (12). The curve represents the
(11) In the case of Italy, there is evidence of a fall in household 
income only between 1991 and 1993, the time of the most
severe recession experienced by Italy after the second
world war (Boeri and Brandolini (2005)). In addition, the 
number of low paid jobs increased rapidly among all 
employees (Cipollone (2001). The increase in female 
participation may therefore be explained by an income
effect resulting from a decline in the level of expected 
household income. The increase in female participation
stemming from the temporary decline in income was then 
kept by policies which promoted flexible working time
arrangements.  
(12) Data on job vacancies and occupied posts are available 
only for some countries and starting from 2000. The graph 
is then based on the information from DG ECFIN 
Businesses' and Consumers' Survey, which asks about
various factors limiting production, including labour
relationship between job vacancies and the
unemployment rate. It is negatively sloped. Shifts 
along the curve represent cyclical changes in 
excess demand for labour, whereas shifts in the 
curve are indicative of long-run changes, like 
variations in the degree of mismatch. Over time
the curve has shifted inwards, suggesting an 
improvement in the process of job reallocation, i.e. 
a lower unemployment rate associated to a given 
rate of vacancies. In recent quarters, however, it 
seems that the curve is again moving rightwards. 
Even if it is too soon to confirm such a movement, 
this may raise some concerns for the 
unemployment rates developments in the near 
future. In any case, for the same level of vacancies, 
the unemployment rate is still much lower than
that seen during the period of high unemployment 
in the 1990s. 
Graph I.1.16: Beveridge curve and aggregate demand 
constraint (insufficient demand) in the euro-
area 
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We may also consider the relationship between 
employers' perceptions of the limits to production
due to insufficient demand and the unemployment 
rate (Graph I.1.16). Over the cycle, one might 
expect a positive relationship between these two
variables: as the economy improves, both the 
unemployment rate and the perceived constraints
to production from insufficient demand should 
decline. It is clear that, since the mid-1990s, the
curve has shifted leftward and has become flatter 
implying  
a) there is lower average unemployment rate over
the cycle  
shortages. Data used are balances of respondents giving
positive and negative answers. 
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b) that an increase (fall) in demand is accompanied 
by a higher reduction (or increase) in the 
unemployment rate.  
This suggests a structural improvement in the 
labour market, both in terms of equilibrium 
unemployment and cyclical response. The recent 
movements of the curve do not imply a significant 
change in the average unemployment over the last 
quarters; they also highlight the smaller increase in 
unemployment compared to what one would have 
expected by looking at the curve for the period 
2000-2007.  
1.2.3. Decomposing the dynamics of 
unemployment 
It is a worthwhile exercise to decompose the 
change in unemployment rate between changes in 
labour supply and changes in employment. 
Additionally, changes in labour supply can be 
decomposed in changes in working age population 
and changes in activity rate. 
Table I.1.6 illustrates such decomposition (13) for 
all the Member States. In 2008, the total 
unemployment rate in the EU27 decreased by 0.2 
pp. (14). Employment growth was still sustained, 
more than counterbalancing the increase in labour 
supply. On the contrary in the euro area, positive 
changes in employment equalized the changes in 
labour supply, resulting in an unchanged 
unemployment rate. Among Member States, Spain, 
Latvia, Ireland, Lithuania and Luxembourg 
experienced an increase of more than 1 pp. in the 
unemployment rate.  
(13) Indicating with Popwa the working age population (15-64), 
pr the participation rate, ur the unemployment rate, U the 
number of unemployed and E the number of employed 
persons, it is easily recognized that U=(Popwa*pr)-E. This 
can be rearranged as U/(Popwa*pr) = 1- E/(Popwa*pr) 
and (1-ur) = E/(Popwa*pr). Thus, by taking the logarithm 
of the expression and differentiating, it gives a 
decomposition that approximates the changes in the 
unemployment rate (in percentage point) as: dur = 
dPopwa/Popwa + dpr/pr – dE/E, that is as the sum of % 
change in the working age population and the participation 
rate minus the % change in employment. 
(14) Data using for this analysis consider the age group of 15-
64. 
In all these countries (with the exception of Latvia) 
the increase in the unemployment rate was 
accompanied by a decrease in employment, while 
labour supply has increased. However, while in 
Spain both the working age population and activity 
rate are rising, a reduction of the participation rate 
was registered in Ireland and Luxembourg, which 
can be interpreted as a sign of discouragement of 
jobless workers. Finally, in Latvia and Lithuania 
the increase in labour supply conceals a decrease 
in the working age population which is more than 
compensated for by an increase in the activity rate. 
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Table I.1.5 analyses the contribution of specific
groups to the annual growth rate of unemployment.
It suggests that the crisis implied a deviation from 
the homogeneous trends of the last decade. In
particular, since men were overrepresented in
those sectors hit hardest and most directly by the
crisis, the response of the labour market has been
asymmetric. Despite a falling total unemployment
rate, the male unemployment rate had already
started to rise in 2008, especially in the euro area. 
Table I.1.5: Decomposing changes in the EU unemployment rate  - 2008
    Unemployment rate (age 15-64)
Change since
(age 15-64)
Level in 2008 2007
BE 7,0 -0,5 0,9 0,0 1,5
DK 3,4 -0,5 0,5 0,7 1,7
DE 7,6 -1,1 -0,3 0,7 1,7
GR 7,8 -0,6 0,3 0,1 1,1
ES 11,4 3,1 1,4 1,5 -0,5
FR 7,4 -0,6 0,5 0,3 1,4
IE 6,1 1,5 1,6 -0,6 -0,6
IT 6,8 0,7 0,6 0,8 0,7
LU 5,1 1,0 0,8 -0,1 -0,4
NL 2,7 -0,5 -0,1 1,1 1,5
AT 3,9 -0,6 0,5 0,4 1,4
PT 8,1 -0,4 0,1 0,1 0,7
FI 6,4 -0,5 0,5 0,5 1,6
SE 6,3 0,1 0,7 0,3 0,9
UK 5,7 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,7
EA 7,5 0,0 0,8 0,6 1,4
EU15 7,2 0,1 0,5 0,6 1,0
CY 3,8 -0,3 1,0 -0,4 0,9
CZ 4,4 -0,9 0,9 -0,3 1,6
EE 5,6 0,8 -0,2 1,5 0,4
HU 7,9 0,5 -0,1 -0,7 -1,2
LT 5,9 1,5 -0,1 0,7 -1,0
LV 7,7 1,6 -0,4 2,2 0,1
MT 6,1 -0,4 1,4 0,6 2,5
PL 7,2 -2,5 -0,1 1,1 3,7
SK 9,5 -1,6 0,5 0,8 3,1
SI 4,5 -0,5 0,7 0,7 1,9
EU25 7,1 -0,1 0,4 0,6 1,2
BG 5,7 -1,3 -0,6 2,2 3,0
RO 6,1 -0,7 0,0 -0,2 0,4
EU27 7,1 -0,2 0,4 0,6 1,2
is~ equal to
=
% Change
in active
population
+
% Change  in
participation
rate
- % Change in 
employment
Source: Commission services.
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Table I.1.6: Unemployment rate contribution to changes by different groups 
Growth
rate Contribution 
Growth 
rate Contribution 
Growth
rate Contribution 
Growth 
rate Contribution 
Unemployment growth: -1,2 (100%) 2,1 (100%) -2,2 (100%) 0,2 (100%)
Young (15-24) 0,4 -7% 3,5 36% -2,3 26% -0,1 -20%
Prime  age (25-54) -1,4 78% 2,5 81% -2,5 78% 0,0 6%
Older (55-64) -3,8 29% -3,5 -16% 1,5 -5% 2,0 113%
MALE: 0,9 -39% 5,0 115% -2,1 49% 0,5 151%
Young (15-24) 2,6 -29% 7,3 39% -2,0 12% 0,5 38%
Prime age (25-54) 0,9 -25% 5,3 80% -2,5 37% 0,4 90%
Older (55-64) -3,4 15% -1,7 -4% 0,2 0% 0,7 23%
FEMALE: -3,3 139% -2,7 -15% -2,2 51% -1,8 -57%
Young (15-24) -2,2 22% -0,7 -3% -2,7 15% -0,8 -59%
Prime age (25-54) -3,4 103% 0,0 0% 0,2 41% -0,4 -85%
Older (55-64) -4,5 14% -5,8 -12% 3,5 -4% 3,9 87%
2008
EU27 Euro area
2001-2007
EU27 Euro area
Source: Commission services.
In the EU27, the number of unemployed persons 
decreased at a rate of 1.2% in 2008. Prime age 
(especially women) and older individuals were the
main contributors to the decline in unemployment. 
The impressive decline in EU27 female
unemployment (-3.3%) more than counterbalances 
the increase in male unemployment (0.9%), which
contrasts with the decline in prime aged male
unemployment over the 2001-2007 period. 
Conversely, in the euro-area, the increase in male
unemployment contributed to the increase in the 
overall unemployment rate. 
1.2.4. The contribution of employment and 
labour productivity to GDP growth 
The relative contribution to GDP growth of labour 
productivity and labour utilisation can be assessed 
using the standard accounting decomposition: 
GDP = Labour productivity x Labour utilisation
or  GDP = GDP/Hours x ((Hours/Employment) x 
(Employment/Working Age Pop.) x (Working Age
Pop./Population)) x Population
Table I.1.7 reproduces this decomposition for 2008
and for the period 1999-2008 respectively. In the
EU25 GDP growth in 2008 was entirely due to
growth in labour utilisation. The contribution of 
productivity growth was zero. This signals the end 
of the period of expansion and the start of the
recession, when firms chose not shed workers and 
from fully adjusting total hours to the new demand
conditions ('labour hoarding'). As a consequence,
hourly productivity stops growing while labour 
utilisation continues to grow, because it reacts with 
lags to the economic cycle. As for labour 
utilisation, its growth was guided by population
growth and adjustments on the extensive margin,
i.e. the employment rate, while the intensive 
margin (hours worked) played no role. In the euro
area, the decomposition of the 2008 GDP growth
was rather different. Indeed, the contribution of
hourly labour productivity growth was still
positive (0.2%) while that of labour utilisation was 
milder (0.5%) than in the EU27. Furthermore, 
while demographic movements and employment 
played a role very similar to that played in the 
EU27, hours worked had a negative effect on GDP
growth, mainly due to the use of short time
arrangements by firms or, more generally, because 
of labour hoarding as the crisis began to hurt. As 
additional evidence, while the contribution of
hourly productivity is positive, that of productivity 
per worker (the sum of column 2 and 4) is null.
The same calculations for the 1999-2007 period 
(Table I.1.7) yield different results. For the euro
Area, hourly labour productivity accounts for more 
GDP growth than labour utilisation. On the 
contrary, the decomposition of labour utilisation 
reveals results that are no different from the 2008
ones: extensive margin and the demographic
factors play the biggest role in driving GDP 
growth.
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The aggregate results mask differing behaviours 
among Member States. In the 1999-2008 period,  
hourly labour productivity was the main driver of 
GDP growth in most Member States, albeit with 
some important exceptions, like Italy and Spain, 
where labour utilisation played a larger role. In 
2008 the situation reversed in many countries. 
Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland - 9 
out of the 17 countries that had had previously 
registered a long-term higher contribution - 
registered a higher contribution of labour 
utilisation instead. Conversely, in Denmark, 
Estonia, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta - 6 
out of 8 countries which had in the past seen a 
higher contribution of labour utilisation - 
registered a higher contribution of hourly 
productivity in 2008. Interestingly some of the 
countries that suffered most in the crisis in 2008 
belong to this group. 
As for the decomposition of labour utilisation, the 
drop in employment mainly contributed to an 
adjustment in labour utilisation in Ireland (-2.5%) 
and in Spain (-1.7%), a rate similar to the US (-
1.3%). This is relatively unsurprising since these 
countries have more flexible labour markets than 
others (even if, especially for Spain, this is the case 
only for a segment of the working population) and 
they are among the worst hit by the crisis 
(especially in labour-intensive sectors like 
construction). 
1.3. EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS IN COMING 
YEARS 
ECFIN's spring forecasts for 2009-2010 predict - 
consistently with other international organisations 
- a pronounced deterioration in Member States' 
labour markets, which is unsurprising given the 
magnitude of the expected fall in aggregate 
demand and the usual lags with which the labour 
market responds to economic activity (Table I.1.8). 
Looking at the largest Member States, GDP in 
Germany fall heavily by more than 5%, mainly 
because of the extremely negative developments in 
global trade markets. As for the other euro area 
members, a negative performance is expected for 
Ireland, with GPD falling by 9% and 2.6% in 2009 
and 2010. The Baltic countries are expected to 
perform even more badly, with an astonishingly 
drop in Latvia of about 13% in 2009 and 3% in 
2010) and Lithuania (-11% in 2009 and -4.7% In 
2010).  
These negative GDP projections only gradually 
start to affect labour markets. This is due to many 
reasons. Firstly, during the crisis, many countries 
have enhanced measures that help firms to mitigate 
labour market adjustments while waiting for the 
recovery (e.g. temporary reductions in working 
hours). Secondly, sunk costs related to training 
restrain firms from shedding workers at an early 
stage, especially if the long-term effects of the 
crisis on the firm demand are not fully predictable. 
Additionally, high hiring costs, especially for high 
skilled staff, may induce firms to hoard labour 
while waiting for increases in orders to materialise. 
This means that even if GDP growth is expected to 
be less negative than previously expected, labour 
market outcomes are expected to be disappointing 
in 2010 as well. 
According to ECFIN (Table I.1.9), the country that 
will experience the most pronounced fall in 
employment over the following two years is 
Ireland, with employment growth of -9.0% in 2009 
and -4.0% in 2010. Among the euro area countries, 
Spanish employment is projected to fall by 5.3% in 
2009 and by 2.7% in 2010. In Germany, 
employment is expected to fall by 1.5% in 2009 
and 0.4% in 2010. France and Italy may 
experience a larger fall, of some 2% in 2009 and 
2010. Outside the euro area, the Baltic states are 
expected to see falls in employment similar to 
those seen in Ireland. 
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Table I.1.7: GDP growth and its sources 
Productivity Labour
(GDP/hour) utilisation Hours worked Employment Share of Working Population
of which per employee rate age population
1 = 2+3 2 3 = 4+5+6+7 4 5 6 7 8 = 1-7
BE 1,1 -0,2 1,2 -0,4 0,7 0,3 0,6 0,5
CZ 3,2 2,5 0,7 -0,4 0,4 0,1 0,7 2,5
DK -1,1 -2,5 1,3 0,3 0,8 -0,1 0,3 -1,4
DE 1,3 0,0 1,3 -0,1 1,9 -0,3 -0,2 1,4
EE -3,6 -2,3 -1,3 -1,5 0,4 -0,1 -0,1 -3,5
EL 2,9 2,4 0,5 -0,7 0,9 -0,1 0,4 2,5
ES 1,2 2,1 -0,9 -0,5 -1,7 -0,3 1,6 -0,4
FR 0,4 -0,5 0,9 0,4 0,2 -0,2 0,5 -0,1
IE -2,3 -1,4 -0,8 0,0 -2,5 -0,2 1,9 -4,2
IT -1,0 -0,5 -0,5 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 0,7 -1,8
CY 3,7 0,9 2,7 0,1 0,2 1,5 1,0 2,7
LV -4,6 -4,8 0,2 -0,5 1,1 0,0 -0,4 -4,1
LT 3,0 1,9 1,1 1,6 -0,4 0,4 -0,5 3,5
LU -0,9 -5,1 4,4 -0,2 2,6 0,3 1,8 -2,7
HU 0,5 1,7 -1,2 0,0 -1,1 0,1 -0,2 0,7
MT 2,7 1,4 1,2 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,6 2,1
NL 2,1 0,4 1,7 0,2 1,3 -0,1 0,3 1,8
AT 1,8 0,1 1,7 -0,1 1,3 0,1 0,3 1,4
PL 5,0 1,0 3,9 -0,1 3,7 0,3 0,0 5,0
PT 0,0 -0,4 0,4 -0,1 0,3 -0,1 0,2 -0,2
SI 3,5 0,7 2,8 -0,1 0,7 0,7 1,5 2,0
SK 6,4 3,9 2,4 -0,6 2,9 -0,2 0,2 6,2
FI 0,9 -1,5 2,5 1,0 1,1 -0,1 0,5 0,5
SE -0,2 -1,8 1,6 0,6 -0,1 0,2 0,8 -1,0
UK 0,7 0,6 0,2 0,8 -1,1 0,0 0,5 0,3
US 1,1 -1,3 -0,1 0,9 0,2
JP -0,7 0,0 -0,5 0,1 -0,8
Euroarea 0,7 0,2 0,5 -0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,5 0,1
EU-25 0,8 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,4 -0,1 0,4 0,3
EUR-15 0,6 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,2 -0,1 0,5 0,1
EU10 3,5 1,3 2,2 -0,2 2,0 0,2 0,1 3,4
Productivity Labour
(GDP/hour) utilisation Hours worked Employment Share of Working  Population
of which per employee rate age population
1 = 2+3 2 3 = 4+5+6+7 4 5 6 7 8 = 1-7
BE 2,3 1,3 1,0 -0,1 0,6 0,0 0,5 1,9
CZ 4,1 4,3 -0,2 -0,4 -0,1 0,3 0,0 4,0
DK 1,9 0,9 1,1 0,4 0,5 -0,2 0,3 1,6
DE 1,5 1,5 0,0 -0,5 0,8 -0,3 0,0 1,5
EE 7,3 0,0 0,7 0,3 -0,4 7,6
EL 4,2 2,7 1,5 0,4 0,9 -0,1 0,4 3,8
ES 3,7 0,7 3,0 -0,6 2,2 0,1 1,4 2,4
FR 2,2 1,7 0,5 -0,6 0,5 0,0 0,6 1,6
IE 6,6 3,3 3,2 -0,5 1,5 0,4 1,8 4,8
IT 1,5 0,5 1,0 -0,4 1,2 -0,3 0,5 1,0
CY 3,8 1,4 2,4 -0,2 0,3 0,8 1,6 2,2
LV 8,2 7,3 0,8 -0,5 1,5 0,4 -0,6 8,8
LT 6,5 5,6 0,9 0,6 0,4 0,5 -0,6 7,1
LU 5,2 2,0 3,0 -0,7 2,3 0,1 1,4 3,8
HU 4,0 2,9 1,1 0,5 0,8 0,1 -0,2 4,2
MT 2,6 0,0 -0,2 0,4 0,9 1,7
NL 2,5 1,6 0,8 -0,4 0,8 -0,1 0,5 2,0
AT 2,4 1,7 0,7 -0,3 0,5 0,1 0,5 2,0
PL 4,1 4,4 -0,2 -0,1 -0,5 0,6 -0,2 4,3
PT 1,7 1,6 0,2 -0,4 0,2 -0,1 0,5 1,2
SI 4,5 3,9 0,6 -0,4 0,7 0,0 0,2 4,3
SK 5,0 4,9 0,1 -0,2 -0,4 0,7 0,0 5,0
FI 3,4 2,3 1,1 -0,3 1,2 0,0 0,3 3,1
SE 3,2 2,4 0,8 -0,3 0,4 0,3 0,4 2,8
UK 2,8 2,3 0,5 -0,4 0,3 0,2 0,5 2,3
US 2,7 2,1 0,6 -0,5 -0,1 0,2 1,0 1,7
JP 1,5 2,2 -0,7 -0,3 0,2 -0,7 0,1 1,4
Euro area 2,2 1,3 0,9 -0,4 1,0 -0,1 0,5 1,7
EU 25 2,4 0,0 : : 0,7 0,0 0,4 2,0
EU15 2,3 1,5 0,9 -0,4 0,8 -0,1 0,5 1,8
GDP growth
in 1999- 
2007
Due to growth in: GDP per capita
growth in 1999-
2007
GDP growth
in 2008
Due to growth in:
GDP per capita
growth in 2008
Source: Commission services.
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Table I.1.8: GDP forecasts by ECFIN, OECD and IMF 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
BE 1,1 -3,5 -0,2 -4,1 -0,5 -3,8 0,3
BG 6,0 -1,6 -0,1 -2,0 -1,0
CZ 3,2 -2,7 0,3 -4,2 1,4 -3,5 0,1
DK -1,1 -3,3 0,3 -4,0 0,1 -4,0 0,4
DE 1,3 -5,4 0,3 -6,1 0,2 -6,2 -0,6
EE -3,6 -10,3 -0,8 -10,0 -1,0
IE -2,3 -9,0 -2,6 -9,8 -1,5 -8,0 -3,0
EL 2,9 -0,9 0,1 -1,3 0,3 -0,2 -0,6
ES 1,2 -3,2 -1,0 -4,2 -0,9 -4,0 -0,8
FR 0,4 -3,0 -0,2 -3,0 0,2 -3,0 0,4
IT -1,0 -4,4 0,1 -5,5 0,4 -5,1 -0,1
CY 3,7 0,3 0,7 0,3 2,1
LV -4,6 -13,1 -3,2 -12,0 -2,0
LT 3,0 -11,0 -4,7 -10,0 -3,0
LU -0,9 -3,0 0,1 -4,0 -0,4 -4,8 -0,2
HU 0,6 -6,3 -0,3 -6,1 -2,2 -3,3 -0,4
MT 2,5 -0,9 0,2 -1,5 1,1
NL 2,1 -3,5 -0,4 -4,9 -0,4 -4,8 -0,7
AT 1,8 -4,0 -0,1 -4,3 -0,1 -3,0 0,2
PL 5,0 -1,4 0,8 -0,4 0,6 -0,7 1,3
PT 0,0 -3,7 -0,8 -4,5 -0,5 -4,1 -0,5
RO 7,1 -4,0 0,0 -4,1 0,0
SI 3,5 -3,4 0,7 -2,7 1,4
SK 6,4 -2,6 0,7 -5,0 3,1 -2,1 1,9
FI 0,9 -4,7 0,2 -4,7 0,8 -5,2 -1,2
SE -0,2 -4,0 0,8 -5,5 0,2 -4,3 0,2
UK 0,7 -3,8 0,1 -4,3 0,0 -4,1 -0,4
EA-16 0,7 -4,0 -0,1 -4,1 -0,3 -4,8 -0,3
EU-27 0,9 -4,0 -0,1
JP -0,7 -5,3 0,1 -6,6 -0,5 -6,2 0,5
US 1,1 -2,9 0,9 -4,0 0,0 -2,8 0,0
GDP growth forecasts
ECFIN OECD IMF
Source:  EU Commission Spring 2009 forecast; OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition & World Economic Outlook update July 2009 for Germany, France, Spain and 
Italy).
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Table I.1.9: Employment growth and unemployment rate forecasts by ECFIN, OECD and IMF 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
BE 1,6 -1,2 -1,5 -0,2 0,2 -3,1 -0,7 7,0 8,5 10,3 8,3 10,6 9,5 10,5
BG 3,3 -2,2 -1,0 5,6 7,3 7,8 0,0 0,0
CZ 1,2 -1,7 -1,3 -0,4 0,0 -1,4 -0,4 4,4 6,1 7,4 6,9 9,2 5,5 5,7
DK 1,0 -2,2 -2,0 -1,9 -1,2 -1,4 -1,3 3,3 5,2 6,6 6,0 7,9 3,2 4,5
DE 1,4 -1,5 -2,2 -0,7 -0,2 -0,4 -2,0 7,3 8,6 10,4 8,7 11,6 9,0 10,8
EE 0,2 -7,0 -2,9 5,5 11,3 14,1 0,0 0,0
IE -0,9 -9,0 -4,0 -2,3 0,5 -7,9 -2,9 6,3 13,3 16,0 12,2 14,8 12,0 13,0
EL 0,4 0,6 -1,0 -1,4 9,5 10,3 9,0 10,5
ES -0,5 -5,3 -2,7 -2,3 -0,6 -3,5 -1,0 11,3 17,3 20,5 18,1 19,6 17,7 19,3
FR 0,5 -2,2 -1,2 -0,6 0,1 -1,8 -0,6 7,8 9,6 10,7 9,7 11,2 9,6 10,3
IT 0,3 -2,1 -0,4 -0,4 0,0 -1,7 -1,5 6,8 8,8 9,4 8,4 10,2 8,9 10,5
CY 2,6 -0,4 0,1 0,3 0,8 3,8 4,7 6,0 4,6 4,3
LV 0,7 -8,9 -3,3 7,5 15,7 16,0 0,0 0,0
LT -0,5 -7,7 -2,4 5,8 13,8 15,9 0,0 0,0
LU 4,7 0,5 -0,8 -1,2 -0,1 -1,4 2,4 4,9 5,9 7,0 6,0 7,2 6,8 6,0
HU -0,5 -3,0 -2,0 -1,3 -0,3 7,8 9,5 11,2 10,7 11,7 0,0 0,0
MT 2,5 -0,5 0,2 -0,6 0,6 5,9 7,1 7,6 6,9 7,6
NL 1,5 -1,2 -2,6 0,0 0,1 -1,0 -1,4 2,8 3,9 6,2 4,0 7,0 4,1 5,0
AT 1,8 -2,1 -0,9 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,7 3,8 6,0 7,1 6,1 7,9 5,4 6,2
PL 4,0 -2,3 -1,4 0,8 0,4 7,1 9,9 12,1 9,0 11,6 0,0 0,0
PT 0,4 -1,4 -0,6 -0,5 0,0 -1,8 -1,3 7,7 9,1 9,8 9,6 11,2 9,6 11,0
RO 0,3 -2,2 0,6 5,8 8,0 7,7 0,0 0,0
SI 2,9 -4,7 -0,6 -2,4 0,0 4,4 6,6 7,4 6,2 6,1
SK 2,9 -1,7 0,4 1,0 1,0 -1,5 0,1 9,5 12,0 12,1 11,8 13,6 11,5 11,7
FI 1,5 -2,9 -0,8 0,2 0,1 -3,8 -1,8 6,4 8,9 9,3 8,7 10,8 8,5 9,3
SE 0,9 -2,4 -2,3 -1,2 -1,0 -2,2 -1,3 6,2 8,4 10,4 8,7 11,4 8,4 9,6
UK -0,7 -2,4 -0,9 -1,8 -1,9 -1,7 -1,4 5,6 8,2 9,4 8,2 9,7 7,4 9,2
EA-16 0,8 -2,4 -1,6 -1,6 -1,3 7,5 9,9 11,5 10,1 11,7 10,1 11,5
EU-27 0,8 -2,4 -1,4 7 9,4 10,9
US -0,5 -3,5 -0,9 -2,6 0,1 5,8 8,9 10,2 8,9 10,1 9,1 10,3
JP -0,4 -3,0 -1,2 -1,2 -1,6 4 5,9 6,4 4,9 5,6 4,6 5,6
Employment (annual percentage change) Unemployment (percentage of civilian labour force)
ECFIN IMF ECFIN OECD IMFOECD
Source: EU Commission Spring 2009 forecast; OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
The second part of Table I.1.9 shows very similar
forecasts for Euro area unemployment rate both in 
2009 and 2010 from all the three sources. The fact
that ECFIN forecasts much more negative 
employment growth than, and a more or less equal
unemployment rate as, the IMF may be explained
by different outcomes in participation rate implied
by the two forecasts. The last available data for 
April 2009 showed that the unemployment rate 
had already reached 18.1% in Spain. In the rest of
the euro area, unemployment will reach 13.3% in 
Ireland up from the 11% of the last available
monthly figure (April 2009). In Germany, the 
unemployment rate should increase, hovering 
around 9% in 2009 and going beyond 10% in
2010. Forecasts for France are slightly more 
optimistic only for 2009. In Italy the 
unemployment rate should remain below the 
average of the largest euro area countries.  
Outside the euro area, unemployment in UK will 
rise to 8.2% in 2009 from 5.6% in 2008 and then
further to 9.4% in 2010. The Baltic countries 
should reach very high unemployment rates 
(16.0% in Latvia, 15.9% in Lithuania and 14.1 in
Estonia for 2010), but in these cases the forecasts
already appear too optimistic, since the last 
available monthly unemployment rate have already
overtaken these rates. 
1.4. UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
EXPECTATIONS DURING THE CRISIS AND
THE LABOUR MARKET PROSPECTS 
The severity of the current recession has raised 
concerns about the extent of the labour market 
adjustment and its persistency. Yet, the response of 
the unemployment rate in the EU has so far been
relatively mild. Since the second quarter of 2008 
(when unemployment reached its lowest level), 
GDP has fallen by about 5% while the 
unemployment rate has increased by only 2 pps.,
mainly owing to a decline in employment (LFS 
definition) growth of the same amount. Yet,
households' and employers' expectations on the 
state of the labour market deteriorated rapidly and 
extensively over the same period (Graph I.1.17). 
After July 2007, which produced the second lowest
value since the survey began in 1985, consumers'
and employers' perceptions about the state of the
labour market worsened to unprecedented levels of
pessimism in March 2009. Recently, the general 
pessimism about the state of the labour market in
the EU appears to be lifting, mainly owing to 
improvements in Germany and France. Yet, 
consumers' fears of unemployment remain high
and employers' intentions in manufacturing and
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services remain well below the levels normally
associated with an economy on a solid footing. 
Graph I.1.17: Employment and unemployment 
expectations: business and consumers survey 
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The aggregate evolution does not highlight the
different responses across countries. Graph I.1.18
displays the change in consumers' unemployment 
expectations for the year ahead together with the 
rise in unemployment since the start of the second 
quarter of 2008; countries have been ordered in 
descending order in terms of GDP growth (shown 
in parentheses). In several Member States the 
increase in the unemployment rate has been
relatively mild, in particular if one consider the 
amount of output loss. Exceptions to this pattern
are on one side the Baltic States and Ireland, where 
the unemployment rate skyrockets in response to 
massive output loss, and on the other Spain, where
mass unemployment occurs with a relatively 
modest fall in GDP. (15) Among countries with an 
output loss higher than the EU27 average (-5%), 
the rise in the unemployment rate is particularly 
low (below 1 pp.) in Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands).  
(15) In Spain, the largest decline in employment was registered
in 2008q2. During the first two quarters of 2009
employment decline has decelerated.
Graph I.1.18: Changes in unemployment rate and in 
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Source: Commission services.
To some extent, the limited pick up in 
unemployment seen in several European countries
may be due to the hoarding of labour during the 
recession. Different reasons may explain why 
firms choose not to adjust employment in line with
transitory fluctuations in the demand of their 
products. Firstly, firms may face costs in adjusting 
the size of the workforce because of hiring and 
firing costs associated with re-training costs and
labour market regulations. Secondly, firms may 
prefer to adjust their labour inputs at the intensive 
(i.e. hours worked) rather than at the extensive 
margin (i.e. workforce) to be able to increase the 
utilisation of labour without major recruitment,
especially of scarce and expensive skilled-labour, 
when the recovery comes, thus keeping wage
pressures under check.  (16)  
Graph I.1.19 plots the change in the average
number of hours worked and the rise in
unemployment since the start of the second quarter 
of 2008; countries are ordered in ascending order 
of output loss. It is clear that where the rise in 
unemployment rate is small and the fall in GDP 
significant, the fall in hours worked is relatively
large, which is suggestive of labour hoarding 
during the current recession. 
(16) Darby, J , Hart, R and Vecchi , M (2001), ‘Wages, work 
intensity and unemployment in Japan, UK and USA’, 
Labour Economics, Vol. 8, pages 243–58.
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Graph I.1.19: Unemployment rate and average hours 
worked
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Yet, the stark deteriorations in both employment 
intentions in manufacturing and services and in
consumers' unemployment expectations for next
year remain a matter of concern as they may 
predict much larger future labour shedding. With 
uncertainty about the persistency of the collapse in 
demand and, thus, about its resumption, it is
extremely difficult to predict whether the wave of 
frightening pessimism among consumers and
employers will anticipate a significant increase in
unemployment, similar, if not higher, than that
which occurred in the deepest recessions of the
1980s and 1990s. In the Box I.1.1 the relationship
between consumers' and employers' expectations 
on unemployment, industrial orders and actual
unemployment rate was studied for the four largest 
European economies. The analysis suggests that
fluctuations in the German unemployment rate are 
linked to the evolution of expectations, while 
industrial orders play a more important role in
France and the UK. For Italy, the unemployment 
rate is not influenced by shocks to the variables
considered (not surprisingly, as the period covered 
was characterised by job expansion with limited 
economic growth). Thus, a pick up of industrial
orders would imply that the recovery is more likely
to be a U shaped rather than V shaped (more so in
Germany than in the UK or France). Conversely, 
without adverse shocks to consumers' 
unemployment expectations in Germany (or even a
positive rebound in confidence) the recovery might 
come about at a faster pace.  
To get further insight into the response of the 
labour market to the recession, Graphs I.1.20-
I.1.35 compare, for selected countries, the 
behaviour of consumers' unemployment 
expectations, the unemployment rate, the total and 
the average hours worked during the current
recession with the behaviour of the last recent
recessions. (17) The evolution during the recession
and the following months of positive GDP growth
are shown in the graphs with lines respectively in
bold and dots. The comparison with the recent 
downturns suggests that the period of weak labour 
market usually continues much longer than the 
period of recession. 
During the recession of the early 1990s, GDP
contracted for about 5 quarters in Italy and the UK 
and 2 quarters in Germany and France. The
unemployment rate continued to climb when the
recession was over. It declined to pre-recession 
levels only after 30 months in Italy and the UK and 
about 20 months in France and Germany.  The
same pattern can be observed for the much 
shallower recessions of the early 2000s. Italy
represents an exception as its unemployment rate
continued to fall even during recent years of low or 
negative growth as a result of reforms. 
Compared with previous recessions, the current 
episode is so far characterised by greater output
loss and a smaller rise in unemployment. This 
apparently inconsistent response is particularly
striking in the case of Italy and Germany. If the
recessions of the past are of any guide, one would
have expected that these countries would 
experience a much higher increase in the jobless 
rate than the one seen during the current recession. 
Even so, consumers' fears of unemployment and 
employers' intentions on employment point toward 
a bleak employment outlook. In Italy expectations 
deteriorated in line with the 1991 recession and 
they were even worse in Germany. Conversely, the 
unemployment rates rose only by a limited amount
(by about 0.6 pp. since the lowest level reached in
2008 in both countries) and the industrial orders 
fell significantly (by about 3%). A fall in industrial 
orders was also experienced by France and the
UK, but of a much smaller size while the increase
in unemployment rates was relatively large (1.8 
pps. in France and 2.6 in the UK).  
Thus, consumers' and employers' labour market
expectations in Germany and Italy evolved more in
line with the evolution of the industrial orders, - to
(17) Recessions are identified as two consecutive negative 
quarters of GDP growth. Total hour worked are from the 
ECFIN TRIMECO database. Employment is based on NA
accounts definition (Source Eurostat; only for France 
employment data from INSEE).
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some extent a reflex reaction to the collapse of 
foreign demand in industrial sectors (18) - than 
with the current deterioration in the labour market. 
Graph I.1.20: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment rate - IT 
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Graph I.1.21: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment rate - DE
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Graph I.1.22: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment rate - FR 
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(18) In Germany and Italy, the recession led to a severe 
contractions of exports. In Italy, since the end of 2007
through the first quarter of 2009 exports have fallen by
more than 20% in volume. With respect to the recession of
the last thirty years where Italian exports bucked the trend 
(Bassanetti et al. 2009), this fall is the main novelty of the
current recession. 
Graph I.1.23: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment rate - UK
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Graph I.1.24: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment expectations - IT 
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Graph I.1.25: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment expectations - DE
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Graph I.1.26: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment expectations - FR 
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Graph I.1.27: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
unemployment expectations - UK
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Graph I.1.28: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
new orders index - IT 
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Graph I.1.29: Impact of the crisis on the change in monthly
new orders index - DE 
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Source: Commission services.
The relevance for some countries of labour
hoarding is clear (Graphs I.1.30-I.1.35) comparing
changes in average and total hours worked during
the current recession and the recessions of the
1980s and 1990s. Total hours worked always 
decline during recessions. But the similarity 
between the current and the past recessions ends
here. During the recession of the early 1990s,
average hours worked remained mainly unchanged
in France and Germany and increased in Italy. 
They even kept rising in France and Italy when the 
recession was over. Conversely, a year into the 
current recession, average hours worked fell in
Italy and Germany below the business cycle peak 
(by 2.5% and 4.5% respectively) but increased in
France by about 1% above the level of the 
beginning of the recession.  
Graph I.1.30: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
hours worked - IT
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Graph I.1.31: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
average hours worked - IT 
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Thus, whatever the cause of the labour hoarding,
the loose link between consumers' and employers'
perceptions on the state of the labour market 
observed in some countries is to a large extent
explained once the adjustment of the labour market
at the intensive margin is taken into account.  
As already mentioned above, firms may choose not
to cut their workforce to the degree warranted by
the demand, mainly because of hiring and firing 
costs. In addition to these costs, the response of 
firms to the crisis may have contributed to the 
patterns observed in the average hours worked 
during the current recession. 
Fluctuations in inflows and outflows from
unemployment determine unemployment 
dynamics. When inflows to unemployment 
dominate outflows from unemployment, measures
that reduce the risks of losing jobs effectively help
to minimise the increase in the unemployment rate
during downturns. Recent evidence on
unemployment dynamics in OECD countries
suggests that variation in the outflow rate accounts 
for the majority (80%) of the variation in the 
unemployment rate in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US. Variation in the inflow rates
plays a larger role (50%) in continental European
countries and the UK while Nordic countries rank
between the two groups. (19) 
Working time flexibility - variation in the length,
scheduling or distribution of working hours - can
be a source of variation of labour input, without
causing additional hiring and firing or wage
renegotiations costs, while preserving firm-specific 
(19) Elsby, M., B. Hbijin and A. S. (2008) "Unemployment
Dynamics in the OECD" NBER WP 14167.
human capital. Yet, a temporary reduction of the 
hours worked can be an effective tool to stabilise
employment only if not accompanied by full 
compensation of hourly wages to keep the monthly 
labour income unchanged. Reduced hours can be
achieved by either wage or labour costs cuts, the 
main difference being that labour costs cuts are 
attained through state-sponsored schemes, which
subsidise workers ready to work fewer hours, 
while wage cuts usually occur with the mutual
consent of both parties (e.g. recession sabbatical).
The latter are more efficient as they involve
bilateral negotiations and need not be a matter of
concern as their use should go down as the 
recovery steps in. 
To minimise the risks of mass unemployment, 
many countries have introduced or made extensive 
use of government sponsored schemes available to
employers to supplement wages of workers
working reduced hours(20). These schemes give
firms the possibility of reducing their activity in
case of short-term falls in industrial orders or other
exceptional circumstances, while allowing
employees to keep their contractual relationship. 
Graph I.1.32: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
hours worked - DE
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Source: Commission services.
(20) For Italy, the hours of Wage Supplement Schemes (Cassa 
integrazione Guadagni) allowed rise more than in the
previous recessions. Bassanetti A., M. Cecioni, A. Nobili
and G. Zevi (2009) Le principlai recessione italiana: un 
confronto retrospettivo, in Banca d'Italia Questioni di
Economia e Finanza. 
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Graph I.1.33: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
average hours worked - DE
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Graph I.1.34: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
hours worked - FR
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Graph I.1.35: Impact of the crisis on the change in the total
average hours worked - FR 
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In many European countries, government
sponsored schemes are available to employers to 
supplement wages of workers working at reduced
hours: the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Italy, 
the Chômage technique in France, or the
Kurzarbeitergeld in Germany, to mention a 
few. (21)  In Italy, the number of hours of wage
supplementation (CIG) was around 20 per
thousands of hours worked between January 2002 
and July 2008 (Graph I.1.36). It rapidly picked up
in November of 2008 and in April 2009 it reached 
its highest ever proportion since 2000 (110 per
thousands of hours worked in industry). In the 
second quarter of 2009 about 10% of full-time
equivalent workers were on wage supplementation
schemes. (22) Similarly, in Germany the use of
short-time employment picked-up swiftly; in
March 2009 it reached the highest level since the 
1992-1993 recessions (Graph I.1.37). In contrast,
the use of the chômage partiel declined
continuously in France between 1995 and 2005, 
affecting on average 1% of the establishments or 
2% of employees (Calavrezo et al., 2009). During
the recession, the proportion of workers in
chômage partiel increased from 0.1% in the first
quarter of 2008 to 0.7% in the first quarter of 2009, 
but remained below the historical average.  
Graph I.1.36: Short-time workers: Italy 
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Source: Commission services.
(21) Short-time scheme are available also in the US (the Short
time compensation programme) and Canada (the Work 
Sharing Program). The data shown below are not 
comparable across countries.
(22) Bank of Italy (2009) Economic Bulletin Number 53, July.  
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Graph I.1.37: Short-time workers: Germany 
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Source: Commission services.
Short-term compensations schemes supported by
public funds to prevent mass layoffs are an 
effective instrument to contain wasteful labour
shedding because a temporary demand shocks in
the short-term. Their benefit is less obvious if the 
recovery takes more time to materialise and/or
companies face the need to restructure.  
Moreover, when such schemes are granted with 
overly loose and unspecified conditions, there is
the risk that they prolong the moment of an 
inevitable closure of a company/plant thus 
delaying structural change, especially when the
market conditions reveal deficiencies in certain 
sectors. There is a trade-off between 
unemployment today and more redundancies at a 
later stage. The same applies when the fall in
demand is persistent and workers are working very
few hours. To address this problem, stricter
conditionalities have been usually imposed on 
firms to gain access to government support (e.g. 
falling demand/or orders over the short term, 
commitment not to lay-off workers at a later stage, 
establishing a plan for sustained employment after 
completion of the scheme; commitment not to
grant bonuses to managers; use the hours of non-
working for training), but it is too early to say if
the increase in short-time workers for economic
reasons will anticipate an increase in
unemployment in some countries when these
schemes expire. Yet, a concern remains that the 
deterioration in consumers' and employers' 
perceptions about the state of the labour market in 
countries that have made large use of these
schemes might herald a larger future increase in
unemployment if a sufficiently vigorous recovery
does not step in. 
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Box I.1.1: How much we should fear the fear of unemployment?
The crisis is characterised by an unprecedented increase in consumers’ and employers’ pessimism on the 
state of the labour market amidst the worst financial crisis since the great depression.  Week or negative job
growth has been the driver in the rise in unemployment. Even so, the increase in unemployment has been
rather limited, and a sharp uptick in unemployment may have still to come. While the announcements of 
redundancies in the press and/or their temporary suspension may build up expectation of an imminent major
job squeeze, the outcomes have so far fallen short of fears of unemployment. It is difficult to establish if
these fears have been overdone, not lastly because exceptional measures have been taken in response to an 
exceptional shock. Yet, the perceptions may influence consumers' spending plans, the demand for goods,
employers' hiring strategies and, ultimately, the unemployment rate. Swings in optimism and pessimism can
affect future economic outcomes irrespectively of underlying fundamentals (e.g. Cooper and John 1988);
thus consumers' sentiment plays a non-trivial role in affecting current and future variations in aggregate
activity (e.g. Acemoglu and Scott (19994); Matsusaka and Sbordone, 1995), especially in exceptional
circumstances (e.g. Adrian Throop, 1992). (1)  
This box investigates how the unemployment rate fluctuates in response to unexpected changes in
expectations on the state of the labour market. We take an agnostic view on the mechanisms through which 
agents' belief influence and respond to economic outcomes. The analysis is developed in a VAR framework,
which allows taking into account the interdependencies between the sentiment indicators, the unemployment
rate and the industrial orders (VAR). The analysed focuses on the 4 largest European countries with monthly 
data over a period which slightly differs across countries depending on the data availability. The periods
considered are: Germany 2002m02-2009m06; France 1989m01-2009m07; UK 1999m01-2009m05, Italy
1997m01-2009m03. To check the robustness of the results, the VARs is re-estimated on the shorter time
period of the German VAR with no major differences. The lag length was selected to have well behaved
residuals; when necessary dummy variables are included to eliminate outliers.
VAR analysis can be summarised in two ways. First, the impulse response functions (IRF) describe the
impact of each shock at different horizons (months). The initial change is one standard deviation shock. But
caution should be paid in comparing the different IRF as the standard deviations of the shocks differ across
countries. Second, the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) explains the role played by different
variables in causing this reaction. Since the estimated shocks (i.e. the residuals from the VAR) are
correlated, it is impossible to shock one variable keeping the other fixed. Structural VARs (SVAR) require 
identifying restrictions that establish causal links among variables. These restrictions can be imposed on the
contemporaneous effects of the shocks - i.e. contemporaneous links among the variables (Christiano et
al.,1996)- on the long-run behaviour of the system (Blanchard, Quah, 1989) or as a mix of the previous
(Gali, 1992). SVAR allows the impact on the unemployment rate of unexpected changes in confidence
indicators to be isolated from that of other disturbances to the industrial orders or to the unemployment rate
itself, while taking into account all the interdependencies between the variables. Thus disturbances to 
consumers' sentiment can be interpreted as exceptional shock (or sunspot) since they correspond to the part
that cannot be explained by the information contained in economic fundamentals captured by the
unemployment rate or the industrial order. We identify shocks assuming a contemporaneous causal
structure, which implies that unexpected changes in the industrial order in one month influence consumers
and employers' perceptions and the unemployment rate within the same month. Conversely, we assume that
it takes more than one month for the industrial orders to respond to a shock in the consumers' and employers' 
expectations or in the unemployment rate. Finally, changes in state of confidence on the labour market
influence the unemployment rate in the same month. The following scheme summarises the instantaneous 
linkages needed to identify the shocks: 
(1) Throop, A. W. (1992), “Consumer sentiment: its causes and effects,” Economic review (Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco), N. 1, p. 35-59. 
(Continued on the next page)
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Box (continued) 
Industrial Orders → Employers' intentions of employment in Industry → Employers' intentions of 
employment in services → Consumers' unemployment expectations → unemployment rate  
The Figure shows the response of unemployment rate to an unexpected change in industrial orders or to 
employers' or consumers' expectations, assuming that in each case no other disturbance occurs. The impulse 
responses are computed assuming symmetry in the response to negative or positive shock. The graph 
suggests a different reaction across countries of the unemployment rate to a shock of confidence or to 
industrial orders. A negative shock to industrial orders is accompanied by an increase in unemployment in 
France and the UK. It takes 1 quarter for the unemployment rate to respond. After 12 months a fall of 
industrial orders by 1 standard deviation leads to an increase in the unemployment rate by half and 0.7 
percentage points. Moreover, a worsening of employers' intentions on employment in industry is 
accompanied by a temporary decline in unemployment rate in all countries; yet the effect on unemployment 
is small and not statistically significant. Quite interestingly, the unemployment rate falls in Germany in the 
same month the shock occurred and reverts to the level before the shock after about 1 quarter. Much more 
persistent is in this country the effect of a worsening in consumers' unemployment expectations. A fall in 
consumer sentiment about future employment prospects leads after 10 months to an increase in the 
unemployment rate by about 0.7 pp. The shock is very persistent as the unemployment rate starts reverting 
back towards the pre-shock level after about 15 months. Finally, deterioration in employers' intention on 
employment in services leads gradually to an increase in the unemployment rate only in the UK, where, after 
3 quarters, the unemployment rate increases by 0.4 pp.  
Finally the FEVD suggests that fluctuations in consumers' unemployment expectations explain about 30% 
and 50% of the variation in the German unemployment rate respectively after 4 and 10 months. However, 
the contribution of the same type of shock is almost nil in the case of the other countries where, with the 
exception of Italy, the industrial orders account for a rising share of the variance of unemployment, in 
particular in France. 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
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2.1. LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EURO AREA 
2.1.1. Recent labour cost developments
Wage developments were impacted by the crisis
with some delay in 2008 and only began to ease
in the last quarter of this year. (Graph I.2.1 and 
Table I.2.1). Labour costs growth continued at a 
fast pace throughout the first three quarters of 
2008. This was largely due to several forces 
including previously tight labour markets and 
continued high capacity utilisation, as well as to
increases due to nominal wage indexation on
account of past temporarily high inflation 
outcomes in some countries (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta and Spain). In
2008Q4, negotiated wages grew by 3.6%, the 
highest rate since 1995, still reflecting past
favourable labour market conditions. The annual 
growth of hourly labour costs in the euro area also 
accelerated from 3.4% in 2008Q3 to 4% in 
2008Q4. However, the upward movement in both 
indicators was short-lived and followed by clear 
signs of abating wage pressures in 2009Q1, when
year-on-year increases in negotiated wages and the 
Labour Cost Index eased to 3.2% and 3.7%
respectively, dissipating fears echoed during the
last quarter of 2008 of broadly-based second-round
effects. Hourly labour costs remain elevated, 
however, on account of the strong downward 
adjustment in hours worked undertaken by many 
firms in order to face the effects of the financial 
crisis. (23) The slowdown came from the wage
component of labour costs. By contrast, the non-
wage component remained at high levels, with
offsetting effects arising from the high cost of
dismissals in the industrial and construction sectors 
and the temporary cuts in employers' social
security contributions aimed at alleviating the 
weight of non-wage costs in overall labour costs.
Growth in compensation per employee, the other 
indicator of wage growth, fell sharply from 3.5%
in the third quarter to 2.7% in 2008Q3 and 1.8%
(23) Since labour costs are usually determined on a monthly 
basis, a temporary reduction of hours worked will lead to 
high hourly labour costs, even though total labour costs as 
such remain unaltered. Thus, caution is needed when
interpreting growth in the Labour Cost Index in the context 
of the current crisis, characterised by an intensive use of 
short-time work schemes as a means to keep workers in
employment.
and 2008Q4 largely explained by short term
working arrangements. Taken together with the 
deterioration in employment and the relative 
stability in negotiated wages (i.e. basic pay), this 
could suggest that, in the face of tight financial 
conditions, firms are actively reducing the variable 
pay component of compensation, such as overtime 
and bonus payments. (24) Recent evidence 
advanced by the ECB indeed suggests that the 
wage drift (25) has turned negative in 2008Q4. 
Graph I.2.1: Nominal wage indicators, euro area, y-o-y % 
change 
Labour Cost Index Compensation per employee Negotiated wages
Source: Labour Cost Index and compensation per 
employee are Eurostat data. Negotiated wages are ECB 
data.
(24) See "New survey on wage setting in Europe" ECB Monthly 
Bulletin, February 2009.
(25) The wage drift is defined as the difference between the 
growth in overall compensation, excluding employers' 
social security contributions, and the growth in collectively 
agreed wages. As wages are bargained for long periods of
time, the wage drift captures the effect of unexpected 
cyclical changes in the economic environment. 
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Graph I.2.2: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs, euro area. 
Quarterly data, 2006Q1-2009Q1 
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale)
Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: Eurostat.
Graph I.2.3: Nominal wage indicators, euro area y-o-y %
change 
Compensation per employee Labour productivity Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: Eurostat.
Unit labour costs in the euro area picked up 
strongly since late 2008 following a severe 
contraction in labour productivity. (Graph I.2.2 
and Table I.2.1). The acceleration in unit labour 
costs was widespread across EA16 Member 
States. (Graph I.2.3 and Table I.2.2). Productivity
growth gradually weakened over the first three 
quarters of the year, mainly due to labour-intensive 
growth characterising the turn of the cycle and 
related at least in part to weak innovation in a 
context of low competition.  Productivity turned 
negative (-1.4% and -3.7%) in 2008Q4 and 
2009Q1, the lowest rates since the start of EMU. 
The intensifying contraction of labour productivity
is mainly attributable to the depression in
economic activity which has not been matched by
a comparable rate of decline in employment helped
by labour hoarding (which has gone hand in hand
with a reduction in hours worked in many
countries). As a result, unit labour costs 
accelerated to 4.5% and 5.5% in the last two
quarters available (2008Q4 and 2009Q1), marking 
the strongest growth in over a decade. In many 
euro-area countries, the annual growth of unit
labour costs in 2008 was at least 2 pps. above the 
average over the period 1999-2007. In most cases, 
this was explained by downward nominal rigidity
present in wages (26) in combination with a 
marked slowdown in labour productivity reflecting
the lagged employment response to economic 
activity, in line with usual cyclical patterns. 
Barring Slovakia, which registered disorderly
wage hikes, the acceleration in unit labour costs
was indeed more marked in those euro-area 
countries with the highest drop in labour
productivity, namely Slovenia, Finland and
Germany. Only in Spain productivity experienced 
a sizeable increase in line with the sharp drop in
employment. The fast speed of deterioration in
employment in this country is related to the dual 
nature of the labour market, with young and 
temporary employment allowing for quick labour 
shedding. Temporary workers in Spain shrank
from 5.2 million in 2007Q4 to 4.5 million in
2008Q4. The youth unemployment rate amounted
to 31.8% in February 2009, more than 14 pps. 
above the average rate in the euro area. The main
conclusion emerging from these figures is that the 
widespread acceleration in unit labour costs across 
countries is mostly attributable to the contraction 
in labour productivity while wages still have a long
way to go in adjusting to the recession. 
(26) The evidence in support of downward (nominal and real) 
wage rigidity among European firms is abundant. Some
recent contributions include Dickens, W. T., L. Goette, E.
L. Groshen, S. Holden, J. Messina, M. E. Schweitzer, J. 
Turunen and M. E. Ward (2007), “How Wages Change: 
Micro Evidence from the International Wage Flexibility 
Project”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), pp. 195-
214; Messina, J., P. Du Caju, C. Filipa Duarte, M. 
Izquierdo and N. Lynggård Hansen (2008), “The Causes 
and Consequences of Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity: A 
Sectoral Approach”, mimeo (WDN); and Holden, S. and F.
Wulfsberg (2007), “Downward nominal wage rigidity in
the OECD”, ECB Working Paper No.964. This body of
literature follows the pioneering work of Blinder, A. S. and 
D. H. Choi (1990), “A Shred of Evidence on Theories of 
Wage Stickiness,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
5(4), pp. 1003-15.
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The contribution of unit labour costs to overall
domestic inflationary pressures in 2008 still 
remained above historical levels (Table I.2.3).
Pushed by the marked contraction in labour 
productivity and the delayed response in wages, 
the contribution of unit labour costs to the 
domestic final demand deflator has remained well
above the average registered during 1999-2007 in 
all euro-area countries. However, with the deep 
downturn weakening firms' pricing power, there is 
virtually no risk that entrepreneurs will pass 
temporary increases in labour costs through to
final demand prices, thus implying squeezing gross 
operating surplus, at least in the short term.
Narrowing profit margins have prevailed in half of
the euro area economies, namely, Belgium,
Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia,
Slovakia and Finland. 
Real unit labour costs increased markedly in 
2008 in many Member States as real production 
wages grew significantly above labour
productivity (Table I.2.2). The gap between 
growth in real unit labour costs in 2008 against the
average growth over the period 1999-2004 was at 
its highest in Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
Finland, Slovakia and Greece. The rise in real unit 
labour costs is a relatively new phenomenon in
euro-area countries. However, it is merely driven 
by temporary factors, i.e. the slowdown in labour 
productivity coupled with downward nominal
wage rigidity in the short term, and thus cannot be
expected to reverse the declining trend observed in
labour shares in many European countries over the 
past three decades. Medium-term movements in
real unit labour costs are to be explained by a 
combination of technological and institutional
Table I.2.1: Nominal wage indicators, labour productivity and unit labour costs, euro area 
2006 2007 2008 Av. 99-07 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1
Negotiated wages 2,3 2,1 3,2 2,4 2,9 2,9 3,4 3,6 3,2
Hourly Labour Cost Index 2,3 2,6 3,3 3,0 3,3 2,3 3,4 4,0 3,7
Compensation per employee 2,3 2,5 3,1 2,4 3,1 3,2 3,5 2,8 1,8
Labour productivity 1,3 0,9 -0,1 0,9 0,4 0,9 0,2 -1,7 -3,7
Nominal unit labour costs 1,0 1,6 3,2 1,5 2,7 2,3 3,3 4,5 5,5
Source: All indicators are Eurostat data except negotiated wages, which are ECB data. 
Table I.2.2: Unit labour costs (in nominal and real terms) and its components. Y-o-y % changes, 2009Q1, 2008 and average 
2004-2007
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA-16
Nominal ULC
2009Q1 5,8 8,1 4,6 0,5 3,9 6,1 2,1 7,5 6,1 15,3 23 10,2 5,7
2008 3,9 2,0 7,0 5,7 3,4 2,8 4,2 3,0 7,2 3,6 3,4 3,0 3,6 7,9 5,2 6,2 3,3
Av. 99-07 1,6 0,3 3,0 2,8 2,8 1,7 2,4 2,8 2,2 1,9 2,2 0,5 2,8 4,4 3,8 1,3 1,6
Compensation per employee
2009Q1 1,9 1,3 5,5 3,8 1,5 0,3 1,8 2,5 2,9 6,3 17,7 3,7 2,0
2008 3,4 1,8 5,5 7,5 5,2 2,6 3,3 4,0 1,5 5,2 3,8 3,3 3,1 8,5 8,7 5,6 3,3
Av. 99-07 2,8 1,8 5,9 5,9 3,3 2,7 2,9 4,0 3,5 3,3 3,8 2,1 3,9 8,0 8,6 3,2 2,7
Labour productivity
2009Q1 -3,9 -6,8 0,9 3,3 -2,4 -5,8 -0,3 -5,0 -3,2 -3,1 -9,0 -5,3 -6,5 -3,7
2008 -0,5 -0,2 -1,4 1,7 1,8 -0,2 -0,9 1,0 -5,3 1,5 0,3 0,3 -0,4 0,6 3,3 -0,5 0,0
Av. 99-07 1,2 1,6 2,8 3,0 0,4 1,0 0,5 1,2 1,3 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,1 3,5 4,6 1,9 1,1
GDP deflator
2009Q1 1,8 1,9 1,8 1,2 1,5 3,8 0,5 2,5 0,9 3,7 10,3 2,0 1,7
2008 1,7 1,5 -0,3 3,4 3,0 2,5 2,8 4,8 1,6 2,5 2,7 2,4 1,8 4,0 2,9 2,7 2,3
Av. 99-07 2,8 1,8 5,9 5,9 3,3 2,7 2,9 4,0 3,5 3,3 3,8 2,1 3,9 8,0 8,6 3,2 2,7
Real ULC
2009Q1 4,0 6,2 2,8 -0,7 2,4 2,3 1,6 5,0 5,2 11,6 12,7 8,2 4,0
2008 2,2 0,4 7,3 2,2 0,4 0,3 1,4 -1,8 5,5 1,1 0,7 0,6 1,7 3,7 2,2 3,4 0,9
Av. 99-07 -0,3 -0,6 -0,5 -0,7 -0,9 -0,1 0,0 -0,3 -0,9 -0,7 -0,4 -1,0 -0,3 -0,6 -0,9 -0,2 -0,5
Source: Eurostat.
Table I.2.3: Contribution of import prices, NULC, gross operating surplus and net indirect taxes to growth in final demand 
deflator (y-o-y % changes), euro-area MS. 2008 and average 2004-2007
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI
Average 1999-2007
Import prices 1,2 0,2 0,7 0,8 0,5 0,1 0,7 0,8 2,1 1,3 0,4 0,4 0,5 1,6 1,5 0,4
Nominal unit labour costs 0,5 0,1 0,8 1,1 1,2 0,8 1,1 1,0 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,2 1,3 1,8 1,0 0,5
Net indirect taxes 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,9 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,1
Gross operating surplus 0,4 0,3 0,8 1,2 1,3 0,5 0,6 0,1 0,8 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,6 1,1 1,5 0,5
Final demand deflator 2,3 0,8 2,7 3,4 3,4 1,5 2,6 2,8 3,5 2,7 2,0 1,4 2,7 4,8 4,3 1,5
2008
Import prices 3,4 0,4 1,0 1,6 0,9 0,9 1,6 1,7 0,7 1,4 1,8 0,9 1,5 1,7 1,4 1,2
Nominal unit labour costs 1,3 0,8 2,1 2,3 1,4 1,2 1,9 1,0 1,4 0,9 1,2 1,1 1,5 2,8 1,2 2,4
Net indirect taxes -0,1 0,1 -0,8 0,0 -1,2 0,1 -0,4 0,6 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,0 -0,5 0,0
Gross operating surplus -0,2 0,2 -1,4 0,3 2,1 0,6 0,7 1,5 -0,7 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,0 -0,4 0,8 -0,5
Final demand deflator 4,3 1,5 0,8 4,1 3,2 2,8 3,8 4,8 1,4 2,7 3,4 2,4 2,8 4,0 2,9 3,1
Source: AMECO.
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factors (Box I.2.1), rather than cyclical labour
market developments.  
A breakdown by sectors indicates that cost
pressures were sharpest in the industrial sector.
Graphs from I.2.4 to I.2.7 show the pp. deviation
in 2008Q4 of compensation per employee, labour
productivity and nominal unit labour costs from
the average values over 2007Q1-2008Q3. Even
though the crisis started in the financial sector, the 
contraction in activity and the ensuing slump in
productivity have been most severe in
manufacturing. Public measures adopted to keep
workers in employment in the manufacturing 
sector have depressed labour productivity in the 
short term. By contrast, labour shedding in
construction has resulted in higher productivity
growth and relatively contained labour costs 
pressures in response to the crisis. Different forms 
of public support are indeed being put in place by 
EU countries to encourage businesses to use more 
flexible working time arrangements instead of 
making employees redundant. Typically, the State 
compensates for lost working hours through wage
top-ups (directly to the employee or to the 
employer) and/or training (through funding or
provision). Even if measures seem to be horizontal 
in nature, the most typical beneficiaries of those 
schemes can be found within the manufacturing
sector, mainly linked to the automotive industry 
and its suppliers (e.g. in Austria, France, and 
Italy). Productivity increased in construction in 
Spain due to the effect of labour shedding, which 
implies a proportionally larger contraction in 
employment than in activity. 
Graph I.2.4: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs by sectors 
(Industry), selected euro-area Member States. 
Y-o-y % change, difference in 2008Q4 from 
average 2007Q2-2008Q3
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: Eurostat.
Graph I.2.5: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs by sectors 
(Construction), selected euro-area Member 
States. Y-o-y % change, difference in 2008Q4
from average 2007Q2-2008Q3 
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: Eurostat.
44 
Part I
Employment and wage developments 
Graph I.2.6: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs by sectors 
(Market services (G-I)), selected euro-area 
Member States. Y-o-y % change, difference in 
2008Q4 from average 2007Q2-2008Q3
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
NACE G-I includes Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants and Transport and Storage and 
Communication (I).
Source: Eurostat.
Graph I.2.7: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs by sectors 
(Market services (J-K)), selected euro-area 
Member States. Y-o-y % change, difference in 
2008Q4 from average 2007Q2-2008Q3
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
NACE J-K includes Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services.
Source: Eurostat.
Lowering labour costs for both employers and 
employees has gained relevance in the 
framework of the crisis. As unemployment 
surges, the most disadvantaged labour-market
groups – youth, low-skilled, immigrants and 
temporary workers – are the first to lose their jobs
and, since they also face serious difficulties in
finding a new job, they are at high risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. Amongst the
measures introduced over the last months by
Member States to support the labour market and 
get the most vulnerable back into jobs is the 
reduction in social security contributions
(Belgium, France and Germany),  especially for 
low-wage earners (e.g. Finland and Malta). 
Rebates on social security contributions to boost
labour demand were typically made conditional
upon job creation (Belgium, Spain, France,
Portugal and Slovakia). Most of the recent
measures undertaken appear to be temporary and
contingent on the economic crisis. As such, they
are intended to alleviate the weight of non-wage 
costs in overall labour costs. This is not yet 
reflected in the Labour Cost Index during the first 
quarter of 2009 (Graph I.2.8), where the 
contribution of costs other than wages and salaries
has increased as compared with previous quarters,
largely due to the higher costs of dismissals in the 
industrial and construction sectors. Box I.2.2
below discusses the theoretical concept and the 
evolution of the tax wedge on labour and further
quantifies the macroeconomic impact of labour tax 
reductions in the euro area using DG ECFIN's
QUESTIII model.
Graph I.2.8: Contribution of wage and non-wage costs to
LCI growth, euro area 
LCI - Labour costs other than wages and salaries LCI - wages and salaries
Source: Eurostat data and European Commission's staff 
calculations.
Although wage behaviour in the public sector
was heterogeneous across euro-area countries 
in 2008, moderation in public wages is foreseen 
which will orient pay practices in the private 
sector. Graph I.2.9 shows that, on average, the
annual growth gap between public and private 
compensation per employee during 1999-2007 was
highest in Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. Apart
from Ireland, these are also the countries with
strong representation of the public administration 
in collective bargaining. In 2008, a growth in 
public wages stronger than in private wages
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continued in Italy and Portugal but was reverted
substantially in Ireland and Spain, i.e. the two
countries most adversely affected by the economic 
crisis. In Ireland, the 7.5% cut in public-sector pay 
that came into force in May was mostly a response
to the fiscal crisis, but also advocated a remedy for 
lost competitiveness. With a view to rationalising 
pay of public sector employees, the Irish Public
Service Benchmarking Body, which was
established five years ago to compare pay and 
conditions between the public and private sectors, 
had previously recommended in a report issued in 
early 2008 that public wages should reflect pay 
practices in the private sector "at a time when the
economy is facing more uncertainty and 
employment growth is slowing". In Italy, a 
program of reform for public sector employment
presented in June 2008 advised the remuneration
system to rely more on productivity rather than
seniority. Looking further ahead, pay related
measures in the public sector aimed at stabilizing
public finances can be expected to narrow the gap 
between public and private wages over 2009-2010
in euro area countries.  
Graph I.2.9: Growth gap between compensation per 
employee in public and private sectors, 
selected euro area Member States
Growth gap 2008 Cumulative growth gap 1999-2007
Source: OECD Economic outlook database.
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Box I.2.1: Understanding Labour Income Share Dynamics in Europe
The empirical evidence shows that over the past three decades labour shares have declined in many
European countries. Building on previous literature in this field, most importantly Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(2003), Arpaia et al. (2009) identify the technological and institutional factors underlying labour share
movements through a micro-founded model. The main novelty of the model is the adoption of a CES
production function with capital and labour heterogeneity coupled with the assumption of capital-skill 
complementarity, i.e. the fact that capital is complementary to skilled labour but highly substitutive to
unskilled labour. The production function is given by: 
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where Y is output and K, Ls, Lu stand for physical capital, skilled and unskilled labour. A production 
function like (1) is characterized by three kinds of parameters: distribution parameters a and α, efficiency
parameters A, Bu and Bs (which represent technical progress specific to each input) and substitution
parameters η and σ, respectively the elasticity of substitution between physical capital and skilled labour and 
the elasticity of substitution between the composite input and unskilled labour. It is assumed that 
∞<<< ση0 . This implies relatively higher complementarity (or less substitution) between capital and 
skilled labour than between the capital-skill aggregate and unskilled labour.  
On an accountancy basis, the share of labour in total income can be expressed as a function of the unskilled
workers' labour share, the skill premium and the relative supply of skilled labour, i.e.  
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w ,, , meaning that the labour share can be expressed as a sole function of
relative factor quantities. As explained below, comparative static results crucially depend on the specific
values of the elasticities of substitution (η and σ).
Equation (2) is calibrated to fit labour share movements in nine EU15 Member States over the period 1970-
2004 (see Graph below). Leaving aside country-specific features, there seems to be a common story to the 
observed downward trend in the labour share. Given the characteristics of the production function, the
various channels through which the labour share is pulled down by technological forces over the medium
term are as follows: 
• With capital-skill complementarity (σ>η), capital-augmenting technical progress (a plausible
assumption for technical progress over the medium run) pushes the labour share downwards.
• With high substitution between skilled and unskilled labour (σ>1), the labour share responds
negatively to the historical increase in the relative supply of skilled labour. Intuitively, an increase
in the relative supply of skilled labour creates an excess of supply of qualified workers and a
reduction in their relative wage. The higher σ, the more unskilled workers will be replaced by
skilled labour in production and the sharper the fall in the unskilled workers' share of income.
Compared with the initial state of the economy, the relative demand for skilled workers will be
higher, and both the labour share of the unskilled and the wage premium will be lower. If σ>1, the
overall effect on the labour share will be negative.
(Continued on the next page)
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• With high substitution between capital and unskilled labour (σ>1), the labour share responds
negatively to the historical increase in the capital to unskilled labour ratio. This is because an
increase in the capital to unskilled labour ratio creates an excess of supply of capital and a
reduction of its price in terms of unskilled labour. The substitution in production of capital for
unskilled labour implies a reduction in the unskilled share in total income (increasing with σ). 
With capital-skill complementarity, the relative demand for skilled workers rises, which increases
the wage premium. In the new equilibrium, both the relative demand for qualified labour and its
relative price will be higher, while the labour income share of the unskilled will be lower. If σ>1, 
the latter effect predominates and the labour share will decrease following a positive shock to
capital. 
• With η>0 the labour share responds negatively to the historical fall in the capital to skilled labour
ratio. This is because with capital-skill complementarity, a reduction in equipment per skilled
worker reduces the relative demand of qualified labour, thus leading to a reduction in the wage 
premium (decreasing with η). In the new equilibrium, the income share of unskilled labour will 
remain unchanged while a smaller number of skilled workers will be employed at a lower wage.
Thus, the share of income accruing to labour will be lower. 
Overall, the calibration exercise suggests that most of the decline in labour shares over the medium term in
nine EU15 Member States is governed by capital deepening in conjunction with capital-augmenting 
technical progress and labour substitution across labour skill categories. Although institutional factors also 
play a significant role, they appear to be of somewhat less importance. 
Observed and calibrated labour shares in selected EU15 Member States 
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(1) Calibration on the basis of EU KLEMS data, 1970-2004. 
Source: Commission services.
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Graph I.2.10: Real consumption wages and terms-of-trade 
adjusted labour productivity, EA16. Annual 
data 1999-2008
Labour productivity Terms of trade
Labour productivity adjusted for terms of trade Real consumption wages
Source: AMECO and European Commission's staff 
calculations.
Prompt action taken by most Member States to 
support people's income should support
consumption despite the stagnation in real
wages. Real wages deflated by the consumption 
price deflator grew at the modest rate of 0.36% in
the euro area in 2008, which nevertheless implied
real consumption wages growing well above 
labour productivity adjusted for the terms of
trade (27) for the first time since 1999 (Graph
I.2.10). This should not be seen as inadequate
wage behaviour.  Indeed, there is no reason why
real wages should absorb the severe slump in
labour productivity registered in 2008, to the 
extent that this is due to short-lived economic
developments –i.e. labour hoarding.  Together with
the deterioration in employment, the slow growth 
in real wages raises concerns as long as it could 
severely depress consumer spending, not only on
account of the effective liquidity constraints
currently at work but more importantly due to the 
downward revision of the permanent income
expected by consumers, negative wealth
effects (28) and the accumulation of higher 
precautionary savings in the face of uncertainty.
However, aggregate consumption has remained 
relatively resilient as yet. Besides a limited
increase in unemployment so far, this could be an
indication of a favourable consumer response to
lower inflation together with improved households' 
confidence on recovery packages and social 
protection nets that have started to play their role
(27) Over the long term, labour productivity adjusted for the 
terms of trade defines an upper limit for real consumption 
wages.  
(28) Those countries suffering a real estate crisis face 
substantially lower consumption growth due to important 
wealth effects. 
as automatic stabilisers. The recent data imply the
decoupling of households' financial expectations
from unemployment prospects since mid-2008
(Graph I.2.11). Many EU countries have indeed
introduced a wealth of measures to support the 
labour market and mitigate the impact of the
downturn on vulnerable groups. Measures range
from increasing the level of minimum income or
minimum wage, extending the coverage or
duration of unemployment benefits, reinforcing
other social benefits (i.e. housing or family 
allowances), to introducing tax rebates or
exemptions for specific groups, measures against
over-indebtedness or repossession, and incentives
for banks to give access to credit to individuals, 
including people of low income.  
Graph I.2.11: Unemployment and financial expectations 
over next 12 months, EA16
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(1) The corresponding questions in the consumer survey 
read as follows: "How do you expect the number of people 
unemployed in this country to change over
the next 12 months?" and "How do you expect the financial
position of your household to change over the next 12
months?" The answer scheme is qualitative according to a 
five-option ordinal scale. Aggregate balances are 
calculated as the difference between positive and 
negative answering options, measured as percentage 
points of total answers. Balance values range from -100,
when all respondents choose the most negative option, to 
+100, when all respondents choose the most positive option.
Source: EU consumer survey.
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Box I.2.2: The evolution of the tax wedge of labour
Taxes and social security contributions drive a wedge between the cost for the employer and the net 
compensation received by the employee. The resulting effects on labour market outcomes have been 
extensively studied. See Pissarides (1998) and Bovenberg (2006) for useful summaries, and Nickell (2006) 
and Arpaia and Carone (2004) for empirical evidence. 
From a theoretical perspective, different predictions have been derived depending on the specific 
assumptions regarding the functioning of the labour market, e.g. whether the labour market is a neoclassical 
one, or collective bargaining dominates or whether search and matching frictions are modelled or not. At the 
individual level, taxes can increase or decrease labour supply, depending on whether the income or 
substitution effect dominates. Empirical evidence tends to find a negative impact of labour taxes on labour 
supply, albeit with different magnitude for different groups of workers. In particular, the effect seems largest 
for the second member of the household and for single parents. In parallel to the disincentive effects of taxes 
on labour supply, taxes and social security contributions, to the extent they are reflected in higher labour 
costs, will also decrease labour demand for any given state of technology, thereby reducing employment and 
output levels. 
The tax burden on labour is typically measured by the tax wedge on labour which measures the difference 
between the gross labour costs an employer has to pay and what the worker receives after taxes and social 
security contributions. This wedge can be calculated either on an average basis or with respect to the 
marginal Euro earned. The table below provides an overview of the average tax wedge (at 67% and 100% of 
the average wage of a single worker without children). 
The tax wedge is composed of several elements. First, employers have to pay payroll taxes and/or 
employers' social security contributions. Second, employees have to pay social security contributions on 
their wage income received. Social security contributions (whether paid by the employer or employee) often 
give rights to individual benefits. Therefore, only to the extent to which the link between contributions and 
benefits in such social insurance schemes is not perceived as actuarially fair, the contributions actually 
constitute a tax.  Finally, labour income is subject to the personal income tax. These different taxes and 
social security contributions constitute the different components of labour taxation, and they can be summed 
up to give the aggregate tax wedge due to labour taxes. 
It should be noted, however, that the tax wedges as reported here underestimates the full tax burden on 
labour. Taxes on consumption, such as value added taxes also reduce the real value of wage payments, so 
should also be included in the tax burden on labour. However, due to the differentiated nature of 
consumption taxes, in particular due to differentiated rates and additional excises, the impact of these taxes 
on the real consumption wage depends on the actual consumption basket and is therefore difficult to 
quantify. Moreover, other taxes can also be implicit forms of labour taxation to the extent the incidence falls 
on labour, no matter how such taxes are classified. This can be the case for environmental or capital income 
taxation whose incidence may ultimately be shifted onto labour. With this caveat regarding the potential 
incompleteness of tax wedges as a measure of the tax burden on labour in mind, the evolution of tax wedges 
can be assessed to gauge the changes in the tax burden on labour over time. 
Such measured tax wedges on labour remain high in most EU countries. This situation contrasts with that of 
non-EU OECD countries, where the total tax wedge is substantially lower on average. However, some 
European governments have been able to reduce the tax wedge over recent years. This has been the case for 
average and low income workers a like (see table below) and particularly in Ireland and in the Nordic 
countries Denmark, Sweden and Finland. On the other hand, some countries have substantially increased 
their tax wedge over the same period, such as Greece, the UK and Austria. 
Given the importance of labour taxation for government revenues, reductions and increases in the tax wedge 
typically take place gradually over time. This is also evident from the table that shows little change on a 
year-over-year basis for individual countries. However, as the evidence of table indicates, continued small 
(Continued on the next page) 
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improvements add up over time and can result in a substantial relief or substantial additional burden within a
few years. Exceptions to the gradual change in the tax burden on labour are changes in the tax wedge as a 
consequence of major tax reforms. Slovakia's reduction in the tax wedge, which is the biggest in the EU over
the period 2001-2007 can be mostly attributed to the change from 2004 to 2005. Finally, a closer look at the
components of the tax wedge reveals that most changes in the total tax wedge are driven by changes in
income taxes. This holds for increases as well as decreases of the wedge. 
Several Member States took measures to improve the incentives to work embedded in their tax system in
2008, providing simultaneously a welcome push in purchasing power during a period of falling demand, as
well as a positive contribution to longer term labour supply and a boost to labour demand. Effective income
tax rates have been significantly reduced in some Member States (Austria, Germany, France, Sweden and 
Finland) sometimes as part of longer-term structural policy agenda’s. Other countries have made more
modest changes to tax brackets or other parametric changes (Spain, Malta and Latvia). Rebates on social
security contributions for employers were introduced in several countries (Belgium, Spain, Finland, France,
Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Germany, Bulgaria and Slovakia), sometimes specifically for SMEs (France 
and Portugal). Other Member States have partly suspended (Denmark) or cut employee contributions (the
Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands). Both tax and benefit measures were often targeted to those
most difficult to employ, low income workers, or to the self-employed (Slovenia and Slovakia). Other 
measures included reinforcement of in-work tax credits (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovakia)
and commuters' tax allowances (Austria and Germany) and a few measures to support female labour market
participation (the Czech Republic, Greece, Malta and the Netherlands). A detailed stocktaking of important 
measures adopted in Member States in 2008 can be found in Section 6.2 Reviewing the incentives to work 
embedded in the tax system, in Carone et al. (2008): "Recent reforms in the tax and benefit systems in the
framework of flexicurity". European Commission, Occasional papers 43, March 2009. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Change
2001-08 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Change
2001-08
Austria 46,9 47,1 47,4 48,1 47,9 48,1 48,5 48,9 2,0 42,9 43,1 43,5 43,9 43,1 43,5 44,1 44,5 1,6
Belgium 56,7 56,3 55,7 55,4 55,4 55,4 55,5 55,9 -0,8 50,7 50,5 49,6 48,9 49,2 49,1 49,6 50,2 -0,5
Bulgaria 40,4 39,6 39,0 38,9 38,9 35,4 36,5 n.a. n.a. 35,9 35,2 35,0 34,9 35,3 31,1 32,3 n.a. n.a.
Cyprus 20,9 17,3 18,5 18,6 13,6 14,1 13,9 n.a. n.a. 17,0 17,2 18,5 18,6 11,9 11,9 11,9 n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic 42,6 42,9 43,2 43,5 43,8 42,6 42,9 43,5 0,9 41,3 41,5 41,7 41,9 42,1 40,1 40,5 40,1 -1,2
Denmark 43,6 42,6 42,6 41,3 41,4 41,3 41,3 41,2 -2,4 40,5 39,8 39,8 39,3 39,3 39,3 39,3 39,0 -1,5
Estonia 39,7 42,2 42,5 41,4 41,6 40,2 40,1 n.a. n.a. 37,4 40,2 40,7 38,9 39,8 38,4 38,7 n.a. n.a.
Finland 46,4 45,9 45,0 44,5 44,6 44,1 43,7 43,5 -2,9 41,4 40,9 40,0 39,4 39,5 38,9 38,2 38,2 -3,2
France 49,8 49,8 49,8 49,9 50,1 50,2 49,2 49,3 -0,5 47,6 47,4 45,0 42,4 41,8 44,5 44,4 44,5 -3,1
Germany 53,0 53,5 54,2 53,2 52,4 52,5 52,2 52,0 -1,0 47,7 48,1 48,8 47,8 47,3 47,4 47,4 47,3 -0,4
Greece 38,1 37,7 37,7 39,5 40,4 41,2 42,3 42,5 4,4 35,1 34,3 34,4 34,9 34,8 35,4 36,7 37,7 2,6
Hungary 54,0 53,7 50,8 51,8 50,5 51,0 54,4 53,9 -0,1 48,1 48,2 44,5 44,8 42,9 42,9 45,9 46,6 -1,5
Ireland 25,8 24,5 24,2 25,0 23,5 23,1 22,3 22,7 -3,1 17,3 16,7 16,2 20,0 16,8 16,3 15,0 15,7 -1,6
Italy 46,0 46,0 45,0 45,4 45,4 45,2 45,9 46,5 0,5 42,7 42,7 41,1 41,4 41,7 41,5 42,0 43,0 0,3
Latvia 42,7 42,9 42,2 42,5 42,2 42,9 42,4 n.a. n.a. 41,2 41,4 40,8 41,2 40,9 41,8 41,1 n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 45,2 44,6 43,4 43,7 44,4 46,3 43,0 n.a. n.a. 42,2 41,2 39,5 40,0 41,0 43,9 41,3 n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg 37,0 34,2 34,7 35,1 35,9 36,5 37,5 37,2 0,2 31,2 29,0 29,3 29,6 30,2 30,6 31,4 31,2 0,0
Malta 23,4 24,1 23,3 23,6 23,9 24,5 23,6 n.a. n.a. 17,0 17,7 17,4 17,6 17,8 18,4 18,6 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 37,2 37,4 37,1 38,8 38,9 44,4 44,0 44,8 7,6 38,9 39,1 40,0 40,8 41,6 40,6 40,2 41,4 2,5
Poland 42,9 42,9 43,1 43,3 43,6 43,7 42,8 39,8 -3,1 41,8 41,7 41,9 42,2 42,4 42,5 41,6 38,7 -3,1
Portugal 36,4 36,6 36,8 36,8 36,3 36,3 37,4 37,4 1,0 32,2 32,3 32,4 32,4 31,8 31,7 32,6 32,6 0,4
Romania 47,9 47,3 46,2 45,8 44,0 43,7 43,4 n.a. n.a. 45,2 44,6 43,4 42,9 42,4 42,2 41,8 n.a. n.a.
Slovak Republic 42,8 42,5 42,9 42,5 38,3 38,5 38,5 38,9 -3,9 41,3 40,8 40,9 39,6 35,3 35,6 35,6 36,1 -5,2
Slovenia 42,3 42,5 42,5 42,6 42,4 44,0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 41,0 41,1 41,1 41,1 39,4 39,8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain 38,8 39,1 38,5 38,7 38,9 39,1 38,9 37,8 -1,0 35,3 35,7 34,7 35,2 35,5 35,9 35,6 33,8 -1,5
Sweden 49,1 47,8 48,2 48,4 47,9 47,9 45,4 44,8 -4,3 47,8 46,8 47,0 47,1 46,5 46,0 43,3 42,5 -5,3
United Kingdom 31,8 31,9 33,3 33,4 33,5 33,9 34,1 33,0 1,2 28,0 28,1 29,6 29,7 29,9 30,4 30,8 30,0 2,0
EU-27 44,9 45,0 45,4 45,2 44,9 45,1 44,8 n.a. n.a. 41,3 41,4 41,3 40,7 40,4 40,7 40,6 n.a. n.a.
Source: OECD and Eurostat, Change 2000-08 in percentage points, 2008 provisional values, AE: Average earnings
Total tax wedge (average rate, including employers' SSC),
single person without children, 100% of AE
Total tax wedge (average rate incl. employers' SSC), single
person without children, 67% of AE
Total tax wedge on labour (including employers' social security contributions)
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Box I.2.3: An assessment of labour tax reductions in the euro area: simulation results
Amongst the measures introduced over the last months by Member States to support the labour market is the 
reduction in social security contributions. This section provides a quantitative assessment of the 
macroeconomic impact of labour tax reductions in the euro area using the R&D extended version of DG 
ECFIN's QUESTIII model. (1)  Two alternative scenarios for the reduction of labour taxes in the euro area 
are presented, one with a 1 pp. tax-cut for the low-skilled workers only and another one with a 1 pp. tax-cut 
on wages for all skill-groups. Each of these two scenarios is investigated for the case that only a small or a 
large euro area country introduces these tax-cut measures respectively (Belgium and Germany are taken as 
representative countries for the exercise (2)) and also for the case when all euro area countries cut taxes on 
wages at the same time.  
For the current exercise the individual country models of the euro area members were linked into a joint 17-
region model with the corresponding trade linkages in order to capture the potential spillover effects. (3)  
The model distinguishes three types of labour services, low-, medium- and high-skilled, and two types of 
households: liquidity-constrained and non-liquidity-constrained households. The liquidity- constrained 
households can offer only low-skilled labour services, while the non-liquidity constrained households offer 
medium and high-skilled labour.  The simulated scenario allows for a increase in the budgetary deficit over 
the first ten years of the shocks. After this period a compensatory financing comes into effect via lump-sum 
taxation which is equivalent to transfer-cuts in our models. Benefits are indexed to wages and consumer 
prices in all scenarios and the benefit replacement rate is kept at 40%. (4)  The euro area countries do not 
have independent monetary policies; the common interest rates follow a standard Taylor-rule which 
responds to the euro-area wide inflation and output-gap movements. 
The simulation results with respect to the long-term GDP gain are summarized in Table 1 and depicted in 
Graph 1. The model predicts that a permanent cut in wage taxes has positive employment and GDP effects 
in all scenarios. The reduction in labour taxes lowers wage costs, reduces prices and boosts exports. The 
short-run increase in employment leads to an increase in the capital stock in the long term. The size of the 
effects depends on the country specific characteristics, but also on whether a country acts in isolation or 
jointly with other member states. These results also suggest that there are some positive spillover effects 
from a euro-area wide tax-cut in both scenarios. The simulation results show that, after 20 years, a 1 p.p. tax-
cut on low-skilled wages leads to a GDP level gain of 0.18 to 0.23% for the representative small euro area 
country and 0.09 to 0.10% for the representative large euro area country depending on whether the tax-cut 
was introduced in a single country only or across the euro area. In case of an overall tax-cut across all skill-
groups the GDP gain is 0.43 to 0.56% for the representative small euro area country and 0.44 to 0.45% for 
the large euro area country after 20 years.  
(1) See Ratto, M., W. Roeger and J.  in't Veld (2008): "QUESTIII: an estimated DSGE model of the euro area with fiscal 
and monetary policy", European Economy, Economic Papers No. 335.  
(2) As discussed in the Section 2.1 Belgium and Germany have actually undertaken temporary cuts in social security 
contributions to soften the impact of the crisis on employment. The analysis in this section nevertheless assumes that 
the reforms are of a permanent nature. 
(3) This version of the model includes the 16 euro-area countries and the rest of the world (RoW).  
(4) This is an average economy-wide replacement rate, set as the ratio of total benefits to total gross wage costs.  
Changing the level would not significantly change simulation results. 
(Continued on the next page) 
52 
Part I
Employment and wage developments 
Box (continued) 
The main findings emerging from these simulation results are as follows:
• The spillovers can be especially strong for smaller, more open economies. If only a single country 
(Belgium or Germany) undertakes the reform, this country could benefit by making competitiveness
gains relative to the trading partners. This effect is less powerful for large countries, which experience
smaller foreign demand effects in the short run and suffer from a terms-of-trade loss in the long run.
• It should be emphasized that the macroeconomic impact of the shocks depends on the country-specific
details, most crucially, on the size of the low-skilled labour share. Belgium has a share of low-skilled
households of 35% vs. 16% in Germany. The higher GDP effect of the first scenario in case of Belgium
(0.18 or 0.23% vs. Germany's 0.09 or 0.10% medium-run GDP gain from low-skilled tax-cuts) is related 
to the low-skilled labour share and not to the size of the country. This can be seen from the magnitude of
the shocks expressed in terms of GDP (see Table 1 in this box). The targeted tax-reduction on low-
skilled wages amounts to 0.15% of GDP in Belgium compared to 0.07% in Germany.
• The across-the-board tax cuts over all labour categories are similar in the single-country scenarios, but
the smaller euro area country again benefits from the positive spillovers when all countries cut taxes at
the same time.
It should be noted that the findings of this simulation are in line with the literature on international spillovers
of labour and product market reforms. (1) For instance, Dao (2008) finds that labour market reforms in
Germany, including reforms in the area of labour taxation, have positive spillover effects on the rest of the
euro area, which operate through the channel of trade, relative price adjustment, and financial market
integration. Interestingly, compared to a competitive labour market, unionization dampens the positive
response of the domestic economy and magnifies the spillover effects on the rest of the euro area. This
literature tends to support the view that carrying out reforms simultaneously allows all countries in the
monetary union to internalize these positive externalities.
(1) See, for instance, Bertola, G. (2006), “Social and Labor Market Policies in a Growing EU” Swedish Economic Policy
Review 13:1 (Spring 2006), pp.189-232, Bertola, G. (2007), “The economics and politics of social policy in Europe’s
EMU”, Mimeo, Coenen, G., P. McAdam and R. Straub (2007), “Tax Reform and Labour-Market Performance in the
Euro Area: A Simulation-Based Analysis Using the New Area-Wide Model”, Journal of Economic Dynamics &
Control, forthcoming, and Dao, M. (2008), "International Spillover of Labour Market Reforms", IMF Working Paper,
WP/08/113.
Single
country
All EA
countries
Size of the
s hock
(%GDP)
Single
country
All EA
countries
Size of the
shock
(%GDP)
GDP
Belgium 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.43 0.56 0.63
Germany 0.09 0.1 0.07 0.44 0.45 0.59
Employment
Belgium 0.24 0.25 0.54 0.57
Germany 0.1 0.1 0.44 0.44
1pp. tax-cut on low s killed wages 1 pp. tax-cut for all skill-groups
Table 1:
Long-run and GDP employment rate gains  form 1 pp. labour-tax cuts
(Continued on the next page)
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2.1.2. THE NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK FOR
LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS 
For the euro area as a whole, labour costs
pressures are expected to dissipate in line with 
the weakness in employment developments, the 
steep rise in the unemployment rate, low 
inflation expectations and the general
deterioration of confidence. According to the 
European Commission's Spring economic 
forecast, (29) the increased deterioration in firms'
demand outlook will lead to reduced labour
hoarding in the course of 2009, where the 
contraction in employment is set to accelerate to 
around 2½% on the back of weakening economic
activity. A further contraction of 1½% is forecast
for 2010. This will clearly have a strong knock-on
effect on unemployment which, on unchanged
policies and labour market behaviour, is expected
to reach double digits (11½%) by 2010. For the 
euro area, this is a level not seen in several decades
(29) European Commission (2009): "Economic forecast. Spring 
2009",  European Economy 3/2009.
– even during the highs of the mid-1990s. The
unemployment rate is expected to rise above the
structural rate (NAWRU, i.e. the non-accelerating 
wage rate of unemployment) despite the marked
increase in the latter. (30) The recent fall in
inflation expectations should also push down wage
claims in the euro area over 2009-2010. Weak
economic activity and the increasing 
unemployment rate more than offset the effect of 
potential increases in commodity prices or
exchange rate movements on inflation 
expectations. Households' expectations of inflation
one year ahead have fallen more sharply than their
perceptions of current inflation (Graph I.2.12). 
This divergence may suggest households are
(30) The very strong increase in the NAWRU, along with a 
sharp decline in capital accumulation, is behind the 
downward revision in the potential GDP growth following 
the financial crisis. For a review of the long lasting effects
on output of financial crisis and the stylised facts of the 
contribution of productivity and input factors to potential 
growth in the aftermath of the concrete crisis see Cerra, V.
and Saxena, S.C., (2008), "Growth Dynamics: The Myth of
Economic Recovery." American Economic Review, 98(1): 
439–57.
Box (continued) 
Graph 1: GDP and employment effects under low-skilled (upper graphs) and overall (lower graphs)
tax cuts
Graph 1a: Belgium Graph 1b: Germany
Graph 1c: Belgium Graph 1d: Germany
Source: Commission services.
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considering future economic developments when
forming their expectations, rather than simply
extrapolating forwards their perceptions of current
inflation. As the unemployment gap (31)  widens
and gloomy prospects for the general economic 
situation materialise, nominal wage pressures
should ease (to slightly below 2% in 2009 and
1½% in 2010), though nominal compensation per 
employee is still expected to remain positive by a 
wide margin, partly reflecting the multiannual 
agreements of earlier years and the effects of 
downward nominal wage flexibility. Labour 
productivity is expected to fall back behind trend
in 2009 with a marked rebound in 2010. Together
with the outlook for wages, unit labour costs
should slightly accelerate in 2009 before returning 
to zero growth in 2010 (Graph I.2.13).
Graph I.2.12: Inflation perceptions and inflation
expectations, EA16. Monthly data, 1999Q1-
2009Q3
9 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Perceptions of inflation over past 12 months Inflation expectations over next 12 months
(1) The corresponding questions in the consumer survey 
read as follows: "How do you think that consumer prices 
have developed over the last 12 months?" and "By
comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect
that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months?" 
The answer scheme is qualitative according to a five-option 
ordinal scale. Aggregate balances are calculated as the 
difference between positive and negative answering 
options, measured as percentage points of total answers.
Balance values range from -100, when all respondents 
choose the most negative option, to +100, when all
respondents choose the most positive option.
Source: EU Consumer Survey.
(31) The unemployment gap is computed as the difference 
between the observed rate of unemployment rate and the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment or NAWRU, available 
from the AMECO database. For a detailed description of
the methodology followed by the European Commission in 
calculating the NAWRU, see Denis, C., D. Grenouilleau,
K. Mc Morrow and W. Röger (2006): "Calculating 
potential growth rates and output gaps - A revised
production function approach", European Economy, 
Economic papers, 247.
Wage increases are expected to decelerate 
strongly in the majority of euro area countries 
over 2009-2010. The acceleration in compensation 
per employee that took pace in 2008 will be 
followed by a moderation in nominal wage growth
in the majority of Member States over the forecast
period, with growth turning negative in 2009 in
two Member States, i.e. Ireland and Portugal. New 
pay agreements signed in the metalworking 
industry in Germany in late 2008, which will be
adopted as a pilot agreement in subsequent 
bargaining negotiations, provide for wage 
increases covering the period 2009-2010 well
below the original pay demand of 8%. In Ireland,
the national pay agreement ratified in November 
2008 by the government and the social partners,
initially allowed for a 6% pay increase over 21
months in all economic sectors. However, in order 
to stabilize public finances, the Irish government
has unilaterally decided to freeze all pay rises due
to public servants until at least the end of 2010, 
while private sector employers are seeking a 
formal deferral of all pay rises for at least 12
months. Pay related measures in the public sector
as well as downward wage flexibility in the private 
sector in the current circumstances suggest a wage 
decline of 4.1% in 2009. In Portugal, the wage
bargaining round in the public sector in December
2008 resulted in a 2.9% pay rise for 2009, which
the trade unions considered insufficient to 
compensate for the decline in purchasing power of
public sector employees. Overall, wages are
expected to fall by 0.6% in 2009.  Another country
where public wages have been revised downwards
is Slovenia, where in late February the government
and the representatives of 23 public sector trade 
unions signed an austerity pay deal for the period
2009–2010 which involves a reduction in wage 
growth for 2009 from 9.9% to 7.1%. In the 
Netherlands and Finland, despite the economic 
crisis, wage growth in 2009 is nevertheless 
expected to remain resilient, as collective
agreements were signed at a time of strong 
economic growth assumptions and high inflation 
expectations. The cabinet's crisis package
approved in May 2009 engages the Dutch
government in refraining from tampering with
existing collective agreements, which, according to
social partners, should ensure wage increases stay 
relatively in line with inflation, thereby 
maintaining spending power. Social partners in
Finland are anticipating wage moderation for the 
near future. Employers have already stressed that
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pay increases are not possible in the upcoming 
bargaining round, scheduled for spring 2010. The
Finnish trade unions also agree that moderate pay 
increases would support workers’ purchasing 
power and ensure economic recovery in the long 
term. In the same vein, sectoral agreements 
adopted in Cyprus and Malta before the downturn
and wage indexation should contribute to a 
sustained wage growth in the current year, both in
the public and private sectors. For 2010, further
employment losses, rising unemployment and 
declining company profits should put downward 
pressure on wages in all euro area countries. 
Graph I.2.13: Unemployment gap and nominal unit labour 
costs, EA16. Annual data, 1997-2010
Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs
(1) The unemployment gap is calculated as the difference 
between the observed rate of unemployment and the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment or NAWRU. Nominal unit
labour costs are expressed in growth rates. All variables are 
taken from the AMECO database.
Source: AMECO.
Unit labour costs are foreseen to continue
increasing steadily in 2009 and to remain 
relatively muted in 2010 in most euro area 
countries. As employment reacts only with a lag 
to the economic downturn, labour productivity
growth should decrease sharply in 2009 before
recovering in 2010. A remarkable exception to this 
general rule is Spain, where indiscriminate labour
shedding which began in 2008 is further expected
to gain momentum over the forecast period,
therefore pushing up labour productivity growth
due to purely cyclical factors. Given the stable and 
relatively subdued nominal compensation growth
in 2009 and 2010, unit labour costs are set to
continue increasing quite steadily in 2009. This is 
expected to be reversed in 2010, when unit labour
costs are forecast to be moderate or turn negative 
in 2010 in almost all euro area countries. On 
average, over 2009-2010 the largest contraction in
unit labour costs will be registered in Ireland, 
followed by the low, albeit positive, growth rates 
of Spain and Slovenia. It is worth noting that unit
labour costs are projected to go some way in 
closing their existing divergence between EMU
Member States. In particular, Germany is forecast
to experience growth in unit labour costs above the 
euro-area average. Conversely, Ireland and Spain 
are expected to see slower growth in unit labour 
costs than in the rest of the euro area in 2009-2010. 
Risks to the outlook for wages are mainly on the
downside. Downside risks are due to important 
unemployment composition effects. Given that the 
percentage of discouraged and marginal workers
are non negligible and have increased since the
beginning of the crisis, the number of unemployed 
tends to underestimate the pool of underutilised
labour resources in euro area countries. Using 
measures of labour underutilization to assess 
labour cost pressures would result in further 
declines in wages. However, the risk of outright
decreases in nominal wages, with possible 
deflationary impacts encouraging consumers to 
postpone spending and push the economy into
deeper recession, appears very small.
Notwithstanding some anecdotal evidence on firm-
and industry-specific agreements to that end, 
inflation expectations so far remain anchored in
positive territory in most countries. Furthermore, 
past reforms in the tax and benefits systems to
increase flexibility, as well as the recent measures 
undertaken to support labour markets, should lead
to a less persistent adjustment to the economic
crisis. Should employment growth pick up quickly
with economy recovery, this would prevent wages 
to decline. 
From a sectoral perspective, organizational
change within firms and workers' reallocation 
is of key importance to wage prospects.
Business cycle indicators point to a smooth 
rebound in the retail trade sector and strong 
improvements in the industry and services sector, 
including a recent recovery for the climate in the 
construction sector. Policies should aim at easing 
the reallocation of resources across sectors,
allowing the economy to better absorb shocks and
take advantage of fast growing sectors. By
preventing that a mismatch of skills translates into 
a permanent rise in the NAWRU, investment in
retraining measures and professional mobility can
contribute to facilitate the reallocation of the 
workforce and to achieve wage growth
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commensurate with productivity developments at
the sectoral level. 
2.1.3. Competitive developments within the
Euro area 
RISING DIVERGENCE OF MEMBER STATES' COST
COMPETITIVENESS PERFORMANCE 
This section reviews divergences in cost
competitiveness among euro-area Member 
States since the launch of the euro, while
identifying the sources of increasing divergence
in cost competitiveness. The concept of 
competitiveness is not straightforward to define. In
a broad sense, it refers to the success of an
economy in selling its output on international
markets. This section takes a close look at
competitiveness within the euro area in a narrow 
sense, i.e. as measured by intra-euro area ULC-
based real effective exchange rates (REERs). (32)  
It further discusses, though in a less detailed
manner, structural competitiveness, as determined
by the industry and trade composition of euro-area 
economies. 
Since the creation of the single currency, 
nominal unit labour cost developments among 
EMU members have been diverse, leading to 
divergence in REERs based on ULC. Focusing
on the former EA12, annual nominal unit labour 
cost growth on average ranged from around zero in
Germany to around 3% in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (Table I.2.2). The standard
deviation of growth in nominal unit labour costs 
was 1.3% in 2008 against 0.95% in 1999. This has
translated into a corresponding divergence of the
ULC-based REERs of almost 34 percentage points 
on an accumulated basis over the period 1999-
2008, with Germany's REER depreciating by 15.2 
pps. in contrast with the sharp appreciation
movement recorded in Ireland equivalent to 18.6
pps. (Graph I.2.14). Looking at the two
components of nominal unit labour costs, the
standard deviation of wage growth across member 
states during 1999-2008 was 1.3, well above that 
of labour productivity growth, which stood at 0.8.
This implies that the divergence in REERs is first 
and foremost driven by diverging wages, though
(32) In the absence of internal nominal exchange rates,
developments in unit labour costs are the sole determinant 
of ULC-based Real Effective Exchange Rates (REERs).
distinct patterns in labour productivity are also
relevant.  
Graph I.2.14: Intra-EA REER, based on ULC total economy, 
EA12 Member States. Cumulative change 
1999-2008
Source: European Commission's price and cost 
competitiveness indicators.
The link between REER based on ULC and 
those based on GDP deflator is generally strong
in euro area countries. In theory, mounting
labour cost pressures do not need to translate into
inflationary pressures and a competitiveness loss if 
accompanied by a reduction in profit margins, at 
least in the short term. Graph I.2.15 shows a 
relatively close connection between REER based 
on ULC and the GDP deflator. There are some
countries, however, where the redistribution of
income between workers and firms has played a 
role in shaping competitiveness. Among countries
with unfavourable labour cost developments, 
Ireland, Italy and (to a much less extent) Portugal, 
have seen offsetting movements in profit margins,
thus mitigating the loss of competitiveness as 
measured in terms of the GDP deflator. By 
contrast, in Spain and Greece firms have been 
passing through the increase in nominal unit labour
costs on final prices, thus leading to a deterioration 
in competitiveness arising from labour cost
pressures.  
Divergence in REER based on ULC only partly 
reflects the response of labour costs to 
asymmetric cyclical positions. Divergence in 
competitiveness can be traced back to business 
cycle developments. In the face of a positive 
asymmetric demand shock, unit labour costs in the 
country affected by the shock should increase
faster than in the rest of the euro area. The increase
in unit labour costs triggers an adjustment in 
competitiveness. In line with the competitiveness 
channel, a positive relation between the cyclical
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position and the REER can be observed within the 
euro area for certain periods of time as, for 
instance, is the case in the previous downturn 
(Graph I.2.16). However, this positive relation
between the relative output gap and relative ULC
becomes much weaker if one considers the whole
EMU period, where the positive relation is driven
by Germany and Ireland. If one removes these two
countries from the sample, the slope of the 
regression line becomes even negative. The most 
striking counter example is Greece, where a 
negative cyclical position is accompanied by a 
sizeable increase in unit labour costs relative to the 
remaining euro-area countries. Portugal, the
Netherlands, Italy and Spain experienced 
comparatively neutral cyclical positions (i.e., their 
position in the cycle is not different from that of 
their main competitors over the period 1999-2008), 
yet nominal unit labour costs accelerated beyond 
the euro-area average. Overall, during 1999-2008 
Member State differences in competitive positions
have widened considerably despite minimal 
cyclical differences over the period as a whole. 
Graph I.2.15: Cumulative changes in intra-EA REER, based
on ULC total economy and GDP deflator, EA12
Member States. Cumulative change 1999-
2008
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Source: European Commission's price and cost 
competitiveness indicators.
Graph I.2.16: Unit labour costs and relative output gap, 
EA12 Member States. 1999-2003 - period 
averages in %
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(1) All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e. they are 
normalised with respect to the weighted average of the 
remaining euro-area countries.
Source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
In many instances, inadequate competitiveness
adjustment has been driven by an
inappropriate response of productivity and
wages to country-specific shocks. To gain a
better understanding of why the response of
productivity and wages to business cycle 
developments was at times inadequate, it is 
necessary to look separately at 1999-03 and 2004-
07, which broadly correspond to the previous
cyclical downturn and upturn in the euro area
(Graph I.2.17). The decline in unit labour costs in
Germany which prevailed in 1999-2003 continued
its downward path in 2003-07, due to persistent
wage moderation in spite of an improvement in the 
country's cyclical position relative to the rest of the 
euro area. The comparatively outstanding wage 
growth performance in Ireland during 1999-03 was
only partially reflected in upward unit labour costs, 
as the country witnessed a structural positive shock 
in productivity. However, the disappearance of the 
advantage in productivity growth in 2004-07 was 
not followed by a corresponding moderation in
wage growth, thereby causing a sizable increase in 
relative unit labour costs which would be unrelated 
to the country's almost neutral cyclical position.  
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Greece experienced marked increases in labour 
productivity in the early years of EMU but not 
thereafter. Unchanged wage behaviour meant 
sizable increases in unit labour costs over 2003-07.
Taking a look at 2008 data, there is a close 
correspondence between those countries with
comparatively weaker economic activity and those 
with sluggish productivity performance. One 
exception to this general rule is Spain, where the 
sharp contraction in (temporary) employment has
resulted in a (non-benign) rebound in productivity.
Graph I.2.17 also suggests that there is a long way
ahead for wages to accommodate relative cyclical
positions. In particular, wages in Germany grew 
considerably below the euro area average in 2008 
despite showing the highest positive output gap in 
relative terms. Conversely, brisk wage growth in 
Ireland and Spain, which have been particularly hit
by the current crisis, was not in line with the
negative sign of their relative output gaps. Wage
behaviour in these two countries therefore faces 
significant adjustment challenges.  
Graph I.2.17: Cyclical divergence and nominal unit labour 
costs, compensation per employee and 
labour productivity, total economy, EA12 MS. 
1999-2003 and 2004-2007 - period averages in 
%. 2008 - Annual % change
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(1) All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e. they are 
normalised with respect to the weighted average of the 
remaining euro-area countries.
Source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
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It is important to take into account sectoral 
differences in wages and productivity 
developments, particularly between 
manufacturing and the rest of the economy 
(Graph I.2.18). Wage moderation in Germany
during 2004-2007 is explained by wages falling far
behind productivity gains in manufacturing. The
reduction in relative productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector in Spain and Italy during
1999-2003 was followed by a sharp deterioration 
in productivity behaviour over 2004-2007. Given 
that, in services, the productivity gap with the rest 
of the euro area remained broadly unchanged 
during the whole period, the loss of
competitiveness in these countries could not be
rationalised in terms of Balassa-Samuelson effects, 
which would predict a real appreciation as a 
consequence of rapid productivity growth in
tradables relative to non- tradables (see Box I.2.4
for a detailed assessment of Balassa-Samuelson 
effects in euro-area countries). In the Netherlands 
and Portugal, wages increased over 1999-2003
more than was justified by their relative cyclical
positions. In Portugal, a substantial part of the 
acceleration in wages was due to excessive wage
growth in the non-tradables (fuelled to a large 
extent by public wages), whereas in the 
Netherlands the excessive wage growth was
located in manufacturing, which largely exceeded 
productivity gains in this sector. 
Euro-area countries with deteriorated 
competitiveness need flexible labour markets to 
improve their external performance. Although 
recent trends point to improved dynamism in terms
of specialization and technological content of 
exports, all current low competitive euro-area 
countries (barring Ireland and the Netherlands) still 
show a low degree of geographic diversification 
relative to their peers. They also faced increasing 
competition in their export markets during the last 
decade, mainly driven by an adverse specialization 
pattern based on labour-intensive low-technology
manufacturing goods. (33)  As a consequence, for 
these countries it is even more important to regain
intra-euro area competitiveness via flexible labour
markets. Otherwise, quantitative adjustment may
become more severe and traditional market 
(33) For a detailed analysis of competitiveness in the Southern 
euro-area countries, see Bennett et al. (2008): 
"Competitiveness in the Southern Euro Area: France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain", IMF Working Paper,
WP/08/112.
destinations in Europe might be entered by non 
euro-area competitors. The capacity of labour 
markets to facilitate competitiveness adjustment is
discussed in the following section. 
Graph I.2.18: Cyclical divergence and nominal unit labour 
costs, compensation per employee and 
labour productivity, manufacturing, EA12 MS. 
1999-2003 and 2004-2007 - period averages in 
% 
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(1) All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e. they are 
normalised with respect to the weighted average of the 
remaining euro-area countries.
Source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
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Box I.2.4: Assessing Balassa-Samuelson effects in euro-area countries
Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effects are one of the possible "benign" sources of divergence in ULC-based 
REER. The BS hypothesis predicts that if prices in the tradable sector are set at international levels because
purchasing power parity holds and if wages equalise across sectors, then wage increases in the sector with 
productivity gains (i.e. the tradable sector) will spread to the sector with relatively lower productivity gains
(i.e. the non-tradable sector). As a consequence, the relative cost of producing non-tradables will rise and
thereby the general price level will increase. The BS hypothesis therefore implies that the REER (any REER 
measure, provided it incorporates both traded and non-traded goods) will appreciate in countries with
comparatively higher productivity gap between tradables and non-tradables.
The analysis in this box assumes that tradables and non-tradables are respectively represented by the 
manufacturing and services. To see whether the BS effect could have been at play between euro-area
countries during 1999-2008, it is convenient to investigate its two central underlying assumptions, namely: i)
Wages equalise across sectors; ii) Catching-up euro-area economies have registered comparatively higher 
productivity growth in the tradable sector. 
The graph below displays relative productivity growth and relative wage growth (tradables versus non-
trandables) in the X-axis and the Y-axis respectively. For BS effects to be present within euro-area 
countries, the following conditions should be fulfilled: i) catching-up, low competitive performers are
situated on (i.e. wage equalisation hypothesis) or below (i.e. wage growth in non-tradables exceeding wage
growth in tradables) the horizontal dotted line; ii) catching-up, low competitive performers are situated to
the right of the vertical dotted line (i.e. positive productivity differential in manufacturing) and to the right of
the rest of euro-area economies. The graph shows some variance of sectoral wage growth across countries
and suggests that the wage equalisation hypothesis is far from perfect in Germany, Austria, Spain and 
Greece. Further, catching-up euro-area economies do not have higher relative productivity growth in the 
tradable sector. Quite the opposite, Greece, Spain and Portugal have among the lowest relative productivity
growth rates. Overall, the graph does not reveal any systematic link between low competitive countries and
the magnitude of the productivity differentials. Thus, there is no robust evidence in favour of the BS effect
in euro-area countries. This is in line with the consensus view in the literature that this hypothesis is well-
suited to explain trends in REERs between emerging market economies rather than between industrial 
countries, where BS effects are of second-order importance to explain the large movements in REERs (see 
Engel (1993) and Rogers and Jenkins (1995)).
Relative productivity and wage growth in euro area Member States. Relative growth tradable vs. non-
tradable sector, annual average growth in % – 1999-2008
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ASSESSING THE CAPACITY OF LABOUR MARKETS 
TO FACILITATE COMPETITIVENESS ADJUSTMENT 
Downward rigidity of nominal wages hinders
adjustment processes as it implies an 
asymmetric response of unit labour costs over
the cycle. The response of the REER to cross-
country differences in cyclical positions is
asymmetric, responding more strongly to excess 
demand than to excess supply. In particular, 
econometric evidence (34) shows that, due to
downward nominal wage rigidity, relative unit 
labour costs are more reactive over the cycle
during expansions than during downturns in some
Member States (e.g. Portugal, Italy, Greece and 
Finland), while, in others, they react broadly 
symmetrically over the cycle (e.g. Belgium,
Ireland and the Netherlands) (Graph I.2.19), or are 
even more reactive to downswings than to 
upswings (e.g. Austria, Germany and Spain). It is
worth mentioning that the information on rigidity
reported in Graph I.2.19 is fully consistent with the
official forecasts on unit labour costs discussed 
under Section 2.1.2, where Greece, Portugal and 
Finland (i.e. the "rigid" ones) stood out as the
euro-area countries with relatively high wage
growth over the forecast period, while the 
estimated marked decline in unit labour costs 
growth in Ireland is perfectly in line with the 
symmetric behaviour of this variable over the 
cycle.  
Since the introduction of the euro, downward 
rigidity of wages has contributed significantly 
to the divergence of real effective exchange
rates. As Graph I.2.20 shows, countries with on
average greater downward rigidity of wages in the
cycle and relatively regulated labour markets have
seen the greatest losses of competitiveness. A 
notable exception is Ireland, where the unit labour 
cost-based REER has appreciated substantially 
despite no asymmetry in the cyclical reaction of 
wages. 
(34) See chapter IV, Market adjustment: the competitiveness 
channel, in European Commission (2006): "Adjustment 
dynamics in the euro area: experiences and challenges. The 
EU Economy 2006 Review", European Economy No.
6/2006.
Graph I.2.19: Rigidity (1) of relative unit labour costs in total 
economy and manufacturing. EA12 Member 
States
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(1) "Rigidity" is the difference between the elasticity in the 
growth of relative unit labour costs to positive output gaps 
and the elasticity in the growth of relative unit labour costs 
to negative output gaps. Output gap elasticities are
estimated by regressing the change in a country's 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the remaining euro-area countries 
on the relative output gap and the lagged value of the 
competitiveness indicator, allowing for the coefficient of the 
output gap to vary across countries. Data are annual and 
cover the period 1970-2005.
Source: Arpaia A. and K. Pichelmann, Nominal and real
wage flexibility in EMU, Economic Paper No. 281, June 2007.
Graph I.2.20: Rigidity (1) of relative unit labour costs and 
change in competitiveness position, total 
economy. EA12 MS, annual data, 1999-2007 
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(1) "Rigidity" is the difference between the elasticity in the 
growth of relative unit labour costs to positive output gaps 
and the elasticity in the growth of relative unit labour costs 
to negative output gaps. Output gap elasticities are
estimated by regressing the change in a country's 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the remaining euro-area countries 
on the relative output gap and the lagged value of the 
competitiveness indicator, allowing for the coefficient of the 
output gap to vary across countries. Data are annual and 
cover the period 1970-2005.
Source: Arpaia A. and K. Pichelmann, Nominal and real
wage flexibility in EMU, Economic Paper No. 281, June 2007.
Nominal rigidity could be very harmful in the 
current crisis as it would require stronger increases
in unemployment to achieve the required change in 
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competitiveness. Moreover, slow adjustment in
wages may not only entail a temporary increase in
the NAWRU during the recession, but long-lasting 
effects on the level of output and the external
position are also possible if cyclical unemployment
becomes entrenched and structural (hysteresis 
effect). REER adjustments required in the future 
therefore call for more flexible labour markets. 
There is indeed an extensive line of research that
strongly supports improved labour market
flexibility as an important factor for adjustment in
EMU. (35)  In the context of the crisis, higher 
market flexibility would make the reallocation of 
resources across sectors easier. Concretely, 
according to the stylized facts of the impact of past 
major recessions in Europe and the US, labour 
(and product) market regulation is negatively
correlated with TFP growth between the five-year 
period before and after the recessions. The US and
UK, with lower labour (and product) market 
regulation, have experienced a positive change in
TFP growth as opposed to Portugal, Spain, France 
or Italy. (36)   
The current crisis has so far brought only
limited adjustment in cost competitiveness.
Graph I.2.21 shows that ULC-based REER are not
forecast to move strongly in the direction of 
rebalancing competitiveness between euro-area 
members. On the contrary, most countries with 
overvalued real exchange rates are expected to 
further lose competitiveness while undervalued 
economies will continue to gain competitiveness. 
Two exceptions to this general rule are Ireland –
which will close its competitiveness gap by 2010, 
and Spain –which will regain only a little of the 
past competitiveness losses. Short of the necessary
correction in REER, the ongoing crisis will take an 
even bigger toll in terms of unemployment and 
falling domestic demand in countries suffering 
from external imbalances. 
(35) For a recent study see Zemanek et al. (2009): "Current
Account Imbalances and Structural Adjustment in the Euro
Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness," CESifo 
Working Paper Series. The paper finds a significant impact 
of higher labour market flexibility and stronger structural
reforms on competitiveness in EMU.
(36) See the evidence reported in Gonzaléz et al. (2009): "The 
impact of the economic and financial crisis on potential 
growth", QREA, Volume 8 No.2 (2009).
Graph I.2.21: Adjustment in ULC-based REER (total
economy) following the financial crisis. EA12
MS, historical data (1999-2008) and official 
forecasts (2008-2010) 
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Labour market support measures can be an
important factor influencing future changes in
intra area competitiveness in the short run.
From an intra euro-area competitiveness 
perspective, a key channel through which labour 
market policies influence competitiveness in the
short run is changes in taxes and social security
contributions, which have an impact on wage and 
labour costs developments. Rebates on social
security contributions to boost labour demand have
been taken in a number of euro area members and 
have then typically been made conditional upon
job creation (Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal and 
Slovakia). It can be noted that lowering labour 
costs for both employers and employees featured
already in some medium-term national reform
programmes and gained additional relevance in the
framework of the crisis (Belgium, France and 
Germany). Improving the incentives to work 
embedded in the tax and benefit systems has also 
been high on the policy agendas and is in line with 
the long term goals. Overall, apart from reducing
the tax pressure on labour especially for low-wage 
earners (e.g. Finland and Malta), most of these
measures appear to be temporary and contingent to
the economic crisis. Many euro area countries have 
either introduced new forms of public support to
flexible working time or temporary unemployment 
(Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia), or extended the 
duration and/or the level of already existing public 
support (Austria, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy). Some Member 
States provide incentives for using the reduced 
hours for training activities (Austria, Belgium and
Germany) in order to maximise the employability
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of workers on short-time arrangements. From a 
competitiveness perspective, it is clear that the 
potential impact on competitiveness of these 
measures hinges very much on their temporary 
nature. It is nevertheless too early to judge whether 
the measures taken are adequate but, to the extent 
that countries deal with these measures with 
different effectiveness, it can be an important 
factor influencing future unit labour cost 
developments and thus changes in intra-area 
competitiveness in the short run.  
Labour market measures adopted in the 
framework of the recovery programmes have 
been rather effective at stopping unemployment 
from shooting up so far. Yet, a good number of 
short-term measures are likely to affect the 
sectoral allocation of resources and the 
competitive positions of the European countries 
in the long run. Training and active labour market 
policies help to respond to the increase in 
unemployment during crises, and therefore 
contribute to ensuring that structural 
unemployment does not increase. By facilitating 
the matching process and labour market 
transitions, policies that promote mobility from 
contracting to expanding sectors and active labour-
market and retraining programmes enhancing the 
employability of those hit by the crisis can also be 
expected to have a longer term impact on labour 
productivity and relative competitiveness 
positions. Euro area members have taken a number 
of relevant measures in this field. (37)  Measures 
taken to support sectors particularly hard-hit by the 
crisis, even if phased out as soon as the economic 
recovery begins to hold, , may implicitly 
contribute to postponing necessary restructuring 
and thus lead to lower long term productivity and 
reduced competitiveness. There has been a 
significant emphasis placed on the automotive 
industry, where 10 euro area countries have taken 
(37) Some Member States have aimed at improving the 
functioning of public agencies to ease labour market 
transition (EL, FI). Measures explicitly designed to support 
and ease the re-integration into the labour market of 
recently laid-off workers were adopted in AT, BE, FI, FR, 
ES, NL, SI, SK. Training opportunities and incentives were 
expanded in many countries (AT, EL, FI, FR, PT, SI). 
Specific interventions to support workers threatened by 
mass dismissals in those sectors which are being most hit 
by the crisis were adopted in ES, including vocational in-
work training, social security rebates to preserve existing 
jobs, subsidies for job search and mobility. 
demand measures, (38) on construction (France, 
Ireland and Spain), and on tourism (Cyprus and 
Malta). 
Rebalancing of existing competitiveness 
disequilibria would also benefit from further 
improvements in wage bargaining practices. It 
has been argued (39) that insufficient transnational 
bargaining coordination is part of the explanation 
of the increasing divergence in REER within euro-
area members). Assuming that trade unions seek to 
maximize the purchasing power of their 
membership, national wage bargainers can choose 
between two strategies depending on whether they 
dominate the negotiating process in the tradable 
rather than the non-tradable sector. In the former 
case (i.e., Germany), they will seek to maximise 
employment by undercutting unit labour costs set 
by world competitors. In the latter case (i.e., Spain, 
Portugal and Italy), non-tradable sector dominates 
collective bargaining, especially in public services, 
and unions seek to maximise income by pushing 
wages in the protected sector. The first strategy 
would lead to a fall in unit labour costs and an 
increase in competitiveness relative to the euro-
area average; the second strategy would lead to 
above average wage inflation and deteriorating 
competitiveness. Over the last 10 years national 
wage settlements have diverged and it has been 
argued that this is due to insufficient consideration 
of the euro-wide macroeconomic environment in 
national wage bargaining, including the relative 
competitive positions of national production 
locations. 
(38) Car-scrapping schemes have been implemented in several 
countries (FR, PT, IT, ES, LU, DE, AT, SK, CY, NL) with 
the German version being the most extensive example, 
where the measure is both temporary and has large cross-
border spill-overs. There are also some measures on the 
supply side, such as in France ("Pacte Automobile" 
proposed in February 2009), Italy and Spain 
(Competitiveness automobile plan proposed in March 
2009). See, DG ECFIN (2009): "The EU's response to 
support the real economy during the economic crisis: an 
overview of Member States' recovery measure", 
Occasional Paper, No.51. 
(39) See, for instance, Collingnon (2008): "Wage developments 
in Euroland: the failure of the Macroeconomic Dialogue", 
mimeo. 
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2.2. LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS IN
DENMARK, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM 
After a period of extensive pressures on the
labour market and high wage increases in 2008,
wage inflation is beginning to decline as a result 
of the economic slowdown. Although private-
sector wage increases declined substantially 
throughout the autumn in step with the abating 
pressure on the labour market, the rate of wage
increase in Denmark reached 4.7% during 2008. 
This was 1 pp. higher than the average over the 
period 1999-2007 and clearly much higher than 
that of the euro area. This was due to labour 
shortages, especially in construction. Domestic
overheating is indeed at the root of the recession in
the Danish economy, which had already started in
the beginning of 2008, well ahead of the time
when the global crisis became visible. Together
with the contraction in productivity of -2.2%, unit
labour costs edged up to 7% in 2008. Thus, the
undermining of competitiveness that has prevailed
for a number of years in the Danish economy 
continued in 2008, and was further accentuated by 
an increase in the effective exchange rate of the 
krone. In the UK, nominal unit labour costs stood 
at 2.4% -i.e. the average over the period 1999-
2007, as wages moderated in line with weaker 
productivity growth. Wage growth nevertheless 
fell sharply in the early months of 2009. This
mainly reflects the impact of the marked rise in 
import prices following the fall in the exchange
rate since the middle of 2007 and the recent falls in
demand, which are both prompting business to
bear down on labour costs. There is evidence that 
the largest falls in regular pay growth have tended
to occur in those sectors that have experienced the
sharpest contractions in output. Also, wage growth
in the past has tended to be relatively weak during
periods of strong import price inflation. Wage
growth in Sweden considerably weakened in 2008 
following sharp deceleration in economic activity.
Unit labour costs nevertheless accelerated in 2008 
compared with the average over 1999-2007, due to
the drag on productivity growth.
Graph I.2.22: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and nominal and real unit labour 
costs in DK, SE and the UK
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Source: AMECO.
Rising unemployment will significantly dampen
wage growth in 2009-2010. Combined with an
expected upswing in productivity growth in 
2010, this should moderate unit labour costs.
The future path of wages will depend on both the 
persistence and severity of the recession and also 
on the degree of flexibility in the labour market, 
which is relatively higher in DK, Sweden and 
Denmark. Surveys conducted by central banks in
these countries towards the end of 2008 suggest
that employees had become increasingly anxious 
about their job security following the recession, 
and that this had reduced their resistance to weaker
pay growth. That influence may grow in
importance, given the further increases expected in
unemployment. As the crisis deepens, 
unemployment will double from its record low of 
3.3% in 2008 to over 6% in 2010 in Denmark. In 
Sweden and the UK, the unemployment rate is 
likely to rise from around 6% in 2008 to around
10% in 2010. While the wage agreements that 
were signed in Sweden and Denmark, prior to the 
onset of the crisis and which run until the spring of 
2010, stipulated fairly robust nominal wage 
increases, it is likely that negative wage drift might
lead to slower wage growth. The new set of
collective agreements, due to enter into force in the
spring 2010 in both countries, is likely to take
place in an environment fostering wage restraint. 
The latest wage agreements in the UK also point to 
weak earnings growth. Around 20% of settlements 
of private sector wage settlements agreed so far in
2009 were for no increase in basic pay, compared 
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with less than 2% of settlements over the past eight
years. Following a short-lived episode of negative 
productivity growth in 2009 in the three countries, 
productivity will be reasonably strong in the
projection for 2010, reflecting the expectation that
the least productive part of the labour force will be
the first to be affected by dismissals. This should 
moderate unit labour costs towards the end of the
forecast period to 0.2% (Denmark), -1.1%
(Sweden) and 0.4% (the UK), down from 7%, 
2.7% and 2.4% in 2008.
2.3. LABOUR COST DEVELOPMENTS IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
2.3.1. Recent labour cost developments
After a mixed period of resilient convergence 
and domestic demand-driven booms, the 
Recently Acceded Member States (RAMS) were 
hit significantly harder than the euro area by 
the current crisis. Growth and living standards 
among RAMS have undoubtedly increased
following the enlargement. Looking at the figures
(Graph I.2.23), there is evidence that RAMS have
seen a considerable boost to their catching-up
process and have expanded at a pace of 5.4% of
GDP over the last five years, compared to the 
2.2% in the EU15 (respectively 4.3% and  2.1% on
average since 1995). This has helped narrow the 
gap in living standards, with income per capita
rising to almost 24% of the EU15 Member States 
average in 2008 (Graph I.2.24), up from 17% in
1995. Some of the RAMS already exceed per-
capita GDP of some of the old Member States. The 
explanatory factors of this rapid catching-up have
operated through the channels of good institutions, 
the strengthening of the rule of law, trade and
financial market integration, which boosted 
economic restructuring, helped by FDI flows. The
global financial turmoil has nevertheless given 
way to a deep crisis in several RAMS. Although 
the banking sector played a central role in the run-
up to the crisis, various features of the catching-up 
process contributed to building up vulnerability 
and increasing exposure in financial markets in 
several RAMS.  
These are associated with a catching-up model 
based on large capital inflows which fuelled 
domestic demand, allowing total investment to
substantially surpass savings, prompting sizable 
current account deficits, a rapid build-up of 
external debt and appreciation of real exchange
rates. Very low real interest rates also induced
rapid credit growth resulting in widespread foreign 
currency lending, overheating, strong wage
pressures and housing bubbles. The largely
foreign-financed domestic demand boom came to a 
sudden end at the beginning of the fourth quarter, 
following the significant tightening of international
capital inflows, increased investor risk aversion to
home-grown vulnerabilities and decelerating 
disposable income. The downturn has been
particularly severe in Latvia, Hungary and 
Romania, which, due to the accumulation of major 
imbalances, faced important funding constraints
and asked for international institutional financing.
By contrast, economic activity in some others
(Poland) continued to be relatively robust and the
recession proved to be comparatively mild. 
Graph I.2.23: Convergence of RAMS with EU15, real GDP 
growth. Average y-o-y % change, 1995-2008
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(1) SEE2 stands for the two South and Eastern Europe 
countries (Romania and Bulgaria), Baltic3 stands for Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania and CEE5 stands for the five Central
and Eastern Europe countries (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia).
Source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
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Graph I.2.24: Convergence of RAMS with EU15, per capita 
GDP relative to EU15. Percent, 1995 and 2008
Graph I.2.25: Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and unit labour costs, RAMS. y-o-
y % change, difference in 2008 from av. 2004-
2007
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(1) SEE2 stands for the two South and Eastern Europe 
countries (Romania and Bulgaria), Baltic3 stands for Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania and CEE5 stands for the five Central
and Eastern Europe countries (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia).
Source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
After continuing tight labour market conditions
and unit labour cost pressures, wages started to 
adjust in the second half of 2008 in some
RAMS. Graph I.2.25 shows that unit labour costs 
in 2008 were still situated well above the average
over the booming period 2004-2007. Wage growth
was exceptionally high in Bulgaria and Poland, 
reflecting tight labour market conditions, 
combined with modest declines in productivity. In
Estonia, where the crisis has been particularly 
severe, nominal wage growth eased considerably
in the economy as a whole and in the private sector 
in particular. Nominal unit labour costs were 
nevertheless fuelled by a severe contraction in
productivity. In Lithuania, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia wages started to adjust to the
changing situation in the labour market in the 
second half of 2008, thereby putting a lead on
nominal unit labour costs. 
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: AMECO.
Domestic inflationary pressures remained high 
in 2008, but have been decreasing rapidly in 
recent months. Compared with 2004-2007, the 
contribution of nominal unit labour costs to
domestic inflationary pressures rose markedly in
2008 in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Poland 
(Graph I.2.26). While external factors such as
soaring energy and food prices considerably 
increased inflation in 2008 in these countries, 
labour cost pressures contributed even more to
boost prices. Inflationary pressures eased
somewhat in the last months of 2008 on the back
of falling international commodity prices. Inflation 
is expected to recede rapidly in 2009 and turn 
slightly negative or register further strong
decreases in 2010 due to much lower commodity 
prices, weakening domestic demand and the abated 
of wage pressures. 
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Accession of Estonia to the EU in 2004 resulted in
a period of massive financial flows, mostly 
directed at the non-tradable sectors of Estonia's 
economy, leading to an overexpansion of 
construction and market services. The slowdown 
and later contraction rapidly affected these sectors.
In Latvia, the recession started in the first half of 
2008 and also originated in the reversal of the
domestic real estate boom, thus implying a 
substantial drop in the housing construction and
labour productivity in the sector. Survey results
point to a further deterioration in the months to
come. The reduced functioning of financial
markets in Latvia has caused nominal unit labour
costs to decrease markedly in this sector, mainly
due to a substantial drop in wages. Industrial
production has plunged to record levels in
Slovakia, mainly due to a substantial drop in
export demand, aggravated by worsening domestic
demand. This has depressed labour productivity
and fuelled unit labour costs in this sector. On the 
contrary, labour shedding has predominated in the 
construction sector, where productivity has 
increased despite the reduced activity in the sector. 
The launch in the public private partnership
investment projects for motorway construction in
the course of 2009 should limit the downward 
trend in employment in this sector.  
Graph I.2.26: Contribution of import prices, NULC, gross 
operating surplus and net indirect taxes to
growth in final demand deflator, RAMS. 2008
compared with av. 2004-2007
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Source: AMECO.
The construction and manufacturing sectors
were the worst hit (Graph I.2.27). In Estonia,
nominal unit labour costs fell the most in the 
construction and wholesale trade and real estate
activities due to a combination of falling wages 
and contracting productivity (only in wholesale
trade and real estate activities).  
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Real unit labour costs accelerated sharply in 
almost all RAMS following brisk increases in 
real production wages. Graph I.2.28 shows that
growth in real unit labour costs in 2008 reached 
6.2% in RAMS as a whole. This is more than 5 
pps. higher than the average over the recent period
2004-2007. Only in Lithuania did real unit labour
costs grow at a slower rate in 2008 than over the 
three previous years, thanks to considerable 
advances in labour productivity coupled with
comparatively contained pressures in real product 
wages. At the opposite side of the spectrum, real 
unit labour costs increased by rates higher than 5%
in Bulgaria (5.2%), Latvia (6.8%) and Estonia
(10.8%), although for different reasons, namely,
strong increases in real wages in Bulgaria, 
plummeting productivity in Latvia and a
combination of the two in Estonia.
Graph I.2.28: Real unit labour costs, RAMS. Y-o-y % change, 
2008 compared with average 2004-2007
GDP-deflated compensation per employee 2008 Labour productivity (inverted) 2008
Real unit labour costs 2008 Real unit labour costs Av. 04-07
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and 
unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts.
Source: AMECO.
Growth in real consumption wages was 
adversely affected by the crisis thereby putting 
pressure on consumers' budget. Graph I.2.29
indicates that real consumption wages growth
decelerated strongly in Baltic3 and SEE2 closely 
tied with labour productivity adjusted for the terms
of trade. (40) By contrast, growth in real
consumption wages accelerated somewhat in 
CEE5, largely decoupled from the significant
(40) Over the long term, labour productivity adjusted for the 
terms of trade defines an upper limit for real consumption 
wages. 
Graph I.2.27: Compensation per employee, labour productivity and unit labour costs by sectors, selected RAMS. Y-o-y % 
change, difference in 2008Q4 from average 2007Q2-2008Q3
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted scale) Nominal unit labour costs
(1) Compensation per employee, labour productivity and unit labour costs are based on employment in headcounts. NACE
G-I includes Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants and Transport and Storage and Communication (I). NACE J-
K includes Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business services. Readers should be aware of the fact that scales differ across
sectors.
Source: Eurostat.
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terms-of-trade deterioration and the slowdown in
labour productivity. From a longer term
perspective, Graph I.2.29 interestingly shows that
real consumption wages tend to be more volatile in
RAMS economies than terms-of-trade adjusted
labour productivity, thus implying that fluctuations
in real product wages are generally sharper than 
those in labour productivity. This is most likely 
suggestive of a higher degree of flexibility in
labour and product markets in RAMS than in euro-
area countries, where quantities were shown to
fluctuate more than prices. Although higher
flexibility in real wages facilitates adjustment in
the labour market it also raises the concern that 
private consumption will be impaired by lower 
disposable income in the short run. This danger is 
especially tangible in RAMS, where consumption
has been adversely affected by the sudden reversal
in the growth of credits to households, thereby
worsening the recession. In many RAMS, the
deleveraging of the economy has indeed resulted
in the monthly growth in credit to the private 
sector turning negative. Narrowed access to credit 
could have severe effects on consumption. The
May 2009 Regional Economic Outlook shows that
household credit growth is positively correlated
with retail sails growth in a number of emerging
European economies, even though the strength of
the correlation differs across countries. This is 
taken as an indication that, in emerging Europe, a
credit decline is associated with a consumption 
decline.  
Graph I.2.29: Real consumption wages and labour
productivity adjusted for terms of trade, RAMS. 
Annual data, 1999-2008
Labour productivity Terms of trade
Labour productivity adjusted for terms of trade Real consumption wages
(1) SEE2 stands for the two South and Eastern Europe 
countries (Romania and Bulgaria), CEE5 stands for the five 
Central and Eastern Europe countries (Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and
Baltic3 stands for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Source: AMECO and European Commission's staff 
calculations.
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Table I.2.4: Unit labour costs (in nominal and real terms) and its components. Y-o-y % changes, 2008 and average 2004-
2007
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SK NMS
Compensation per employee
2008 19,3 6,3 14,7 16,7 14,5 7,8 7,6 22,0 8,7 13,7
Av. 04-07 9,1 5,8 15,7 24,5 14,0 7,4 2,2 19,3 8,6 9,7
Labour productivity
2008 2,7 2,0 -3,8 -5,3 3,5 1,8 0,9 6,8 3,3 2,0
Av. 04-07 3,4 4,4 6,3 7,4 6,1 3,3 2,6 7,3 6,2 4,2
Nominal unit labour costs
2008 16,6 4,3 18,6 22,0 10,9 6,0 6,7 15,2 5,4 11,7
Av. 04-07 5,7 1,4 9,4 17,1 7,9 4,1 -0,5 12,0 2,5 5,5
GDP deflator
2008 11,4 1,7 7,8 15,2 10,3 3,8 3,1 14,0 2,9 5,5
Av. 04-07 6,3 2,2 6,3 11,8 6,1 4,2 3,0 12,7 3,1 4,6
Real unit labour costs
2008 5,2 2,6 10,8 6,8 0,7 2,1 3,6 1,2 2,5 6,2
Av. 04-07 -0,6 -0,8 3,1 5,3 1,8 0,0 -3,5 -0,7 -0,6 0,9
Source: Eurostat.
The economic downturn has been accompanied 
by some depreciation in a few RAMS in 2008, 
whereas the remaining ones have seen
competitiveness deteriorating further. Graph 
I.2.30 illustrates that European emerging
economies have accumulated significant
competitiveness losses in the recent past. Another 
interesting pattern featuring competitiveness 
performance in RAMS is the squeeze in corporate
profits to compensate for strong labour cost 
pressures. As illustrated by Graph I.2.30, almost
all RAMS have avoided passing thorough the 
marked increase in nominal unit labour costs 
characterising the convergence process on prices, 
thus mitigating the loss of competitiveness as 
measured in terms of GDP deflator at the expense
of a drop in profit margins. As regards the impact 
of the crisis, due to the fact that most RAMS are
small open economies, the marked deterioration in
regional trade with the rest of the EU, the main
trading partners, hit RAMS particularly hard.
Exports of both goods and services are expected to
contract further in coming months in view of the 
bleak economic outlook in RAMS' main trading
partners. Economic downturn in RAMS will,
therefore, most likely be deeper and more 
protracted than previously assumed. One exception
to this general rule is Poland, where the recession
is relatively mild, as the lower degree of openness 
cushions the effects of external developments. 
During 2008, depreciation in nominal currencies
took place in Romania, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. In Romania, successive wage
negotiations have driven up unit labour costs, 
affecting Romania's international competitiveness 
in favour of low-cost Asian countries. Pressures on
the RON resulted in 25% depreciation since
August 2008, which partly reflected a correction 
from previously overvalued levels. The Polish 
currency also witnessed a strong depreciation in
2008. This is expected to rebound external 
demand. However, there are increasing concerns 
that depreciation could also hamper the 
consumption of foreign-currency-indebted
households, increase the financial costs of
companies and affect also the inflation outlook. In 
the Czech Republic, the collapse of external
demand is expected to weigh on export growth in
spite of depreciation of the Czech koruna in the 
second half of 2008. Excessive borrowing by both
the public and private sectors in Hungary made the 
economy vulnerable to a depreciation of the 
exchange rate. Although the large depreciation of 
the forint (October 2008) is expected to
temporarily improve competitiveness, it also hurts 
household balance sheets, given large foreign-
currency denominated liabilities. Exchange rate 
movements may also have an impact on real wages
if the depreciation of the exchange rate make 
imported goods more expensive, increase the
consumer price index and reduce the real wages. 
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Graph I.2.30: Competitiveness in RAMS. Cumulative % 
change 2004Q1-2008Q3 compared to q-o-q
% change 2008Q4 over 2008Q3
Cumulative change, 2004Q1-2008Q3
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
LV RO EE PO SK CZ LT BG HU
q-o-q % change, 2008Q3 over 2008Q4
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
LV RO EE PO SK CZ LT BG HU
REER based on ULC total economy REER based on GDP deflator NEER
Source: European Commission's price and cost 
competitiveness indicators.
2.3.2. The near term outlook for labour cost 
developments 
Looking further ahead, weaker labour demand
and inflation expectations should ease wage
pressures in the RAMS. The economic slowdown 
is expected to have a strong impact on the labour
market with significant job losses being broad
based across economic sectors, though particularly
acute in those sectors most exposed to the 
downturn, namely the real estate. Labour market
conditions, which had previously driven 
unemployment close to full employment, will 
deteriorate and the downward trend in 
unemployment is to be reversed over the forecast
period. Weaker inflation expectations (Graph 
I.2.31) should also put downward pressure on
wages in wage negotiations ahead. As a general
rule, the severe downturn should accordingly 
trigger a progressive wage adjustment supported 
by private sector wage reductions as well as wage
cuts in the public sector. However, public sector 
wages will outpace wages in the business sector in
some countries, namely Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus and Malta. In contrast with
recent past trends, public wages in the Czech 
Republic will grow faster than wages in the
business sector, which are set to decelerate 
substantially following cuts in working hours and 
falling demand for labour. The outlook for wage
developments in Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus was
already discussed under section 2.1.2. 
Graph I.2.31: Inflation expectations, selected RAMS 
BG EE LT HU SI SK
(1) The corresponding question in the consumer survey 
reads as follows "By comparison with the past 12 months, 
how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in the 
next 12 months?" The answer scheme is qualitative 
according to a five-option ordinal scale. Aggregate 
balances are calculated as the difference between
positive and negative answering options, measured as 
percentage points of total answers. Balance values range 
from -100, when all respondents choose the most negative 
option, to +100, when all respondents choose the most
positive option. 
Source: EU consumer survey.
Despite the lower productivity growth, the
projected much more moderate nominal wage 
increases will bring nominal unit labour cost 
growth in RAMS down from 8.2% in 2008 to
around 4.0% this year and 2.1% the next. In
line with slowing activity, productivity growth is 
expected to moderate over the forecast horizon. 
Coupled with a lower acceleration in wages, this is
set to decelerate unit labour cost further (Graph 
I.2.32). The unemployment gap (41) will be
situated in positive territory in all RAMS, although 
with varying magnitudes. Unemployment gaps 
higher than 3% are projected by 2010 in Estonia
(41) The unemployment gap is computed as the difference 
between the observed rate of unemployment rate and the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment or NAWRU, available 
from the AMECO database. For a detailed description of
the methodology followed by the European Commission in 
calculating the NAWRU, see Denis, C., D. Grenouilleau,
K. Mc Morrow and W. Röger (2006): "Calculating 
potential growth rates and output gaps - A revised
production function approach", European Economy, 
Economic papers, 247.
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Graph I.2.32: Unemployment gap and nominal unit labour costs, RAMS. Annual data, 2002-2010
Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs
Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs
Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs Unemployment gap Nominal unit labour costsUnemployment gap Nominal unit labour costs
(1) The unemployment gap is calculated as the difference between the observed rate of unemployment and the NAWRU.
Nominal unit labour costs are expressed in growth rates. All variables are taken from the AMECO database.
Source: AMECO.
Rapidly declining wage growth will not be
sufficient, however, to redress all competitiveness 
weaknesses in RAMS and put their economies on a
stronger footing for a sustainable export-led
recovery from end-2010. It is possible that some
pressures emerge in the future to compensate for 
the loss in corporate profits, adversely affecting 
competitiveness. In the medium term, policy
measures should aim at shifting economic
resources to the tradable sector and attracting 
investment in higher value added sectors, which
are less dependent on low wages. This could be
achieved by further improving the business
climate, upgrading infrastructure and developing
labour skills. Investment in human capital is still at
a relatively low level compared with the euro area 
average. External imbalances make the need for 
policy measures which ensure continued FDI
inflows particularly acute.   
and Lithuania, Poland and Latvia. In Slovakia,
Hungary and Rumania the unemployment gap will 
gradually close over the forecast horizon. The
Czech Republic and Bulgaria occupy intermediate
positions, with unemployment gaps of around 1%
to 2%. Although developments in unit labour costs 
are still governed by long-term dynamics and 
convergence phenomena specific to RAMS, Graph 
I.2.32 suggests that the relation between labour
market slack and nominal unit labour costs is 
broadly negative, i.e. labour costs can be expected
to adjust to the excess of labour supply over the 
forecast period. 
Weakening labour costs will contribute to 
improving the competitiveness position of 
RAMS. Together with weak domestic demand and
modest commodity price growth in 2009 and 2010, 
low nominal wage growth should compensate for
the losses seen in cost competitiveness over recent
years.  
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1.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
1.1.1. Recent trends 
Austrian labour market performed relatively well 
in recent years, with an employment rate of 72.1%, 
already above the Lisbon target since 2006. This 
result is a consequence of a sustained increase in 
female employment (+5.6 pps. since 2001, up to 
65.8% in 2008) and an even more pronounced rise 
in older workers employment rate (+12.4 pps. 
since 2001) that, however, was still at 41% in 
2008,  well below the Lisbon target. 
The effects of the financial crisis on the labour 
market were relatively mild in 2008. Employment 
rate still increased by 0.7 pp., by less than in 2007 
(+1.2 pps.) and the unemployment rate shrank to 
3.8%, very close to the record low (3.6%) 
registered in 2001. With an employment rate about 
half percentage points below the rate of 2008q3, 
the crisis started to have a tool on previously 
resilient labour market in 2008q4. In 2009q1 the 
employment rate fell to 70.8%, 2 pps., below the 
rate of only 6 months earlier.  
The growth of labour productivity, 1.4% on 
average between 2002 and 2008, came to a halt in 
2008, perhaps as a consequence of labour hoarding 
during the first months of recession. 
As for long-term trends, the degree of 
segmentation in the Austrian labour market is low, 
as compared to other countries. Males have an 
activity rate about 13 pps. higher than females. 
Their employment and unemployment rates are 
respectively 12.7 pps. higher and 0.5 pp. lower 
than those of females. These figures are in line 
with EU27 averages but less pronounced than the 
euro-area averages. Age gaps appear to be more 
important compared to other countries. The 
employment rate of prime-age individuals is higher 
than in the EU27 and the euro area average, while 
that of older workers is still well below the EU 
average, despite  considerable increases in recent 
years. However, the youth employment rate is 
relatively high (55.9%) as compared to the EU27 
and the euro area (around 38%), while the 
unemployment rate of young is relatively low (8%, 
around a half of the EU averages), although it has 
been increasing considerably over the last decade.  
Although the gaps in terms of activity, 
employment and unemployment rates between 
nationals and non-nationals are not the highest in 
Europe, they have been widening over the last 
decade. With respect to 2001, the activity rate of 
nationals increased by 5.4 pps. while that of non-
nationals decreased by 4.5 pps., thus making non-
nationals less attached to the labour force than 
nationals (in 2008 the activity rates of nationals 
and non-nationals were 75.7% and 69.5%, 
respectively). The lack of labour demand, in 
particular for non-EU nationals (probably due to 
skills mismatch between labour demand and 
supply as they on average achieve lower 
educational levels and have a higher share of early 
school leavers), evidenced by a more than doubled 
unemployment rate, may explain higher 
discouragement effect of non-nationals.  
Temporary contracts are not as common as in other 
countries (9% of the total employment against the 
euro area average of 16.4%) and have remained 
more or less stable in the latest years. On the other 
hand, part-time employment is much more spread 
out, accounting for 22.6% of the total employment 
(17.6% and 19.3% for the EU27 and the euro area 
respectively), after a 5.8 pps. increase since 2001. 
In 2008, 41% of women (as % of all contracts) had 
part time contracts compared to only 6.9% of men.  
The relatively good performance of the labour 
market is confirmed by the low incidence of long-
term unemployment that accounts for about 24% 
of the total unemployed (37% in EU27). Yet, the 
employment rate of older workers is low while 
their long-term unemployment rate high. In 
2009q1, the older workers' activity rate fell to 
41.2% (about ½ pp. lower than in 2008q1), thus 
widening a gap with the EU in the recent quarters.  
1.1.2. Outlook for next two years  
According to the most recent EU Commission 
forecasts (Spring 2009), in 2009 and 2010 Austria 
will be heavily hurt by the international financial 
and economic crisis. After a GDP growth of 
+1.8% in 2008, output is seen shrinking by -4.0% 
in 2009 and -0.1% in 2010. The negative effects on 
labour demand are supposed to be very 
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pronounced, with a substantial impact on the 
unemployment rate (moving up from 3.8% in 2008 
to 7.1% in 2010). 
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Table II.1.1: Short-term forecasts - AT 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
1,8 -4,0 -0,1 -4,3 -0,1 -3,0 0,2
1,8 -2,1 -0,9 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,7
3,8 6,0 7,1 6,1 7,9 5,4 6,2
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
IMFEU Commission OECD
GDP growth
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic Outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.1.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 68,4 72,1 62,5 65,9
Men 76,7 78,5 70,8 72,8
Women 60,1 65,8 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 28,7 41,0 37,5 45,6
Men 40,0 51,8 47,4 55,0
Women 17,9 30,8 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 71,0 75,0 68,5 70,9
Men 79,4 81,4 76,9 78,0
Women 62,5 68,6 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 30,1 41,9 40,1 48,1
Men 42,1 52,8 50,8 57,9
Women 18,8 31,6 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 3,6 3,8 8,5 7,0
Men 3,1 3,6 7,7 6,6
Women 4,2 4,1 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 26,1 24,2 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 5,2 6,4 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 8,1 9,0 12,4 14,0
15-24 33,4 34,9 35,9 40,0
55-64 2,9 3,0 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 16,8 22,6 : 17,6
Men 3,8 6,9 : 7,0
Women 33,1 41,1 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 68,4 72,1 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 47,2 51,0 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 73,3 77,1 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 86,2 86,1 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 2,1 2,7 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 17,2 18,1 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 11,0 12,2 18,0 22,5
AT EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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1.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
A first economic recovery program was adopted in
October 2008 and a second one was adopted in
December 2008. Income tax cuts approved by the 
Parliament in April are retroactive from 1 January 
onwards. The Austrian government adopted two
labour market support packages, respectively in 
February and June 2009. These measures focus, 
inter alia, on income support,  on reducing lay-offs 
and improving access to training, as well as on 
gross fixed investment, ensuring enterprises with
access to finance, and support for the automotive 
industry. In addition to discretionary measures, 
automatic stabilisers will be fully effective. 
Measures targeted to avoid lay-offs include the
extension of the access to short-time work by firms
and greater financial incentives (including special 
training allowances) to use it. The duration of the 
short-time working allowance was extended to six 
months from previously three. Further on, the
possibility of demanding a prolongation of the 
scheme was introduced, up to 18 months in total.
The necessary minimum working hours were
reduced to 10% of normal working time. A further
extension of the allowance - up to a maximum
duration of 24 months - was decided in June 2009 
in the framework of the second labour market 
package, for the period 2010 to 2012. For
employees under a short-time working scheme, it
was also decided that from the 7th month onwards 
the employer's part to social contributions will be
covered in total by the public employment agency.
While in April 2009 around 60.000 persons 
(around 2% of dependent employees) were on
short-time work, by the end of September 2009 
their number dropped to 40.000. The cost for this 
scheme is projected by the authorities at € 220 
million (0.1% of GDP for 2009 and 2010 each).  
Additional training and qualifying programs for 
women, younger and metal workers have been also
announced. All school leavers looking for a job
will be guaranteed an apprenticeship placement. 
The number of participants will increase from
10.300 to 12.000, if necessary to 15.000. An 
extended education leave scheme will enable 
training for 3 to 12 months while receiving a 
fictitious unemployment benefit. The level of
unemployment benefits was increased and the
regulation of sabbatical leave relaxed (2 to 12
months' minimum duration from formerly 3
months; and minimum employment spell prior to 
the sabbatical leave lowered to 6 months from 
previously 12 months) on a permanent basis in
June 2009. Partial retirement regulations were also 
eased in June 2009 (42).
(42) New measures include: (i) Easier access to partial
retirement; (ii) postponement of planned increase in the 
minimum age to be eligible for this measure to 2011 
(minimum age for females: 53 years, male: 58 years); (iii) 
Box II.1.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - AT
EU (CSRs 2009): 
Further improve incentives for older workers to continue working by implementing a comprehensive
strategy including enhanced job-related training, adaptation of working conditions, and tightening the
conditions for early retirement; improve education outcomes for disadvantaged youth.
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Enhance work and entrepreneurship incentives by lowering marginal income tax rates financed by further
broadening the tax base through reducing numerous tax allowances. 
IMF (2008 Article IV): 
Recommend that pension reforms be implemented firmly to enhance long-run fiscal sustainability and 
encourage labour market participation and flexibility. 
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There has been a remarkable increase in the 
number of labour foundation participants
(Arbeitsstiftungen) since September 2008, when 
the effects of the crisis became more 
noticeable (43). The creation of "sectoral labour 
foundations" (Branchenstiftungen) for young 
temporary workers, who are strongly affected by 
the crisis, is in its final stage. The strong increase 
in the use of short-time work and extensions in 
training programs has helped limiting the rise in 
unemployment so far. However, in the case of a 
prolonged recession, lay-offs of employees 
currently on short-time work might not be avoided. 
1.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Austria has adopted substantial recovery measures 
providing a timely stimulus, as a large part of them 
took effect in the first quarter of 2009. Extensions 
of the access to and greater financial incentives for 
companies to use short time as well as extensions 
in training programs have helped to avoid 
excessive labour market adjustments so far and are 
in line with the EERP.  
Austria has non-rigid employment protection 
legislation as well as a relatively high internal 
flexibility. The reform of the severance pay system 
introduced in 2003 injected, in a rather original 
way, additional external flexibility, as it eliminates 
uncertainty of firms related to severance payments 
and supports job-to-job transitions of workers. As 
to the internal flexibility, reform of the Working 
Hours Act in 2007 reduced the costs of overtime 
work as a part of relaxing regulation on working 
hours, thus supporting in particular companies 
with a high incidence of overtime work. These 
companies constitute the highest share of 
companies in Austria. Also, since mid-80s, as a 
part of a general tendency towards greater 
flexibility, work agreements at company level have 
90% public reimbursement of costs if the partial retirement 
follows a continuous schema until the legal retirement age 
(60 for females, 65 for males) and 55% if it is blocked (i.e. 
full-time work in the first half of the partial retirement 
period and full retirement in the second part). 
(43) Labour foundations are a peculiar element of the Austrian 
social model, where former employers, the PES and 
employees work together to provide financial and labour 
market policy support to help a smooth reallocation in the 
labour market of dismissed employees. 
been increasingly gaining on importance as an 
instrument to regulate terms and conditions of 
employment.  
High effective labour taxation produces 
disincentives to take up work, in particular for 
families with children. Furthermore, high gender 
segregation is still decisively influenced by the 
decision on the path and subject of education. 
Although childcare services have expanded and 
enrolment rates have gone up in recent years, 
measures taken are too few to offset the shortage 
of childcare facilities, especially for children under 
the age of three. This has contributed to an above 
the EU average gap in employment rates of women 
with and without children (17 pps.).  
The wage bargaining process has contributed to 
wage moderation and wage flexibility in recent 
years and has become increasingly diversified and 
decentralized. High wage flexibility offsets the low 
external mobility and mitigates the adverse impact 
of high labour taxes on employment - as a 
substantial share of tax burden is ultimately on 
workers, which could explain the relatively high 
job tenure rate and low external mobility. Recent 
shift to the national minimum wage of 1.000€ 
might reduce the downward wage flexibility, 
potentially hurting in particular employment 
prospects of low skilled workers and labour market 
entrants (especially young persons). A reduction of 
a relatively high tax wedge could additionally 
boost employment, in particular of certain family 
types with children, while increasing their income.  
Another challenge concerns the low employment 
rate of older workers who face a structural problem 
on the labour market, also as a result of high 
seniority pay and weak incentives to work due to 
generous early retirement. In fact, Austria has 
among the highest share of working age population 
receiving old age and early retirement benefits 
(about 10%), and among the highest implicit tax 
on continued work in the EU. Furthermore, the 
seniority pay rules tend to push wage above 
productivity weakening the incentives to employ 
older workers. 
Finally, Austria still lacks a coherent lifelong 
learning strategy, given its rather fragmented 
education system. The main reason is a lack of an 
educational and a governance approach for the 
implementation of lifelong learning. The 
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institutional framework and the pattern of 
coordination are quite unclear. Furthermore, a 
particularly high gap in education level can be 
observed for immigrants and it appears that it even 
persists for second level generation immigration.  
The issues of reducing the high percentage of early 
school leavers among young immigrants and 
improving their qualifications need to be further 
addressed.  
2. BELGIUM 
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2.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
2.1.1. Recent trends 
Despite the improvements of the recent years,  the 
Belgian labour market shows wide gaps between 
different groups, and employment rates far from 
the EU average.  
According to LFS data (44), the total employment 
rate in 2008 was at 62.4%, respectively 0.4 pp. and 
2.5 pps. higher than in 2007 and 2001. The female 
employment rate at 56.2% remains well below the 
Lisbon target set for the EU as a whole. Despite a 
strong increase (more than 9 pps. since 2001), the 
older workers employment rate at 34.5% is among 
the lowest in the euro area. After growing at a 
sustained pace in 2007 (+2.7%), employment 
decelerated in 2008 (+1.5%), more for males (from 
+2.1% to +0.7%) than females (from +3.5% to 
+2.5%). Due to a milder increase in the labour 
force (+1.0%), the unemployment rate kept 
declining down to 7.0% (from 7.5% in 2007). The 
effects of the financial crisis on the Belgian labour 
market, still light in 2008, became sharper in 
2009Q1 when employment rate fell by 0.5 pp. and 
the unemployment rate edged up to 8% - the 
highest rate since almost three years. 
Age gaps in employment and participation rates 
clearly point towards older workers as the main 
responsible of the low overall employment rate. In 
fact, against an activity rate for prime age workers 
of 85.7% and an employment rate of 80.5%, the 
corresponding rates for older workers are about 50 
pps. lower. Also, the unemployment rate of the 
young, at almost 21% in 2008, was three times 
larger than the unemployment rate of population 
aged between 25 and 54 (prime aged). 
As for the nationality of the workforce, while the 
activity rate of nationals is 3 pps. higher than that 
of foreigners (67.4% versus 64.3%), the 
employment rate of nationals (55.2%) is 8 pps. 
higher than that of non-nationals. Hence, non-
nationals still have a very high unemployment rate 
(44) Data from administrative datasets differ substantially from 
those from LFS. 
(14.2% in 2008, more than twice higher than the 
rate of nationals). 
The gap between nationals and non-nationals is 
probably largely due to skills mismatch, besides 
cultural and discrimination factors. The skill gaps 
are among the highest in Europe, with low-skilled 
having an activity rate of 45.4% (almost 27 pps. 
and 41 pps. below the activity rate of medium- and 
high-skilled), an employment rate of 39.7% (27.3 
pps. and 43.3 pps. below the employment rate of 
medium- and high-skilled) and an unemployment 
rate of 12.5% (respectively +5.5 and +8.9 pps. 
higher than the medium- and high-skilled). 
Temporary employment is less common than in 
other countries (8.3% of the total), even if it is 
much higher for female (10.2%) than for male 
workers (6.6%). Part-time contracts constitute an 
important part of total female employment 
(40.8%). 
Regional imbalances are very pronounced and 
even widening in the last years. Contrary to what 
seen in the rest of the EU, the gap between the 
region with the highest and lowest unemployment 
rate widened to 12.8 pps., almost 4 pps. more than 
in 2001.  
Long-term unemployment was at 47.7% of total 
unemployment in 2008, registering a decrease of 
2.6 pps. with respect to 2007. In 2008 labour 
productivity decreased by 0.5%, mainly as a 
consequence of the use of reduced-hours schemes 
at onset of the financial crisis. 
2.1.2. Outlook for the next two years  
The financial crisis is expected to have an 
important impact on the Belgian economy. The 
European Commission (ECFIN) previews a fall in 
the output (-3.5% in 2009 and -0.2% in 2010). This 
should result in an upward trend in unemployment 
rate, which is seen at 8.5% this year and 10.3% 
next year. 
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Table II.2.1: Short-term forecasts - BE 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
1,1 -3,5 -0,2 -4,1 -0,5 -3,8 0,3
1,6 -1,2 -1,5 -0,2 0,2 -3,1 -0,7
7,0 8,5 10,3 8,3 10,6 9,5 10,5
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.2.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 59,9 62,4 62,5 65,9
Men 68,8 68,6 70,8 72,8
Women 51,0 56,2 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 25,1 34,5 37,5 45,6
Men 35,1 42,8 47,4 55,0
Women 15,5 26,3 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 64,2 67,1 68,5 70,9
Men 73,2 73,3 76,9 78,0
Women 55,1 60,8 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 25,9 36,1 40,1 48,1
Men 36,3 44,4 50,8 57,9
Women 15,9 27,9 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 6,6 7,0 8,5 7,0
Men 5,9 6,5 7,7 6,6
Women 7,5 7,6 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 48,6 47,7 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 8,7 8,5 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 8,8 8,3 12,4 14,0
15-24 26,4 29,5 35,9 40,0
55-64 3,5 3,8 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 18,4 22,4 : 17,6
Men 4,9 7,5 : 7,0
Women 36,8 40,8 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 59,9 62,4 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 40,8 39,7 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 66,2 67,0 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 83,6 83,0 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 8,9 12,8 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 81,3 80,0 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 20,3 14,8 18,0 22,5
BE EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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2.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Belgium's stimulus packages include a permanent 
reduction of the tax wedge on labour, in part for 
low-income workers, as well as a number of 
measures to enhance the functioning of the labour 
market, such as a better follow-up of dismissed 
workers due to restructuring, more forceful 
outplacement obligations for employers, improved 
access to training (e.g. for those who are 
temporarily unemployed) and qualifications, as 
well as better job seeker's advice. Training and 
counselling for the unemployed were reinforced, 
especially for older workers, and the income 
supplement for older unemployed who go back to 
work extended, by removing the seniority 
condition. 
Temporary unemployment ('Chomage technique') 
allowances were temporarily increased 
(replacement rate up from 60-65% to 70%-75% 
and wage ceiling up by 300€ from 1906€ to 
2206€) and unemployment benefits extended to 
temporary and interim workers (with a tenure of 
more than 3 months in the same company). 
Unemployment allowances have been permanently 
increased as of January 2009: the wage ceiling has 
been raised by 300€ for the first 6 months of 
unemployment (leading to a ceiling at 2206€); by 
150€ from the 7th month until the 12th of 
unemployment; and by +0.8% after 12 months of 
unemployment. The goal is to make 
unemployment benefits regressive over time. 
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The existing system of temporary unemployment 
allows firms to reduce employees' working time
without resorting to dismissals and thus provides 
support to both employers and employees. While
costly in itself, this system has up to now 
contributed to the relatively contained increase in
unemployment and might also facilitate the pick 
up of production once demand accelerates as
employees with relevant experience have been
retained. However, as the crisis becomes more
protracted, a larger increase in unemployment 
cannot be excluded.
2.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
While the level of labour productivity in Belgium 
(measured in terms of output per hour worked) is 
high and comparable to the US, its growth has
been low. The weak dynamics of productivity is
responsible for the deterioration of
competitiveness of the last years, which is the 
main challenge the country has to face particularly 
in order to allow the economy to benefit from a
rebound of the world economy. It puzzles 
Box II.2.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - BE
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Further reduce the tax burden on labour, especially by reducing the tax wedge on low wage workers, while in
the medium-term improving expenditure restraint to support fiscal consolidation. 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, accelerate the implementation of coordinated policy measures that
improve labour market efficiency, review unemployment benefits to facilitate a rapid return of the
unemployed to the labour market, enhance labour market participation (especially for older workers and
people with a migrant background), reduce regional disparities and increase participation in lifelong learning
across all regions.
OECD (Going for Growth, 2009): 
To fully benefit from the increased focus on activation policies, the level of unemployment benefits should be
reduced with unemployment duration to raise incentives for job seekers to search for employment.
Target all wage subsidies and reductions of social security contributions to low-wage earners, to avoid
substitution effects between different support schemes. In particular, other reductions of social security
contributions for other types of workers, such as for shift-workers, should be phased out. 
Increase the scope for individual companies to opt out from sectoral agreements, to reduce the large and
persistent geographical mismatches in the labour market. To make wage determination more flexible, wage
indexation should be abolished. 
IMF (Article IV, 2008): 
Give consideration to reforming the wage indexation parameters to permit full coverage for the poorest, most
vulnerable workers, while allowing for less-than complete indexation for the economy as a whole. 
Improve activation policies and remove inactivity traps keeping potential workers out of the labour market.
These measures should be coupled with increase training opportunities and focused on improving labour
productivity. 
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many (45) that the high level of productivity is 
mainly due to the relatively few low-skilled (and 
low-productive) employed and a relatively short 
working time. Yet the low employment rates for 
core groups remain the main challenge.  
The actions taken so far by the government to 
respond to the crisis appear to be broadly well 
designed to face the short-term consequences of 
the recession. However, further efforts have to be 
made in order to deal with the long-term challenge 
of increasing competitiveness and improving 
labour market outcomes.  
The long-term unemployment rate is among the 
highest in the EU, which reflects structural 
problems stemming from large financial 
disincentives to take up work, unlimited 
unemployment benefit duration, wage setting 
mechanism producing high degree of real wage 
rigidities, long job tenure (higher than EU average) 
and little job mobility. Employment rates for older 
workers are low, as early retirement schemes 
remain pervasive and implicit taxes on continued 
work are high. 
High marginal effective tax rates (especially for 
women) and their interaction with benefits, as well 
as high reservation wages, depress labour supply 
both in terms of employment and hours worked. 
Furthermore, unlimited unemployment benefit 
duration tends to depress labour supply even 
further, while the employability of older workers is 
also hampered by low participation in lifelong 
learning and steep seniority pay. The latter drives 
in fact wages of older workers above their 
marginal productivity. In this setup, lower 
marginal tax rates might boost employment, in 
particular if targeted to (low-skilled) female 
employment, while properly designed activation 
policies could offset the financial disincentives to 
work enshrined in the benefit system.  
(45) See OECD (2007). 
Consistent with an intermediate degree of 
strictness of EPL, the share of temporary workers 
is relatively low; yet a large fraction of temporary 
workers declared to be involuntarily in this type 
work relationship. Furthermore, in-work poverty 
risk by temporary contracts is about three times 
higher than in-work poverty risk by permanent 
contracts (though below the EU27 average). 
Conversion rates from temporary to permanent 
contracts are intermediate. 
Strict employment protection legislation for 
temporary contracts can partly explain the low 
participation rate of young people, while numerous 
pathways into early retirement contribute to the 
very low participation of older workers.  
Reinforcing the activation strategy, in particular by 
extending the activation measures to workers over 
50, might be necessary to cope with the 
restructuring of the economy that the recession 
may bring. This strategy should be accompanied 
by lifelong learning programs that guarantee 
continuous education and a better adaptation of the 
workforce. 
The top-down determination of wages, with a 
prominent role of wage indexation and the "wage 
norm", limits the response of wages to local labour 
market developments. In addition, the high 
statutory minimum wage (with no differentiation 
by region) depresses labour demand especially for 
low-skilled and new entrants in the labour market 
(despite some differentiation in the minimum wage 
by age). 
3. CYPRUS 
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3.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
3.1.1. Recent trends  
Many years of sustained economic growth allow 
Cyprus to have high employment and participation 
rates in comparison with other European countries. 
All targets set by the Lisbon Strategy have already 
been achieved. In 2008 the total employment rate 
was at 70.9% (3 pps. higher than the 2001), while 
female employment rate was at 62.9% (5.8 pps. 
more than 2001). The rate of older workers (55-64) 
was at 54.8%, but some concerns arise because of 
its decline (by 1.1 pps.) compared to 2007. Youth 
unemployment dropped from 13.9% in 2005 to 
8.9% in 2008, well below the EU27 average 
(15,5%). In 2009q1 it increased to 10%, yet well 
below the EU average (19%). 
After years of buoyant growth, employment grew 
in 2008 by only 0.9% (down from 5.6% in 2007). 
The deceleration hurt both the male (from 4.2% to 
0.6%) and the female component (from 7.4% to 
1.3%). Since the labour force also grew at a lower 
pace (0.6%), the unemployment rate in 2008 was 
still falling relative to 2007 by 0.2 pp. to 3.8%. 
However, the activity rate showed a decline from 
73.9% in 2007 to 73.6% in 2008, signalling that 
the crisis may cause discouragement of 
unemployed workers.  
One significant feature of the Cypriot labour 
market is the employment of foreign labour in 
specific sectors of economic activity in an effort to 
offset labour shortages. Foreign labour constitutes 
around 14.6% of labour force and is employed in 
mainly low skill occupations sustaining lower 
wages in these sectors. 
Nominal earnings including COLA (46) increased 
at a rate of around 7.2% in 2008, following a 3.1% 
increase in 2007. The large increase of nominal 
earnings in 2008 was based upon the salary 
increases granted to civil servants, bank officers 
and other public service workers that were agreed 
during the bargaining process between employers 
and employees. High nominal wages were also 
(46) Cost of Living Allowance, a wage indexation system 
adjusting salaries to past 6 months domestic inflation. 
granted in the construction sector due to its 
buoyant performance during the year. 
Despite recent improvements, gender gaps are 
high. The difference between male and female 
employment and activity rates amounts to 16.3 
pps., which implies that many women are 
discouraged to participate into the labour market. 
As a consequence, the gender gap in 
unemployment rates is small (3.3% for males and 
4.3% for females). Age gaps are less relevant than 
in many euro area countries, even if young 
workers face a tight labour market since their 
unemployment rate is almost three times that of 
prime-age and older workers (8.9% and 3.2% 
respectively). 
The low-skilled have a participation rate of 53.7%, 
about 2 pps. lower than in 2007 and below the 
euro-area average. It is also worth noticing that the 
activity rate of high-skilled followed a path similar 
to the low-skilled: it declined in 2008 by 0.4 pp. to 
89.1% (1.6% from 2001's level). 
Temporary employment represents 14% of the 
total and is very unevenly distributed between 
males and females (20.0% of female employment 
is temporary against 8.2% of male). Part-time 
contracts constitute about 8% of total employment, 
(but 11.4% of the female employment). The long-
term unemployment rate (12 months or more) was 
at 13.6% in 2008, registering a remarkable 
decrease (5 pps.) with respect to 2007. In 2008, 
labour productivity grew by 1% and hourly labour 
productivity by 0.9%. The main sources of 
economic growth were the increase in total 
population and in the share of working population, 
as in past years. 
3.1.2. Outlook for next two years  
The financial crisis is expected to have an impact 
through the fall in the global demand. After a 
strong positive growth in 2007 (3.7%), output is 
expected to stagnate in 2009 and to 0.7% in 2010, 
according to Commission Spring 2009 forecasts. 
The growth deceleration is expected to result in a 
negative growth of employment in 2009 (-0.4%) 
and only very a light recovery in 2010 (0.1%). 
Unemployment rate will hover around 5% and 6% 
respectively in 2009 and 2010. 
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Table II.3.1: Short-term forecasts - CY 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
3,7 0,3 0,7 : : 0,3 2,1
2,6 -0,4 0,1 : : 0,3 0,8
3,8 4,7 6,0 : : 4,6 4,3
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
IMFEU Commission OECD
GDP growth
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.3.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 67,9 70,9 62,5 65,9
Men 79,5 79,2 70,8 72,8
Women 57,1 62,9 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 49,1 54,8 37,5 45,6
Men 66,8 70,9 47,4 55,0
Women 32,0 39,4 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 70,7 73,6 68,5 70,9
Men 81,6 82,0 76,9 78,0
Women 60,6 65,7 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 52,0 56,6 40,1 48,1
Men 69,6 73,0 50,8 57,9
Women 35,0 41,0 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 3,8 3,8 8,5 7,0
Men 2,6 3,3 7,7 6,6
Women 5,3 4,3 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 21,2 13,5 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 12,9 11,7 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 10,8 14,0 12,4 14,0
15-24 14,7 20,8 35,9 40,0
55-64 5,7 4,9 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 7,4 6,8 : 17,6
Men 3,7 3,5 : 7,0
Women 12,1 10,8 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 67,9 70,9 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 52,9 50,9 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 70,9 74,1 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 88,2 86,5 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 83,6 89,5 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 20,5 30,7 18,0 22,5
CY EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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3.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Cyprus has adopted some fiscal stimulus and
structural measures, as a response to the crisis. 
Discretionary measures amount to around 1½% of
GDP and include the February 2009 stimulus 
package, which is in line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). The measures
are timely, as the package is front-loaded, and
most of the measures are temporary. 
So far, the labour market has remained at almost 
full employment, but unemployment is set to rise 
in the coming months. The increase is expected to 
mainly derive form shedding in construction and 
tourism, the sectors most exposed to the downturn,
although government investment in infrastructure 
is expected to somewhat mitigate pressures on 
employment in the former. In view of the 
worldwide recession and with the aim of
minimising its effects on the labour market, 
Cyprus has put forward a special Prevention-
Action Plan, comprising mainly the following 
measures:  
• in-company training programmes for
employees faced with the risk of lay-offs in
sectors most affected by the crisis; 
• training programmes for upgrading the skills of 
unemployed persons; accelerated training 
programmes for newcomers;  
• work experience to unemployed tertiary 
education graduates;
• intensifying the support provided by the Public 
Employment Services (PES) for assessing job 
vacancies, providing job placement services 
and facilitating job transitions, including
individualized counselling.
Beyond the positive effect on private sector
employment, additional staff would also be
employed by the government departments 
involved in the implementation of the 
infrastructure projects, while the recruitment of 
seasonal workers in the public sector is being 
accelerated. Also, inspection mechanisms are
being reinforced in order to fight illegal
employment and undeclared work. 
3.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Although Cyprus performs better than the EU 
average in terms of labour market outcomes, its
labour market is characterised by large gender
gaps in employment rates and pay, and mismatches
in the demand for and supply of skills. The
measures promoted (encouragement of women’s 
entrepreneurship; promotion of training and
employability of economically inactive women;
and development of family support services and 
care facilities) aim at increasing the participation
of women in the labour market, which should 
normally contribute to reducing the gender pay
gap. 
Even though the short-term measures will not
prevent a significant GDP slowdown in 2009 and 
2010, they will act as stabilising factors.  
In parallel, a new legislation in relation to the long-
term sustainability of the General Social Insurance 
Scheme came into force on 1 April 2009.  The
legislation includes measures which aim at both 
Box II.3.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - CY
EU (CSR 2009): 
Continues with the efforts to expand lifelong learning opportunities, especially for the low skilled,
unemployed and disadvantaged groups, by implementing actions within the approved Lifelong Learning 
National Strategy including the reforms of the vocational, education, training and the New Modern
Apprenticeship Scheme. Address the very high gender pay gap. 
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increasing income and reducing expenditure of the 
Social Insurance Fund (SIF).  
To facilitate the adjustment of the workforce, the 
Human Resources Development Authority 
(HRDA) is coordinating a New Scheme for 
Training of the Unemployed for the sectors where 
an increase in unemployment is expected. The aim 
is to have trained local or EU residents to replace 
third-country nationals, employed on a temporary 
basis, especially those for whom the work permit 
will be expiring. Bearing in mind that more than 
14% of the workforce is third-country nationals, 
this is a significant measure for reducing labour 
supply pressures. 
 Despite the fact that most work is carried out on a 
full-time basis under relatively inflexible real 
wages with a low incidence of performance pay, 
and despite a relatively inflexible public sector, the 
high incidence of self-employment and the use of 
foreign labour supply inject considerable 
flexibility in the labour market and in the Cypriot 
economy more in general.  Yet, easy access to 
low-cost foreign labour has moderated efforts to 
tap pools of labour supply (teenagers, married 
women, retirees) that would come forth only 
through flexible forms of employment. In the case 
of small, open and services-oriented economies, 
the loss of autonomous monetary policy gives a 
more prominent role to competitiveness as channel 
of adjustment, and therefore to  productivity and 
wage developments.  Thus, also in the case of 
Cyprus steps to boost productivity through 
investment in knowledge, new technologies and 
skills, the business environment, and innovation 
remain useful, while efforts to ensure that labour 
market institutions contribute to the efficiency of 
the wage-setting process are important. Allowing 
wages to reflect sector or company productivity 
gains may contribute to a more competitive 
sectoral outlook and a more efficient allocation of 
labour. 
The approval of the Cyprus national Life-long-
learning Strategy in 2007 is a significant advance. 
The establishment of a monitoring mechanism for 
the implementation of the Life-long-learning 
Strategy will be helpful for the success of this 
strategy. A list of policy measures in the field of 
lifelong learning is provided in the NPR, but it is 
also admitted that “additional efforts are requited 
to increase the participation in training and life 
long learning”. The approval of the New Modern 
Apprenticeship (NMA) Scheme may provide a 
learning pathway for young persons who withdraw 
from the education system early, enabling them to 
upgrade their skills and become more employable, 
ensuring mobility between education, 
apprenticeship and employment, thus minimising 
the risk of social exclusion. However, according 
the information provided in NPR, the 
implementation of the scheme has been delayed 
and due start in the school year 2010-2011. 
Measures such as those encouraging women’s 
entrepreneurship, promoting training and 
employability of economically inactive women, on 
care services, on the reconciliation of family and 
personal life are expected to enhance female 
labour market attachment and, ultimately, 
contribute to narrow the gender pay gap.  
4. FINLAND 
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4.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
4.1.1. Recent trends 
The prolonged expansionary period that has 
characterized the Finnish economy in the last 
decade is largely confirmed by all labour market 
indicators. All the Lisbon targets have been fully 
achieved since 2007, when the total employment 
rate overcame 70% for the first time (71.1% in 
2008 up by 0.8 pp. from 2007 level and by 2.9 pps. 
from 2001 level). The female employment rate is 
still increasing (69.0% in 2008 from 68.5% in 
2007 and 65.4% in 2001). At the same time, the 
older workers employment rate registered the 
quickest growth, being now at 56.5%, almost 11 
pps. higher than 2001 and 1.4 pps. more than 2007. 
The labour market weakness that started to be felt 
at the end of 2008 worsened in 2009Q1. 
Decelerating growth has resulted in rising 
unemployment, along with wage pressures and 
eroding competitiveness. 
Following three years of sustained growth since 
2005, employment still grew at a fast rate in 2008 
(+1.6%), only slightly less than in 2007 (+1.8%). 
While the female employment growth almost 
halved in 2008 as compared to the year before 
(from +2.1% in 2007 to +1.2% in 2008), the male 
employment rate rose by 1.9% in 2008, from 1.5% 
in 2007. Total labour force rose by 1.0% and the 
unemployment rate decreased by 0.5 pp. to 6.4%, 
in line with the trend of recent years (the rate was 
at 9.1% in 2001).  
Compared to other euro area countries, during the 
last decade the increase in the older workers' 
employment was particularly relevant. Thus, the 
gap with the employment rate of prime age 
workers fell from 35 pps. in 2001 to 27 pps. in 
2008. Conversely, the gap in the employment rates 
of young and prime-age workers remained 
unchanged at around 40 percentage points. Even 
so, the relative high unemployment rate of young 
people (more than three times higher than for 
prime-age workers) remains a cause of concern.  
Progress in the labour market attachment of non-
nationals has been noticeable in the last decade. 
The difference between nationals and non-
nationals employment rates shrank to 10.4 pps. in 
favour of the former, from 14.3 pps. in 2001. The 
unemployment rate gap remained high (9.5 pps.), 
although non-nationals showed a remarkable 
reduction in their unemployment rate, from 23.7% 
in 2001 to 15.7% in 2009.  
Some concerns arise regarding the gap between 
groups with different skills. The activity rate of the 
low-skilled declined from 60.1% in 2001 to 53.2% 
in 2009 and their employment rate fell from 49.4% 
to 46.4% respectively in 2001 and 2009. Thus, the 
strong reduction in unemployment rate of low-
skilled registered from 2001 to 2009 (-5.0%) can 
be attributed almost completely to a 
discouragement effect.  
Temporary employment represents 14.9% of the 
total and it is much higher for female (18.7%) than 
for male employment (11.1%). Since 2001, the 
share of temporary employment over the total 
declined by 1.5 pps. Part-time contracts are less 
diffused than in other euro-area countries (12.7% 
against an average of 19.3% in the euro area) and 
obviously the share is much higher for female 
workers than for males. 
Signalling a well functioning labour market, 
together with strong economic growth, the 
proportion of unemployed for more than 12 
months stood at 18.6% in 2008, much lower than 
in many other European countries, registering a 
remarkable decrease of 4.4 pps. with respect to 
2007 and of 9.4 pps. with respect to 2001. In 2008 
labour productivity shrank by 0.5% from +2.0% in 
2007. Apparently, the lower growth rate of GDP 
(+0.9% in 2008 versus +4.2% in 2007) had not 
completely translated into lower employment. 
4.1.2. Outlook for next two years  
Due to its strong link with the world demand, the 
Finnish economy is expected to pay a high price to 
the current world recession. After still positive 
growth in 2008 (+0.9%), ECFIN Spring forecasts 
expect an output fall of 4.7% in 2009 and a slight 
recovery in 2010. 
This should result in negative employment growth 
both this year and in 2010, equal to -2.9% and -
0.8% respectively. The unemployment rate should 
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increase from 6.4% in 2008 to 8.9% in 2009 and
9.3% in 2010. 
Table II.4.1: Short-term forecasts - FI 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
0,9 -4,7 0,2 -4,7 0,8 -5,2 -1,2
1,5 -2,9 -0,8 0,2 0,1 -3,8 -1,8
6,4 8,9 9,3 8,7 10,8 8,5 9,3
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.4.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 68,1 71,1 62,5 65,9
Men 70,8 73,1 70,8 72,8
Women 65,4 69,0 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 45,7 56,5 37,5 45,6
Men 46,6 57,1 47,4 55,0
Women 44,9 55,9 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 75,0 76,0 68,5 70,9
Men 77,6 77,9 76,9 78,0
Women 72,4 73,9 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 50,3 59,7 40,1 48,1
Men 51,3 60,6 50,8 57,9
Women 49,4 58,8 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 9,1 6,4 8,5 7,0
Men 8,6 6,1 7,7 6,6
Women 9,7 6,7 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 28,0 18,6 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 8,3 8,0 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 17,9 14,9 12,4 14,0
15-24 51,1 39,6 35,9 40,0
55-64 6,4 6,9 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 11,8 12,7 : 17,6
Men 7,4 7,9 : 7,0
Women 16,6 17,8 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 68,1 71,1 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 49,4 46,4 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 73,2 75,1 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 85,5 85,6 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 65,0 64,5 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 34,1 25,2 18,0 22,5
FI EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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4.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
The governments' stimulus measures were
announced in several waves, with the measures 
announced in 2008 concentrating mainly on 
permanent income tax cuts to support consumers' 
purchasing power, and those contained in the 
package of 30 January 2009 focusing more on
stimulating infrastructure and housing investment
with a view to upholding employment. The 
Government has estimated that the overall impact 
of the various measures will amount to 1.8% of 
GDP in 2009 and to 1.4% of GDP in 2010. The 
recovery measures are largely related to the 
medium-term reform agenda. Various structural 
Box II.4.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - FI
EU (2009, no CSR addressed):
A number of reforms are ongoing to address bottlenecks in the labour markets, but a reinforced 
implementation of measures is needed to tackle increasing labour mismatches. Economic growth and
competitiveness are held back by labour shortages that will increase in the medium term because of a rapidly
ageing population. Given the already high employment level, the main challenges will be to further enhance
participation rates and reduce structural unemployment stemming from regional, sectoral and skills 
mismatches.
OECD (Going for Growth, 2009):  
Continue to reduce taxes on labour income and ensure fiscal sustainability by shifting the tax burden
towards less distortionary revenue sources. Average and marginal tax wedges on labour income are among 
the highest in the OECD. In combination with the compressed wage structure, this poses problems for the
employment of the low-skilled and for both attracting high-skilled workers and retaining high-skilled jobs. 
Abolish the special treatment of unemployed workers aged 59 and over (the “unemployment pipeline”) with 
a view to lifting the effective retirement age. Grant the disability pension only on medical grounds rather
than on social criteria as permitted under the current system.
Increase the activation of persons on disability schemes with some work capacity. 
Ensure that the activation reform is strictly enforced, including the requirement that the unemployed relocate
if offered employment in other regions of the country. In addition, reduce the financial support available to
the long-term unemployed to increase the incentive to take up work, including tapering unemployment
benefits over time. 
Promote employment and economic flexibility by negotiating a larger share of annual wage increases at the
firm level and allowing opt-out clauses from central collective agreements, thus making wages more
responsive to local conditions. 
IMF (Article IV, 2009): 
Steps to strengthen activation of the unemployed and partially disabled, shorten time spent in tertiary
education, improve training and reduce labour market mismatches, and lessen poverty traps will continue to
be crucial. The next round of wage bargaining ought to reflect productivity increase and differentials to stem
rising unit labour costs. Measures to raise competition, above all in “sheltered” sectors of the economy, are
required to enhance productivity growth. 
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measures with a more medium- to long-term 
perspective have been also planned in the domain 
of functioning of the labour and product markets, 
often with no major budgetary impact. Over 80% 
of the total stimulus package for 2009 is spent on 
permanent tax cuts (income taxes, VAT and 
employers' social contributions), which should 
support consumers' purchasing power, work 
incentives and employment over the duration of 
the crisis. Measures targeted to other priority areas 
such as innovation, environment, and employment 
have also been adopted, albeit with relatively little 
additional state financing in relation to the total 
size of the stimulus packages.  
Overall, the stimulus packages comply with the 
general principles of the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP). In particular, the mix of 
revenue and expenditure measures appears to be 
targeted towards the internal sources of economic 
challenges and is timely. The bulk of the fiscal 
stimulus is given through permanent tax cuts, 
which are not planned to be reversed given the 
long-term tax policy goals of the Government. 
The direct increase of government financing of 
active labour market measures is marginal in 
relation to the total size of the stimulus package, 
and is mostly spent on training, vocational 
education and workers' relocation measures. 
However, the government is also planning various 
structural measures to improve the functioning of 
the labour market with little direct budgetary 
impact.  
The income tax cuts make up about two thirds of 
the total size of different stimulus packages and are 
for most part equally spread across all income 
groups and only some more minor specific 
measures benefit specific groups- like families 
with children, people with lower incomes and 
income on timber sales. They have been designed 
to serve the double aim of boosting domestic 
demand, as well as of reducing the relatively high 
tax burden on labour and increasing employment 
incentives. As part of the Lisbon process, the 
government is presently undertaking a 
comprehensive review of work incentives. The 
Public employment services (PES) have reinforced 
their support and follow-up to job search activities 
by jobseekers; their operative model has been also 
modified to reach laid-off workers and offer them 
special guidance and counselling.  
As of 1 July 2009, the group of jobseekers who 
qualify for the "change security" scheme has been 
broadened to all those workers who have been laid 
off for a minimum of 180 days or whose fixed-
term employment contract has finished after 
having been employed for at least 5 years during 
the last 7 years. "Change security" consists of paid 
leave higher than normal unemployment 
allowances for seeking a new job or an 
employment programme. The maximum period of 
payment (36 months) of the adjusted 
unemployment allowance will be permanently 
abolished as of 2010. The adjusted unemployment 
allowance can be paid to a person working part-
time but seeking full-time employment, whose 
daily or weekly hours have been reduced on 
account of a lay-off or an industrial action not 
related to his terms of employment, who has 
received a full-time job for a fixed term of a 
maximum of two weeks or who has income from 
part-time entrepreneurship. 
4.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
From a long term perspective, the Finnish 
economy faces pressing challenges due to a 
number of pitfalls of supply-side nature, which 
require reforms that boost competitiveness. This 
calls both for product and labour market reforms. 
On the labour market front, it has proved difficult 
for Finland so far to facilitate the movement of 
production factors from declining sectors to more 
dynamic ones, and, further, from slow growing to 
buoyant regions. As Finland points out in its NRP, 
“structural unemployment is based on occupational 
and regional incompatibility of demand and 
supply”, so that there are both regional mismatches 
and skills-mismatches. Two institutions have 
largely contributed to these mismatches: the wage 
bargaining framework and the tax and benefit 
system. Besides, easy access to education and 
accommodation and the related housing policy 
have a bearing on how willing people are to 
relocate. 
Sluggish trend productivity growth threatens long-
term growth potential and raises unit labour costs. 
Although growth in Finland's tradable sector has 
been remarkably high, the same cannot be said for 
the non-tradable. Productivity growth has been 
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particularly sluggish in the sheltered sectors 
(agriculture, utilities, and trade). Given that the 
exposed industries purchase a certain amount of 
inputs from the non-tradable sector, slowing 
productivity growth in the latter deteriorates the 
external competitiveness of Finland. As long as 
Finland's export base remains narrow and highly 
specialized, it will continue to be highly vulnerable 
to erosion in terms of trade – the price of Finnish 
industrial exports relative to that of trading 
partners has indeed been falling – which would  
calls for sustained reduction in unit labour costs. 
Finland's wage negotiation framework is largely 
centralized and provides weak incentives to 
employees to move to a different sector (or region) 
for work. This is due to an insufficient degree of 
wage differentiation for each skill level and 
occupation, which limits the inter-sectoral/regional 
labour mobility. Relatively tight EPL possibly 
contributes to wage developments which are not 
related to productivity growth. There has been 
recently a significant shift towards company-level 
agreements. In addition, the possibility of further 
strengthening the link of wages to productivity was 
considered in the decentralized wage agreements 
of the second half of 2007 – in particular, by 
making easier to resort to opting out clauses. 
Otherwise, skill shortages in some sectors (or 
regions) may prevail together with high 
unemployment rates in other sectors (or regions). 
Insufficient mobility across regions is also 
supported by weak incentives of unemployed 
workers to move, despite second residence 
subsidy.  
Finland succeeded to combine generous welfare 
system with high employment rates across all age 
groups and, in particular, with a relatively high 
female employment rate. Despite the fact that both 
tax wedges and long-term net replacement rates 
are relatively high, and  their interaction may 
distort work incentives, in particular for one-earner 
couple either with or without children, the 
unemployment and inactivity traps for the second 
earners are relatively low, thus supporting the high 
female employment rate, 10 pps. above the euro-
area average.  
Finally, imminent population aging - the working-
age population is set to decline after 2010- will 
shrink working-age cohorts. Therefore, raising the 
employment rate of older workers through 
activation measures and reducing the access to the 
"unemployment pipeline" - which allows older 
persons to extend their entitlement to 
unemployment benefits up to old-age pension - 
seems essential to boost potential growth. It is 
crucial that hysteresis effects and unemployment 
persistence be averted in the current juncture, also 
on account of ageing populations. Creating jobs for 
young people has been the main focus of recent 
policy measures but it is equally important to 
ensure that older workers remain employed and 
that work careers last longer.  
5. FRANCE 
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5.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
5.1.1. Recent trends 
The total employment rate in 2008 was 65.2%, up 
by 0.6 pp. from the 2007's level and only by 2.5 
pps. from 2001. On the contrary, the female 
employment rate reached 60.7%, +4.3 pps. with 
respect to 2001. The older (age 55-64) workers 
employment rate is at 38.3%, very far away from 
the Lisbon target (50%), although with an increase 
of 7.6 pps. since 2001. 
After a sustained employment growth in 2007, the 
expansion of employment slowed down in 2008 
(+1.4%). This deceleration was mainly due to 
female employment (from 2.6% to 1.6%), while 
male employment accelerated further (from +1.0% 
to +1.2%). Due to a much milder increase in 
labour force (+0.7%), the unemployment rate kept 
declining to 7.8% (from 8.3% in 2007). The 
weakness of the second half of 2008 worsened 
during 2009. In July 2009 the unemployment rate 
was at 9.8%, or 2 pps. higher than in July 2008.  
Compared to other countries, gender gaps in 
employment appear not very pronounced. Instead 
age gaps are relevant. For prime age workers the 
activity rate is 88.8% and employment rate 83.2%, 
respectively almost 48 pps. and 45 pps. more than 
for older workers. Young workers suffer an 
unemployment rate of 18.1%, almost three times 
as large as the prime age unemployment rate. As 
for nationality of the workforce, France is one of 
the European countries with the most segmented 
labour market. While the activity rate of nationals 
is 5.5 pps. higher than foreigners (70.7% versus 
65.2%), the employment rate of non-nationals is 
only 56%, almost 10 pps. less than nationals.  
Hence, non-nationals undergo a still very high 
unemployment rate (14.1% in 2008, more than 
twice higher than the rate of nationals). This, 
together with the gap in the activity rates, points to 
discouragement effects among non-nationals. The 
gap among workers with different skills in terms of 
activity, employment and unemployment rates 
appears in line with the euro area average.  
Temporary employment represents 14.3% of the 
total and it is slightly higher for female (15.5%). 
Part-time contracts constitute less than one third of 
total female employment (29.3%). 
Regional imbalances are very pronounced in 
France. The standard deviation of the regional 
employment rates was at 6.7 in 2007, while that of 
unemployment rate was at 5.5, still high, but down 
from the 6.8 in 2001.  
Long-term unemployment ratio at 37.6% in 2008 
went down (-2.6 pps.) compared to 2007. In 2008, 
labour productivity shrank by 0.1% from +1.0% in 
2007. 
5.1.2. Outlook for next two years  
After positive output growth in 2007 (0.7%), the 
Commission foresees negative output growth in 
2009 (-3.0%) and 2010 (-0.2%).  Despite a slightly 
better outlook according to the September interim 
forecast (-2.1% and +0.8% respectively in 2009 
and 2010), given the usual late reaction of 
employment to the economic cycle, employment 
growth is expected to be negative in 2009 and 
2010, while the unemployment rate is set to enter a 
double digit territory, after a steep increase in 
2009.  
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
Table II.5.1: Short-term forecasts - FR 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
0,4 -3,0 -0,2 -3,0 0,2 -3,0 0,4
0,5 -2,2 -1,2 -0,6 0,1 -1,8 -0,6
7,8 9,6 10,7 9,7 11,2 9,6 10,3
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database update July 2009).
Table II.5.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 62,7 65,2 62,5 65,9
Men 69,8 69,8 70,8 72,8
Women 55,7 60,7 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 30,7 38,3 37,5 45,6
Men 34,9 40,6 47,4 55,0
Women 26,7 36,1 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 68,6 70,4 68,5 70,9
Men 75,1 75,0 76,9 78,0
Women 62,3 65,9 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 32,6 40,2 40,1 48,1
Men 36,9 42,7 50,8 57,9
Women 28,5 37,8 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 8,3 7,8 8,5 7,0
Men 7,0 7,2 7,7 6,6
Women 9,9 8,3 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 36,8 37,6 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 5,5 5,2 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 14,9 14,2 12,4 14,0
15-24 52,2 51,4 35,9 40,0
55-64 5,5 6,2 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 16,3 16,7 : 17,6
Men 4,9 5,6 : 7,0
Women 30,3 29,3 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 62,7 65,2 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 46,6 47,2 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 69,7 69,6 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 79,5 81,0 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 20,5 17,5 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) : 54,9 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 25,3 33,5 18,0 22,5
FR EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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5.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
A first €26 billion (1.3% of GDP) recovery plan 
was announced on 4 December 2008. Its measures 
encompass public investment, support to
employment (such as a total exemption from social 
security contributions for employers of small 
companies for new hires and only for 2009 and
extra subsidies for supported jobs), support to 
firms and support to household purchasing power.
This has been followed by a second set of
measures, announced on 18 February 2009, aiming
at mitigating the impact of the crisis on vulnerable 
households. The total size of the stimulus measures
– which will have an overall impact of around 1% 
of GDP on the public deficit – reflects France's 
limited fiscal space. In addition, automatic
stabilisers will work fully, implying a substantial
increase in social expenditure and a significant 
decrease in tax revenue.  
To directly support employment, temporary short-
time working (chômage partiel) has been extended 
to 800 hours from previously 600 hours per year 
(up to 1000h/y in some sectors), while the 
allowance has been permanently raised from 50%
to 60% of previous wages, and then further
increased to 75% of previous wages in April 2009. 
The costs will be borne mostly by the central 
government and in the small part by the 
employment agency. Since September 2009 
temporary short-time working has been allowed to
1000h/y in all sectors. 
Box II.5.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - FR
EU (CSRs 2009): 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, further modernises employment protection in order to reduce
labour market segmentation among contract types and support entry and transitions in the labour market,
notably of the young; and improve lifelong learning opportunities so they are better aligned with labour
market needs 
OECD (Going for Growth, 2009):  
Continue to limit future increases in the minimum wage so as to allow the minimum cost of labour to fall in
relative terms. Also, take advantage of the introduction of the new income support scheme to integrate the
existing scheme in order to have a single earned income tax credit so that it is more effectively targeted on
low wage earners. 
Pursue efforts to ease employment protection legislation and to further increase the predictability of
dismissal costs, in particular in the case of layoffs on economic grounds, so as to limit the need for court 
intervention.  
Further reduce the implicit tax on continued work at older ages. Ease the restrictions on combining pension
and work incomes.
IMF (Article IV, 2009):  
Important labour market measures have been implemented, but additional efforts, particularly in this time of
crisis, should be considered to increase employment. The merger of the national employment agency
(ANPE) and the unemployment insurance scheme (UNEDIC) holds the promise of improving placement 
services for job seekers but its effectiveness will depend on successful integration of the two entities into the
new Pôle emploi, and on the strict enforcement of job-search requirements and sanctions. Cooperation with 
private placement agencies could also be enhanced. In addition, international experience has shown that
activation policies can be very successful, even if implemented under difficult economic conditions. It
would be helpful if the authorities could study and implement such measures, which need to be combined
with further training to reduce skill mismatches in a rapidly evolving economy.
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In order to step up the effectiveness of the 
employment services and activation policies, the 
ongoing merger between job placement and 
unemployment compensation agencies (Pôle 
Emploi and UNEDIC), which had been decided in 
2008, has been sped up. The new operator is 
supposed to better assist companies, workers and 
job seekers. To facilitate the transition and better 
manage the increasing amount of job seekers, 600 
new case managers were recruited with fixed-term 
contracts up to the 1st trimester of 2009. The 
experimental 'professional transition contracts' 
(CTP), which since 2006 have been supporting 
laid-off employees in areas suffering important 
economic difficulties, have been reinforced with 
training and higher allowances for 12 months 
instead of previously 6 months. Moreover, a 
"Social Investment Fund" was set up in February 
2009 (scheduled to end in 2010), to coordinate 
funds for employment and professional training, 
managed by both the State and social partners (cost 
for central government: 0.1% of GDP; existing 
funds for professional training will contribute). To 
support job creation, firms with less than 10 
employees have been exempted from paying social 
security contributions in 2009 for employees hired 
in 2009. 100,000 new temporary subsided jobs 
have been also created. 
In addition to the €200 social benefit in favour of 
lower-income households, which was part of the 
recovery plan (0.04% of GDP), new social 
measures were announced on 18 February, 
comprising various allowances and tax cuts. All in 
all, they will have a budgetary impact of around 
0.1% of GDP. The main measures include a lump-
sum bonus of 500€ for newly unemployed people 
that can justify from 2 to 4 months of work but that 
cannot benefit from unemployment allowances; 
and personal income tax cuts of 2/3 in 2009 for the 
lowest scale of revenues, plus an additional tax 
credit.  
On the top of these short-term answers to the 
crisis, a set of structural reforms have been 
undertaken.  Since April 2009, the unemployment 
benefit managed by Unédic has been simplified 
and extended to people claiming 4 months of 
contribution. Before the reform, the limit was set at 
6 months of participation. The experimental 
solidarity benefit for low-income working 
households (Revenu de solidarité active - RSA) 
was also introduced nation-wide from June 2009, 
as already foreseen in the framework of the 
government's work programme, with the primary 
medium-term objective to increase incentives to 
work and reduce poverty. Finally, following the 
temporary measures for youth (such as subsidies 
for hiring apprentices) decided in April 2009, a 
comprehensive plan was unveiled in September to 
deal with youth labour market participation and 
income. The so-called "Plan Jeunes" includes, 
among others, an extension of the RSA to people 
under the age of 25 with at least 2 years of work 
experience, and higher incentives to hire 
apprentices. 
5.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Employment protection legislation remains strict, 
although it was partially loosened (at the margin) 
by liberalizing temporary contracts, which now 
account for about 70% of new hires. The 
conversion rate from temporary to permanent 
contracts is among the lowest in the EU, as only 
about 18% of those with a temporary contract in 
2005 were employed in 2006 with a permanent 
contract (un-weighted average for the EU is about 
30%. (47) In-work poverty risk of temporary 
contracts is at the EU average, however more than 
three times higher than for permanent contracts. In 
contrast, the OECD score index might suggest a 
tightening of EPL for permanent contract from the 
mid 1970s (48).  
Some of these temporary measures are going to be 
extended partly during 2010. For instance, total 
exemption from social security contributions by 
employers of small companies for new hires could 
last until June 2010. The lump sum bonus offered 
in 2009 for hiring an intern with a permanent 
contract (€3000) has been also extended until June 
2010.  
(47) This proportion is for young workers 21% (un-weighted 
EU average 35%), for prime-aged 17% (un-weighted EU 
average is 35%) and for older workers 9% (un-weighted 
EU19 average 29%). There is also a large gender 
difference in transition rates, 14% for female (un-weighted 
EU average of 34%) and 23% for males (un-weighted 
EU19 average of 36%).  
(48) However, this result should be interpreted carefully. The 
high score index might mainly be driven by the theoretical 
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In any case, a tight EPL by stabilising employment 
fluctuation contributes to reduce the volatility of 
consumers' confidence in the short term. However, 
it could delay structural adjustment in declining 
sectors, influence adversely employment growth 
during the recovery (e.g. through the use of more 
distortive measures to shed labour such as early 
retirement). An increased adjustment capacity in 
the labour market, through more flexicurity and 
better activation policies, would support 
employment in the long run while reducing the 
segmentation between different types of contracts.  
The merger of the agency paying unemployment 
benefits with the service responsible for the 
placement of job-seekers go in the direction of 
more individualised activation strategies. The 
creation of the "pôles Emploi", where all the 
agencies of labour market policy should be 
gathered, goes in the right direction. It is an 
important point that those pôles become "one-stop 
shops" for the unemployed, gathering together all 
the actors of labour market policy. However, the 
capacity of covering all the unemployed depends 
on the number of pôles. The international literature 
has shown that activation strategies should 
enhance the search effort of job seekers and 
facilitate their employability, while reducing their 
welfare dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level of training, job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by public 
employment services (PES) on non-working 
individuals, through monitoring work availability 
and search actions, mandatory job-search 
requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of a 
strategy aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
The August 2008 law establishes that the PES will 
support the unemployed in identifying 
employment plans that define a "reasonable job 
tight regulation on short or temporary contract (CDD and 
interim). The high share of new hires under these contracts 
(70%) suggests this regulation being not too tightening.  
offer" which if rejected twice leads to an automatic 
suspension of the unemployment benefits.  
France has among the highest tax wedges in 
Europe let alone the social contribution 
exemptions on low wages (49.6% against an un-
weighted EU27 average for the average workers of 
41%, and 44.4% for low-wage workers, against 
un-weighted EU27 average of 37). Also, 
interaction of tax and benefits distort financial 
incentives to work, in particular for single parents 
and one-earner couples with two children. Recent 
welfare reforms (notably the introduction on an 
experimental basis of the Revenu de solidarité 
active - RSA) should contribute to reduce the risks 
of inactivity trap. 
The minimum wage in France is among the highest 
in the EU (relative to both the median and the 
average wage) and it compresses wage distribution 
at the bottom end. This contributes to limiting job 
creation for the low-skilled and the labour market 
entrants. However the job effect is alleviated by 
social contribution exemptions on low wages.  
Social security contributions paid by employer are 
high and strongly progressive at the bottom end of 
wage distribution - the SSC rate is about 18% at 
the minimum wage (which is set at about 45% of 
average wage) and about 33% at the 67% of 
average wage. This might create disincentive for 
employers to offer wages above the minimum 
wage. As a result, the minimum wage is binding 
for a large proportion of persons employed in non-
agricultural sector even if this share has shrunk 
over years (about 13% in 2007 and 15.6% in 
2005). (49) 
(49) See OECD, Economic Surveys: France, 2009; French 
Ministry of Economics, 
http://www.minefe.gouv.fr/directions_services/sircom/emp
loi/conf071023/smic.pdf  and EEAG Report, 2009, Chapter 
4. 
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6.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
6.1.1. Recent trends 
During the last decade, the labour market has 
improved significantly. In 2008, the total 
employment rate went above the Lisbon target 
(70.7%, +1.4 pps. with respect to 2007). Female 
employment rate was at 65.4% (+1.5 pps. from the 
previous year) and older workers' employment rate 
reached 53.8% (+2.3 pps. with respect to 2007 and 
an impressive +16 pps. with respect to 2000). The 
rhythm of expansion of employment slowed down 
only at the end of 2008. Yet, compared to other 
euro area- countries the increase of unemployment 
was relatively small, as it started to increase in 
2009Q1 by only 1 pp. to 8%, owing to the massive 
increase in the use of short-time work schemes. 
The deceleration involved mainly male 
employment, which slowed to 0.5%, while female 
employment growth remained sustained (+2.6%).  
Despite the improvements of recent years, 
concerns remain for structural weaknesses of the 
German labour market. 
Firstly, activity and employment rates of high-
skilled workers are respectively 35 pps. and 40 
pps. higher than low-skilled; the low-skilled 
unemployment rate at 15.3%, among the highest in 
the euro area, is more than five times as large as 
the unemployment rate of high-skilled. These 
figures suggest that skill gaps reflect mainly an 
insufficient labour demand for less qualified 
workers. 
Secondly, the proportion of unemployed for more 
than 12 months (long-term unemployed) at 53% is 
among the highest in the euro area.  
Thirdly, despite recent progress, Germany shows 
very high dispersion of unemployment across 
regions (measured as standard deviations of 
regional unemployment rates). On the other hand, 
the regional dispersion of participation rates is 
much lower, pointing to weak labour demand as 
the main source of the regional imbalances in the 
labour market. 
After being positive for many years, labour 
productivity stagnated in 2008, as a consequence 
of a falling GDP growth (from about 3% in 2007 
to 1.8% in 2008) and a mainly unchanged 
employment growth owing to labour hoarding in 
the aftermath of the crisis, boosted also by the 
government support schemes.  
6.1.2. Outlook for the next two years  
The fall in world trade has heavily hit German 
exports. The latest Commission forecasts for 2009 
expect a fall of GDP by 5.1% (slightly better than 
the 5.4% expected in Spring owing to unexpected 
upsurge in growth in the first half of the year), 
followed by a light recovery in 2010 (0.3% 
according to the Spring forecast). The fall in 
output is reflected in the employment and 
unemployment forecasts. The employment is 
expected fall by 1.5% and 2.2% in 2009 and 2010 
respectively (according to the Spring forecasts). 
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Table II.6.1: Short-term forecasts - DE 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
1,3 -5,4 0,3 -6,1 0,2 -6,2 -0,6
1,4 -1,5 -2,2 -0,7 -0,2 -0,4 -2,0
7,3 8,6 10,4 8,7 11,6 9,0 10,8
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database update July 2009).
Table II.6.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 65,7 70,7 62,5 65,9
Men 72,6 75,9 70,8 72,8
Women 58,7 65,4 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 37,7 53,8 37,5 45,6
Men 46,1 61,8 47,4 55,0
Women 29,3 46,1 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 71,3 76,5 68,5 70,9
Men 78,8 82,1 76,9 78,0
Women 63,7 70,8 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 42,8 58,8 40,1 48,1
Men 52,0 67,3 50,8 57,9
Women 33,6 50,6 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 7,6 7,3 8,5 7,0
Men 7,8 7,4 7,7 6,6
Women 7,4 7,2 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 50,4 52,6 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 4,8 5,7 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 12,4 14,7 12,4 14,0
15-24 52,1 56,6 35,9 40,0
55-64 4,4 4,5 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 19,9 25,2 : 17,6
Men 4,7 8,4 : 7,0
Women 39,0 44,9 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 65,7 70,7 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 44,9 45,9 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 69,9 74,7 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 83,2 86,4 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 14,8 12,5 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 16,8 26,7 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 12,7 22,5 18,0 22,5
DE EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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6.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Germany has adopted a wide ranging response to 
the crisis covering financial market, fiscal stimulus 
and structural measures. Its fiscal stimulus (around 
1¾% of GDP on average per year) consisted of 
two packages: an autumn package with measures 
adopted in October and November 2008 
(Konjunkturpaket I) and a second package adopted 
in January 2009 (Konjunkturpaket II). The 
measures focus on income support and income tax 
reductions, public and private investment, ensuring 
access to finance, reducing lay-offs, improving 
access to training and employment services, and 
instruments to support the automotive industry. In 
addition, a substantial increase in social 
expenditure and a significant decrease in tax 
revenue (estimated impact around 3% of GDP in 
2009) were triggered by the automatic stabilisers. 
To avoid massive labour shedding, the recovery 
plan extended the possibility to use short-time 
work, provided incentives to firms for the use of 
these schemes, and improved the access to training 
and qualifications as well as placement advisory 
services for jobseekers (around ¼ of GDP).  
Measures to boost the uptake of short-time work to 
avoid redundancies have been introduced in three 
steps. In autumn 2008, the period of receipt of 
short-time allowance has been extended from 12 to 
18 months. As from February 2009,  social 
security contributions paid by employers on short-
term allowances in 2009 and 2010 will be 
reimbursed up to 50% (approx. €1.7 billion of 
relief for 2009). Since January 2009, employers 
who during short-time work provided their 
workers with the opportunity to participate in 
qualification measures have been reimbursed with 
the full amount of their share of social insurance 
contributions. As of 5 June 2009, the duration of 
the short-time allowance has been extended to 24 
months, and from the 7th month of short-time work 
onwards full reimbursement of the employer's 
share of social insurance contributions is no longer 
coupled with qualification and training measures 
and can be applied to all plants within a company, 
provided at least one plant has been using the 
short-time work scheme for 6 months. These 
measures are temporary and should apply to firms 
and workers eligible up to  end 2009. 
The application and procedure for the receipt of 
short-time allowance were also simplified and a 
Federal Programme for funding qualification 
measures for workers on short-time, 
supplementing the extension of the short-time 
work allowance, has been set up in January 2009 
(until end 2010). Low-skilled workers who have 
performed for at least four years a job for which 
they have no certified vocational training, are fully 
refunded (including transport and childcare costs) 
for participating in education measures that lead to 
recognized vocational qualifications or partially 
qualify workers for the related tasks. For workers 
with certified qualifications, the amount of 
assistance varies between 25 and 80% of training 
costs, depending on the type of training, the size of 
the company and the persons participating in the 
scheme. Until the end of 2010, short-time 
allowance will be also granted to temporary 
agency workers. 
To prepare the public employment service (PES) 
and the unemployment services to serve the 
additional unemployed and improve job placement 
activities, the German Employment Agency will 
recruit additional 5000 job-placement officers on 
open-ended contract to facilitate the placement of 
the most recent jobless persons. Further 1000 
placement officers will be also recruited, limited to 
2012. As to the training and skill development 
outside short-time work, the special programme to 
support training of older and low-skilled workers 
was extended to all workers irrespective of age and 
company size, provided that at least four years 
have passed since they completed their vocational 
training. The Federal Employment Agency bears 
the full cost of the further education efforts and a 
share of the wage costs for low skilled workers. 
Also, a new programme was established to support 
further vocational training for temporary workers 
who were employed in 2007 and 2008.  
The capacity of the PES to deal with the expected 
increase in unemployment risks to be hampered by 
legal uncertainty, as long as there is no political 
agreement on the reform of the joint agencies 
(municipalities and PES), implementing the basic 
income support for jobseekers. This reform is 
required by a ruling of the Federal Constitutional 
Court within the deadline of December 2010. 
104 
Part II 
Addressing the crisis and longer term challenges - Euro area Member States 
6.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
The economic downturn stopped a prolonged 
recovery of the labour market, which benefited 
from structural reforms as well as favourable 
business cycle conditions. Despite its good labour 
market performance (Germany reached the Lisbon 
targets in 2008), structural weaknesses manifest in 
the disappointing outcomes for low skilled workers 
and the high long-term unemployment, which 
hampers German economic potential.  
To mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis on 
labour demand, continued efforts are essential to 
ensure strong employment creation and raising 
labour productivity to support higher real wage 
growth. Labour market measures aimed at 
improving the functioning of the labour market 
and strengthening the growth potential will also 
need to be compatible with future fiscal 
consolidation efforts (e.g. reforms of the tax-
benefit system). 
In Germany there has been a greater focus on 
internal flexibility. Reforms of the last 20 years 
have gradually liberalized the use of fixed-term 
and temporary-agency work, while the EPL for 
regular contracts remained relatively strict. 
Although a lack of external flexibility has been in 
part compensated by a relatively high internal 
flexibility, the challenge is to gradually increase 
the external flexibility of regular jobs, in particular 
to allow better reallocation in the face of the 
restructuring needs posed by the global recession.  
Box II.6.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - DE
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Proceed with planned measures that enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of job placement services and 
promote the integration of the low skilled and long-term unemployed into the labour market through a 
flexicurity approach which combines better access to qualifications with improved incentives to work. 
OECD (Going for Growth, 2009): 
Promote regular work contracts by relaxing employment protection legislation applicable to such 
arrangements. 
Lower social security contribution rates, to reduce average tax wedges on labour income. 
Reduce fiscal impediments to full-time female labour force participation by lowering the tax burden for 
second-earners through moving to individual taxation of couples and by introducing a health insurance 
charge for non-working spouses. Continue with plans to increase the number of childcare places to facilitate 
the employment of young mothers. 
Increase participation in, and enhance the quality of, early child care and education to better prepare young 
people for subsequent studies. Make schools and teachers more accountable for outcomes and reduce the 
large degree of segmentation of the school system. 
IMF (Article IV, 2008): 
Increasing labour participation and improving education and training further are also necessities as Germany 
is expected to age faster than most other countries. 
Improving the incentives to work is essential to 
support transitions to employment. The Hartz IV 
reform merging unemployment assistance and 
social assistance into means tested benefits 
(Arbeitslosengeld 2) raised financial incentives, in 
particular for long-term unemployed. However, 
benefits recipients who may combine welfare 
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benefits with so-called mini/midi jobs which are 
taxed preferentially may face disincentives to take 
up work in the primary labour market. Also, 
second earners in households with children still 
face substantial disincentives to work. Joint 
taxation is one of the main reasons for the low 
incentives to work of second spouse, usually 
women, which adversely affect female labour 
supply. But non-tax driven factors should be taken 
into account as well. In particular, a reduction in 
non-wage labour costs, efficient activation 
strategies and a high-quality system of childcare 
and pre-schooling facilities (nurseries and 
kindergarten) could help to mobilise the labour 
supply.  
Promoting the employability of low skilled and 
long-term unemployed within a flexicurity 
approach represents a major challenge, especially 
as the crisis can further deepen the labour market 
segmentation by skills. During the last years a 
series of measures were taken to enhance the 
effectiveness of the vocational training provided. 
In the face of the current recession, financial 
incentives have been provided to support workers’ 
participation in qualification measures during 
short-time working schemes. Outside short-time 
working schemes, the special programme to 
support training of older and low-skilled workers 
was extended to all workers irrespective of their 
age and the company size - provided that at least 
four years have passed since they completed their 
vocational training.  
Even so, participation in lifelong learning is 
generally low. Low skilled people need 
comprehensive strategies to support their 
employability and transitions into employment. 
Furthermore, Germany's comparative advantage in 
technology-advanced products combined with the 
growing bottlenecks on the German labour market, 
in particular in the area of high-skilled labour, call 
for continued efforts to increase the overall 
educational and skills levels and thus to reduce the 
skill gaps. 
Flexible elements in collective agreements have 
been more frequently accepted by the social 
partners. This has implied higher flexibility at the 
firm level, which should contribute to the 
reduction of the regional imbalances. However, 
wage flexibility, in particular at the lower end of 
the wage distribution, can still be reduced by 
collective agreements declared generally binding 
by the government.  
7. GREECE 
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7.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
7.1.1. Recent trends 
Despite recent progress, labour market 
performance in Greece is still lagging far behind 
other European countries. The total employment 
rate at 61.9% in 2008 (0.5 pp. respect to 2007) is 
far away from the Lisbon target. The employment 
rate of older workers (42.8% in 2008, +0.3 pp. 
over 2007) and females (48.7% in 2008, +0.9 pp. 
over 2007) are below the euro-area average. 
Improvements in recent years were moderate as, 
since 2001, the total employment rate grew by 
only 5.5 pps.  
The global crisis is cooling down the economy; yet 
the GDP growth remained positive in 2008. In 
response to these developments, the labour market 
indicators for 2008 kept on signalling 
improvements with respect to other countries. 
Thus, the unemployment rate reached 7.7% (-0.6 
pp. from 2007), an all-time low for the country, 
while employment growth further increased (to 
1.4% from 1.2% in 2007).  
There are clear signs of segmentation in the labour 
market, with very pronounced gender and age gaps 
and a disproportionate share of young people with 
flexible working arrangements. 
The gender gap is among the highest in Europe. In 
2008, males activity and employment rates were 
much higher than females (by about 25 pps.), 
while the unemployment rate of females was more 
than twice as much as that of males (11.4% against 
5.1%). However, these strong gaps registered a 
reduction in recent years. Other relevant gaps are 
especially evident across different age groups. 
While prime age males experience activity and 
employment rates even higher than EU27 and 
euro-area averages, young and (especially females) 
older workers have very low rates. Young active 
people amount to 30.2% of the working age 
population, while young employed are only 23.5% 
with young female employment rate amounting to 
18.5%. As for older workers, even if their overall  
activity and employment rates are closer to the EU 
averages, the gender differences are much more 
pronounced (the employment rate of male older 
workers is 59.1% against only 27.1% of females). 
Unemployment affects heavily the young, (22.1%), 
and especially the young female (28.9%), even 
though some improvements have been registered 
in the last few years. 
Participation, employment and unemployment 
rates are very different for workers with different 
skill levels. In 2008 high-skilled had an activity 
rate of 87.7% and an employment rate of 82.1% 
(respectively, 20.9 pps. and 29.7 pps. higher than 
the low-skilled), as well as an unemployment rate 
of 6.4% against 8.8% and 7.6% for medium- and 
low-skilled respectively. 
Temporary employment amounts to 11.5% of total 
employment, a low level compared to other 
European countries. However, the share of self-
employed is quite high (20.5%), much higher than 
in the EU27 and the euro area. Among the young, 
the share of temporary contracts rises up to 29.2%. 
The share of those who declare to have a 
temporary contract against their will is very high 
(82.5% in 2008). Another sign of segmentation 
and lack of flexibility in the labour market is the 
high share of long-term unemployment (47.6% of 
total unemployment). 
Regional imbalances are not very high compared 
to other European countries. The difference 
between the region with the highest unemployment 
rate and that with the lowest is 2.4 pps., less than 
the EU27 un-weighted average (3.2 pps. EU 
average) and also lower than in 2001 level (3.2 
pps.). 
7.1.2. Outlook for the next two years  
According to the most recent forecasts (Table 
II.7.1), in 2009 and 2010 the international financial 
and economic crisis will hurt Greece, even if to a 
lower extent than other countries. After a still 
positive GDP growth in 2008 (+2.9%), output is 
seen shrinking by -0.9% in 2009 and slightly 
recovering by +0.1% in 2010, according to EU 
Commission estimates. This will lead to a sharp 
increase in unemployment rate which is expected 
to increase to 9.1% in 2009 and 9.7% in 2010, 
starting from the historical low rate of 7.7% in 
2008.  
European Commission 
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Table II.7.1: Short-term forecasts - EL 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
2,9 -0,9 0,1 -1,3 0,3 -0,2 -0,6
1,2 -1,1 -0,1 0,4 0,6 -1,0 -1,4
7,7 9,1 9,7 9,5 10,3 9,0 10,5
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.7.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 56,3 61,9 62,5 65,9
Men 71,4 75,0 70,8 72,8
Women 41,5 48,7 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 38,2 42,8 37,5 45,6
Men 55,3 59,1 47,4 55,0
Women 22,9 27,5 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 63,3 67,1 68,5 70,9
Men 77,1 79,1 76,9 78,0
Women 49,7 55,1 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 39,9 44,2 40,1 48,1
Men 57,7 60,9 50,8 57,9
Women 23,9 28,6 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 10,7 7,7 8,5 7,0
Men 7,2 5,1 7,7 6,6
Women 16,1 11,4 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 51,5 47,6 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 22,5 20,5 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 13,5 11,5 12,4 14,0
15-24 29,2 29,2 35,9 40,0
55-64 8,9 6,3 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 3,8 5,4 : 17,6
Men 2,0 2,5 : 7,0
Women 6,9 9,8 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 56,3 61,9 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 49,1 52,4 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 57,1 61,2 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 79,5 82,1 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 3,2 2,4 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 85,0 82,5 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 52,0 45,2 18,0 22,5
EL EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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7.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS  
The labour market response of the Greek 
authorities mostly consisted in reinforcing active 
labour market policies, especially for certain 
categories, as well as sectors of the economy most 
hit by the crisis (construction, tourism and 
technical professions). The Minister of 
Employment also announced a programme for the 
promotion of on-the-job training for workers in 
SMEs that have made use of provisions for shorter 
employment or for workers who are under 
suspension. The Christmas and Easter bonuses for 
the unemployed have been doubled and the level 
of the unemployment benefit increased (from 
349,5€ in 2007 to 430,75 in September  2008 and 
further to 454 € in May 2009). The new package of 
ALMPs is aimed at the immediate inclusion or re-
inclusion of unemployed in the labour market. To 
this end, the public employment services (OAED) 
will provide twice as much resources than in the 
previous years (more than 1.1 billion €) for the 
creation of about 200.000 new jobs (employment 
and self employment), especially targeted at 
women, young people, older workers. A new 
programme was also decided, by means of which 
unemployment benefits can be converted into a 
sort of employment subsidy: unemployed people, 
instead of receiving the unemployment benefit, can 
be recruited for full or part-time employment, and 
the hiring companies registered in the programme 
are subsidized with the equivalent of the 
unemployment benefit. This measure, which could 
be welcome to address the expected increase in 
unemployment in the short term, risks to be 
expensive and could lead to deadweight costs.  
Box II.7.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - EL
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Within an integrated 'flexicurity' approach, modernise employment protection legislation, reduces non-wage 
costs to the low-paid, strengthen active labour market policies, and transforms undeclared work into formal 
employment; and accelerate the implementation of reforms on education and training, increase participation 
in lifelong learning and facilitate transition to work, particularly for the young. 
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Ease entry to the labour market by reducing the minimum cost of labour through the setting of sub-minimum 
wages that take into account high unemployment rates of youth, and the lowering of social security 
contributions for low-paid workers. 
Reduce tax wedges over the medium term. Continue efforts to combat tax evasion. A high tax wedge on 
labour income hampers employment creation, and encourages tax evasion and informal activities. 
Raise the quality of formal education through improvements in teaching quality and advanced technology at 
schools. Address the school-dropout problem and facilitate the school to work transition through more 
flexible curricula. 
Pension reform needs to proceed further, including a change in entitlement ages and accrual rates of the 
system. Access to disability pension should be strictly enforced on medical criteria. 
IMF (Article IV 2009): 
Promote a tripartite social contract between employers, unions, and the public sector, aimed at more 
cooperative bargaining to favour employment growth over income growth, requiring understandings on 
wage moderation in return for investment and employment promotion. 
Facilitate part-time work to boost participation of youths and women in the labour force. 
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7.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Labour market in Greece is traditionally affected 
by a strong segmentation, which is reflected in 
high gender, age and skill gaps. The high share of 
long-term unemployed and of young 
unemployment, and the low occupational mobility 
especially in the private sector, are all signs of a 
sclerotic labour market that misses easy and rapid 
transitions between labour market states. The 
recent economic growth above euro-area average 
brought a certain reduction in the unemployment 
rate, but the many problems of the Greek labour 
market are still on the ground.  
Measures to address the crisis should be closely 
and systematically monitored. They should not 
undermine long-term policy goals and structural 
reforms aiming to address long-term constrains 
Greece is facing. In order to restore 
competitiveness, the country needs ambitious and 
comprehensive reforms of its labour market 
institutions. Issues such as high EPL, the reform of 
the wage bargaining system, or of the education 
system, have not been the main focus of policy 
actions. Yet, more recently, concerns about the 
sustainability of public finances raise attention to 
flexicurity approach as a cost effective way to 
solve the structural problems of the labour market. 
Greece is an exception among Mediterranean 
countries, as OECD score on employment 
protection legislation (EPL) for temporary 
contracts is higher than for regular contracts. 
Greece has a below-the-EU27 average share of 
temporary workers (11%) and a large proportion 
(about 80%) of them declares to be involuntary. 
The high share of involuntary temporary workers 
can probably be explained by very high in-work 
risk of poverty rates associated to temporary 
contracts as well as a high probability of workers 
to get trapped in precarious jobs. In fact, the 
probability to stay in temporary contract (55%) is 
the highest in the EU while only 19% of temporary 
contracts were converted into permanent between 
2005 and 2006. Strict regulation of temporary 
contracts delays the entrance to the labour market, 
in particular of young people who have 
unemployment rates three times as high as 
aggregate unemployment rate. As a result, the 
share of young in temporary employment is 
considerably below the EU average (27% versus 
41%). In addition, there is no sub-minimum wage 
for young, which contributes to their high 
unemployment rate. To avoid further dualism in 
the labour market, the transition from temporary to 
permanent contracts should be facilitated by 
combining a reform of EPL for these contracts 
with a reduction of the high protection for 
permanent workers. High EPL for white collar 
workers and the high share of self-employed in the 
non-agricultural employment possibly contribute 
to the relevance of the shadow economy. The 
social costs of informal economy are high and are 
associated with precarious jobs, relatively low on-
the-job training as well as limited upward mobility. 
Another field that needs a special attention is the 
wage setting mechanism. Even if minimum wages 
as a percentage of median wages are not high in 
international comparisons, the absence of a 
specific sub-minimum for some categories 
impedes their employability. The young are among 
the most hurt. Concerns arise also for the 
mechanism that automatically extend to all firms 
the minimum wages agreed by social partners. In 
addition to this, high social security contributions 
make minimum labour cost particularly heavy, 
thus eroding the competitiveness of the country. 
Promoting the decentralization of the wage 
formation mechanism, by increasing the rate of 
wage bargained at firm level or strengthening the 
link between wage and productivity, could help. 
The announced public sector wage freeze, which 
could have a strong signalling effect on the private 
sector, is a step in the right direction. Furthermore, 
a reduction in social security contributions, well 
targeted to low-paid workers, would stimulate the 
demand for labour.  
To reduce the risks of long-term unemployment, it 
is important to enhance active labour market 
policies and life-long learning. More efficient 
public employment services are needed to ease the 
matching between demand and supply of labour.  
Finally, a general reform of the tertiary education 
system could help in enhancing the potential of the 
economy and reducing the mismatches in the 
labour market. 
8. IRELAND 
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8.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
8.1.1. Recent trends 
After many years of buoyant economic growth, in 
2008 output declined by 3%, giving start to a very 
deep crisis which may put at risks the 
improvements registered by the labour market in 
the last ten years.  
Against this recent outlook, the employment rate in 
2008 hovered around 67.5% of the working age 
population, down by 1.5 compared to 2007 (yet 
still 1.8 pps. more than 2001). The female 
employment rate, which hit the Lisbon target in 
2007, in 2008 was at 60.2% (-0.4 pp. with respect 
to 2007 but 5.3 pps. more than 2001). The older 
workers employment rate was 53.6% (-0.2 pp. with 
respect to 2007 but 6.8 pps. more than 2001). 
Following many years of strong growth, 
employment shrank in 2008 by 0.6%, as a net 
result of a drop by 2% of male employment, so far 
the most hardly hit by the crisis, and an increase of 
1.3% of female employment. The reduction in 
employment, together with the still positive 
increase in labour force (1%) led to a large 
increase in the unemployment rate that reached 
6.3% in 2008.  
In relative terms, gender gaps are not very 
pronounced. Interestingly, since many years 
females have experienced a lower unemployment 
rate than males and this tendency has been 
confirmed during the current recession, as the male 
male unemployment rate surged to 7.5% in 2008 
(+2.6 pps. with respect to 2007) while the female 
one increased by much more to 4.8% (+0.6 pp.). 
Since the female activity rate is lower than males, 
there is potential female labour supply that could 
further be activated.   
The age gap is much lower than in other European 
countries. However, recent trends show a different 
response to the crisis by different age groups. The 
employment rate of older workers hardly 
decreased with respect to 2007 (53.6%, -0.2 pp.), 
while that of prime-age (77.3%, -1.4 pps.) and 
especially of young workers (46.0%, -3.9 pps.) 
suffered much more the effects of the crisis. The 
result is the same if we look at the unemployment 
rate. The already higher young unemployment rate 
jumped up by 3.5 pps. to 12.6%, against 5.2% of 
prime-age and 3.2% of older workers. The gap 
among workers with different skills in terms of 
activity, employment and unemployment rates 
appeared in line with the euro-area average but the 
crisis seems to affect asymmetrically different 
typologies of workers. Indeed, the employment 
rate declined much more for low- (-2.4 pps. to 
46.9%) and medium-skilled (-2.2 pps. to 71.9%) 
than for high-skilled (-1.5 pps. to 84.4%). A 
similar path can be observed for unemployment 
rate, which jumped to 10% (+2.4 pps.) for low-
skilled, to 6.1% (+1.7 pps.) for medium-skilled and 
only to 3.4% (+0.8 pp.) for high-skilled. 
Temporary employment represents 8.4% of the 
total, still increasing by 1.1 pps. with respect to 
2007 and by 3.2 pps. with respect to 2001, and it is 
higher for females (9.8%) than for males (7.1%). 
Part-time contracts constitute almost one third of 
total female employment (31.7%) and their 
incidence over the total employment is at 18.1%. 
The long-term unemployment rate was at 27.3% in 
2008, with a remarkable decrease (2.8 pps.) with 
respect to 2007. This decline, in a period of 
increasing unemployment, is mainly due to a 
composition effect: new entrants into the 
unemployment pool reduce the incidence of long-
term unemployed over the total. In 2008, labour 
productivity shrank by -1.4%, a big fall from 2007 
(+2.4%). This is the most important factor in 
explaining the negative GDP growth (-2.3%), 
while the -0.8 pp. contribution of labour utilisation 
is the net outcome of a negative contribution of the 
employment rate (-2.5 pps.) and a positive 
contribution of population growth (+1.9 pps.) 
8.1.2. Outlook for the next two years  
Forecasts for 2009 and 2010 are very negative for 
the Irish economy. According to the Commission 
forecast (Spring 2009), output is expected to shrink 
by 9% this year and 2.6% next year. Such a huge 
contraction will have negative effects on 
employment growth (-9% in 2009 and -4% in 
2010) and the unemployment rate (up to 13.3% in 
2009 and 16% in 2010). 
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
Table II.8.1: Short-term forecasts - IE 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
-2,3 -9,0 -2,6 -9,8 -1,5 -8,0 -3,0
-0,9 -9,0 -4,0 -2,3 0,5 -7,9 -2,9
6,3 13,3 16,0 12,2 14,8 12,0 13,0
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.8.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 65,8 67,6 62,5 65,9
Men 76,6 74,9 70,8 72,8
Women 54,9 60,2 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 46,8 53,6 37,5 45,6
Men 64,6 66,0 47,4 55,0
Women 28,7 41,0 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 68,6 72,0 68,5 70,9
Men 79,9 80,7 76,9 78,0
Women 57,1 63,1 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 48,0 55,4 40,1 48,1
Men 66,4 68,5 50,8 57,9
Women 29,4 42,1 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 4,0 6,3 8,5 7,0
Men 4,1 7,5 7,7 6,6
Women 3,8 4,8 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 33,0 27,3 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 10,4 10,1 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 4,6 8,4 12,4 14,0
15-24 12,5 21,9 35,9 40,0
55-64 3,2 5,4 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 16,2 18,1 : 17,6
Men 6,1 7,3 : 7,0
Women 30,5 31,7 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 65,8 67,6 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 48,7 46,9 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 72,4 71,9 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 85,8 84,4 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 29,0 : 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 15,0 : 18,0 22,5
IE EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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8.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Ireland's response to the crisis contains a wide
range of measures addressing fiscal, financial
markets, the labour market and structural issues. 
Fiscal policy is at the centre of the government's
response to the crisis, while the nature of the 
measures has changed in view of the worsening 
economic outlook and shrinking room for fiscal 
manoeuvre.  
As regards the labour market, new measures at a
full-year cost of almost 0.1% of GDP (from within
existing resources) were announced in the context 
of the Framework for Stabilisation, Social
Solidarity and Economic Renewal published at the 
end of 2008 and the supplementary budget adopted 
in early April 2009.  
The Framework mainly involves measures aimed 
at the activation and re-skilling of unemployed
people through training, education and 
work/employment experience. Specific measures 
include an increase in the number of places in 
training programmes for newly unemployed
people (51,000 new training places under the FÁS 
Training Initiatives Strategy); re-training for 
redundant construction workers in sustainable 
energy and 'green' technology; measures to allow
redundant apprentices finish their on-the-job 
training with approved employers on a rotation
basis; and facilitating access to enterprise and 
education-related allowances. The monthly 
capacity of job-search services to assist individuals 
through the provision of guidance on employment,
education and training opportunities has been
increased. New schemes are being developed for
re-skilling unemployed people through training, 
education and work/employment experience. 
A limited number of recovery measures are
targeted to support the employability and the 
income of the most vulnerable groups and to
sectors expected to be most affected by the crisis. 
Labour market measures appear to be in line with
the medium-term priorities of the country under 
the Lisbon reform agenda.  
8.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Ireland has been hardly hit by the current 
economic crisis. The sharp adjustment in the
housing market, coupled with the distressed
financial sector, which represents a relevant share 
of the Irish economy, caused a first heavy
contraction in output. The fall in global demand
added to this negative impulse. 
In response to the crisis, the Government has 
enacted measures aimed at activating and re-
skilling those who have lost their jobs and 
preventing the drift towards long-term 
unemployment. This strategy is consistent with the 
need of promoting the reallocation from certain 
sectors of the economy to others. Such measures
take time to have an affect and their impact on the
economy could be appreciated only once the
Box II.8.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - IE
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Foster a swift adjustment to sustainable medium-term growth by productivity enhancing measures, which 
will help restore competitiveness and adequate wage policies. 
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Improve the targeting of child support to strengthen the incentives for second earners and lone parents with 
young children to work. Further increase the supply of childcare places. 
Extend the availability of pre-primary education. Consider a system of upfront tuition fees for higher
education financed by loans to make institutions more responsive to students’ needs. 
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recovery kicks in. However, these measures may 
be the only ones feasible in a situation where 
public finances are quickly deteriorating.  
A small country like Ireland relies hugely on world 
trade. However to fully enjoy the recovery, the 
competitive position of the country must improve. 
This is possible if labour productivity regains a 
positive and sustained pace and if adequate wage 
adjustment take place. On one side, converting 
labour force skills to adapt them to the need of new 
sectors characterized by higher growth rates will 
have effect on labour productivity. On the other 
side, targeted re-skilling of unemployment is 
important to avoid bottlenecks that could give rise 
to spiralling inflation during the recovery. 
Increasing labour supply among females and those 
at the margins of the labour force may be 
necessary to mobilise potential labour supply. The 
goal may be pursued through continued investment 
in activation measures and continued investment in 
the childcare system. Up-skilling the workforce, 
especially older and low-skilled workers will also 
continue to remain a priority.  Another important 
measure is a moderation of wage settlements in 
public sector which often has higher wages in 
many areas. This would contribute to wage 
moderation in the private sector and then to 
competitiveness.
In the National Reform Program, Ireland has stated 
it aims to improve the quality of work as well as 
the amount of overall employment. This is 
important in the light of the high at-risk-of-poverty 
rate with about 30% of those at risk of poverty 
living in households where the main earner is in 
employment.  
Employment Protection Legislation is among the 
less stringent in Europe, with the OECD's overall 
index at 1.4 against an un-weighted EU average of 
2.4. To some extent the high external flexibility 
explains the sizeable increase in the Irish 
unemployment rate to the fall of GDP; yet, one 
would also expect that such flexibility would entail 
a rapid recovery as the economic growth rebounds.  
High marginal effective tax rates are responsible 
for unemployment and inactivity traps, which 
depend also on the indefinite duration of means-
tested payments, the high withdrawal rates, the 
loss of secondary benefits and the structure of the 
tax credit system for one-earner couples. 
Together with a flexible labour market, a modern 
tax and social welfare system is necessary to have 
a balanced flexicurity approach, which promotes 
transitions from non-paid income to paid 
employment. 
9. ITALY 
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9.1. LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
9.1.1. Recent trends 
In the second half of the 1990s, the performance of 
the Italian labour market improved in terms of 
employment, participation and unemployment 
rates. These improvements are reflected in the 
significant increase in the female and older 
workers participation rates driven by both socio-
demographic changes and important policy 
measures. 
Even so, the labour market is still characterised by 
relatively low employment and participation rates, 
with significant heterogeneities across age groups, 
gender and regions (Table II.9.2).  
The overall employment rate (58.7%) remains 
largely below the EU average (65.9%) and far 
from the Lisbon target, owing to low female and 
older workers employment rates, which however 
grew also in 2008 (by about 0.7 pp. both), 
regardless of the incoming global downturn. After 
having hit the historically low rate of 6.1% in 
2007, the unemployment rose sharply to 6.8% in 
2008, indicating that the global financial turmoil 
had started to bite; yet it remained well below the 
rates recorded during the milder 2001 recession. 
The increase in the unemployment rate resulted 
from an increase in the working age population by 
0.6% and in the participation rate by 0.8% not 
compensated by a sufficiently robust growth of 
employment (0.7% against 1% of one year earlier). 
Concerning vulnerable groups, unemployment is 
still very high and even increasing, at 21.3% for 
the young (up by 1 pp.) and the low-skilled (up by 
1 pp. to 8.6% in 2008), who are so far the most 
hardly hit by the recession. In 2009q1, temporary 
and self-employment, the most prevalent contract 
types among young workers, plummeted 
respectively by 7% and 4.5% as compared to the 
previous quarter. 
The gap with the EU employment and activity 
rates is mainly determined by the very low female 
components, below the EU average by more than 8 
pps. and about 14 pps. respectively. For males, the 
gap is much smaller (-4 and -5 pps.), and is mainly 
due to the low older workers' participation rate 
(more than 12 pps. below the EU average). 
Because of the low female employment rates, Italy 
ranks third in the list of countries with poor 
records in term of gender equality in employment 
rates. The age gap is even more pronounced, with 
very high activity and employment rates among 
prime age individuals and very low rates among 
young and old workers. Compared to the EU 
average of 38% and 45.5%, only about 24.5% of 
young individuals and 34.5% of old ones are 
employed.  
The reforms undertaken since 1997 aimed at 
increasing the flexibility of work contracts for new 
entrants by reducing hiring and firing costs at the 
margin. The Treu Package of 1997 introduced for 
the first time flexible work arrangements 
(temporary contracts and temporary-agency work) 
and provided incentives for part-time work, while 
the 2003 Biagi Reform introduced new provisions 
related to the use of such atypical labour 
arrangements and set new forms of work such as 
on-call jobs, job sharing and occasional work. This 
deregulation probably had a welcome negative 
impact on undeclared work, but also increased the 
share of temporary workers, which, however, 
remains below the EU average (Table II.2.9.2). 
Flexible contracts are relatively more common 
among the young and represent the prevalent 
contract typology to enter into the labour market. 
In 2008 the percentage of young (15-24) with a 
temporary employment stood at 43.3%, up by 1 
pp. compared to 2007. Yet, to assess the total 
amount of flexible work arrangements in Italy, one 
should consider that a share of self-employed 
workers usually have a stable or preferential 
relationship with one firm only, making them in 
practice not dissimilar from dependent workers as 
far as working hours, presence in the workplace 
and work organisation are concerned. The cost of 
this ‘quasi-subordinate’ labour and the protection 
and rights stipulated by law continue to be 
significantly lower than those granted to dependent 
employees. Compared to the largest European 
economies, Italy has a very high percentage of 
self-employed, (about 16% of total employment, 
lower than the 17.7% peak reached in 2004, but 
bigger than the almost 10% of the EU average). 
Most of this self-employment is voluntary but, as 
explained above, part of it could actually be 
considered almost equivalent to flexible dependent 
work, which the simple indicators of protection 
European Commission 
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legislation (valid only for dependent work) cannot 
capture. In addition to the above mentioned 
typologies of work, as elsewhere part-time work is 
to some extent used as flexible contractual 
arrangement. As suggested by the high share of 
women with children in part-time jobs and by their 
number growing with the number of children, part-
time is usually chosen as a way to reconcile 
working life with family life (OECD, 2007). Yet, it 
is also a very common type of work among young 
women without children. For example, the fact that 
40% of part-time working women aged between 
15 and 39 and 60% of men of the same age declare 
to be in a part-time job because they could not find 
a full-time one - against respective EU average of 
22.5% and 32.5% - suggests that this contractual 
arrangement is used by firms to increase the 
flexibility of their work organisation.  
9.2. THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Finally, regional imbalances in the country are 
quite sizeable. The employment rate is highly 
dispersed across regions, with a gap of more than 
21 pps. between north-eastern (67.6%) and 
southern regions (46.5%).  
One of the most discussed characteristic of the 
Italian economy is the poor dynamic of labour 
productivity. After a steady decline in 2001-03, the 
path remained stagnant in 2005-2007 following an 
increase of 1.1% in 2004. However, 2008 was 
characterized by a strong decrease in labour 
productivity per worker (-1.4%), mainly due to 
labour hoarding in the first period of the crisis. The 
fact that hourly labour productivity declined by 
only 0.5% can be explained by the firms' massive 
use of wage supplementation schemes (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni) that has reduced the hours 
effectively worked. 
9.1.2. Outlook for the next two years  
Consistently with those of other international 
institutions, the Commission's forecasts (Spring 
2009) point to a strong deterioration of the 
economic situation in 2009 and 2010. After a fall 
by -1.0% in 2008, GDP is expected to shrink by 
4.4% in 2009 (5% according to September 2009's 
Interim forecasts) and to only moderately recover 
in 2010 (0.1%). As a result, employment growth is 
expected to turn strongly negative in 2009 (-2.1) 
and to remain so in 2010 (-0.4).  
Italy has adopted recovery measures with limited 
budgetary impact (0.5% of GDP in 2009 and 0.2% 
in 2010), focusing on restoring confidence and 
offering some relief to distressed firms and 
households.  
Besides a temporary extension to 2009 of the 
favourable fiscal treatment of performance-related 
pay to allow a better alignment of wage and 
productivity developments (0.03% of GDP), the 
intervention of the government to offset the 
employment impact of the crisis mainly consisted 
in a) a temporary extension of the coverage of the 
Wage Guarantee Fund (CIG); b) a temporary 
extension of unemployment benefits coverage to 
workers not covered by the ordinary benefit and 
suspended from work in time of crisis, for a 
maximum duration of 90 days per year; c) granting 
one-off payments to atypical workers in case of 
non-renewal of contracts over 2009-2010; d) better 
definition of the procedures for the application of 
sanctions in case of refusal of a suitable job offer 
or training proposal by the PES (access to 
unemployment benefits made conditional upon 
declaring immediate readiness to work or 
participate in training). 
More recently, the government introduced a 
number of measures aimed mainly to reduce job 
losses and support investment.  
With a view to limit collective dismissals, the so-
called “solidarity contracts” (Contratti di 
solidarietà) are being strengthened. These 
contracts, introduced in 1991, involve employees 
accepting a reduction of working time and a 
corresponding pay cut. In general, the government   
integrates part of the lost wages. The newly 
introduced measure sets a higher public support  
(from 60% to 80% of the lost wage) to those 
workers accepting these contracts.  
With a view to encourage self-employment and 
entrepreneurship, workers receiving transfers 
under existing wage supplementation schemes 
(such as CIGS or mobility allowances) can ask for 
a one-off payment of the remaining allowances 
they are entitled to. 
Finally, with a view to accelerate workers’ return 
to work, workers receiving  CIGS transfers can be 
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involved in vocational training projects inside their 
workplaces. If they accept training, workers
receive the entire wage rather than the partial wage
as under the normal scheme (80% of the wage is
financed as normal CIGS and the remaining 20%
is financed by the State through the Social Fund 
for Employment). 
In the current adverse cyclical conditions, the 
extended use of the wage supplementation scheme
(CIG), whereby the employment relationship is
maintained even in the case of interruption of the 
activity, has helped to limit the rise in
unemployment so far.  
However, if economic activity and labour demand 
remain subdued for a longer period, these schemes 
need to be further linked to training and re-training
measures to facilitate restructuring. Moreover, the 
current crisis has highlighted the need to introduce 
a universal income-insurance scheme, partly
financed by the private sector, which could replace
or go along with existing ones. 
Table II.9.1: Short-term forecasts - IT 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
-1,0 -4,4 0,1 -5,5 0,4 -5,1 -0,1
0,3 -2,1 -0,4 -0,4 0,0 -1,7 -1,5
6,8 8,8 9,4 8,4 10,2 8,9 10,5
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database update July 2009.
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Table II.9.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 54,8 58,7 62,5 65,9
Men 68,5 70,3 70,8 72,8
Women 41,1 47,2 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 28,0 34,4 37,5 45,6
Men 40,4 45,5 47,4 55,0
Women 16,2 24,0 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 60,6 63,0 68,5 70,9
Men 74,1 74,4 76,9 78,0
Women 47,3 51,6 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 29,2 35,5 40,1 48,1
Men 42,3 47,0 50,8 57,9
Women 16,9 24,7 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 9,1 6,8 8,5 7,0
Men 7,1 5,5 7,7 6,6
Women 12,2 8,5 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 62,2 45,6 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 11,3 16,2 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 9,6 13,3 12,4 14,0
15-24 23,3 43,3 35,9 40,0
55-64 6,2 6,2 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 8,3 14,1 : 17,6
Men 3,3 4,8 : 7,0
Women 16,6 27,8 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 54,8 58,7 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 44,5 46,0 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 64,5 67,9 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 81,4 78,5 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 17,2 9,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 57,1 64,9 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 37,7 39,5 18,0 22,5
IT EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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9.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
The current global recession started to affect the
Italian labour market in early 2009. The cyclical
deterioration impinged upon well-known structural
weaknesses, which are evident in sizeable 
differences in labour market outcomes (between 
various age groups, by gender and between 
regions) and in the uneven distribution across 
generations of flexible contracts, along with 
persistently high share of irregular jobs. The 
substantial degree of dualism of the Italian labour
market is making the less attached workers to 
suffer most from the crisis. 
A series of reforms, especially those aiming at 
broadening the use of non-standard contracts, have 
marginally but incrementally increased the 
flexibility of the labour market. Together with the 
pension reforms, these measures improved the 
female and older workers' participation. The 
policies undertaken since 1997 have targeted
flexibility of work contracts for new entrants, 
significantly reducing hiring and firing costs at the 
margin while leaving unchanged the legislation on 
incumbent permanent employment. Between 1998
and 2008 the overall EPL score (version 1) 
declined from 2.70 to 1.89, mainly owing to the 
decrease in the tightness of employment regulation 
for temporary contracts (from 4.0 to 2.25). Even
so, these measures have not modified the
traditional configuration of the Italian welfare 
system based on the protection of the male
breadwinner whose permanent full-time job is 
sheltered by tight conditions for dismissals and
who has a preferential access to a system of social
shock absorbers, sometimes including early labour
market exit if needed. The asymmetry in the 
Box II.9.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - IT
EU (CSRs 2009): 
To address the productivity challenge, improve the efficiency and outcomes of the education system, inter 
alia by closely monitoring quality standards, while paying attention to equity issues. Within a flexicurity
approach and with a view to reducing regional disparities, reallocate social expenditure so as to put in place 
a uniform unemployment benefit system, ensure the efficient operation of employment services and promote
lifelong learning, and furthers tackle undeclared work. 
OECD (Going for Growth 2009): 
Marginal tax rates should be decreased, especially for low-income groups, without introducing excessive
complexity, financed by reduced public expenditures and strengthened tax enforcement. Since joint taxation 
is detrimental to women’s labour force participation, already among the lowest in the OECD, separate
taxation of couples should be maintained. 
Reduce regional disparities in labour utilisation, promote decentralisation in wage bargaining, starting with 
differentiating wages in the public sector, so as to take into account regional differences in productivity and
the cost of living. 
Increase the amount of private financial investment in tertiary education through higher tuition fees and
private sector financing, to increase the supply (quality and quantity) of university places and reduce drop-
out rates. 
IMF (Article IV 2008): 
Encourage a second generation of labour market reforms to strengthen the link between wages and 
productivity, allow wages to better respond to regional differences, and make permanent contracts more 
flexible, in tandem with efforts to enhance the social safety net. 
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treatment of open-ended full-time workers vis-à-
vis the proliferation of atypical and flexible forms 
of work has raised concerns related to the presence 
of a dual labour market. In addition, firms have 
made use of temporary contracts not only to cope 
with the uncertainty of production or as a way to 
test un-experienced workers before offering a 
permanent contract, but also as a way to 
circumvent the hiring and screening process and 
the costly procedure entailed by the standard 
permanent contract. The age and gender specific 
characteristics of workers with temporary contracts 
suggests that firms have decided to organise the 
production for normal periods around a pool of 
permanent workers smaller than would have 
prevailed in the absence of firing costs, while 
leaving to “marginal” workers the task of coping 
with temporary shifts in production. According to 
the special Eurobarometer survey made in 2006, 
insufficient flexibility is also reflected in a 
difficulty to find a new job (only 10% of 
respondents think that they would very likely find 
a new job in case they were laid-off) and small 
mobility across firms (only 3% of respondents 
changed their employer more than 6 times during 
their working life). The duration of short-term 
unemployment spells is indeed about 30% higher 
than the EU average, and even more for the 
younger cohorts. 
Employment rigidities have also probably 
contributed to a large share of self-employed in 
non-agricultural sectors (19% in 2007), which is 
the highest in the EU after Greece and has strongly 
increased since 2001 (by almost 6.5p.p). The high 
share of self-employment includes to some extent 
"independent" (bogus self-employed) workers who 
are in fact engaged in regular activities with a 
single employer. The social costs of dualism are 
high, as they are associated with precarious jobs, 
low on-the-job training, as well as limited upward 
mobility. However, these costs need to the 
weighted against the likely benefits of the role of 
flexible arrangements in reducing undeclared work 
and the informal sector. 
Labour market reforms contributed to a 
considerable reduction in the long-term 
unemployment rate since 1997 (by about 16 pps.), 
which however is still high at 45%, reflecting 
remaining employment rigidities, skills 
mismatches, regional imbalances, and other 
factors.  
The policy response has been so far mild but 
adequate. The strategy of the Government has been 
to restore confidence and offer some relief to 
workers and firms to avoid further deterioration in 
internal demand, therefore reducing the impact on 
labour demand, while at the same time taking into 
account concerns about the budgetary impacts of 
more substantial reforms. 
Yet, the structural problems of the labour market 
are still unsolved. Productivity and 
competitiveness remain the main challenges for the 
country. A comprehensive reform strategy would   
allow the country to gain from the world recovery. 
Labour market reforms in line with the flexicurity 
principles can play a key role in boosting 
economic activity and reducing the inequality in 
opportunities of a segmented labour market. 
Reducing asymmetries between non-standard and 
standard employment, making open-ended 
contracts more attractive to firms, is prerequisite to 
distribute more equally across contract types the 
job created with the economic recovery. The 
proposal of introducing a unique labour contract, 
based on the so-called "tenure track approach" has 
been put forward in the policy debate. This kind of 
contract should be a permanent contract, but 
specific elements of protection (on top of the 
basics) can be built up progressively as the 
working relationship continues. (50)  
A comprehensive reform of the currently 
segmented and partial social safety net, while 
strengthening incentives to work, appears also 
necessary. Yet, the tight budgetary situation 
constrains the amount of resources that can be 
devoted to new outlays, and suggests a 
redistributive approach across contract types.  
Moreover, without reinforcing activation policies
and incentives to work, while providing security 
trough a universal scheme, the risk of hysteresis in 
(50) These elements of protection may concern notification 
periods, the amount of severance pay and procedural 
aspects of dismissal protection. At the same time, the 
(consecutive) use of fixed-term contracts should be limited 
and undeclared work should be reduced as rapidly as 
possible, notably by increasing effective inspections. Along 
these lines see also: "Flexicurity Pathways, Turning 
Hurdles into Stepping Stones" Report by the European 
Expert Group on Flexicurity, June 2007                                           
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=1519&langId
=en 
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unemployment is high. At the same time, measures 
aimed at increasing the employability of workers 
through appropriate activation (ALMPs) and life-
long learning measures should be reviewed, and a 
strict check of their effectiveness conducted, to 
ensure that they provide workers with the 
opportunity to work in a more flexible 
environment, while making them more employable 
and protected against the risks of marginalisation 
after restructuring.  
The recent agreement between the social partners 
aimed at giving more weight to firm-level wage 
negotiations is an important development to align 
wages to productivity and a step to overcome the 
traditional regional imbalances. This measure, 
combined with a mobilisation of labour supply, 
should keep wage developments under control 
while increasing employment rates and 
productivity. 
Italy has relatively centralised bargaining 
institutions. In particular, although in principle 
firm-level agreements are possible, nationally 
negotiated wages at sector level dominate and 
restrict the scope of negotiations at the firm level. 
Decentralised bargaining is common in large firms 
but rare in small ones. This has an adverse impact 
on regional differences in economic development. 
Collectively agreed wages impose a "de facto" 
wage floor even for workers not covered by 
collective bargaining. As mentioned above, the 
recent agreement between the social partners 
aimed at giving more weight at the firm's level 
wage negotiations goes in the right direction of 
making wage developments consistent with 
productivity developments at the firm level. 
10. LUXEMBOURG 
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10.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
10.1.1.  Recent trends 
Over recent years, Luxembourg has registered only 
limited improvements in achieving the Lisbon's 
employment targets (Table II.10.2), despite a 
sustained job creation that affected mainly non-
residents. The overall employment rate in 2008 
was at 63.4%, down by 0.8 pp. from the 2007's 
level and only 0.4 pp. higher than in 2001. The 
female employment rate (55.1%) has registered 
only a mild long-term growth since 2001 (+4.3 
pps.). The employment rate of older workers (age 
55-64) was at 34.1%, among the lowest in the euro 
area, although since 2001 it increased by more 
than 9 pps. 
According to national accounts, employment 
growth remained at a sustained pace in 2008 
(+4.7%), even if Labour Force Survey's data 
registered a negative employment growth (-0.4% 
compared to +3/.9% in 2007). The reversal was 
very strong for female employment (that went 
down from +5.8% in 2007 to -2.8% in 2008), 
while the employment growth of males remained 
positive (+1.6% down from 2.4%). The negative 
employment growth, together with the increase in 
labour force (+0.7%), explains why the 
unemployment rate moved up to 4.9% (from 4.2% 
in 2007), very close to the all-time high registered 
in 2004 (5%).  
Even if not extremely deep, the gender gap is 
higher than the euro-area average, with females 
having activity (58.7%) and employment (55.1%) 
rates about 16 pps. lower than males. Age gaps 
even matter. Prime age workers have an activity 
rate of 83.4% and an employment rate of 80.0%, 
respectively 48.4 pps. and 45.9 pps. more than 
older workers. Young workers suffer an 
unemployment rate of 18%, four and a half times 
the prime age unemployment rate. 
As for the nationality, Luxembourg is one of the 
European countries in which foreigners living in 
the country perform better than nationals in terms 
of attachment to the labour market. Foreigners 
have an activity rate of 71.9% (+9.2 pps. with 
respect to nationals) and an employment rate of 
66.6% (+5.8 pps.). However, the unemployment 
rate of foreigners is at 7.3% against 3% for 
nationals. 
The gap related to skills, even if pronounced, is not 
among the highest in Europe. Temporary 
employment is much less diffused than in other 
countries (6.2% of the total), and this share was 
decreasing in 2008 by 0.6 pp. from 2007's level, 
mainly because labour adjustment at the beginning 
of the crisis affects temporary contracts more 
hardly than permanent ones. Part-time contracts 
constitute an important part of the overall female 
employment (38.2%). 
The long-term unemployment rate was at 32.9% in 
2008, up by 4.4 pps. with respect to 2007. This 
important change, together with the increase in 
total unemployment, suggests that movements in 
unemployment in 2008 were due mainly to fewer 
outflows from unemployment rather than more 
inflows into unemployment. In 2008 labour 
productivity collapsed by -5.3%, partly as an effect 
of the drop in the value added, not accompanied by 
a corresponding shrinking in the employed labour 
force. 
10.1.2.  Outlook for the next two years  
The financial crisis is expected to continue having 
an important impact on the Luxembourg economy. 
Table II.10.1 shows that the current recession may 
go on up to the next year, resulting in a strong 
deterioration of the labour market.  
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Table II.10.1: Short-term forecasts - LU 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
-0.9 -3.0 0.1 -4.0 -0.4 -4.8 -0.2
4.7 0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -0.1 -1.4 2.4
4.9 5.9 7.0 6.0 7.2 6.8 6.0
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.10.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 63.0 63.4 62.5 65.9
Men 74.9 71.5 70.8 72.8
Women 50.8 55.1 54.3 59.1
Employment rate 55-64 24.9 34.1 37.5 45.6
Men 35.4 38.7 47.4 55.0
Women 14.6 29.4 28.2 36.9
Participation rate 15-64 64.1 66.8 68.5 70.9
Men 76.0 74.7 76.9 78.0
Women 51.9 58.7 60.2 63.9
Participation rate 55-64 24.9 35.0 40.1 48.1
Men 35.4 39.8 50.8 57.9
Women 14.6 30.4 30.1 38.8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 1.9 4.9 8.5 7.0
Men 1.6 4.0 7.7 6.6
Women 2.4 6.0 9.4 7.5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 28.4 32.9 46.8 37.0
Self-employment (3) 2.2 3.8 9.5 9.8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 4.3 6.2 12.4 14.0
15-24 19.5 39.3 35.9 40.0
55-64 : 0.9 6.8 6.7
Part-time contracts (4) 11.3 17.9 : 17.6
Men 1.7 3.8 : 7.0
Women 25.7 38.2 : 30.6
Employment rate 15-64 63.0 63.4 62.5 65.9
Low-skilled 51.1 48.4 47.9 48.1
Medium-skilled 69.5 65.3 68.3 70.6
High-skilled 83.8 83.7 82.8 83.9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 15.5 36.5 53.7 60.2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 8.9 5.2 18.0 22.5
LU EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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Luxembourg has taken a wide range of measures 
Moreover, a set of measures already decided 
9, following a similar increase by 
6% in 2008. This increase had been decided in the 
lly 
encouraged the recourse to temporary 
unemployment in order to limit lay-offs, through 
RM CHALLENGES 
The current economic crisis is adding concerns for 
Luxem nted some 
long-term challenges, like the low employment 
for the future. In 
particular, competitiveness is a key issue to 
to alleviate the impact of the economic downturn. 
before the aggravation of the crisis can also serve 
that purpose. The bulk of the recovery package is 
made of cuts (and associated reforms) in taxes, 
especially in personal income tax, and of a large 
increase in government investment. The cuts in 
income tax are not planned to be temporary but, 
due to the very sound condition of public finances, 
this does not constitute a real risk for their 
sustainability.  
Income tax brackets have been increased by 9% on 
1st January 200
2009 budget in order to compensate for the non-
indexation of tax brackets since 2001 and was thus 
not initially planned as a response to the crisis. 
To support the labour market during the 
slowdown, Luxembourg has essentia
the lengthening of the coverage duration, the 
reimbursement of the employers' share of the 
benefit, and the increase in its level from 80% to 
90% of the wage for workers following a training 
(0.4% of GDP).   
10.3.  ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TE
the proper functioning of the labour market in 
bourg, which even before prese
rate of young and older workers. 
The strong dependence of the economy from the 
world demand and its specialization in the 
financial services add other risks 
Box II.10.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - LU
EU (2009, no CSR addressed): 
Luxembourg has made some progress to increase the employment rate of older workers, reduce the number 
of early school leavers and remove artificial barriers in the education system, and to make the economic 
environment more attractive. Further measures are needed to address these underlying challenges. The 
employment rate of the resident population remains below the European average with that of older workers 
being particularly low. 
OECD (Going for Growth, 2009):  
Decouple revenu minimum garanti (RMI) and complementary benefits from minimum wage increases. 
Tighten access conditions to unemployment benefits for the young.  
Phase out existing pre-pension and early retirement schemes. Reduce the high net replacement rates that can 
reach more than 100% of the last wage for low-income earners who retire, preferably by adjusting the 
pension indexation mechanism.  
Employment protection legislation is one of the strictest among the OECD countries. In particular, the 
regulation of collective dismissals should be made more flexible as it currently acts as a barrier to firm 
growth. 
School autonomy should increase to allow headmasters and teachers to adjust their school programme in 
line with student needs. In addition, language education should be rebalanced in order to make school 
education better reflect labour market requirements.  
guarantee the country will catch up the recovery, 
once it will appear. Last year's comparatively rapid 
increase in unit labour cost ,which is projected to 
continue also in the following years due to the fall 
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ial 
unemployment scheme is likely to have an 
MPs can constitute an obstacle to 
matching the increase in labour demand that the 
o cope with the financial crisis and the rooted 
weaknesses of the country's labour market, a 
umber of long-term reforms will need to be 
considered in a longer term perspective . In 
in labour productivity, significantly weakened the 
competitiveness of the economy of the country. 
Measures taken to address the crisis are not at odds 
with a long-term strategy aiming at solving more 
structural weaknesses. The extension of the part
important effect to limit the rise in unemployment, 
at least in the short run, by giving firms an 
additional - and hopefully strong - incentive to 
limit lay-offs. The question arises, however, 
whether this incentive will persist in a longer 
perspective if enterprises have to face a protracted 
contraction in activity, which cannot be discarded 
at this stage. 
Even more important is to evaluate if the 
combination of generous unemployment benefits 
and weak AL
recovery will bring. If disincentives to works lower 
labour supply, the increase in labour demand 
during the economic upturn will cause an adverse 
upward pressure on wages with negative 
consequences over unit labour costs and 
competitiveness. However, at the same time, 
Luxembourg would suffer the consequences of 
labour supply shortages to a lesser extent than 
other countries, given the large pool of available 
workers in the neighbouring regions.  
T
n
particular, even though a period of rising 
unemployment would suggest some caution, it 
would be important to modernise employment 
protection legislation in order to guarantee better 
transitions into employment for those that have 
lost their job, and notably for those specific 
categories, such as young workers, that have 
historically paid a high tribute to the rigidity of the 
labour market in terms of lower employment and 
higher unemployment rates. Together with this, 
and always taking due account of the caution 
required in periods of rising unemployment,  , 
disincentives to work that still lower young 
workers' labour supply should be reduced, notably 
through tightening access condition to 
unemployment benefits for this category. Finally, 
it would be advisable to avoid using traditional 
early retirement schemes to cope with the crisis, in 
order to escape further reductions in older workers' 
employment rates.  
11. MALTA 
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11.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS  
11.1.1.  Recent trends 
Structural weaknesses continue to characterize the 
Maltese labour market, despite the last four years 
of sustained economic growth. The Lisbon targets 
are very far away with no evidence of catching up 
with the EU. Although increasing by 0.6 pp. in 
2008, the employment rate of Malta remains the 
lowest in the EU (55.2%), primarily due to the 
extreme low female and older workers 
employment rates (respectively at 37.4%, +1.7% 
with respect to 2007 and at 29.1%, more or less the 
same rate as in 2001). It is worth noting that the 
employment rate for young women is well above 
the euro area and the EU27 average (43.8% against 
35.1% and 34.5% respectively), while the 
employment rate for older females, at only 12.4% 
against 35.9% in the euro area and 36.9% in the 
EU27, is the lowest in the EU. With a participation 
and employment rate for women lower than for 
those men by respectively 36.7 and35.1 pps., the 
gender gap is the highest in Europe. Thus the small 
difference between female and male 
unemployment rates (6.5% versus 5.6% 
respectively) indicates cultural factors and 
discouragement in searching, which explain the 
very low female labour market attachment. 
Following a strong growth in 2007 (3.2%), 
employment grew at a lower pace (2.5%) in 2008. 
The employment growth rate was particularly high 
for females (7.9% in 2007 and 6.5% in 2008). 
With a labour force growing by 2.0% in 2008, still 
below the employment growth, the unemployment 
rate kept on declining, down to 5.9% in 2008 
(from 6.4% in 2007). In 2008 the effects of crisis 
on the Maltese labour market were not particularly 
evident. Conversely, young workers participate in 
the labour market more than in the rest of the euro 
area (participation rate is 52.2% in Malta versus 
45% in the euro area); on the other hand , the gap 
in employment rates between prime-age and older 
workers is huge (67.3% versus 29.1% 
respectively), even worse for males (+43 pps.) than 
for females (+31.7 pps.).  
With such a high participation, the unemployment 
rate of young, even if declining, is still high 
(12.1%), 7.2 pps. higher than prime-age rate. Only 
46% of the low-skilled are employed (-3.3 pps. 
since 2001), while medium- and high-skilled have 
much higher employment rates (72.5% and 85.7% 
respectively). On the contrary, the very low level 
of unemployment rate for high-skilled could be 
interpreted as a sign of shortage of this kind of 
workers in the labour market. 
Temporary employment represents a very small 
fraction of the total employment compared to other 
countries (4.2%) with a slightly higher incidence 
among women (5.8%). Part-time contracts 
constitute a bit more than a quarter of total female 
employment (26.1%), while as a percentage of the 
total employment they amount to 11.3%, with a 
long-term growth by 4.2 pps. since 2001 but still 
well below the Euro Area average of 19.3%. 
The long-term unemployment rate remained quite 
stable over the last decade and stood at 2.5% of the 
labour force in 2008, about half of the EU average. 
Labour productivity grew by 1.5% in 2008 (0.9% 
in 2007). As hourly labour productivity increased 
by 1.4%, the other main contributors to the GDP 
growth in 2008 were population (0.6%) and the 
share of working population (0.5%). 
11.1.2.  Outlook for next two years  
The crisis is expected to have a minor impact on 
the Maltese economy. After a positive growth in 
2007 (2.5%), the Commission expects an output 
fall by -0.9% in 2009 followed by a modest growth 
(0.2%) already in 2010, while IMF forecasts the 
same -1.5% this year and +1.1% the next one. This 
should imply a negative employment growth this 
year, equal to -0.5%. Finally unemployment rate 
should hover around 7% in 2009 and 7.6% in 
2010. 
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Table II.11.1: Short-term forecasts - MT 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
2,5 -0,9 0,2 : : -1,5 1,1
2,5 -0,5 0,2 : : -0,6 0,6
5,9 7,1 7,6 : : 6,9 7,6
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
IMFEU Commission OECD
GDP growth
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.11.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 54,7 55,2 62,5 65,9
Men 76,6 72,5 70,8 72,8
Women 32,7 37,4 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 28,1 29,1 37,5 45,6
Men 48,7 46,5 47,4 55,0
Women 9,6 12,4 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 58,9 58,8 68,5 70,9
Men 82,1 76,8 76,9 78,0
Women 35,6 40,1 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 28,6 30,3 40,1 48,1
Men 49,2 47,9 50,8 57,9
Women 9,1 13,2 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 7,6 5,9 8,5 7,0
Men 6,9 5,6 7,7 6,6
Women 9,3 6,5 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 43,3 42,2 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 8,1 8,9 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 4,1 4,2 12,4 14,0
15-24 9,4 9,2 35,9 40,0
55-64 : : 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 7,1 11,3 : 17,6
Men 3,0 3,9 : 7,0
Women 16,8 26,1 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 54,7 55,2 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 49,3 46,0 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 67,4 72,5 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 86,0 85,7 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 40,7 50,0 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 24,3 17,1 18,0 22,5
MT EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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11.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Despite limited fiscal space as a result of the high 
general government deficit and debt ratios and a 
deteriorating competitive position, Malta has 
adopted several measures to support the economy 
in 2009. While these form part of a broader 
consolidation effort, they act as a stimulus on both 
the revenue (declining by a ¼% of GDP) and the 
expenditure (increasing by 1¼% of GDP) side. 
The total budgetary cost of the fiscal stimulus 
measures in 2009 is thus expected to amount to 
around 1½% of GDP. 
Most measures have came into effect in 2009 and 
are aimed at increasing public investment on 
infrastructure and the environment (partly financed 
by EU funds), as well as at directly supporting the 
economy through supply-side initiatives (in 
particular for manufacturing, tourism and SMEs) 
and support of households' purchasing power..  
The government is providing financial assistance 
aimed at encouraging crisis-affected companies to 
invest further while avoiding layoffs and return to 
normal working hours. The measures thus are 
securing employment, rather than supplementing 
household income through transfer payments. 
Moreover, Malta is envisaging implement a 
flexicurity roadmap to ensure an adequate supply 
of skills in emerging high-skill sectors of the 
economy while ensuring that those at the lower 
end of the skills spectrum are sufficiently skilled 
and motivated to take up work in the formal 
economy.  
The 2009 revision in the personal income tax 
brackets, involving a broadening of the tax-free 
range of household income and income tax 
brackets in general, and including specific fiscal 
measures aimed at encouraging higher female 
participation, is expected to support purchasing 
power and to improve the incentives to work. The 
budgetary impact of this measure is estimated to 
amount to some 0.2% of GDP. 
More recently, the government has concluded 
tailor-made financial assistance to manufacturing 
firms in difficulties in return for increasing 
investment, training of employees and returning to 
normal working hours. Besides stimulating 
demand in the short term, public investment 
projects will also enhance long-term economic 
growth. Similarly, a number of structural 
measures, which are part of the longer-term policy 
reform agenda, such as the implementation of a 
flexicurity roadmap, will provide support in view 
of the challenges posed by the downturn by 
enhancing growth potential. 
11.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
The notable improvement of labour market 
conditions observed during recent years started to 
lose pace in 2008. As an initial response, 
companies have reduced the number of hours 
worked and adopted more flexible working time 
arrangements so as to avoid layoffs. In doing so, as 
in other EU countries, they benefited from public 
funding support.  
In response to the crisis and despite the high public 
deficit and debt, Malta has adopted several 
measures to support the economy in 2009. To a 
large extent the measures enacted aimed at 
supporting sectors adversely affected by the global 
slowdown as well as households' incomes through 
Box II.11.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - MT
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Step up efforts to attract more people, particularly women and older workers, into the labour
market by, inter-alia, facilitating childcare; intensifying efforts to tackle undeclared work and
encouraging participation in the labour market, including by tightening access conditions to the
benefit system. 
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protecting jobs rather than through benefits paid to 
laid off workers. The implementation of a 
flexicurity roadmap will contribute to create an 
adequate supply of skills in emerging high-skill 
sectors while ensuring that those at the lower end 
of the skills spectrum are sufficiently skilled and 
motivated to take up work in the formal economy. 
The recent measures in the area of tax and benefit 
systems may have a relevant impact on the 
financial incentives to work. However, more action 
needs to be brought up front so that results can be 
realised more quickly. Any actions that can 
improve the benefits system need to be tackled 
now rather than in a year’s time.  Initiatives to 
train those in and outside work should be given 
priority. Also, interventions for young people, 
women and older workers are vital early on, in 
order to prevent further action being necessary 
later in the lifecycle. 
Significant efforts are being made to encourage 
more people into the labour market, particularly 
women, through steps to stimulate more part-time 
work, enhanced maternity leave, tax incentives on 
childcare provision and training for women re-
entering the labour market.  
Similarly, different labour market programmes are 
aimed at improving the employability of hard to 
place workers at higher risks of becoming long-
term unemployed. Initiatives include a youth 
employment programme that covers job search 
assistance to youth, career guidance services and 
employment schemes, ICT job search facilities in 
the community, basic skills training and out reach 
programmes that target early school leavers. 
Beyond facilitating upward shifts in value-added 
activity, cost competitiveness remains a key to a 
sustainable recovery in exports. This calls for 
ensuring a closer link between wage and
productivity developments as well as taking further 
productivity-enhancing structural reforms 
including redirecting resources to growth-
enhancing areas, investing in human capital 
development and in R&D.  
12. THE NETHERLANDS 
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12.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
12.1.1.  Recent trends 
The Dutch labour market has historically been 
considered as an example of "best practice" and 
recent trends confirm this assessment. The Lisbon 
targets are fully reached and all indicators clearly 
signal a well functioning labour market. Yet, the 
welfare dependency remains high and the 
challenge of mobilising the labour supply is still 
valid.  
The total employment rate in 2008 was at 77.2%, 
up by 1.2 pps. from the 2007's level (+3.1 pps. 
from 2001). The female employment rate was at 
71.1% (+1.5 pps. with respect to 2007 and +5.9 
pps. with respect to 2001) and represents a success 
story in the European panorama. The older 
workers' (55-64) employment rate, which was low 
in 2001 (39.6%), in 2007 overcame the Lisbon 
target of 50% and in 2008 moved up to 53% (+2.1 
pps. with respect to 2007). 
After a period of negative or null growth in 2003-
05, employment regained a positive pace after 
2006. In 2008, employment grew by 1.5%, 
slowing down from 2.4% in 2007. Male 
employment decelerated from 1.7% in 2007 to 
0.9%, more than female employment (from 3.2% 
to 2.2%). The total labour force increased by 1.0% 
and unemployment rate went down to only 2.8% 
of the labour force. Thus, the effects of the global 
recession were still not reflected in the data from 
2008. 
In comparison with other countries, gender gaps do 
not appear to be very pronounced, thanks to very 
high female participation and employment rates. 
As for differences among age groups, prime-age 
workers have an employment rate of 86.8% or 
about 34 pps. more than older workers, which is a 
high gap, but still less pronounced than in the rest 
of the euro area. 
The gap among workers with different skills in 
terms of activity, employment and unemployment 
rates appears less pronounced than in other euro 
area countries. 
Temporary employment represents 17.9% of the 
total and it is higher for women (19.8%): this share 
increased remarkably since 2001 (+3.6 pps.). Part-
time contracts constitute three quarters of total 
female employment, leading the share over total 
employment up to 46.8%, with a reduction in the 
last year (-0.9 pp.) after many years of stability. 
Long-term unemployment rate as a percentage of 
total unemployment was at 34.3% in 2008, 
registering a remarkable decrease (5.1 pps.) with 
respect to 2007.  
12.1.2.  Outlook for the next two years  
Due to the fall in world trade, the current recession 
is expected to have an important impact on the 
Dutch economy. After a still positive growth in 
2008 (+2%), the European Commission (Spring 
2009 Forecast) foresees output shrinking by 3.5% 
in 2009 (-4.5% according to September 2009's 
Interim Forecasts) and 0.4% in 2010. This should 
result in negative employment growth of 1.2% and 
2.6% respectively this year and in 2010, while the 
unemployment rate should climb to 6.2% in 2010 
(from 3.9% in 2009). 
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Table II.12.1: Short-term forecasts - NL 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
2,1 -3,5 -0,4 -4,9 -0,4 -4,8 -0,7
1,5 -1,2 -2,6 0,0 0,1 -1,0 -1,4
2,8 3,9 6,2 4,0 7,0 4,1 5,0
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.12.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 74,1 77,2 62,5 65,9
Men 82,8 83,2 70,8 72,8
Women 65,2 71,1 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 39,6 53,0 37,5 45,6
Men 51,1 63,7 47,4 55,0
Women 28,0 42,2 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 75,8 79,3 68,5 70,9
Men 84,3 85,3 76,9 78,0
Women 67,1 73,3 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 40,2 54,7 40,1 48,1
Men 51,8 65,9 50,8 57,9
Women 28,4 43,5 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 2,2 2,8 8,5 7,0
Men 1,8 2,5 7,7 6,6
Women 2,8 3,0 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) : 34,3 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 7,2 8,4 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 14,3 17,9 12,4 14,0
15-24 36,5 45,2 35,9 40,0
55-64 6,0 7,0 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 41,9 46,8 : 17,6
Men 19,3 22,8 : 7,0
Women 71,2 75,2 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 74,1 77,2 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 61,0 62,8 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 79,8 80,9 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 86,8 88,0 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 1,0 0,9 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 32,4 37,9 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 2,8 5,1 18,0 22,5
NL EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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12.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Three fiscal stimulus packages have been adopted 
by the Dutch government, amounting to almost 2% 
of GDP, 1% of GDP respectively in 2009 and 
2010. The measures focus on income support 
(notably through the abolition of unemployment 
benefit premiums payable by employees), 
increasing public and private investment, 
protecting employment, increasing the budget for 
education and retraining, ensuring access to 
finance and providing liquidity support to 
companies. In addition, automatic stabilisers will 
work fully, implying a substantial increase in 
social expenditure and a significant decrease in tax 
revenue. Stimulus packages also include structural 
measures such as the lowering of social security 
contributions, which aims at boosting labour 
demand while increasing labour supply at the same 
time, and the creation of mobility centres, which 
should ease the transition in the labour market and 
reduce labour shedding. These measures are 
broadly in line with the European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP) agreed in December 2008 
by the European Council. 
Up until mid 2008, the Dutch labour market was 
very tight, with a very low unemployment rate and 
a high vacancy rate. In the fourth quarter of 2008, 
the labour market started to loosen, with 
unemployment increasing and the number of 
unfilled vacancies dropping sharply, though 
remaining high. The Dutch recovery plans contain 
measures aimed at protecting employment, 
improving labour market transitions, tackling 
youth unemployment and improving access to 
training, totalling up to ¼% of GDP.  Important 
measures in this regard are the introduction of the 
short-time employment and of the part-time 
unemployment schemes. (51)  
(51) The part-time unemployment scheme replaced and more or 
less institutionalised the scheme of a temporary lowering of 
hours worked. 
The Shortening Working Hours Scheme enables 
companies to cope with a short-term fall in 
demand of at least 30% by shortening the working 
hours, while companies can hold on to valuable 
personnel, which will be needed when demand 
resumes. The initial budget allocated to this 
scheme was 200 million of euro (0.03% of GDP). 
This scheme was replaced in April 2009 by the 
Part-time Unemployment Scheme. With the Part-
time Unemployment Scheme, companies can 
decide whether to benefit from this scheme and for 
which part of their personnel. The employees 
concerned by part-time unemployment have the 
obligation to follow training courses, thereby 
improving their qualifications. The budget for this 
scheme was 375 million of euro, increased to 950 
million in July 2009. In net terms, the total 
budgetary impact of the measure is projected to 
cost €500 million. 
Another important measure is the set-up of 
mobility centres, to facilitate labour market 
transitions. Mobility centres are temporary public-
private partnerships with the goal of intensifying 
assistance to job seekers and businesses in order to 
prevent forced lay-offs as much as possible. 
Employees who are threatened by unemployment 
will be assisted in finding a new job, or 
temporarily be sent on secondment to other 
employers, if necessary through additional 
education and training.  
While most of the instruments are of temporary 
nature, some of them will be permanent, in 
particular the lowering of social contributions. 
Thus, the full reversibility of the short-term 
measures adopted in response to the crisis is not 
ensured.  
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Box II.12.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - NL
EU (CSRs 2009): 
Develop further measures, including fostering labour market transitions within an integrated flexicurity
approach, to improve the participation of women, older workers and disadvantaged groups with a view to 
raising overall hours worked.
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Make the current dual system of dismissal simpler and more predictable. In particular, the rules governing
layoffs should be clearly specified in law, with appeal to local courts only possible as an ex post option, in
case one of the parties feels unfairly treated. Moreover, in order to safeguard labour market opportunities for 
workers after the age of 50, the rate of accumulation of their severance payment rights should be aligned 
with that of other workers. 
Strengthened further activation policies for the long-term unemployed to raise overall labour participation;
and shorten benefit duration.
Phase out more rapidly the transferability of the individual tax credit. Moreover, more of the family-income-
based child tax credit should be shifted to the individual or second-earner child tax credit. In addition, the
tapering-off rate for housing and child benefits should be reduced further and certain work-related
entitlements and tax credits could be conditioned on the number of hours worked. 
Further limit or phase out the initial disability periods where benefits are based on previous earnings. Apply
the new stricter medical testing criteria in the periodic medical reassessment to the existing pool of disability
recipients. 
IMF (Article IV, 2008): 
Efforts to increase employment would ease growing labour shortages, support growth, and alleviate the
effects of population aging. Despite relatively high employment rates and recent reforms, hours worked per
employee are the lowest in the OECD. Reducing unemployment-benefit duration, which remains high by
international standards, would raise labour participation while continuing to support job search. Further
reduction in the still high effective tax rate on second family workers and faster elimination of the
imputation of the general tax credit to the primary worker would encourage female employment. To 
stimulate elderly participation, the mission supports targeted increases of income tax credits for workers 
aged 57. Access to the young disabled scheme should be tightened. In addition, stricter enforcement of work
availability requirements and extension of the new stringent rules for periodic reassessment of disability
status to those aged 45 and over.
Strict EPL for regular employment results in high long-term unemployment and may hinder labour mobility
or process innovation. Severance payments are relatively generous and may also reduce labour mobility to
prevent loss of accumulated severance rights. To alleviate these concerns, the mission advocates relaxation
of EPL and a funded severance pay scheme. 
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12.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Despite the low unemployment rate, the long-term 
unemployment rate is close to the EU average and 
reflects relatively high EPL for regular contracts 
and disincentives to take up work. Atypical work
such as part-time work, fixed-term work and 
agency work is widespread in the Netherlands. The 
share of part-time workers is high (45% of
employed). A high share of them works part-time 
voluntarily. The share of temporary workers is
above the EU average, while the share of 
involuntary temporary employed workers (almost 
40%) is much below the EU average (60%).
Temporary workers are somewhat disadvantaged 
in accessing the unemployment benefits compared 
to regular workers. In addition, their transition to
permanent contracts is among the lowest in the EU 
(about 20%). However, their in-work at-risk-of-
poverty rate is the lowest in the EU and (only) 
about 70% higher than in-work at-risk-of-poverty
rate by permanent contract.  
Disincentives to work created by the tax and 
benefit system, in particular high inactivity traps, 
contribute to a lower labour utilization of women.
Although voluntary, part-time work reduces labour
utilization and is highly persistent. Furthermore, a 
high incidence of part-time work may reduce the
returns from human capital formation and has a
negative impact on female careers and their 
upward wage mobility over their life cycle. 
Box II.12.2: Employment insurance
The employment insurance is geared towards the prevention of unemployment and a smooth transition to a 
new job. Employers are required to continue to pay 80 to 100 percent of the worker’s wage payments for a
maximum of six months after giving notice to the worker. During this so-called transfer period, the worker
can fully devote himself or herself to finding new employment. If this time span does not suffice, the worker
is dismissed, but not before the efforts of both the employer and worker have been evaluated. The
unemployed worker then enters a reintegration scheme where the sector of industry bears the financial
responsibility and where private or public reintegration organisations can be relied upon. If a new job still
has not been obtained after another six months, the responsibility is shifted to the municipality. This new 
system also benefits the employer, as employment protection legislation is eased by abolishing the current
pre-emptive testing of dismissals, conducted by the public employment services. At the same time, during
the notice period, the worker may petition the courts to challenge the reason the employer gives for the
prospective dismissal, although this notice period is shortened to only one month. Moreover, as indicated
above, a gatekeeper (probably the public labour office) evaluates the efforts of the employer to help the 
employee find a new job during the transfer period.
The Work Budget
The Work Budget has a larger scope than life-course saving and can also be utilised to provide additional
income in case of job transitions, setting up one’s own business, part-time retirement, training, unpaid leave, 
a new job or position with lower earnings. The Work Budget is also available to flexible workers, such as
workers with a fixed-term contract. The Work Budget is personal and portable, which means that the worker
can transfer it from one job to another. It is designed to maintain the worker’s employability level and can be
used to finance the actual costs of training and schooling. Both the worker and the employer make financial
contributions to the Work Budget. The most important sources for the employer’s contributions are current
severance payments. In the new system with employment insurance, severance pay is paid in addition to the
payments during the transfer period only in special situations in which employers do not meet their 
contractual and other responsibilities towards workers who are laid off. Lower severance payments thus 
provide room for contributions into the Work Budget. This makes workers less vulnerable to the risk of
firm-specific shocks: if the firm that employs them goes bankrupt, workers have already received payments
in their Work Budget. 
Source: Bovenberg, Wilthagen and Bekker, 2008 
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Labour supply could be increased in particular 
among social assistance recipients, females, older 
workers, long-term unemployed workers and 
disadvantaged people.  
The Committee on Labour Market Participation 
(also known as the "Bakker Committee") has made 
proposals that aim at increasing the participation 
rate to 80% by 2016, by tackling with the main 
weaknesses of the Dutch labour market. These 
proposals include: measures that stimulate both the 
extensive (number of people in the labour force) 
and intensive margin (i.e. hours worked) to 
increase labour supply of vulnerable groups; the 
increase in the official retirement age as of 2016 
(by one month per year); improved responsibility 
for employers, employees and municipalities to 
enhance the employability and the transitional 
security of workers.  
A key element of the proposal is the change of the 
unemployment insurance into an employment 
insurance system which facilitates job-to-job 
transitions. The idea is consistent with the proposal 
of Blanchard and Tirole (2008) that introduces a 
price for firing to internalise the cost of 
unemployment and take efficient layoff decisions. 
In this context, the Life Course Savings scheme 
should be replaced by the Work Budget, which 
allows workers to draw from savings accumulated 
in the scheme to finance schooling or training 
and/or to support income when changing jobs. 
Both workers and employers contribute to the 
Work Budget. The contributions of the employers 
to the Work Budget come from the lower 
severance payments implied by the employment 
insurance (in fact severance payments will be paid 
only in exceptional cases) and should not raise the 
labour costs. 
13. PORTUGAL 
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13.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
13.1.1.  Recent trends 
The relatively poor performance of the Portuguese 
economy in recent years is reflected in the fact that 
the total employment rate in 2008 is below the 
level of 2001 (68.2% versus 69% respectively). 
The employment rate for females and older 
workers is already in line with the 2010 Lisbon 
targets (62.5% and 50.8% respectively in 2008), 
but this was the case already in 2001.  
With the spreading out of the crisis, the already 
below-EU-average  GDP growth of Portugal fell to 
zero in 2008. The unemployment rate continued to 
decrease (0.4 pp., down to 7.7% in 2008), but in 
the second part of the year there were already clear 
signs of deterioration. 
The gender gap is much less pronounced than in 
other southern EU countries. Considering labour 
supply, in 2008 males experienced an activity rate 
of 79.5%, only 10.6 pps. higher than females. 
However, the employment rate of males (74.0%) is 
11.5 pps. higher than that of females, and females' 
unemployment rate is also much higher (9.0% 
against 6.6% for males). 
The activity rate of young people (at 41.6% in 
2008) is not low in comparison with other EU 
countries, but the labour demand for the young 
does not match well with labour supply and results 
in relatively high youth unemployment rate, equal 
to 16.4% (against 7.3% and 6.6% for prime-age 
and older workers respectively). Older workers 
(55-64) experience high participation and 
employment rates.  
A peculiar characteristic of the Portuguese labour 
market is the distribution of employment across 
people with different skills. In contrast with other 
euro-area countries, skills are not very highly 
rewarded in terms of labour market outcomes, as it 
is shown by the almost equal activity and 
employment rates for low- and medium-skilled 
workers. Only high-skilled workers present clear-
cut higher rates than the other two categories. This 
is a consequence of the fact that the catching-up 
process of the Portuguese economy is still not 
over. 
Like other southern EU countries, the Portuguese 
labour market achieved flexibility only at the 
margin, with a great diffusion of temporary 
contracts and self-employment, the latter often 
most probably dissimulating workers de facto
engaged in regular activities with one single 
employer. Temporary workers are 22.8% of total 
employees (17.4% of total employment) and self-
employment amounts to 13.3% of total 
employment.  
As a summary of the structural weakness of the 
Portuguese labour market, long-term 
unemployment rate is very high, amounting to 
47.4% of total unemployment, a considerable level 
especially if compared to the situation of 2001 
when it stood at 38%. Deteriorating labour market 
performance caused many workers affected by job 
losses to remain trapped in long-term 
unemployment. Long-term unemployment has 
increased to almost 50% of total unemployment, 
despite a considerable share of temporary workers 
with a high labour turnover. This reflects difficulty 
in finding a new job and little mobility across 
firms, and can be attributed to the presence of 
employment rigidities, insufficient labour market 
adjustment and skills mismatch. In particular, job 
creation has been systematically below job 
destruction for many years. By reducing labour 
turnover and hiring, tight EPL may have also 
contributed to an increase in (long-term) 
unemployment. (52)    
The deterioration in labour market performance 
has also caused many workers to move into 
precarious jobs. Portugal has a high share of 
temporary workers (22% in 2007) and a huge share 
of these contracts is involuntary (about 80%). 
Similar situation applies to young temporary 
workers, as their share reaches almost 50%, with 
about 70% of them involuntary. While the 
conversion rate from temporary to permanent 
contracts was relatively high at the beginning of 
2000 (about half of all temporary contracts were 
converted to permanent contracts from 2000 to 
2001), it dropped enormously in mid-2000 (only 
about 10% of all temporary contracts were 
(52) See OECD, Economic Surveys: Portugal, 2008. 
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converted to permanent contracts from 2005 to 
2006). Finally, while temporary workers do not 
face high in-work-risk-of-poverty rates (which are 
below the EU average), they are disadvantaged 
compared to regular workers in accessing 
unemployment benefits. 
Finally, after some years of relatively slow growth, 
labour productivity declined by 0.4% in 2008, as a 
result of a still positive employment growth and 
flat GDP growth. This path can be partly explained 
by labour hoarding behaviour by firms at the onset 
of the crisis. 
13.1.2.  Outlook for the next two years  
According to the Commission's Spring 2009 
forecasts (Table II.13.1), in 2009 and 2010 
Portugal will be heavily affected by the 
international financial and economic crisis. After 
the stagnation of GDP in 2008, output is expected 
to shrink by -3.7% in 2009 and -0.8% in 2010. 
This will lead to a sharp increase in the 
unemployment rate, which will sky-rocket to 9.1% 
in 2009 and 9.8% in 2010, from 7.7% in 2008. 
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Table II.13.1: Short-term forecasts - PT 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
0,0 -3,7 -0,8 -4,5 -0,5 -4,1 -0,5
0,4 -1,4 -0,6 -0,5 0,0 -1,8 -1,3
7,7 9,1 9,8 9,6 11,2 9,6 11,0
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.13.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 69,0 68,2 62,5 65,9
Men 77,0 74,0 70,8 72,8
Women 61,3 62,5 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 50,2 50,8 37,5 45,6
Men 61,6 58,4 47,4 55,0
Women 40,3 43,9 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 72,1 74,2 68,5 70,9
Men 79,6 79,5 76,9 78,0
Women 64,8 68,9 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 51,9 54,4 40,1 48,1
Men 63,6 63,0 50,8 57,9
Women 41,5 46,6 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 4,1 7,7 8,5 7,0
Men 3,2 6,6 7,7 6,6
Women 5,1 9,0 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 38,0 47,4 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 15,4 13,3 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 20,0 22,9 12,4 14,0
15-24 42,8 54,2 35,9 40,0
55-64 10,9 10,1 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 8,0 8,6 : 17,6
Men 3,6 4,1 : 7,0
Women 13,4 13,9 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 69,0 68,2 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 67,7 65,8 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 63,7 65,8 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 89,9 84,7 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) : 3,8 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 82,9 81,7 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 22,0 38,9 18,0 22,5
PT EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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13.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Portugal has adopted a wide package of fiscal 
measures to stimulate economic activity as a 
response to the crisis. In line with the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), a package was 
adopted in December 2008, focused on support to 
employment, social protection, investment and 
exports. Overall, the package represents an 
impulse of 1¼% of GDP in 2009 (of which 0.8% 
of GDP is to be financed out of the national budget 
and the rest through EU funds). Most of the 
measures are temporary and limited to 2009, but 
others are permanent and some others are expected 
to extend their impact also to 2010 and 2011. 
The Portuguese authorities undertook measures 
worth over 0.3% of GDP to help maintaining jobs, 
boost employment take-up by long-term 
unemployed and support the labour market 
participation of young workers. A 3% reduction in 
employers' social security contributions 
concerning workers aged over 45 and employed in 
micro and small enterprises has been implemented 
in 2009. Training opportunities up to six months 
have been offered for workers of firms facing a 
sharp fall in activity in 2009 through the 
Qualification-Employment measure (estimated to 
cover 450 companies, or 20.000 workers).  
Other measures include an increase in the number 
of young people supported through professional 
placements and financial support to companies that 
contract young people aged under 35 and seeking 
first employment; subsidies and reductions of 
social security contributions (over two to three 
years) for the hiring of long-term unemployed; 
financial support to firm creation and to the return 
to the labour market by the unemployed, as well as 
training in targeted regions; internships in firms 
and not-for-profit institutions for long-term 
unemployed, more than 55 years old workers being 
enrolled in an Employment Centre as job seekers 
for more than 6 months and young workers; the 
expansion of the provision of job training to 
beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum income. 
Social protection was temporarily extended to an 
additional 6-months entitlement for those long-
term unemployed who in 2009 were no longer 
entitled to initial or subsequent unemployment 
assistance.  
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13.3.  ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
For many years Portugal has suffered a severe 
problem of low productivity. This reflects in turn a 
rigid economy and other structural weaknesses 
related to the accumulation of human capital and 
the skill levels that impede the relocation towards 
high-value added, high-tech productions.  
Compared to other low-growth and low-
productivity countries, Portugal experienced also a 
relevant increase in unemployment, mainly in 
long-term unemployment. 
Measures taken by the Government to cope with 
the effects of the crisis, even if well suited from a 
theoretical perspective, may be ineffective in a 
context like the current one. Indeed, most of the 
hiring incentives are conditional on hiring on a 
permanent basis and in an uncertain 
macroeconomic environment employers may 
decide not to hire.  
Rigid employment protection also contributes to a 
relatively large informal economy which is on the 
rise (since mid-2005 the share of employees 
without a written contract has almost doubled). 
The relatively high share of self-employed in non-
agricultural sector (12%) includes to a large extent 
"independent" (self-employed) workers who are in 
fact engaged in regular activities with an employer. 
The social costs of informal sector are high as they 
are associated with precarious jobs, low on-the-job 
training as well as limited upward mobility. 
To face the unavoidable increase in 
unemployment, it can be very useful to strengthen 
the adjustment capacity of the labour market, 
including by improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of employment services and active 
labour market policy and by enhancing access to 
training and qualification. This kind of measures 
Box II.13.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - PT
EU (CSRs 2009): 
Continue the efforts to improve in a sustained way the overall efficiency of the education system, and 
develop a vocational training system relevant to labour market needs, by the full achievement of the 
National Qualifications Framework and with the involvement of appropriate stakeholders. 
Implement the legislation to modernise employment protection, in order to reduce the high levels of labour 
market segmentation, within the flexicurity approach. 
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Increase the adaptability of the labour market, while protecting workers at risk, and upgrading competences, 
by:  
Increase the proportion of education spending on non-wage items: continue to strengthen teachers' initial and 
on-the-job training; fully implement a performance-based evaluation and career-progression system for 
teachers; continue developing vocational and technical education; monitor and evaluate results of the New 
Opportunities initiative. 
Further ease restrictions for temporary employment: it is essential that the reform measures be implemented 
promptly and enforced. 
IMF (Article IV 2008): 
Further action, such as eliminating the automatic extension of collectively agreed contracts and broadening 
the scope for individual dismissals, could be considered. 
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can also make it more politically affordable to 
further ease the strict employment protection 
legislation, both for permanent and temporary 
workers. High labour market rigidities are 
hampering the necessary reallocation of human 
resources from contracting to expanding sectors. 
This has contributed to a decline in productivity 
growth and in competitiveness at least since 2001, 
with adverse impact on output, employment and 
long-term unemployment. 
There is much scope to improve the effectiveness 
of ALMPs in Portugal. (53) ALMPs should be 
carefully evaluated in terms of their targets, cost 
and benefits. For example, ALMPs should be well 
targeted to tackle a persistent increase in long-tem 
unemployment which reflects a rising skill 
mismatch between the unemployed and new job 
offers. From this perspective, effective training is 
needed to improve employability of new entrants 
and to help displaced workers in sectors affected 
by structural adjustments. Some of these 
shortcomings were addressed in 2006, when 
reform measures strengthened activation strategies 
for beneficiaries with a more intensive 
involvement of the PES and reinforced linkages 
between employment services and social security 
services.  
(53) See OECD, Economic Surveys: Portugal, 2008. 
. 
Furthermore, a reinforced link between the 
Training Centres and the employers is desirable. 
ALMPs should be directed towards increasing 
employability of temporary workers who face a 
high labour turnover and potentially low on-the-
job training. ALMPs should also be suitably 
adjusted to ensure employability of low-skilled 
workers as it is expected that the further 
restructuring of Portuguese economy will increase 
the unemployment rate of this segment of the 
workforce. Furthermore, as the lowering of EPL is 
expected to hurt more than proportionally low-
skilled workers, in particular by increasing their 
inflow into unemployment, any potential EPL 
reform measures should be part of a broader policy 
package within a flexicurity framework that takes 
into account properly designed ALMPs. 
A comprehensive strategy of reforming labour 
market institutions must be accompanied by a 
revision of the education system and by an 
enhancement of the life-long learning. Both are 
decisive to deal with one of the most relevant 
weakness of Portugal, namely the low share of 
skilled labour force. A revision of the education 
system has already started in 2005. 
Over the past 10 years, wage increases in excess of 
productivity gains in the business sector have lead 
to a considerable deterioration in cost 
competitiveness, as measured by relative unit 
labour costs. Maintaining sensible real wage 
increases while promoting faster productivity 
growth is important for economic performance. 
14. SLOVAKIA 
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14.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
14.1.1.  Recent trends 
Many years of buoyant economic growth have had 
a positive effect on the Slovak labour market, 
though to a lesser extent than one would have 
expected. Indeed, at the end of this prolonged 
expansion, the Lisbon targets are still far away. 
The total employment rate was at 62.3% in 2008 
(up by 1.6 pps. from the level of 2007 and only by 
5.4 pps. from the  level of 2001) while for the 
females it stood at 54.6. Older workers (55-64) had 
an employment rate of 39.2%, as a consequence of 
an impressive long-term employment growth over 
the last years (+16.9 pps. with respect to 2001), 
continued even in 2008 (+3.6% with respect to 
2007). 
Employment growth even accelerated in 2008 
(+3.1%) with respect to 2006 (2.4%) and this 
acceleration was more evident for females (+3.3%) 
than for males (2.9%). Since the labour force grew 
only by 1.2% in 2008, the unemployment rate 
further decreased to 9.5%, a historical low for the 
country, which in 2001 had an unemployment rate 
as high as 19.3%. Therefore, the economic crisis, 
despite slowing down GDP growth from 10.4% in 
2007 to 6.4% in 2008, had not much affected the 
labour market. 
Gender gaps arise some concerns. Although 
remaining at the average of the euro area, in recent 
years, instead of closing, employment gaps have 
opened further up, from 10.2 pps. in 2001 to 15.3 
pps. in 2008. All age groups contributed to this 
higher gap. 
Looking at the age dimension, the gap across age 
groups is still remarkable. While the prime-age 
employment rate (88%) is in line with the EU27 
average, older workers (39.2%) and especially 
young workers (26.2%) have employment rates by 
6.4 pps. and 10.4 pps. respectively lower than the 
EU27. Again, the dynamics in recent years is 
worth noting. On one side, the activity rate of the 
young declined massively from 45.5% in 2001 to 
32.4%. On the other side, the youth unemployment 
rate decreased from 42.1% in 2001 to 18.5% in 
2008. The combination of the two movements may 
be due to both higher education levels attained by 
the young and some discouragement effects. As for 
older workers, the combined increase in activity 
rates (+16.5 pps. since 2001, up to 41.9% in 2008) 
and decrease in unemployment rates (-5.8% since 
2001) seem to be the consequence of recent 
pension reforms that have introduced more 
incentives to postpone retirement for older 
workers. 
The difference in labour market states between 
workers with different skills is striking. Low-
skilled workers have the lowest employment rate 
in Europe (only 15.9%), which, once compared 
with 70.1% of the medium- and 83.9% of the high-
skilled, results in a very huge skills gap. Again, 
this gap, instead of closing, has been opening since 
2001. 
Temporary employment represents only a tiny 
fraction (4.5%) of total employment and is evenly 
distributed between males and females. Part-time 
contracts are not diffused (2.5% of the total), even 
for females (only 4.1%). The share of temporary 
workers is low, at about 5% since 2001, and 
almost 70% of them are involuntarily in this type 
of employment. A low share of temporary workers 
could be explained by a generally weak 
employment security guaranteed by the Labour 
Code, as well as by the large disadvantage of 
temporary workers in accessing unemployment 
benefits, as compared to permanent workers. 
Although temporary workers are subject to looser 
eligibility criteria (2 years instead of 3 years of 
unemployment insurance contributions during the 
last 4 year), they are eligible for a shorter 
unemployment benefit duration (4 months instead 
of 6 months). Average conversion rates from 
temporary to permanent contracts are relatively 
high, as more than 45% of temporary contracts are 
converted into permanent ones. This rate is 
however very low for older workers (at about 
15%). In-work at-poverty-risk by temporary 
contract is relatively low and twice as high as the 
in-work at-poverty-risk by regular contract. The 
share of self-employment is above the EU average. 
However, it has increased considerably since 2001 
(by 5 pps. to about 12%). 
The long-term unemployment ratio is the highest 
in the EU (about 70% of unemployed persons are 
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without work for more than a year) and is 
concentrated among the young. Despite some 
improvements in the last year (-5.0 pps. in 2007), it 
was in 2008 about 11 pps. higher than in 2001, 
signalling a problem of hysteresis in the 
unemployment rate. Even so, the long-term 
unemployment rate declined from 11.3% in 2001 
to 6.6% in 2008.  
In 2008, labour productivity grew only by 3.3%, 
down from +8.1% in 2007. As hourly employment 
growth amounted to 3.9% in 2008, down from the 
average 4.8% of the period 1999-2008, in 2008 
labour utilisation can explain a higher portion of 
GDP growth than in the past (2.4 pps. instead of 
0.3 in the average 1999-2008). The same applies 
for the employment rate, which  To this among the 
factors that explain labour utilisation, is the one 
that explained more in 2008 (2.9 pps.). 
14.1.2.  Outlook for next two years  
The financial crisis is expected to have an 
important impact on the Slovak economy. 
According to ECFIN (Spring 2009 forecast), the 
GDP growth is expected to fall from +6.4% in 
2008 to -2.6% in 2009, before an ailing recovery in 
2010 (+0.7%). IMF is more positive both for 2009 
(-2.1%) and for 2010 (+1.9%). (54) The effects in 
term of occupation will be remarkable. The 
employment growth will become negative in 2009 
(-1.7%) before returning to be positive in 2010 
(+0.4%), according to ECFIN forecasts. The 
unemployment rate is forecasted to reach 12% 
(11.5%) in 2009 and 12.1% (11.7%) in 2010 by 
ECFIN and IMF respectively. 
(54) The forecast of the Slovak government, concerning the 
GDP growth rate in 2009 is considerably different, at -
6.2%.  
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Table II.14.1: Short-term forecasts - SK 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
6,4 -2,6 0,7 -5,0 3,1 -2,1 1,9
2,9 -1,7 0,4 1,0 1,0 -1,5 0,1
9,5 12,0 12,1 11,8 13,6 11,5 11,7
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.14.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 56,8 62,3 62,5 65,9
Men 62,0 70,0 70,8 72,8
Women 51,8 54,6 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 22,4 39,2 37,5 45,6
Men 37,7 56,7 47,4 55,0
Women 9,8 24,2 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 70,4 68,8 68,5 70,9
Men 77,4 76,4 76,9 78,0
Women 63,7 61,3 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 25,5 41,9 40,1 48,1
Men 43,2 59,9 50,8 57,9
Women 11,0 26,4 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 19,3 9,5 8,5 7,0
Men 19,8 8,4 7,7 6,6
Women 18,7 10,9 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 58,6 69,3 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 5,6 10,4 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 4,9 4,5 12,4 14,0
15-24 11,5 12,6 35,9 40,0
55-64 11,2 4,5 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 2,2 2,5 : 17,6
Men 1,2 1,3 : 7,0
Women 3,5 4,1 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 56,8 62,3 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 17,2 15,9 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 65,1 70,1 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 85,8 83,9 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 84,9 68,8 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 18,1 13,4 18,0 22,5
SK EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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14.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
In response to the crisis, Slovakia has adopted 
three stimulus packages accompanied by measures 
for the banking sector and structural measures. 
Overall, the stimulus packages appear to be 
broadly in line with the EERP. The first set of 
measures was adopted in November 2008 and two 
additional packages followed in February 2009. 
The total budgetary impact of the anti-crisis 
measures is estimated at around 1% of GDP. The 
measures can be considered as timely, as they were 
adopted when the economic situation started 
deteriorating and their implementation has started 
in most cases in the first quarter of 2009, despite 
the fact that the major part of the stimulus 
measures (0.6% of GDP) is budgeted for 2010 
when the crisis is already expected to abate.  
Moreover, they are mostly temporary (with the 
exception of the changes of income taxes) and 
geared towards the most affected groups.  
Labour market measures proposed by the Slovak 
government temporarily for 2009-2010 are aimed 
principally at maintaining jobs in the short term 
and creating more favourable conditions for self-
employed and low-income employees. A 
temporary financial support for a maximum 
duration of 60 days was decided for employers 
who have to reduce by at least 4% the normal 
weekly working time of their employees, however 
without using the inactivity period for training 
activities. While the concerned employees are paid 
a wage replacement benefit, employers get a 
subsidy corresponding to the social security 
contributions paid by the employee and the 
employer, up to 339€ per employee per month in 
2009. The government has estimated that the 
supported jobs will amount in average to 20,000 
per year (2009, 2010).  
Financial support (equal to 22% of the average 
wage) will be also provided to employees who 
have been registered as unemployed for at least 3 
months, whose gross monthly wage amounts to 
maximum 1.7 times the subsistence minimum, and 
who find a job without government assistance, as 
well as to employers who hire a jobseeker who has 
been unemployed for 3 months and upon retaining 
him/her on a newly created job for at least 12 
months.  Further measures include a mobility 
allowance covering travelling costs for commuters, 
support for job creation and self-employment, an 
easing of the legislative requirements and financial 
assistance for the creation and functioning of 
social enterprises.  
In order to cope with the significant increase of 
registered unemployed and to ensure smooth 
implementation of the new ALMP measure, the 
government approved a temporary staff 
reinforcement of labour offices by 350 persons. 
Yet, the newly introduced ALMP measures ask for 
regular monitoring and assessment as their up-to-
date implementation show that some measures 
either duplicate already existing tools or require 
too complicated administratively procedures to 
apply.  
With a view to reinforcing activation, and to 
supporting low-income and low-skilled workers, 
the government has provided additional tax relief 
for low-income earners, by increasing the tax-free 
threshold from € 3,435 per year to €4,027 per year. 
A temporary decrease in social security 
contributions for self-employed (from 4.75% to 
2%), together with other measures concerning 
health and social insurance, will help sustain the 
self-employed.  
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14.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Despite years of strong economic growth, Slovakia 
still has a long way to go to reach all Lisbon 
targets, in particular for older workers, who 
however experienced a considerable improvement 
in their employment rate since 2001. The
unemployment rate and the long term
unemployment rate strongly decreased since 2001;
however, the share of unemployed persons without
work for more than a year increased to the highest 
level in the EU. Structural problems on the labour
market are characterized by large and widening
gender as well as skills gaps. As Slovakia is a 
small open economy, a sharp fall in exports due to
recent economic downturn slowed down the GDP 
growth; however labour market remained resilient
in 2008, which more than halved labour
productivity growth. 
In response to the crisis, Slovakia has adopted 
three stimulus packages with the total budgetary 
impact of the anti-crisis measures at around 1% of 
GDP. Labour market measures are mostly 
temporary and aim principally at maintaining jobs
in the short term as well as crating more 
favourable conditions for self-employed.
Box II.14.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - SK
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, make progress in the implementation of the lifelong learning
strategy and continues the reforms of education and training systems to address the skill mismatch, develop
an active ageing strategy and enhance access to employment for the long-term unemployed and
disadvantaged groups.
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Improve the activation of the long-term unemployed by expanding training measures, introducing job search
and job acceptance requirements and strengthening the capacity of the public employment service. In
addition, narrow the targeting of subsidised job creation to the long-term unemployed.
Shorten the duration of parental leave entitlements in favour of childcare subsidies. Reduce the tax wedge on 
second earners by cutting the tax allowance and by phasing out free health insurance for non-working 
spouses. 
Foster the integration of Roma children into the education system and further reduce stratification of the
school system. Make tertiary education more attractive by offering 2-3 year occupationally-oriented
programmes. 
IMF (Article IV 2008): 
The authorities should avoid further large increases in the minimum wage as it would lead to wage drift and
may harm employment prospects of low-skilled workers. 
Consideration should be given to introducing earned income credit for low-income workers, with a view to 
stimulating job creation and further increasing incentive to work.
The authorities should also ensure that the amendments to the labour code do not lead to higher labour costs 
and reduce labour market flexibility. 
Reforms introduced in 2003 have promoted 
external and internal flexibility and contributed to
relatively lax employment protection legislation
for regular contracts, which is also reflected in a
very low share of temporary contracts. Reforms in
2003 also injected additional flexibility in working 
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hours; however, incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements remains relatively low. 
Slovakia has introduced a substantial reform of the 
social assistance and family policy, the pension 
system, the unemployment benefit and taxation in 
2003, which replaced the traditional redistributive 
system. While these reforms considerably 
increased incentives to work, income security may 
not be sufficient during unemployment spell as a 
result of both, low coverage of unemployment 
benefit recipients, especially with a temporary 
contracts, as well as a sharp drop in benefit 
replacement rates set at the 6th month of 
unemployment. In addition to measures to activate 
labour supply, social security contributions paid by 
employers were also reduced to support, in 
particular, labour demand for low-wage workers.  
Another challenge concerns low adaptability of 
workers, which contributes to high skills 
mismatches and high long-term unemployment. 
Although ALMPs improved their focus on 
disadvantaged groups and increased activation and 
incentives to work, a monitoring system for 
assessing the efficiency of individual ALMP tools 
and their eventual revision is still missing. 
Expenditures on ALMPs and activation strategies, 
in particular on training, are still very low, also 
because of the low coverage of persons benefiting 
from them. This is the case in spite of high long-
term unemployment rate - which is widespread in 
particular among the young - and a very low 
employment rate/employability of low-skilled 
workers. As the structure of ALMP expenditures is 
strongly biased towards public job creations, it is 
essential to keep search activities of ALMPs 
participants intact in order to avoid the typical 
risks of lock-in effects associated to ALMPs.  
Participation in lifelong learning declined since 
2001 to one of the lowest in the EU, and is low 
regardless of educational attainment, economic 
activity and age. Older workers have among the 
lowest participation rates in lifelong learning, and 
it would be appropriate to raise it, along with the 
increase in the statutory retirement age and a 
comprehensive active aging strategy to ensure their 
adaptability to change. This is the case also for 
unemployed persons who fail to experience fast 
transition to employment and get trapped in long-
term unemployment. Finally, Slovakia also faces 
challenges to further improve the quality of its 
education and training system to address persisting 
skills mismatch.  
More regional and sectoral wage flexibility is 
essential to reduce regional imbalances in labour 
market performance and improve the adjustment 
capacity of the economy. In particular, 
notwithstanding minimum wages, more wage 
flexibility should be allowed at the bottom-end of 
the wage distribution. Furthermore, economy-wide 
sectoral wage agreements should allow for 
sufficient regional wage differentiation to take into 
account local labour market positions.    
15. SLOVENIA 
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15.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
15.1.1.  Recent trends 
Despite years of strong economic growth, Slovenia 
has not yet met the Lisbon target on total 
employment, since its employment rate is at 68.6% 
in 2008 (up by 0.8 pp. from 2007). Female 
employment is instead over the Lisbon target, at 
64.2% in 2008, while the older workers 
employment rate is very low, amounting only to 
32.8% (0.7 pp. less than 2007).  
The global downturn is significantly affecting 
Slovenia since the last quarters of 2008 through a 
sharp fall in exports. GDP growth slowed down to 
3.5% in 2008 from 6.8% in 2007. The effects on 
the labour market are still not evident from the 
2008 data, as unemployment rate went down to 
4.4% (0.5 pp. less than 2007), thanks to an 
increase in the labour force of 1.4% and an 
employment growth of 1.9%, only slightly below 
the 2007 growth of 2.2%. 
The gender gap is not very pronounced, as in many 
other Central Eastern EU countries. More 
substantial differences remain among age groups. 
The activity rate of older workers is very low both 
with respect to other age groups and to other EU 
countries. It was at 34.2% in 2008, 7.7 pps. higher 
than in 2001, but -0.4 pps. lower than the year 
before. The employment rate of older workers 
decreased by 0.7 pps. to 32.8% in 2008. As a 
consequence, the unemployment rate of this group 
rose to 4.0% from 3.3% of the 2007, very close to 
the last ten years' high. Economic crisis may be 
called to explain the last year path, as restructuring 
firms may prefer to substitute older and more 
costly workers with younger ones, thus pushing up 
unemployment and down activity rate (through 
discouragement effect) of older workers.  
The share of temporary workers has increased 
strongly in recent years (by 5.4 pps. since 2001), 
reaching 18.5% in 2007. The increase has been 
even higher for young workers (17.3 pps. since 
2001) reaching the highest share in the EU (close 
to 70%). This was followed by a strong reduction 
in the share of temporary contracts in 2008, of the 
magnitude of 1.1 pps., which  can be imputed to 
the first impact of the economic crisis on the 
labour market. In-work at-risk-of-poverty rates for 
temporary workers are below the EU25 average, 
however 2.5 times higher than for permanent 
contracts.   
The share of  long-term unemployment in the last 
years was largely affected by the buoyant 
economic growth, declining by 18.2 pps. since 
2001 to 42.2% of total unemployment in 2008. 
However this percentage is still high and is a sign 
of a not well functioning labour market. 
While labour productivity growth was particularly 
sustained between 2001 and 2007, it showed a 
clear deceleration in 2008 (+0.6%). This is the 
result of a halved GDP growth and of an only 
slight reduction in employment growth - a pattern 
that has been observed in all those countries where 
the crisis mainly hit through reduction in exports 
and not through deflation of building sector and 
financial services bubbles. 
15.1.2.  Outlook for next two years  
According to the most recent forecasts, in 2009 
and 2010 Slovenia will be heavily hurt by the 
international financial and economic crisis. After a 
GDP growth of +3.5% in 2008, output is seen 
shrinking by -3.4% in 2009, before a light recovery 
of +0.7% in 2010, according to EU Commission 
estimates. The effects of the slowdown over the 
labour market should lead to an increase in the 
unemployment rate up to 6.6% in 2009 and 7.4% 
in 2010, according to the EU Commission's 
forecasts. 
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Table II.15.1: Short-term forecasts - SI 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
3,5 -3,4 0,7 : : -2,7 1,4
2,9 -4,7 -0,6 : : -2,4 0,0
4,4 6,6 7,4 : : 6,2 6,1
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database April 2009 edition).
Table II.15.2: Labour market indicators 
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 63,8 68,6 62,5 65,9
Men 68,6 72,7 70,8 72,8
Women 58,8 64,2 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 25,5 32,8 37,5 45,6
Men 35,9 44,7 47,4 55,0
Women 15,8 21,1 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 68,1 71,8 68,5 70,9
Men 72,8 75,8 76,9 78,0
Women 63,2 67,5 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 26,5 34,2 40,1 48,1
Men 37,5 46,4 50,8 57,9
Women 16,3 22,2 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 6,2 4,4 8,5 7,0
Men 5,7 4,0 7,7 6,6
Women 6,8 4,8 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 60,4 42,2 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 7,1 6,1 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 13,0 17,3 12,4 14,0
15-24 51,0 69,8 35,9 40,0
55-64 7,6 6,6 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 5,4 8,1 : 17,6
Men 4,4 6,2 : 7,0
Women 6,6 10,4 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 63,8 68,6 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 41,9 42,9 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 69,3 72,0 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 85,7 87,5 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 41,4 52,0 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 8,4 5,8 18,0 22,5
SI EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) 
As % of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest 
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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15.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
The Slovenian government has first adopted two 
packages to stimulate the economy: a first package
of stimulus measures on 19 December 2008 and a
second one on 19 February. The aim of the 
packages is to mitigate the impact of the crisis on 
productive capacity and jobs. Together, these 
measures are estimated by the government to cost
around 1.1% of GDP in 2009 and 0.7% in 2010. A 
third package of anti-crisis measures was adopted 
at the end of May 2009. 
A major measure to stem the rise in unemployment 
is a subsidy on wages (60€-120€ per employee per
month) to companies that reduce their working 
time from 40 hours per week to 36 – 32 hours. 
Should an employer opt for a 36-hour week for a 
full-time position, and then agree with the unions 
to ensure work to 35, 34, 33 or 32 hours a week, 
they will be entitled to an additional subsidy
(depending on shortened hours) per month per 
employee under certain conditions. The subsidy is 
granted for a maximum period of 6 months and 
companies can apply until 31 March 2010. 
Companies benefitting from the scheme must
agree not to dismiss employees for business
reasons and not to pay out bonuses to management
during the time subsidies are granted. Additionally,
workers covered by the wage subsidy scheme have
the opportunity, but not the obligation, to
participate in training (financed from national
sources), since these workers are eligible for co-
financing under the programme of Employment
Service of Slovenia for increasing the
employability of workers, adopted subsequently.  
Box II.15.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - SI
EU (CSRs 2009):  
Reform the pension system and implements active ageing, with a view to increasing the employment rate of
older workers and improving the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach counter labour market segmentation in particular by reviewing
employment protection for permanent contracts and conditions for so-called student work. 
OECD (Accession Review of Labour Market and Social Policies in Slovenia):  
The existing relatively strict EPL should be modified to encourage a wider use of indefinite-duration
contracts.
The conditions for eligibility to unemployment insurance (UI) could be made more generous to those with
moderate work experience. 
Student jobs should be regulated by ordinary labour legislation and the tax system should not discriminate
according to the type of labour contract used. 
A reduced minimum wage would be justified for youths up to age 25. 
The PES needs to focus on its core activities.
The activation strategy should be revised to permit better monitoring and availability checks with regard to 
hard-to-place benefit recipients. 
IMF (Article IV): 
A further liberalization of employment protection legislation is necessary in the medium term.
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This measure can help limit the rise in 
unemployment and thus provide some security to 
workers in the current adverse economic 
conditions, but would lead to an increase in labour 
market rigidity if not reversed as soon as economic 
conditions improve. Up to May 2009, its take up 
by employers has fallen short of the government's 
expectations, probably due to the stringent 
conditions attached to it. Overall, the government 
has initially put aside €230 million (0.6% of GDP) 
to fund it but, in view of the low take-up, the final 
cost is now estimated to be much lower: the 
second supplementary budget puts it down to €53 
million in 2009.  
The Partial Reimbursement of Payment 
compensation Act was adopted at the end of May, 
in the framework of the third package of anti-crisis 
measures. Subsidies are available to companies 
which are able to hold on at least 50% of their 
work force during the crisis. Workers on forced 
leave will receive 85% of their last three months 
average wage, with a state contribution of 50% and 
35% from employers (contribution is limited to 
805€ monthly per worker).  Workers on so called 
forced leave for a maximum 6 months during a 12 
month period are eligible for funds. Workers are 
obliged to spend 20% of the working time spent on 
forced leave on training, for which employers will 
receive a maximum of 500€ per employee. 
Training must be provided by the employer. The 
government has earmarked € 208.5 mio until April 
2011 and additional € 11 million from the ESF will 
be provided for training.  
Redundant workers should now be provided with 
intensive assistance, individual employment plans 
and individual consultations before entering the 
open unemployment. Immediately after 
registration at PES, they will be treated as a 
priority group for entering training and education 
schemes. Furthermore, they will be included into 
social entrepreneurship, training and self-
employment programmes. New active labour 
market programmes were also devised and will 
focus on the promotion of employment for long-
term unemployed, older people and young persons 
with tertiary education. The new programmes 
provide for job-oriented training workplaces and 
for subsidised employment in the later phase, 
including in the non-profit sector. Extra funds have 
been allocated to stimulate self-employment, for 
the education and training of those employed in 
SME's and low-skilled workers in enterprises with 
subsidised full-time employment. A special 
financial incentive was introduced to accept jobs 
requiring a lower educational attainment and that 
are more remote from the place of permanent 
residence. 
Finally, the government has implementing two 
programmes, consisting in the redesign and 
expansion of the programme of public works and 
in one-off solidarity assistance for individuals and 
families earning less than 60% or 70% of the 
minimum wage. Besides discretionary measures, 
additional funds for unemployment benefits have 
been budgeted for the period 2010-2011.   
15.3.  ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Despite years of strong economic growth, Slovenia 
has not yet met the Lisbon targets concerning the 
total employment rate and the employment rate of 
older persons. Recent economic downturn strongly 
reduced the incidence of temporary contracts 
which were largely prevalent among the new 
employment contracts in the last years. The 
employment growth somewhat cooled down while 
labour productivity growth strongly declined in 
face of halved GDP growth.  
Slovenia adopted three packages to stimulate the 
economy, affected by a sharp drop in external 
demand, and mitigate the impact of the crisis. Two 
major measures to stem the rise in unemployment 
are a short-time working arrangement - a subsidy 
to companies that reduce their working time 
which, however, fall short of government 
expectations, possibly due to stringent conditions 
attached - and the measures adopted at the end of 
May, which consist in a partial reimbursement of 
payments for workers on so-called forced leave. In 
line with the flexicurity principles, measures have 
also been taken to support employability of 
workers, with a particular emphasize on low-
skilled workers in enterprises with subsidized full-
time employment.  
Very strict employment protection legislation for 
regular contracts and reforms liberalizing only on 
the margin have strongly pushed up the share of 
temporary contracts, in particular among young 
persons. According to the Eurobarometer, it is 
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relatively difficult to find a job, mobility between 
employers (external mobility) is among the lowest 
in the EU and job tenure is among the highest in 
the EU. An average conversion rate from 
temporary to permanent contracts is 46%, for 
young workers 30%. Furthermore, many young 
people have so called contracts for "student work" 
(status of student is required), with lower social 
protection and employment rights (neither the 
employer nor the student pay any social and 
pension contributions and the income is not subject 
to taxation until a certain limit.), which is causing 
"parallel" labour market. Reducing asymmetries 
between non-standard and standard employment 
within a flexicurity framework, and making open-
ended employment in standard contracts more 
attractive to firms, is prerequisite to limit 
increasing labour market segmentation and make 
the recovery more equally distributed across 
contract types. Amendments to the Employment 
Relationship Act in 2007 only managed to increase 
internal flexibility and expand the legal basis for 
the flexible use of employment.  
Very low coverage of unemployment benefits - as 
a result of stringent eligibility criteria, relatively 
short duration of unemployment benefits for 
persons with relatively short contribution periods 
and the exclusion of temporary contracts - has 
limited the ability of automatic stabilizers to act as 
shock absorbers. In particular, a strong fall in the 
share of temporary contracts in 2008 may increase 
the share of unemployed not eligible for 
unemployment benefits due to insufficient 
contribution period. On the other hand, further 
increase in incentives to work is essential to 
support transitions to employment, in particular for 
unemployed persons with poor income prospects. 
Step in this direction was the reform in 2007, 
which replaced unemployment assistance (that 
exceeded unemployment benefits due to 
exemptions from taxation and social security 
contributions) with social assistance, thereby 
raising incentives to work for persons who exhaust 
their eligibility to unemployment benefits.  
Another challenge concerns the employability of 
workers and activation measures. PES has been 
modernized; however, expenditures on ALMP and 
activation strategies are still very low, also because 
of low coverage of persons benefiting from 
activation strategies, in spite of high long-term 
unemployment rate and very low employment 
rate/employability of older workers. Participation 
in lifelong learning is generally high, though very 
low for older workers, which may hamper the 
prolongation of their working life. Therefore, 
increasing employability of older workers along 
with reforms of the pension system, including 
active ageing, would help to lift up their incentives 
to work and their employment rate. Finally, the 
link between the education system and the labour 
market should be further strengthened to support 
employment and employability of the young and 
of the low-skilled. The participation rate of less 
skilled people in lifelong learning also lags 
strongly behind the participation rate of tertiary 
educated and secondary educated people. This also 
represents a main challenge, insofar as higher 
participation in lifelong learning would contribute 
to raising the employability of the less skilled in 
the long run. 
Slovenia is characterized by a high coverage of 
trade unions and collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining is highly coordinated and has generally 
supported employment growth. However, 
competitiveness has deteriorated since 2006 as the 
overheated economy led to second round effects. 
Minimum wage is relatively high, at 44% of the 
average monthly earnings in industry and services, 
and is not differentiated by age. This may hamper 
wage flexibility at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, though a proportion of workers 
earning minimum wage is relatively low. 
Furthermore, as the minimum wage is not 
differentiated, it may hamper transitions to 
employment, in particular for young persons.  
Measures recently adopted to address these long-
term challenges, for implementation in 2010 and 
2011, include: (a) changes in scholarship and 
student work to ease the transition of young people 
to the labour market; (b) changes in the 
unemployment insurance system (protection of 
specific categories of unemployed; renewed 
activation policies and modernisation of the PES, 
etc.); (c) modernisation of the pension system and 
of the health insurance system. 
16. SPAIN 
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16.1.  LABOUR MARKET SITUATION AND KEY 
TRENDS 
16.1.1.  Recent trends 
The Spanish labour market is characterized by 
high segmentation that is reflected in huge gaps in 
activity, employment and unemployment rates 
across different groups, and by low labour 
productivity growth. In 2008, total employment 
(64.3% in 2008, -1.3 pps. over 2007), the 
employment rate of older workers (45.6% in 2008, 
+1.0 pp. over 2007) and the employment rate of 
women (54.9% in 2008, +0.2 pp. over 2007) were 
all quite low, still well below the Lisbon target, 
despite the progress made over recent years in 
terms of job creation. 
After many years of sustained economic growth, 
which leaded the unemployment rate down to 
8.3% in 2007, an all-time low for Spain, dramatic 
adjustment in a number of accumulated domestic 
imbalances, like those in housing sector, 
competitiveness and the external deficit, caused a 
remarkable economic deterioration soon reflected 
in labour market conditions. The unemployment 
rate rose up to 11.3% in 2008, as a result of a 2.9% 
increase in the labour force and a contraction of 
employment by -0.5%, according to LFS data. In 
July 2009, the unemployment rate has reached 
18.5%, not very far from the historical high 
(19.8% in May 1994). 
Despite recent progress, the Spanish labour market 
is still characterised by a relevant gender gap. 
Males have much higher activity and employment 
rates than females (+18.6 pps. for both rates in 
2008) and lower unemployment rate (-2.9 pps. in 
2008). The current economic crisis, hitting more 
pronouncedly some sector with a majority of male 
workers, like the construction sector, is reducing 
the gender gap. 
Large differences remain among age groups due to 
very low young and older workers' activity and 
employment rates. Unemployment affects 
particularly young workers, whose unemployment 
rates rose up to 24.6% in 2008 (6.4 pps. more than 
in 2007). In the last year, young males suffered the 
highest increase in the unemployment rate among 
all the age / gender groups, namely +8.5 pps. up to 
23.7%, signalling again that male occupation was 
the most affected by the crisis. The last available 
data, referring to July 2009, report a youth 
unemployment rate at an astonishingly high rate of 
38.4%, more than 13 pps. higher than a year 
before. 
Temporary employment represents a large share of 
total employment (29.3% in 2008). During the last 
year this share shrank by 2.4 pps., suggesting that 
firms largely faced the drop in demand by not 
renovating temporary contracts. Among young 
workers, the percentage of those with temporary 
contracts was 59.3% in 2008. Confronting this 
figure with the diffusion of temporary contracts in 
total employment, it is apparent that the burden of 
flexibility is mainly on the young. Up to now have 
indeed sustained most part of the adjustment 
required by the recession.  
Reforms of job protection legislation passed over 
the last twenty years - there including the 
liberalisation of temporary contracts in the mid-80s 
and a number of still incomplete reforms to 
promote the use of permanent contracts in the 90s 
and the 2000s - have overall produced large labour 
market segmentation. Spain has the highest share 
of temporary workers (32% in 2007) and the 
highest, though declining, share of involuntary 
temporary workers in the EU 27 (85% in 2007, 
95% in 1997). This is the case despite no 
disadvantage of temporary workers versus 
permanent workers in accessing unemployment 
benefits and relatively low in-work risk of poverty 
rates when in temporary contracts. The high share 
of involuntary employed temporary workers can be 
explained by high differences in severance 
payment between temporary and regular contracts 
and relatively low number of conversions of 
temporary contracts into permanent ones (about 
30% of all temporary contracts were converted to 
permanent contracts from 2005 to 2006). However, 
as temporary contracts constitute a high share of 
all contracts in Spain, the effective number of 
contracts converted from temporary to permanent 
is above the EU average (4% in Spain versus 1.6% 
in the EU15).  
A high share of temporary workers with a high 
labour market turnover has also contributed to a 
reduction in hysteresis on the labour market and to 
a large reduction in the long-term unemployment 
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rate until the crisis started to bite. This can explain 
the current relatively low levels of long-term 
unemployment.  A relatively low long-term 
unemployment rate is also in line with Spain 
having a relatively low (below the EU average) 
share of staying with the current employer for 
more than 11 years (28%). 
Regional imbalances are still high compared to the 
EU27 average. The difference between the highest 
and lowest unemployment rates across Spanish 
regions in 2007 was 6.4 pps. (3.2 pps. in the 
EU27). However, a big improvement has been 
registered since 2001 when the difference was 
around 10 pps. 
Rigid employment protection legislation for 
regular workers hurts in particular disadvantaged 
groups such as women, young and immigrants, 
trapping them in "precarious jobs" with high levels 
of employment insecurity and under-investment in 
firm-specific human capital. Close to 56% of 
immigrants have temporary contracts, nearly 
double the rate among native born. (55) However, 
the availability of fixed-term contracts eased the 
assimilation of the recent immigration boom. The 
high incidence of temporary contracts among 
better educated young cohorts is often detrimental 
for returns to education due to frequent 
underutilization of skills.  
Low conversion rates from temporary to 
permanent contracts have negative implications on 
investing in specific human capital or on-the job 
training. Dolado and Stucchi (2008) attribute one-
third of the fall in TFP in Spanish manufacturing 
firms during 2001-05 to the disincentive effects of 
the low conversion rates on temporary workers' 
effort. 
Finally, long-term unemployed amounted to 17.9% 
in 2008, 2.6 pps. less than 2007. However this 
reduction can be mainly due to a composition 
effect, namely the massive injection into the 
unemployment pool of individuals with shorter 
unemployment durations during the last year.  
(55) OECD, Economic Surveys: Spain, 2008. 
Labour productivity dynamic was poor in the last 
decade, with an almost null growth on a yearly 
average. Labour productivity nevertheless 
increased in 2008 (+1.6%) as a consequence of the 
job destruction in the building sector, that still has 
an important share of the Spanish value added. 
Indeed during the deflation of a bubble, there is no 
room for labour hoarding because the low level of 
demand is recognized as permanent and firms, if 
not gone bankrupted, prefer to destroy jobs very 
soon. 
16.1.2.  Outlook for the next two years  
According to the most recent forecasts, 2009 and 
2010 will be very difficult years for economic 
activity in Spain. After a still positive GDP growth 
in 2008 (+1.2%), output is seen shrinking by -3.2% 
in 2009 (-3.7% according to September 2009's 
interim Forecasts) and -1.0% in 2010, according to 
EU Commission estimates. Other international 
institutions substantially agree with these figures, 
as IMF forecasts a -3.0% and -0.7% for GDP in 
2009 and 2010 respectively. This will result in an 
acceleration of the job destruction process that 
already characterized the Spanish economy in 
2008, as the EU Commission sees a very negative 
employment growth rate for both years (-5.3% in 
2009 and -2.7% in 2010). As a result, the 
unemployment rate will reach historical records, as 
EU Commission previews 17.3% in 2009 and 
20.5% in 2010. 
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Table II.16.1: Short-term forecasts - ES 
2008 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
1,2 -3,2 -1,0 -4,2 -0,9 -4,0 -0,8
-0,5 -5,3 -2,7 -2,3 -0,6 -3,5 -1,0
11,3 17,3 20,5 18,1 19,6 17,7 19,3
IMF
GDP growth
Employment growth
Unemployment rate
EU Commission OECD
Source: EU Commission (Ameco June 2009); OECD (Economic outlook 85 (June 2009)/84 (December 2008)); IMF (World
Economic Outlook Database update July 2009).
Table II.2.16.2: Labour market indicators
2001 2008 2001 2008
Employment rate 15-64 57,8 64,3 62,5 65,9
Men 72,5 73,5 70,8 72,8
Women 43,1 54,9 54,3 59,1
Employment rate 55-64 39,2 45,6 37,5 45,6
Men 57,7 60,9 47,4 55,0
Women 21,7 31,1 28,2 36,9
Participation rate 15-64 64,7 72,6 68,5 70,9
Men 78,4 81,8 76,9 78,0
Women 50,9 63,2 60,2 63,9
Participation rate 55-64 41,9 49,2 40,1 48,1
Men 61,2 65,1 50,8 57,9
Women 23,7 34,2 30,1 38,8
Unemployment rate 15+ (1) 10,3 11,3 8,5 7,0
Men 7,5 10,1 7,7 6,6
Women 14,8 13,0 9,4 7,5
Long-term unemployment rate (2) 36,1 17,9 46,8 37,0
Self-employment (3) 12,4 10,7 9,5 9,8
Fixed term contracts (3,4) 32,1 29,3 12,4 14,0
15-24 66,6 59,4 35,9 40,0
55-64 12,8 12,2 6,8 6,7
Part-time contracts (4) 7,9 11,8 : 17,6
Men 2,7 4,0 : 7,0
Women 16,7 22,6 : 30,6
Employment rate 15-64 57,8 64,3 62,5 65,9
Low-skilled 52,6 55,5 47,9 48,1
Medium-skilled 56,4 67,4 68,3 70,6
High-skilled 76,8 81,7 82,8 83,9
Regional unemployment (5,7) 9,9 6,4 3,4 3,2
Involuntary fixed-term contracts (6,7) 93,5 84,5 53,7 60,2
Involuntary part-time contracts (6,7) 22,4 32,5 18,0 22,5
ES EU27
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Statistics. (1) Harmonized unemployment rate; (2) As % of total unemployment; (3) As
% of total employment in the relevant group; (4) As % of all contracts; (5) Gap between the highest and the lowest
unemployment rate at NUTS1 level (for EU27 average of the individual national gaps; (6) As % of total fixed-term contracts or
part-time contracts; (7) 2007 data.
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16.2.  THE SHORT TERM RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS 
Spain has adopted a wide ranging response to the
crisis aimed at stimulating the economy and 
stabilising the banking sector, covering the 
financial market and the real economy through 
fiscal stimulus and structural measures. These
fiscal expansionary measures amount to around
3% of GDP in 2009, the largest stimulus in the
euro area. Overall, the sizeable stimulus is well 
mixed, including both revenue and expenditure
measures, and is mainly directed to investment
activity, supporting household purchasing power 
and businesses. In addition, automatic stabilisers
will work fully, implying a substantial increase in 
social expenditure and a significant decrease in tax
revenue. Finally, the impulse of discretionary
fiscal measures is supported by some new 
structural measures, which while being part of the 
longer-term policy reform agenda, will help to
address the current challenges posed by the 
downturn.  
Measures to improve the functioning of the labour
market have been so far less relevant than other
categories. They include, inter alia, the
introduction of an 'Extraordinary Plan for 
Orientation, Vocational Education and Training
and Labour Insertion' including the hiring of 1500 
professional employment advisors, the
introduction of temporary incentives for firms
hiring unemployed workers with children via 
permanent and full-time contracts through rebates 
on employers’ social security contribution, the
introduction of social security contributions
bonuses for new employment in strategic sectors,
and measures to allow undertake projects with a
major impact on job creation, particularly in
strategic sectors (Central Government's special
fund to vitalise the economy and employment). 
The design of the unemployment scheme was 
modified to improve activation, by giving the
unemployed who decide to become self-employed 
the possibility to draw 60% of their unemployment
benefit rights all at once (instead of the current 
40%). 
Finally, a Decree on the recognition of 
professional competences acquired by work 
experience adopted in July 2009 will also allow for 
a better recognition of certificates hold by
immigrants. As residential construction activity
adjusts to lower levels, this was needed to help
Box II.16.1: Recommendations (EU, OECD, IMF) - ES
EU (CSRs 2009): 
Promote a swift transition into employment, further encouraging mobility, upgrading skills and countering
segmentation in the labour market. 
Ensure the effective implementation of education reforms, also at regional level, with the main objectives of
reducing early school leaving and increasing the graduation rate in upper secondary education.
OECD (Going for Growth 2009):  
Reduce labour-market duality by cutting the costs of EPL for regular workers - further reduce severance
payments for workers with permanent contracts and promote a single contract by bringing in gradual
increases in required severance payments linked to length of service. 
Limit the administrative extension of collective agreements to promote greater flexibility in wage
determination.  
IMF (Article IV, 2009): 
Reducing labour market segmentation would allow better trained young cohorts to flow more quickly from
fixed-term to better-paid permanent jobs, thereby increasing returns to higher education (which are low).
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them shift to more productive activities 
commensurate to their skills. 
From their part, the plans to support strategic 
sectors, such as the automotive, textile, 
manufacturing or leather industry, involve 
vocational training within enterprises, rebates on 
social security contributions for maintaining the 
employment of workers over 55 years, rebates on 
social security contributions with respect to open-
ended contracts on redundant workers, subsidies 
during the process of job searching either for job 
seeking or participating in training activities and 
up-grading skills, subsidies to facilitate 
geographical mobility, subsidies to facilitate labour 
insertion of older workers, and subsidies to 
promote self-employment.  
A strong increase in unemployment rate during the 
present crisis has been facilitated by the high share 
of temporary contracts. In these circumstances it is 
also expected that employers will convert very few 
temporary contracts into open-ended ones.  
16.3. ADDRESSING THE CRISIS AND THE 
LONGER TERM CHALLENGES 
Following a 14-year long period of expansion, 
Spain has entered a sharp downturn. The crisis, 
though still at an early stage, has exacerbated 
macroeconomic imbalances, which are quickly 
jeopardizing past achievements in employment. 
Unemployment has increased by more than 6 pps. 
since mid 2008 to reach 18.7% in May 2009 and 
Spain's competitiveness difficulties are far from 
dissipating.  
Spain continues to rely on a set of exceptionally 
unemployment-prone labour institutions, in 
particular in the area of EPL, unemployment 
benefits and collective bargaining. This is because 
labour institutions were established in the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy and in 
the midst of the sharp recession of the 1970s, and 
thus were conceived to compensate for the lack of 
social protection in difficult times. 
The large short-term fiscal stimulus that was 
provided in late 2008, which focused on labour-
intensive public works, can be regarded as 
commensurate with the size of the downturn and is 
helping to strengthen confidence and reduce the 
risks of further employment losses. 
At the heart of the competitiveness weaknesses is 
the excessive growth of unit labour costs.  
Productivity growth in tradables relative to non-
tradables has grown even below the euro-area 
average over 1999-2008. This excludes the 
Balassa-Samuelson effects as explanation of the 
deterioration of competitiveness. Authorities 
emphasize increased productivity (both through 
product and labour market reforms) as the best 
way to lower unit labour costs. Given lower 
average wages than in EU partners, wage 
moderation is not pursued as a means to improve 
competitiveness. It is also alleged that lower wages 
could reinforce activity losses via weaker 
consumption, thereby accentuating the large 
negative contribution of investment to private 
demand. Furthermore, trade unions are more than 
reluctant to accept wage cuts in the presence of 
high profit margins. This very much calls for a 
coordinated approach in labour and product market 
reforms, so as to avoid changes in the income 
distribution and enjoy stronger support from social 
partners, especially trade unions. 
Dualism in the labour market may imply higher 
wage bargaining power of protected insiders. 
There is empirical evidence that fixed-term 
contracts have adverse effects on wage pressure in 
Spain (Bentolila, Dolado 1994). Beside that, 
nominal wage rigidities contribute to relatively 
high labour costs as wage negotiations are done at 
intermediate (industry or regional) level coupled 
with legal extensions to all firms and regions and 
further strengthened with the widely used 
indexation clauses. Wage indexation to past 
temporarily high inflation has caused wages to be 
rigid downwards, and has been detrimental to 
Spanish competitiveness in the recent past, given 
that this practice is not generally followed by other 
countries in EMU. Opt-out clauses are especially 
desirable when collective agreements take place at 
the intermediate level as a means to ensure that 
wages keep tied with productivity developments at 
the firm and/or local level. Wage bargaining in 
Spain is the domain of a small number of agents 
who mostly represent the interest of large firms 
and their permanent workers, in detriment of small 
firms and fixed-term employees. The regulation 
establishing the conditions that justify the non-
application of automatic extension of labour 
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conditions agreed in industrial agreements to all 
firms is very strict and should be lifted. This is 
even more urgent during the crisis, as many 
companies do not have the possibility to invoke 
them in due time, going bankruptcy and resulting 
in a loss of all jobs. From a long-term perspective, 
a reform which fostered decentralisation would 
help reduce unemployment by facilitating wage 
differentiation.  
Excessive employment protection (EPL) of 
workers benefiting from regular contracts 
precludes wages to moderate in the presence of 
excess in labour supply. There is at present ample 
room for reforming the dual system of 
employment protection. A majority of labour 
economists in Spain are proposing to maintain the 
current average level of dismissal costs paid by 
firms while changing its distribution so that 
severance payments increase smoothly as workers 
accumulate job tenure (the so-called tenure track 
approach). This is probably more realistic than 
equalizing dismissal costs at a low level.  
Together with the two-tier EPL system, 
unemployment benefits get too much blame for the 
rise in unemployment, in part because 
unemployment benefits are relatively high at the 
beginning of the spell, even if coverage rates are 
low. Enforcement criteria for benefit receipt are 
rather lax. Increasing strictness could prove very 
effective. An adequate level of coordination 
between the administration of benefits and 
activation would also be needed to lower the risk 
of benefit traps. More intense job search 
assistance, especially for workers over 45 years 
old, would be desirable. 
Even if there has been some improvement in 
productivity outcomes in recent years, the 
underlying trend still appears weak. The policy 
challenge is to implement structural labour market 
reforms to exploit existing labour potential. These 
include, in the first place, improve the matching of 
workers to jobs. The Labour Ministry has indeed 
favoured improved job intermediation and 
activation of the unemployed by boosting the 
effectiveness of ALMP, which can be regarded as 
a step in the right direction. However, improved 
matching also calls for a reform of EPL that lowers 
the barriers for young qualified workers to obtain 
jobs commensurate with their skills. Although the 
ongoing large rise in tertiary attainment provides a 
significant potential to raise productivity growth, 
young qualified workers often face substantial 
barriers to obtain qualified jobs, in part as a result 
of strict EPL for incumbent workers and low 
mobility. Allow better trained young cohorts to 
flow more quickly from fixed-term to better-paid 
and qualified permanent jobs is therefore a 
prerequisite to fully exploit existing human capital. 
A second challenge is to better exploit the 
contribution the education system can make to 
raising long-term economic performance by 
making vocational training more effective. The 
supply of workers with intermediate vocational 
skills is very low. Vocational training, whose 
returns are high, needs to be made more attractive. 
The Spanish government is indeed planning to 
modernise the country's vocational training system 
as a means to improve the employability of young 
people in emerging sectors of economic activity. 
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1.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
1.1.1. Employment protection legislation 
Employment protection legislation is relatively 
non-rigid and is determined by decentralized 
branch collective bargaining and by law. The most 
inflexible element regarding individual dismissals 
concerns the mandatory period of notice, which is 
high in particular for white-collar workers with 
longer job tenure. Also, reinstatement is always 
available as an option to compensation; however it 
is seldom taken up by the employee. Trial period is 
short. As to collective dismissals, the most 
inflexible element concerns the obligation of small 
firms (with 20-99 employees) to adhere to specific 
collective dismissals regulations already from 5 
dismissals onwards. Finally, concerning the 
temporary employment, some rigidity is observed 
concerning the authorisation and reporting needs 
of temporary work agencies.  
Individual dismissals are deemed to be lawful 
when based on a broad “serious reason”, including 
non-performance or lack of competence, and 
operational reasons or other business needs. In 
case of dismissal for operational reasons, the court 
may examine whether the dismissal was actually 
necessary or whether it would have been possible 
to transfer the worker to another post. Only those 
dismissals which would affect the dismissed 
employee more unfavourably than other 
comparable employees of the company, or which 
would impair the interests of the employee to a 
greater degree than the interest of the firm, and 
dismissals on inadmissible motive (e.g. 
discrimination) are considered unfair. The trial 
period is particularly short and is usually set at one 
month for all workers. Employers intending to 
terminate older workers’ contracts with job tenure 
of more than 2 years have to take social aspects 
into account if it appears to be difficult for such 
workers to get another job.  The period of notice, 
as laid down by law or collective agreement or 
possibly specified in their individual contract, 
differ for manual workers and white-collar 
employees. In the case of white-collars, statutory 
periods of notice to be observed by the employer 
may not be shortened to the employee's 
disadvantage. The basic period is of 6 weeks for up 
to two years of job tenure and increases to 
respectively 2, 3, 4 and 5 months after a length of 
service in the establishment of 5, 15, 25 years and 
beyond. In the case of blue collars, a negotiable 
notice period of 14 days is provided for, which is 
usually shortened or lengthened by collective 
agreement (ranging from 1 day in construction 
industry to 5 months in some other collective 
agreements). 
Following the major reform of the severance pay 
system introduced in 2003, severance pay 
entitlements, which were previously based on the 
length of the employment relationship (where the 
payment started with one month's wage per year of 
tenure exceeding three years and reached a 
maximum of one year of pay after 25 years), have 
been replaced by a flexible system of individual 
severance accounts based on defined contributions. 
With the new regulation, in principle every private 
sector employee (with an employment contract of 
at least one month) is entitled to severance pay 
upon termination of an employment relationship, 
regardless of the reason for the termination of the 
contract, there including case of resignation by the 
employee. The employer is obliged to contribute 
1.53% of monthly pay for all employees to a 
separate fund set up for this purpose, so that the 
claim increases progressively. The contribution 
periods of different employers will be cumulated. 
In the case of dismissal by the employer, an 
employee with at least three years of job tenure 
can chose between receiving his/her severance 
payment from the account, or saving the 
entitlement towards a future pension. If the 
employee quits or if job tenure is shorter than three 
years, no severance payment will be made but the 
balance of the account is carried over to the next 
employer. The amount of severance pay will 
depend on the capital accrued in the fund, the 
investment income earned and the capital 
guaranteed. By replacing lump-sum payments with 
portable individual severance accounts, the reform 
has eliminated uncertainty for firms, related to 
severance payments, and supported job mobility of 
workers as they do no loose entitlements to 
severance payments when quitting a job. A 
specific system of severance pay, based on the 
model developed for employees, has been 
established also for self-employed and freelancers 
in 2008. The employee has also the right to choose 
between reinstatement and compensation, although 
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this option is rarely taken up by the employee 
concerned. In the event of socially unjustified 
dismissal, the employee is also entitled to 
compensation equal to earnings between the 
dismissal and the legal settlement of the case. 
Sums earned by the employee in the interim are set 
off against the award.  
Collective dismissals apply whenever, within a 
time lag of 30 days, 5 or more workers are 
dismissed in firms with 20 to 99 employees; or 5% 
of the workforce in firms with 100-599 employees; 
or 30+ workers in firms employing more than 600 
people; and in any case when the dismissals 
concern at least 5 workers aged 50 years or more. 
The employer must notify the works council, as 
well as the local PES, of its intention to proceed 
with a collective dismissal. Consultations with the 
work council cover the alternatives to redundancy 
and possible ways to mitigate the effects of 
dismissals, there including the obligation to 
establish a social plan in firms with at least 20 
employees. This involves a 30 days waiting period 
before the first notice can become effective. No 
legal requirements exist concerning the severance 
pay, but often this is part of the social 
compensation plans.  
Temporary employment 
In case of a first contract, fixed-term contracts can 
be signed with no need to indicate a specific 
reason. On the other hand, a succession of fixed-
term contracts will automatically lead to an open-
ended employment contract, unless objective or 
material reasons can justify the need to renew a 
fixed-term contract. In this case, no limits apply 
concerning the maximum cumulated duration of 
fixed-term contracts. Similarly, no restrictions 
apply to temporary agency work contracts 
concerning their maximum duration and number of 
renewals, on the condition that they are stipulated 
for "objective reasons". Authorisation and 
reporting needs for temporary work agencies are 
quite heavy and include special administrative 
authorisations as well as periodic reporting 
obligations. Regulations on equal treatment for 
TWA workers are also strict and concern pay and 
other working conditions. 
1.1.2. Working time and work organisation (56)   
Austria has a relatively high incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, intermediate work 
intensity and irregularity and intermediate 
incidence of rotation and team work as well as 
intermediate work autonomy and complexity.     
In Austria, almost 50% of workers do not have 
fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% at 
the EU27 average) and about 32% of workers do 
not work the same number of days every week 
(about 25% in the EU27). For 48% of persons in 
employment working hours are set by the company 
with no possibility of changes. Relative to the 
EU27 average (56%), this indicates relatively 
flexible working time arrangements, though they 
are less flexible than in Sweden (34%), Netherland 
(36%) and Denmark (41%). Also, slightly more 
than 40% of persons in employment can adapt 
working hours within certain limits or determine 
working hours entirely by themselves, compared to 
60% in Sweden, 53% in the Netherlands and 50% 
in Denmark. Atypical work, in particular working 
in the night and in the evening is at about the 
EU27 average while working on the weekend is 
somewhat more widespread than in the EU15. 
Work complexity is among the highest in the EU 
as almost 85% of workers perceive their work to 
involve complex tasks (60% at the EU27 average) 
while work autonomy as measured by the ability of 
workers to change the order of tasks, methods of 
work and speed or rate of work is at the EU 
average. Finally, team work and rotation of tasks 
are close to the EU27 average; however teams and 
workers involved in tasks rotation are considerably 
more autonomous in their division of tasks than in 
the rest of the EU.    
In terms of practices to organize working time 
flexibly, Austria has the highest share of 
companies with intermediate flexibility, in 
particular with a high incidence of overtime work 
(32% of all companies). Relative to the EU 
average distribution of companies, Austria also has 
a relatively high share of companies with 
(56) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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1. Austria 
intermediate flexibility characterized by a high 
take-up of part-time work and a high incidence of 
unusual working hours which help these 
companies to cope with short-term (within a day or 
week) variability of the workload.  
Many sectoral collective agreements contain 
"delegation clauses" designed to allow more 
flexibility as regards working hours. Since the 
mid-1980s, works agreements at company level 
have been acquiring growing importance in 
Austria as an instrument for the regulation of the 
terms and conditions of employment, as part of a 
generalized tendency towards greater flexibility. 
Recently, such delegation clauses have also been 
agreed for certain sectors with a view to increased 
pay flexibility. Working hours were made more 
flexible in most of the collective agreements 
signed in 2005, with longer calculation periods in 
industries such as electrical machinery and 
electronics, metal products and saving banks. The 
reform of the Working Hours Act, passed in 2007, 
provided for even greater flexibility in response to 
fluctuating work burdens. Collective bargaining 
parties are now given the right to stipulate up to a 
10-hour normal working day, even without 
compensation in the form of longer weekly or 
monthly rest periods, and to introduce a working 
week of only four working days with extended 
normal working hours. Further flexibility has been 
also introduced with regard to the reference 
periods for overtime and with regard to shift work. 
At the same time, part-time workers have been 
given a legal claim to premium rates of pay for 
overtime.  
1.1.3. Wage setting and bargaining systems 
Austria is distinct from other EU countries in the 
scope and influence of its specific form of social 
partnership. In contrast to other countries, social 
partnership is not just a system of labour 
management relations or of wage bargaining, but 
one of institutionalised cooperation between 
labour, business, and government that covers all 
important aspects of economic and social policy. 
The social partnership was formed on a voluntary 
and informal basis to control post-war economic 
problems in the early 1950s. It developed later into 
a comprehensive system of influence in the fields 
of economic and social policy. The system has 
long been widely recognised as uniquely Austrian, 
creating political stability and social peace. In 
Austria, the notion of social partnership stands for 
a durable and rather robust pattern of day-to-day 
policy making which is capable of solving political 
conflicts by a routine of policy cooperation (see 
the example of labour foundations, where former 
employers, the PES and employees provide 
financial and labour market support to help a 
smooth reallocation of dismissed employees). 
The high degree of stability, in terms of structure 
and with regard to the practices of the wage 
bargaining agents, that characterises the Austrian 
wage bargaining system has been accompanied by 
a growing diversification and de-centralisation of 
the bargaining process with respect to the 
substantive outcomes of collective bargaining. 
Competences of lower-level bargaining actors 
have been widened since the mid-1990s, with the 
crucial competences remaining with the sectoral 
bargaining actors, and a part of the agreements 
being concluded at regional level. Although the 
peak employer and employee organisations 
possess the capacity to conclude collective 
agreements, national general agreements 
concluded at the central level are indeed very rare 
and never regulate pay. Wage levels at sectoral 
level are calculated on the basis of two main 
parameters: the prospective national inflation rate 
and productivity in the current and next year.  
Minimum rates of pay are not fixed by law but are 
laid down in branch-level collective agreements. 
The wage level, agreed by social partners for the 
least skilled group of workers, determines a de 
facto minimum wage for the industry covered by 
the applicable collective agreement. In order to 
reduce existing pay differentials between sectors, 
sexes and employee categories and to set a 
minimum wage floor for all employees, the 
national-level social partners agreed in 2007 on the 
introduction of a monthly minimum pay rate of € 
1,000, to be paid 14 times per year for all pay 
grades and in all sectors of the economy, 
beginning in 2009. This minimum pay rate relates 
to regular full-time work of more than 35 hours a 
week and does not include any form of additional 
pay. 
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1.1.4. Tax and benefit systems (57) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies 
(1.2% of GDP) are above the EU27 average (1%). 
The benefit coverage of unemployed persons is 
relatively low as about 35 persons out of 100 
persons wanting to work receive unemployment 
benefits (44 persons at the EU27 average). 
However, the coverage of unemployment benefit 
recipients increases among LFS unemployed and 
registered unemployed. Initial net replacement 
rates for low wage and average wage persons are 
at 55% and for one earner couple with children at 
65% (66%, 59% and 67% at the EU27 average). 
As there is no guaranteed minimum income, low 
wage persons may have insufficient income 
security during transitions. Net replacement rates 
decline only marginally during the unemployment 
spell, thus remaining at relatively high levels after 
5 years, at 51% for low wage and average wage 
persons, and at 53% (without social assistance) and 
65% (with social assistance) for one earner couples 
with children.  
Despite relatively low initial net replacement rates, 
marginal effective tax rates measuring financial 
incentives to take up work are relatively high. As 
out-of-work benefits are not taxed, taxation of 
earnings when taking up work, in particular social 
security contributions paid by employees, 
increases financial disincentives to work 
considerably. The tax wedge is relatively high, 
both for low wage (at 44%, 37% at the EU27 
average) and average wage persons (at 49%, 41% 
at the EU27 average) and has not changed much 
over 2001-2007. Unemployment and inactivity 
traps are higher for family types with two children, 
in particular one earner couple and single parents, 
though these family types saw a reduction in their 
financial disincentives to work over 2001 – 2007. 
Reductions in income taxes, along with a reduction 
in the number of tax brackets from four to three, 
and a small extension of the group of tax-exempt 
people, were passed in 2004. A further reform of 
the personal income tax system was passed in 2009 
(57) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
including rate cuts for low-income individuals. On 
the other hand, cuts in non-wage labour costs were 
decided over recent years to stimulate the labour 
demand for specific groups, notably older workers 
and young apprentices. The integration subsidy 
given to employers for hiring long-term 
unemployed persons was converted in 2007 into a 
‘comeback cheque’ for long-term unemployed 
people, to be used as a marketing tool when 
applying for a job. Particular age groups are 
eligible for the subsidy, which is negotiated 
between the PES and the employer. 
Recent pension reforms (2000 and 2003) have 
strengthened incentives to work longer, but 
transition periods are long and early retirement is 
still a widely used option. Various measures have 
also been adopted to increase the incentives to hire 
older workers and to improve their employability 
and labour market attachment, there including 
exemptions to employers from paying 
unemployment insurance contributions when 
recruiting workers aged 50+, part-time allowances 
for older workers, employment promotion 
measures and special training and reintegration 
measures. The preparation of an activation strategy 
with respect to disability pensions was launched in 
2007, while work incentives for parents on lower 
income brackets were increased in 2008 (raising 
the personal income tax allowance and exempting 
low-income parents from employee unemployment 
insurance contributions). 'Combination wages' for 
long-term unemployed, a form of in-work-benefits 
first introduced in 2006 to facilitate employment 
for low-skilled workers of specific age cohorts in 
very low paying jobs, have been extended in 2009.  
Unemployment insurance (58)   
Eligibility conditions 
In order to be eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefits, applicants must have paid 52 weeks of 
contributions during the last 24 months. This 
condition is reduced to 26 weeks during the last 12 
months for persons under 25 years of age. In case 
of repeated claims, the employment condition is 28 
weeks during the past 12 months (or 52 weeks 
within the past 24 months). Employees employed 
(58) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
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on a limited basis (i.e. with employment earnings 
below € 341 per month in 2007), persons 
employed on the basis of a non-standard contract, 
civil servants and most self-employed persons are 
exempted from unemployment insurance. Self-
employed have been given the option to enter a 
voluntary unemployment insurance scheme in 
2001. As of 2008, bogus self-employed working 
under the same conditions as employees will be 
compulsorily covered by unemployment insurance 
or, like genuine self-employed people, may opt for 
this scheme on a voluntary basis. Unemployment 
assistance (Notstandshilfe) is paid to unemployed 
individuals who have exhausted their claim for 
unemployment benefits or transition benefits, are 
in financial distress and available for placement in 
a job. 
Replacement rates 
On average, the replacement rate is 55% of 
average net income over the previous year, subject 
to daily rates between €7 and €42. There is no 
guaranteed minimum income (introduction has 
been announced but implementation has been 
delayed), so persons previously in low-paid jobs 
suffer the problem of low unemployment benefits. 
The maximum benefit level is defined by the 
ceiling on insurable earnings (maximum basis for 
2007 = €3,450). The level of unemployment 
assistance depends on the unemployment benefit 
previously paid. It amounts to 95% of the basic 
amount of the UB unless this basic benefit exceeds 
1/30 of the equalisation supplement reference rate 
of € 726 in 2007 (i.e. € 24) and 92% for all other 
cases. 
Benefit duration  
The benefits are normally paid for 20 to 52 weeks 
depending on the length of time insured and on 
age. Duration can be extended if the beneficiary 
participates in active labour market measures.  
1.1.5. Active labour market policies 
Since 1998 Austria gradually increased its 
expenditures on active labour market policies 
(from about 0.33% to about 0.51% of GDP in 
2007), which slightly exceeded the EU27 average 
in 2007. The coverage of persons activated by 
active labour market policies is high, as more than 
60 out of 100 persons wanting to work benefit 
from regular activation (36 at the EU27 average). 
The majority of active labour market policies 
expenditures (73%) are directed towards training. 
Public expenditures on labour market policy 
services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditures of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are close to the 
EU27 average, at 0.17% of GDP. (59) 
The job availability requirement index (which 
illustrates the strictness of availability criteria, 
primarily on the basis of formal rules in the labour 
market policy legislation) calculated for 2004, 
suggests that Austria has a relatively strict 
activation strategy. 
The Austrian public-law service agency (AMS) is 
charged with responsibility for job placement and 
the provision of advisory services to job-seekers 
and employers regarding supply and demand in the 
labour market. Its main functions include matters 
associated with unemployment insurance benefits, 
public job placement and labour market. In 
specific circumstances, the AMS dispenses 
financial assistance for the creation, preservation 
and protection of jobs, and subsidies for short-time 
working. Its functions in connection with 
unemployment insurance include, in particular, the 
administration of unemployment benefit and 
unemployment assistance. Depending on the 
particular requirements involved, the functions of 
the AMS are performed at Federal, regional (Land) 
or local level. At the local level, it operates as an 
information and job-placement system between 
job-seekers and job-providers through local 
employment offices called AMS-Büros. In 
practice, this means that the actual enforcement of 
activation programmes differs according to local 
conditions and Landër policies. In 2001, the 
obligation was introduced for regional AMS 
offices to ensure that people having difficulties in 
entering the labour market are offered a suitable 
job within 4 weeks, or are given the opportunity to 
participate in a training or reintegration 
programme. Since 2003, AMS offices must enable 
(59) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
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all unemployed persons under 25 and over 50 to 
participate in some training or re-integration 
programme if they cannot be offered any suitable 
job within three months. 
During recent years, a large number of 
programmes were launched aimed at improving 
employment opportunities for young people. The 
"Employment Promotion Act" of 2005 provided a 
comprehensive framework for the implementation 
of all existing qualification and activation 
measures. Young job seekers are now provided 
with a personal coach to help them in their job 
search. In April 2008, the youth employment 
package was adopted that guarantees 
apprenticeships training and reformed the 
apprenticeship subsidies. The so-called "Blum 
Bonus" reform subsidises employers creating new 
apprenticeships places. The vocational education 
guarantee offers young people who are not able to 
find an apprenticeship place in a company 
vocational training in special training institutions. 
Grants were also introduced for further training 
measures for older employees and older 
unemployed people. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(60)   
(60) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5.  
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Registration for placement and application for 
unemployment benefit take place at the same time. 
It is not possible to apply for benefit without 
registering for placement. 
Job-search requirements  
At the initial registration, applicants have to 
confirm (in written form) that they are available 
for work. The benefits could be cancelled if the 
PES offers vacancies, but the person cannot take 
up employment because of non-availability. 
Clients have to report in person, normally every 
week, at the local employment office, for control 
of their unemployment status. Moreover, they need 
to report their job-search efforts in person to the 
PES counsellors (AMS) every month on average, 
depending on the labour market situation or their 
previously concluded activity agreement). 
Unemployed participants in training and job 
creation programmes usually do not have to prove 
continuing independent job search and attend PES 
interviews. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
About 9% of the notified vacancies are handled 
using a procedure of direct referral to “closed” 
vacancies. Other notified vacancies are usually 
advertised and receive also candidates by direct 
referral. The PES may undertake pre-selection 
interviews by phone or personally. This service is 
offered in 8.7% of direct referrals. 
Intensive interview  
The first intensive interview takes place either at 
registration (about 60%) or within a period of one 
month (40%). An action plan is created on this 
occasion, at the latest one month after initial 
registration. Thereafter, intensive interviews take 
place every three months as a minimum, based on 
the client’s individual action plan. One collective 
information session is obligatory for newly-
registered unemployed. 
Referral to ALMPs 
There is no general rule to attend an active labour 
market programme after a certain period of 
unemployment, but participation is obligatory after 
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a respective counsellor direction and is usually laid 
down in the jobseeker’s individual action plans. 
PES-defined target groups, in particular youth and 
older people, enter ALMPs more frequently than 
non-target groups.  
1.1.6. Lifelong learning (61)   
Austria scores relatively favourable in terms of 
human capital investment, implying relatively 
good employability of workers. (62)    
Austria spent about 5.5% of GDP on education in 
2005 (5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in Denmark, 
around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). About 63% of 
adults have medium education (47% at the EU27 
average) while the shares of adults with low or 
high education is considerably lower, 20% and 
18% respectively (29% and 24% at the EU27 
average). Employability of medium educated 
workers is high as they have skills that are highly 
responsive to labour market needs. (63) The share 
of early school leavers (young persons with at 
most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training) is below the EU27 average 
(11% versus 15% respectively). However, it is 
particularly high among non-EU nationals, even 
for second level generation immigrants, who face 
large gaps in educational achievements. Results of 
PISA study reveal an average performance of 
Austria among OECD countries, despite relatively 
high per student spending on public education and 
GDP per capita. 
Participation in LLL increased since 2000, by 
almost 5 pps. to 13%, which is above the EU27 
average (10%), however much less than in Sweden 
(33%), Denmark (29%) and in the UK (27%). Yet, 
lifelong learning is largely addressed to already-
qualified workers for up-skilling (participation in 
LLL for workers with high education is 24%; 19% 
at the EU27 average; for workers with medium 
education is 13%; 9% at the EU27 average), while 
workers with a weak basic educational background 
participate much less in LLL (4%, which is also at 
(61) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(62) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Austria above the EU27 average in 
terms of on-the-job employability as measured by learning, 
training and task rotation. 
(63) See OECD, Economics Surveys: Austria, 2007. 
the EU27 average). Participation in LLL of 
unemployed increased remarkably since 2000 (by 
12 pps. to almost 20%), thus reaching more than 
double level of the EU27 average (at 8.5%). 
However, an increase in participation in LLL of 
employed and inactive was smaller reaching 14% 
and 9%, respectively (11% and 7%, respectively at 
the EU27 average). Finally, employability of older 
workers is considerably lower as only 6% of older 
workers participate in LLL (5% at the EU27 
average). More than 65% of firms provide CVT 
courses (almost 50% at the EU27 average, more 
than 80% in Denmark, around 70% in Sweden, 
France, the Netherlands and Finland), however 
they spend on average 1.4% of total labour costs 
on CVT (1.6% at the EU27 average). About one 
third of workers participate in CVT courses (equal 
to the EU27) with almost no change since 1999 
and they spent on average 9 hours on CVT courses 
in 2005 (equal to the EU27).  
Austria still lacks a coherent lifelong learning 
strategy given its rather fragmented education 
system. The main reason is a lack of an 
educational and a governance approach for the 
implementation of LLL. The institutional 
framework and the pattern of coordination are 
quite unclear. Individuals have no explicit right to 
certain continuous pathways or individual 
qualification programmes provided by the PES 
(AMS) or the employer. Rather, it is up to the PES 
and the employer to decide which qualification 
measures to be taken. Nevertheless, workers 
employed for more than one year have the 
possibility, in agreement with their employer, to 
take from three months to one year of unpaid 
training leave during which they are entitled to a 
lifelong training allowance. 
Policy measures in the area of lifelong learning  
generally include tax deductibility and incentives 
for firms regarding expenses related to lifelong 
learning (notably in the form of educational 
allowances, educational premium targeted at start-
ups, and apprenticeship bonuses), the introduction 
of enabling training leaves, as well as vocational 
A-level exams and qualifications certificates. New 
forms of training have been also developed, 
including measures to reintegrate drop-outs and 
disadvantaged people, while a reform of apprentice 
training and vocational training centres has been 
launched in 2008-2009.  
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2.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
2.1.1. Employment protection legislation (64)   
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is 
characterized by a degree of strictness similar to 
that of the EU average. The OECD's overall EPL 
indicator amounts to 2.6 against an un-weighted 
European average of 2.4. This overall performance 
is the outcome of a different behaviour in the sub-
indicators. Indeed, the strictness of legislation 
regulating dismissals of individual workers with 
regular contracts is relatively low, with the 
corresponding indicator at 1.9 versus 2.3 on 
average for the other European countries. On the 
contrary, temporary jobs are more strictly 
regulated than the European average (2.7 versus 
2.2) and collective dismissals' regulation is second 
only to Italy among the OECD countries, 
amounting to 4.1 against a European average of 
3.2.  
Despite considerable reform measures to liberalize 
fixed-term contracts during the 1990s, employment 
protection for fixed-term contracts continues to be 
one of the highest in Europe, and definitely higher 
than for regular contracts. This may be attributed 
to the fact that for Belgian labour law permanent 
contracts are still the standard, and temporary work 
is strictly regulated regarding duration and number 
of renewals. Maximum total duration of fixed-term 
contracts was lengthened in 2002, but only in those 
cases where it is justified by temporary increase in 
workload. Temporary employment agencies also 
face restrictions regarding the type of work for 
which they can engage temporary workers, and 
their regulation has remained largely unchanged 
since 1987. The moderate level of employment 
protection for permanent workers against 
individual dismissal is mainly due to the very 
limited terms of notice for blue-collar workers, 
which is set at only seven days for blue-collar 
workers with less than six months seniority, this 
implying lower compensation in the event of 
dismissal. White-collar workers are much more 
advantaged in employment protection, since notice 
periods for them are among the longest in the EU. 
(64) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
Besides, Belgium has strict employment protection 
legislation for collective dismissals.  
Individual dismissals for blue collar workers are 
unfair if pronounced for reasons which have no 
connection with the capability or conduct of the 
worker or which are not based on the operational 
needs of the undertaking, establishment or 
department. For white collar workers, the concept 
of abusive dismissal does not exist in regulation. In 
this case the right to lay-off can be exerted in the 
interest of the company. The trial period is not 
legally required, but when introduced in the 
employment contract, a minimum and maximum 
duration is set by law, corresponding to 7 to 14 
days for blue collars and to 1 to 6 months (up to 12 
months if the annual salary exceeds a given 
amount) for white collars. No notice period is 
required during the trial period for blue collars. 
Afterwards, it corresponds to 7days for 6 months 
tenure, and it is then set to increase with job tenure 
(28 days for more than 6 months tenure; 35 days 
for 5 years tenure and so on, 42d<10y, 56d<15y, 
84d<20y, 112d>20y). For white collars, the notice 
period is of 7 days during the trial period. It 
corresponds to 3 months for maximum 5 years 
tenure and then to three additional months for 
every following five years (e.g. 6m<10 years, 
9m<15 years). This is the legal minimum. If the 
annual salary is above a give threshold, the parties 
must agree a notice period not less than the legal 
minimum. The compensation in case of unfair 
dismissal is at least equal to the notice period (in 
the event that notice was not given). White collars 
get an additional compensation for damages as 
determined by a judge, while for blue collars the 
additional compensation for damages always 
corresponds to six months’ wages. There is no 
reinstatement option for the employee following 
unfair dismissal. 
Collective dismissals apply quite extensively, 
whenever within a time span of 60 days 10 or more 
workers are dismissed in firms with 20-99 
employees; or al least 10% of the workforce in 
firms with 100-300; or 30+ workers in firms with 
300+ employees. The employer must inform and 
consult with the works council or trade union 
delegation on possible alternatives to redundancy 
and ways to mitigate its effects, and notify the 
local PES, by reporting on the results of 
consultations and giving full information of the 
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planned dismissals. A social plan can be 
established. The procedure is indeed quite 
burdensome and the delay after notification to the 
local PES is quite long, fixed at 30 days with 
possibility to be lengthened to 60 days by the PES. 
The amount of the severance pay varies according 
to the length of the notice period. The longer the 
notice period, the lower the severance pay. 
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts are permitted without 
specifying an objective reason, for up to two years, 
or for up to three years with the authorisation of 
the social and labour inspectorate, with maximum 
four successive renewals. With objective reasons 
(replacement, temporary increase in workload, 
etc.) no time limits apply. 
The regulation of temporary work agency (TWA) 
employment is more restrictive than for fixed-term 
contracts. TWA is limited to objective situations, 
including replacement of absent workers, 
temporary increases in workload or exceptional 
work. In case of replacement of absent workers, 
the maximum duration of a TWA contract is of 6 
months renewable, with a 12 months limit. In case 
of temporary increases in workload, TWA 
contracts can be concluded for 18 months or more 
if extended by collective agreement.  In case of 
exceptional workload they are limited to 3 months.  
TWA workers must receive equal pay and 
conditions to other workers in user firm with no 
exception. 
2.1.2. Working time and work organization (65)   
In Belgium, more than 40% of workers do not 
have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, about 23% of 
workers do not work the same number of days 
every week compared to slightly more than 25% in 
the EU27. However, for 53% of persons in 
employment, working hours are set by the 
company with no possibility of changes. This 
indicates somewhat more flexible working time 
(65) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
arrangements than in the EU27 (56%), however 
considerably less than in Sweden (34%), 
Netherland (36%) and Denmark (41%). Almost 
40% of persons in employment can adapt working 
hours within certain limits or determine working 
hours entirely by themselves, compared to 60% in 
Sweden, 53% in the Netherlands and 50% in 
Denmark. The incidence of atypical work is 
somewhat above the EU27 average, except 
working on Sunday. Work autonomy is relatively 
high, as many workers (about 75%) have the 
possibility to change or choose the order of tasks, 
methods of work and speed or rate of work (65-
70% in the EU27). Finally, compared to the EU 
average, team work and tasks rotation are 
somewhat more widespread than in the EU and a 
degree of autonomy of teams and workers 
involved in tasks rotation in division of tasks is 
close to the EU27 average.   
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, 
Belgium has the highest share of companies 
characterized by high flexibility which is driven in 
particular by companies' operational needs (26%) 
– such as unusual working hours and non-standard 
employment contracts – and companies 
characterized by low flexibility (26%). (66)   These 
two types of companies are also the most prevalent 
establishment types within Europe, covering 43% 
of all establishments surveyed. 
The Belgian government has been promoting 
flexible working time over recent years, notably by 
means of tax reductions. From 2006, the partial 
exemption from payment of withholding tax on 
premiums for shift-work and for night work has 
been raised from 2.5% to 5.63%. The annual limit 
of 65 hours' overtime work was doubled in 2005.  
2.1.3. Wage setting and bargaining systems 
Wage bargaining is highly structured at three 
interlinked levels: the central cross-sector  level 
(66) See Chung, et al, 2007. These results, in particular 
concerning a high share of "low flexibility" companies, are 
somehow different from the results of clustering reported 
by Employment in Europe, 2007. A discrepancy likely 
stems from the usage of a different survey (ESWT versus 
EWCS), different set of variables  - which are in some 
cases slightly adjusted (e.g. indicators for part-time work, 
flexible working hours and overtime are replaced by 
indicators, which apply to at least 20% of the workers in a 
company) - and different clustering techniques. 
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covering the entire economy; an important 
intermediate level covering specific industrial 
sectors; and company-level negotiations as a 
complement or substitute for the sector-level 
bargaining. In principle, lower level agreements 
can only improve what has been negotiated at 
higher level for the employees. It is up to the social 
partners to agree on the wage evolution for the 
next two years in an inter-professional agreement. 
The inter-professional agreement defines an 
indicative national wage norm and a national 
minimum wage, which serve as the upper and 
lower limits for the subsequent sector and 
enterprise level wage negotiations. The indicative 
standard set by the inter-professional agreement 
can be exceeded by well-performing sectors, 
bearing in mind that since 1996 Belgian wages are 
not allowed to increase faster than wages in the 
three neighbouring countries (France, the 
Netherlands and Germany), though this average  
has been often breached without correction in 
subsequent periods. Extension mechanisms ensure 
that collective agreements cover almost the whole 
workforce. Belgium is also one of the few 
countries in the EU to still have an extensive 
automatic index-linking for setting wages. This 
means that pay and social security benefits are 
linked to a specific consumer price index (called 
health index). Since almost all sectoral collective 
agreements have their own way of implementing 
the indexing mechanism in setting wages, as a 
result, indexing has developed into a rather 
complex system that, in general, prevents 
downward tendencies in real wages. Favourable 
measures were introduced at the end of 2007, after 
agreement between the social partners, for 
employers to settle a system of flexible pay linked 
to employees' performance. 
Tax and benefit systems (67)
Belgium has relatively high expenditures on 
passive labour market policies (2% of GDP 
compared to 1% at the EU27 average). This 
reflects relatively high unemployment rate, 
including a high long term unemployment rate, as 
well as a high benefit coverage of unemployed 
persons (there are more unemployment benefit 
recipients than persons wanting to work;  at the 
EU27 average, about 44 persons out of 100 
persons wanting to work are recipients of 
unemployment benefits). 
Also, initial net replacement rates for low wage 
earners are relatively high (74%, 66% at the EU27 
average) and remain relatively high also after 5 
years (at 64%). Initial net replacement rates for 
average wage earners and one-earner are lower 
(55% and 66%, respectively; 59% and 67%, 
respectively at the EU27 average), however as they 
decline only slightly over unemployment spell, 
they are among the highest in the EU after 5 years. 
Belgium is also the only country in the EU that has 
unlimited duration of unemployment benefits, 
which may considerably reduce incentives to 
work, and even more so since the financial gain 
from taking up work is overall low. Tax wedge is 
among the highest in the EU, at 50% for the low 
wage person (37% at the EU27 average) and at 
56% for the average wage person (41% at the 
EU27 average). The interaction between the 
withdrawal of unemployment benefits when taking 
up work and high taxation reduces incentives to 
work considerably, with financial gain when 
moving from unemployment to work in some 
cases below 20%. This applies in particular for 
unemployed and inactive persons taking up low-
paid jobs. Financial disincentives to move from 
inactivity to work are also relatively high for the 
second spouse in the household with two children 
and one earning spouse - in particular due to 
income taxation - which depresses the participation 
rate of women. Finally, Belgium has a relatively 
high low wage trap, which discourages incentives 
(67) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedge and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
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to increase hours worked. On the other hand, the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social 
transfers is relatively low for the inactive and the 
unemployed, with social transfers reducing the risk 
of poverty of unemployed by about 20%.  
Recent reform measures have somewhat reduced 
all traps. As part of a long-term policy objective to 
shift the tax burden from labour to a broader base, 
since 2000 Belgium has constantly reduced social 
security contributions for employers and 
employees and in particular for low-wage workers. 
The reform efforts were accompanied by the 
introduction of various in-work benefits, notably to 
improve work incentives for long-term 
unemployed taking up paid work, for young 
unemployed and for older workers. In this context, 
the allowance for resuming work, a supplement to 
the normal wage for older unemployed people that 
begin to work again, which was originally only 
focused on the long-term unemployed, has been 
extended in 2006 to those short-term unemployed 
who find a new job and to older unemployed 
people who become self-employed.  In 2005, a 
work bonus gradually replaced the previous tax 
credit scheme for low-wage workers which had 
been introduced with the 2001 tax reform. The 
work bonus became soon an important incentive to 
accept low-wage jobs rather than to apply for 
unemployment benefits, and consequently a good 
instrument to combat unemployment traps. The 
various pre-existing schemes to reduce employers' 
social security contributions (SSC) were also 
streamlined in 2002, while a substantial 
simplification of the SSC rebates for various target 
groups (such as low skilled workers, older 
employees and long-term unemployed) was 
decided in 2004. 
Unemployment insurance (68)   
Eligibility conditions
For employees, the qualifying period varies 
according to the age of the insured person, 
between 312 working days during the previous 18 
months and 624 working days over the previous 36 
months. Part-time workers must do at least 12 
hours per week to qualify (or 1/3 of normal full-
(68) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
time hours in the job). Eligibility then follows the 
same criteria as for full-time workers, except that 
the units are half-days and the reference period is 
increased by 6 months (e.g. the criterion for 
persons under 36 of age is 312 half-days in 24 
months). For young people who have recently 
completed training a waiting allowance is payable, 
dependent on training record. 
Those who do not qualify for unemployment 
insurance benefits can have access to 
unemployment assistance if are resident in 
Belgium, have an EU nationality or equivalent, are 
18 years old, do not reach the subsistence level and 
are ready to take up work. 
Replacement rates 
Unemployment benefit pays up to 60% of previous 
average daily earnings, subject to minimum and 
maximum levels. The 60% is made up of a basic 
allowance of 35% plus supplements dependent on 
various circumstances (adaptation 20%, loss of 
sole income 5%, family 20%). The amounts are 
reduced after 1 year. For part-time workers, 
benefits are paid in proportion to hours worked, 
where full-time equals 35 hours. The waiting 
allowance for young persons after training is paid 
at a fixed flat-rate. 
Unemployment assistance benefits are flat 
amounts fixed by law (€ 465.06 per person for 
people living together; €679.61 for a single person; 
€ 930.14 per person for people having a family to 
support - as of 1st May 2008). 
Benefit duration  
In principle, duration is unlimited (but there may 
be some exceptions in the case of very long-term 
unemployed). The duration of unemployment 
assistance is also unlimited. 
2.1.4. Active labour market policies 
In the framework of low financial gains from 
taking-up work or increasing work effort and 
unlimited unemployment benefit duration, active 
labour market policies are crucial to support 
transitions and prevent inflow into long-term 
unemployment. In Belgium, federal agencies 
collect social security contributions and distribute 
unemployment benefits, while regional agencies 
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help with job search. Since the responsibilities in 
financing unemployment benefits and job search 
assistance are shared between federal and regional 
agencies, efficiency in reaching policy targets may 
be improved. 
An index that measures the job availability 
requirement was calculated for Belgium in 2004 
and its relatively low value points to relatively 
poor activation strategies [to add source in 
footnote]. To activate long-term unemployed, 
Belgium introduced a substantial reform of the 
active labour market policies in 2004 to improve 
incentives to job search. The old system of 
monitoring unemployed people was replaced by a 
new system managed by the federal agency in 
cooperation with the regions and communities, 
featuring an individualised approach to supervision 
and regular check-ups for long-term unemployed. 
Those unemployed who no longer actively look for 
work or refuse training or counselling can incur in 
financial sanctions.  
Belgium has among the highest expenditures on 
active labour market policies (1 % of GDP, 0.5% 
at the EU27 average). About 88 persons out of 100 
persons wanting to work benefit from regular 
activation (36 persons at the EU27 average). The 
highest share of ALMPs expenditures goes to 
employment incentives (40%) and direct job 
creation (32%) while relatively little share is 
devoted to training (17%). Employment incentives 
are especially important in case high labour costs 
depress labour demand. Therefore, Belgium offers 
several hiring subsidies to firms that recruit 
unemployed, young and older workers, workers in 
certain occupations. Public expenditures on labour 
market policy services (which cover the costs of 
providing services for jobseekers together with all 
other expenditures of the public employment 
services, including overheads and functions such 
as benefit administration where relevant) are 
relatively high, at about 0.22% of GDP (0.19% at 
the EU27 average). (69) 
Activation policies 
(69) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work, who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(70)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
In order to receive unemployment benefits, the 
unemployed must register as job seeker at the 
regional PES, within eight days from the request of 
benefits. In Flanders, the registration as 
unemployed can be done through three channels 
(online, call centre and face-to-face) leading to an 
immediate employable file. From the first week the 
file is weekly matched with new vacancies. The 
second step is a telephonic screening done by the 
PES (VDAB) call centre: i) for the low-educated 
after three months of unemployment; ii) for the 
high-schooled unemployed below 25 years of age 
after four months of unemployment; iii) for the 
high-schooled unemployed above 25 years of age 
after six months of unemployment. If the person is 
still unemployed three months after the telephonic 
screening, they are invited for an intensive 
interview, the “intake” (the third step).  The action 
plan is established during the intake (after six to 
nine months of unemployment). In Wallonia, when 
first registering as unemployed, the job seeker can 
benefit from a short interview of 10-15 minutes to 
analyse his/her needs. Depending on the result of 
the interview, the job seeker is directed either 
towards free access services or specialised 
services, such as professional advice. In the latter 
case, an intensive interview of 45-60 minutes is 
planned within one month.  The basic service for 
all unemployed also includes a collective interview 
(70) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5.  
172 
Annex - Description of labour market institutions - EA country fiches 
2. Belgium 
of two hours and an orientation interview of one 
hour, to take place before the second month from 
registration as unemployed for those under 25 
years of age and before the 7th month for those 
aged 25 and beyond.  
Job-search requirements 
The job seeker must certify his/her status of 
unemployed and provide evidence of autonomous 
job search activity. The evaluation of the job effort 
is done at the different individual interviews which 
take place starting from 15/21 days after 
registration as unemployed, and then after 4, 12 or 
16 months of unemployment spell. The actual 
procedures slightly differ in Flanders and in 
Wallonia. Moreover, while in Flanders even during 
training and job-creation programmes, the 
jobseeker is expected to continue his/her job 
search, in Wallonia, the unemployed who take part 
in a training programme are covered by 
exoneration from job availability requirement for 
the duration of the programme.  
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
All job vacancies are public. In the Flanders, the 
follow-up ensured to individual job offers depends 
on the score given to the various offers. In 
Wallonia, only 5 to 10% of job offers are managed 
by the PES, which makes a pre-selection of 
suitable candidates.  
Intensive interview  
In the Flanders, during the pathway guidance 
(starting after six to nine months as unemployed) 
jobseekers have at least a monthly interview with 
their pathway counsellor, unless they follow an 
intensive action (e.g. training) at that time. In 
Wallonia, the frequency of intensive interviews 
with PES (FOREM) varies according to the 
specific needs and characteristic of the 
unemployed. In the framework of the 'plan 
d'accompagnement' of unemployed aged 25 to 50, 
which starts at the latest in the 7th month of their 
registration, it is generally foreseen either a 
specific action or an individual interview per 
month.  
Referral to ALMPs 
In Flanders there are no compulsory ALMPs 
where every jobseeker has to participate at a given 
duration of unemployment. It is always within a 
pathway guidance context, thus after thorough 
screening, that a jobseeker is engaged in an 
ALMP. Once an ALMP is decided within the 
pathway guidance and integrated in the action 
plan, the jobseeker is obliged to participate. These 
action plans are always written by the PES 
counsellor after thorough discussion with the 
jobseeker during one or more intensive interviews; 
once put in the action plan, the jobseeker is obliged 
to participate in the ALMP. In Wallonia, for 
unemployed registered since 2004, a follow-up is 
proposed before 3 months of unemployment to 
unemployed younger than 25, and before the 7th 
month of unemployment for those aged 25 and 
beyond. Job seekers have to sign a follow-up 
agreement ('convention d'accompagenement') 
where are detailed the actions to realise.  
2.1.5. Lifelong learning (71)   
Belgium scores relatively favourable in terms of 
human capital investment, implying relatively 
good employability of workers. (72)    
The country spent about 6% of GDP on education 
in 2005 (5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in 
Denmark, around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). The 
shares of low, medium and highly educated 
persons are all close to one third, thus deviating 
from the EU27 average in particular for medium 
educated (47% at the EU27 average) and highly 
educated persons (24% at the EU27 average). The 
share of early school leavers (young persons with 
at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training) is below the EU27 
average (12% versus 15% respectively).  
Despite a favourable educational structure of 
adults, employability of workers may be hampered 
as only 7% of workers participate in life-long 
learning (LLL) (10% at the EU27 average, 33% in 
(71) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(72) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Belgium above the EU27 average 
in terms of on-the-job employability as measured by 
learning, training and task rotation. 
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Sweden, 29% in Denmark, 27% in the UK) with 
almost no change since 2000. Participation in LLL 
is relatively low regardless of educational 
attainment, though it is about 10 pps. higher for 
workers with a high education (13%; 19% at the 
EU27 average) than for workers with a low 
education (3%; 4% at the EU27 average). 
Participation in LLL of unemployed is at around 
the EU27 average (9%) while participation of 
employed and inactive is somewhat below the 
EU27 average (8% and 5%, respectively). Finally, 
employability of older workers is considerably 
lower as only 4% of older workers participate in 
LLL (5% at the EU27 average). 
Almost half of the firms provide continuous 
vocational training (CVT) courses (roughly equal 
to the EU27 average, against more than 80% in 
Denmark, and around 70% in Sweden, France, the 
Netherlands and Finland) and they spend on 
average 1.6% of total labour costs on CVT (equal 
to the EU27 average). About 40% of workers 
participate in CVT courses (one third in the EU27) 
with no change since 1999 and they spent on 
average 12 hours in 2005 on CVT courses (9 hours 
at the EU27 average).  
Lifelong policies in Belgium have mainly 
concentrated on investment in formal education. 
For example, training vouchers and competence 
centres were developed to lower formal learning 
barriers. The statistical results relating to the 
participation of workers to CVT show that training 
seems to be more often proposed to men without 
any foreign origin, people aged between 25 and 54 
and with high qualifications. The participation rate 
is also different according to the three regions and 
it is more important in the region of Brussels and 
in the Flemish region than in the Walloon 
region. (73)  
(73) See EIRO, "Belgium: Collective bargaining and continuous 
vocational training", 2008. Source: Continuous vocational 
training survey (2007), Federal Public Service Economy, 
Belgium. 
Adult education was indeed regionalized during 
the institutional reform of the State, so that 
vocational training now depends on the three 
regions (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia) while 
initial training depends on the three linguistic 
communities (Dutch, French and German-
speaking). Moreover, the social partners at all 
levels play a prominent role in devising, 
organizing and managing the Belgian CVT system.  
In some sectors, the social partners have even 
organized sector-based training funds, with the aim 
of financing training that better fits the demands of 
companies. 
Following the youth employment scheme launched 
in 2000 and known as the "Rosetta Plan", in 2002 
a new allowance was decided addressed to young 
people upon completion of training recognised by 
the regional PES. Aim of the initiative was to 
encourage young unskilled workers to undergo 
additional training or training leading to a 
qualification. The training was to be set out in a 
contract signed by the young person and the 
regional PES. A new system of allowances for 
vocational training was then set up in 2006, 
including a) a training allowance for the individual 
vocational training of employees in the enterprise; 
b) a traineeship paid by the unemployment service 
and aimed at the integration of unemployed people 
into the company; and c) a six-month allowance to 
help unemployed people aged at least 30 to set up 
their own business. The maximum number of 
hours for paid vocational training was increased in 
2007 and employers’ contributions to this system 
were also progressively increased. Further major 
initiatives in the field of vocational training are 
mainly taken at regional level.  
3. CYPRUS 
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3.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
3.1.1. Employment protection legislation (74)  
The OECD score of tightness of EPL is not 
available for Cyprus.  Legislation governing the 
termination of employment goes as far back as 
1968 and covers all employers in the private and 
public sector. The law determines the period of 
notice that must be given to an employee and the 
conditions under which a dismissal can be deemed 
unfair and is, therefore, subject to compensation. 
The employer has the right to dismiss an employee 
as redundant. If the employee has been working 
continuously for 104 weeks, he or she has the right 
to compensation. Such payments are made from 
the Redundancy Fund which is entirely financed 
by employers' contributions. 
Temporary contracts 
Temporary employment includes people in paid 
employment with fixed-term or works contracts, 
and people employed on a seasonal basis. Since 
1997 the law has regulates the operation of Private 
Employment Agencies, which must secure a 
license from the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Insurance. Temporary work employment is not 
permitted to replace workers on strike without 
informing the applicant of the situation. 
Temporary agency work is very rare. Temporary 
agency work is not governed by collective 
bargaining at any level, but the principle of non-
discrimination between contracts types applies. 
3.1.2. Working time and work organization (75)  
Cyprus has a very low incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, low work intensity 
and irregularity and intermediate incidence of 
(74) This section draws heavily from European Employment 
Observatory (2006), Contribution to the EEO Autumn 
Review 2006 "Flexicurity". 
(75) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
rotation and team work as well as relatively low 
work autonomy and complexity.  
In Cyprus, the share of workers which does not 
have fixed starting and finishing time is the lowest 
in the EU (about 20% compared to almost 40% at 
the EU27 average). Furthermore, for almost 75% 
of persons in employment working hours are set by 
the company with no possibility of changes. This 
indicates a low incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements (56% at the EU27 average), in 
particular if compared with Sweden (34%), 
Netherland (36%) and Denmark (41%). Only 23% 
of persons in employment can adapt working hours 
within certain limits or determine working hours 
entirely by themselves, compared to 60% in 
Sweden, 53% in the Netherlands and 50% in 
Denmark. Furthermore, only 10% of workers do 
not work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. The 
incidence of atypical work, such as working in the 
night, in the evening and on weekends is among 
the lowest in the EU. Work complexity is 
relatively low - as about 50% of workers perceive 
their work to involve complex tasks (60% at the 
EU27 average) - as also autonomy at work as 
measured by the ability to choose or change the 
order of tasks, methods of work and speed or rate 
of work. Finally, compared to the EU27 average, 
team work is somewhat less and tasks rotation 
somewhat more widespread, however, both 
workers involved in teams and in tasks rotation are 
the least autonomous in their division of tasks in 
the EU.    
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, 
Cyprus has the highest share of companies 
characterized by low flexibility (33% of all 
companies). Relative to the EU average 
distribution of companies, Cyprus also has a high 
share of companies with intermediate flexibility 
characterized by a high incidence of overtime 
work.  
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3.1.3. Tax and benefit systems (76) 
Cyprus spends below the EU27 average on passive 
labour market policies (about 0.6% of GDP 
compared to 1% at the EU27 average). This is due 
to relatively low benefit coverage of unemployed 
(about 36% of persons wanting to work are 
recipients of unemployment benefits compared to 
44% at the EU27 average), low unemployment 
rate, including low long term unemployment rate, 
relatively low initial net replacement rates (at 59%, 
58% and 70% for low wage, average wage persons 
and 1-earner couples compared to 66%, 59% and 
67% at the EU27) as well as a strong reduction in 
net replacement rates after unemployed exhaust 
their unemployment benefits (after 7 months), in 
particular if they are not eligible for social 
assistance. Tax wedge is the lowest in the EU, both 
for low wage persons (12% vs. 37% at the EU27 
average) and average wage persons (14% vs. 41% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, tax wedges 
saw a strong decline over 2001-2007, both for the 
low wage and average wage persons, in particular 
as a result of a reduction in social security 
contributions paid by employers and to a lesser 
extent due to a reduction in personal income tax. 
Overall, the interaction of taxes and withdrawal of 
benefits does not produce substantial financial 
disincentives to work, except for jobless 
households (with or without children) in which one 
spouse, either unemployed or inactive, considers 
taking up work. 
Unemployment insurance (77)  
The Unemployment benefit includes a basic part 
and a supplementary part. The unemployed person 
is entitled to unemployment benefits for 156 days 
in each period of interruption of employment (78) 
provided that he is insured with the Social 
(76) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
(77) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
(78) It means two days of sickness or unemployment within a 
period of six consecutive days.   Two or more of such 
periods are considered as being one, if they are not 
separated by a period of more   than 13 weeks. 
Insurance Scheme and satisfies certain 
contribution conditions. The same person can 
reclaim the benefit, provided that 26 weeks passed 
since the last days he had received the 
unemployment benefit and that that the person had 
worked for at least 26 weeks after the last day he 
had received it. Two or more of periods of 
interruption on employment are considered as one, 
if not separated by a period of more than 13 weeks. 
Eligibility conditions 
Unemployment benefit is payable to registered 
unemployed aged between 16 and 63 years old, 
including insured attending courses of 
occupational training. The age of 63 is extended to 
the age of sixty-five if the insured is not entitled to 
old age pension.  
To claim benefits, an unemployed should  
• be insured for at least 26 weeks before 
becoming unemployed and have paid 
contributions on insurable earnings not lower 
than 26 times the weekly amount of the basic 
insurable earnings. (79) Contributions by self-
employed are not allowed. 
• have paid (80) or been credited (81) with 
contributions in the previous contribution 
year (82) on insurable earnings not lower than 
20 times the weekly amount of the basic 
insurable earnings. 
In case the insured person is over 60 and is not 
entitled to a pension out of an occupational 
pension scheme, he can claim for the 
unemployment benefit provided that he has paid 
(79) The weekly amount of the Basic Insurable Earnings 
changes from year to year.  
(80) Paid Insurable Earnings:  Insurable Earnings on which 
contributions have been paid.  
(81) Credited Insurable Earnings: Every insured person can be 
credited with insurable earnings for any period of full time 
education after the age of 16 years, for periods of serving 
in the National Guard, for periods who is in receipt of 
sickness, unemployment, maternity, injury benefits or 
invalidity pension out of the Social Insurance Fund and for 
the period of paternal leave or period of leave on grounds 
of force majeure.  
(82) Previous Contribution year:  For the first semester of each 
year it is the calendar year before the last and for the 
second semester it is the last calendar year i.e. for the first 
semester of 2006, the previous contribution year is 2004 
whereas for the second semester of 2006, it is the year 
2005.     
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contributions on earnings, not lower than 26 times 
the weekly amount of the basic insurable earnings 
and that 13 weeks have passed since the last day he 
had received the unemployment benefit. 
Replacement rate  
The Unemployment Benefit is composed of two 
parts - the basic and the supplementary part– and is 
calculated based on a system of insurance points 
set by the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance 
and the gross earnings of the unemployed in the 
previous one or two years, depending on whether 
the unemployment starts after or before the first of 
July. 
The weekly rate of the basic benefit equals 60% of 
the weekly average of the basic insurable earnings 
of the previous contribution year. An integration 
for the dependant spouse is paid, only if his/her 
earnings or the rate of the benefit he/she may 
receive from the Social Insurance, are not higher 
than the amount of increase for dependants. In the 
case both spouses are entitled to a benefit, the 
increase for dependants6 is payable only to the 
spouse who is entitled to increase of benefit at a 
higher rate. In case the applicant has a dependent 
spouse, the weekly rate of the Basic Benefit will 
increase by 1/3.  If the applicant has children or 
other dependants - up to two dependants-, the basic 
benefit is be increased by 1/6 for each dependent.  
The weekly rate of supplementary benefit is equal 
to 50% of the weekly average of insurable earnings 
of the beneficiary in excess of the basic insurable 
earnings but in no case, the supplementary benefit 
is higher than the weekly amount of the basic 
insurable earnings.   
Benefit duration 
In the case of an employed person, the payment of 
the benefit starts from the forth day of 
unemployment and in the case of a voluntarily 
insured person (working abroad in the service of a 
Cypriot employer) the payment starts after the first 
30 days of unemployment.  
3.1.4. Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
among the lowest in the EU (about 0.1% of GDP 
compared to 0.5% at the EU27 average). About 
63% of expenditures are directed towards 
employment incentives and about 25% to training. 
Only 11 out of 100 persons wanting to work 
benefit from regular activation (36 persons at the 
EU27 average). Public expenditures on labour 
market policy services (which cover the costs of 
providing services for jobseekers together with all 
other expenditures of the public employment 
services, including overheads and functions such 
as benefit administration where relevant) are 
among the lowest in the EU, at 0.04% of GDP 
(0.19% at the EU27 average). (83) 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
ALMPs are centred on, or co-ordinated by, the 
HRDA whose operations are funded by payroll 
taxes. A multitude of programmes exist. The main 
initial training activities consist of enterprise-based 
and institution-based initial training; training for 
tertiary education graduates who are about to enter 
the labour market; the Apprenticeship Scheme; and 
training for high school students to help improve 
their labour market orientation. These programmes 
improve the match between the skills of workers 
and those sought by employers, thereby reducing 
the probability of unemployment. The Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs also offers a number of 
ALMPs, including vocational guidance, help to 
(83) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
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tertiary education graduates, repatriated and 
disabled people who wish to become self-
employed, and schemes aimed at increasing the 
participation rate of older workers.  The overall 
participation rate in the various training 
programmes by individuals aged 25-64 was 5.9% 
in 2005, lower than the EU average of 11% and 
lower than the EU target of 12.5% by 2010. 
Following the first phase of the reform measures 
for the transformation of the PES into a customer-
orientated and decentralised service delivery 
system providing high quality and timely services, 
implemented during the period 2005 – 2008 with 
the financial support of the European Social Fund 
(ESF), a policy decision was taken to implement a 
Phase II.  Relevant activities for this new Phase 
include:  
• The adoption of a personalized customer-
oriented approach to employers with the use of 
tailor made action plans and specialized tools;  
• The development of close cooperation with 
local authorities and social partners in the 
promotion of employment of vulnerable 
groups; 
• The upgrading of IT tools for the monitoring of 
labour market developments,  
• The introduction of quality system in PES 
service delivery; 
• The upgrading of vocational guidance services; 
• The strengthening of the technical and 
administrative capacity of the PES to 
continuously monitor and evaluate labour 
market policies. 
The enhancement and modernisation of the Public 
Employment Services is expected to contribute 
positively towards more effective and timely job 
placement, thus shortening the period of 
unemployment. More specifically, the main aim of 
this measure was the development of structures 
that will contribute to the implementation of a 
preventive and employability-oriented strategy. 
This implies that PES will be moving towards 
active engagement with the groups they aim to 
serve (workers and employers) leading to the 
integration into employment of the inactive and 
persons receiving public assistance and 
unemployment benefit. 
3.1.5. Lifelong learning 
Significant progress has been achieved with 
respect to the lifelong learning. Life–long learning 
has increased from 5,9% in 2005 when the NRP 
started being implemented, to 7,1% in 2006 and to 
8,4% in 2007, decreasing the gap with the EU27 
average, which is at 9,7% (2007). The ratio of 
early school leavers decreased from 18,2% in 2005 
to 16% in 2006 and dropped down to 12,6% in 
2007, i.e. lower than the EU27 average of 14,8%. 
The educational attainment (20-24) kept increasing 
from 80,4% in 2005 to 83,7% in 2006 and 
reaching 85,8% in 2007, being well above the 
EU27 of 78,1%.  
The National Strategy for Lifelong Learning (LLL) 
2007-13 was approved by the Council of Ministers 
on 7.11.2007, and it is a comprehensive and 
coherent framework of strategic objectives, based 
on the following four pillars: 
• Promoting access and participation in lifelong 
learning for all; 
• Strengthening of lifelong learning 
infrastructures and systems; 
• Promoting research and development for the 
support of lifelong learning;  
• Effective governance of lifelong learning. 
A Monitoring Mechanism for the implementation 
of the Lifelong Learning Strategy was set up in 
order to monitor, coordinate and promote all 
necessary actions for the realization of the 
National Lifelong Learning Strategy. Under the 
four pillars of the LLL strategy several actions are 
being promoted.  Specifically:  
• Promoting access and participation in lifelong 
learning for all; 
• Establishment of new five new Universities in 
the last two years, increase of the intakes and 
departments in the University of Cyprus and in 
the Cyprus University of Technology; 
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• Promotion of accelerated vocational training 
programmes to the unemployed and unskilled 
young persons, upgrading of the 
Apprenticeship System, promotion of youth 
entrepreneurship and training for new farmers, 
promotion of training to enhance the 
employability of young secondary education 
school graduates, women and disabled, 
establishment of education centres which 
provide Greek language courses to speakers of 
other languages (children-adults), computer 
and foreign language courses; 
• Enhancement and modernization of the Public 
Employment Services (including expansion of 
building network, improvement of service 
quality, personalized counselling, specialized 
studies, and upgrade of ICT systems), 
implementation of different education and 
training programmes on management skills 
aiming at providing lifelong learning 
opportunities for the employed people and at 
supporting enterprises; 
• Lifelong-learning promotion in the Public 
Sector by offering courses on public 
administration and training for teachers.   
• Strengthening of infrastructures and systems; 
• Development of an integrated lifelong career 
guidance and counselling system; 
• Continuation of the Education reform, 
strengthening of the quality and attractiveness 
of the Secondary Technical and Vocational 
Education (STVE) and setting up mechanisms 
to safeguard quality assurance in higher 
education; 
• Provision of further support to the training 
institutions,  
• Promotion of the reform of the curricula of all 
subjects so that they provide ICT as a learning 
tool and ensure that primary and secondary 
education teachers will become digitally 
literate; 
• Establishment of a National Qualifications 
Framework and introduction of a Vocational 
Qualifications System;  
• Research and development for the support of 
LLL. 
4. FINLAND 
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4.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
4.1.1. Employment protection legislation (84) 
A quite substantial reform of the EPL for regular 
contracts was decided in 2001, with a) the 
reduction of the notice period related to the 
termination of employment contracts in the case of 
short-term employment relationships and the 
introduction of a longer notice period of six 
months once an employment relationship has 
continued for more than 12 years (from previously 
15 years); and b) the introduction of a 
comprehensive compensation system for cases of 
groundless termination of the employment 
relationship by the employer, involving a 
compensation of minimum 3 months' and 
maximum 24 months' pay. 
Individual dismissals are justified for “specific 
serious reasons”, including personal characteristics 
and urgent business needs. Dismissals for 
economic and personal reasons are valid only if 
employees cannot be reasonably, in view of their 
skills and abilities, transferred or retrained. 
Protection against individual dismissals applies 
after a trial period of 4 months for all workers. The 
notice period varies according to job tenure and 
goes from 14 days in case job tenure of maximum 
1 year, to 1 months for maximum 4 years job 
tenure and so on, up to 6 months for more than 12 
years of job tenure. The notification procedures in 
the case of individual dismissal of a worker with a 
regular contract are quite burdensome. In case of 
dismissal for personal reasons, the employer must 
proceed to an advance discussion with employee 
and trade union if requested by employee, and 
further provide him/her with a statement of reasons 
and information on appeals procedures. In case of 
dismissal for lack of work, in companies with 20 
or more employees the employer must notify the 
employment office and trade union representatives 
and consult them for 14 days on the reasons and 
ways to avoid lay-off; in companies with less than 
20 employees, only a notification to the 
employment office is required. There is no 
provision for severance pay under Finnish law, and 
(84) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
reinstatement is not contemplated. In case of unfair 
dismissal the employee can get a compensation of 
between 3 and 24 months of pay. When 
determining the amount of compensation, the 
estimated time without employment, the estimated 
loss of earnings, the duration of the employment 
relationship, and the degree of guilt found on the 
side of employer must be taken into account. The 
typical compensation at 20 years tenure amounts to 
14 months. 
Collective dismissals apply when more than 9 
workers are dismissed in firms with more than 20 
employees, in case of dismissal for financial or 
production-related reasons. The employer must 
notify the local employment office and the trade 
union or personnel representatives, and consult 
them on alternatives to redundancy and ways to 
mitigate the effects. When an employer with more 
than 30 employees is considering laying off at least 
10 employees, the mandatory period for 
negotiating with employees or their representatives 
is extended from 14 days to six weeks. As laid 
down in collective agreements, selection procedure 
usually takes account of seniority, family 
circumstances and the retention of skilled 
personnel. 
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts are permitted for temporary 
replacements, traineeship, and special business 
needs (unstable nature of service activity, etc.) 
with no limits on their cumulated duration. In case 
of successive contracts, the justification of 
limitation of a contract is subject to court 
examination. No limits apply also concerning the 
maximum duration and number of renewals of 
temporary agency work contracts; while the 
principle of equal treatment regarding pay and 
working conditions apply for TWA employees. 
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4.1.2. Working time and work organization (85)  
Finland has a relatively high incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, high work intensity 
and irregularity, intermediate incidence of rotation 
and team work and high work autonomy and 
complexity.   
In Finland, more than 50% of workers do not have 
fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% at 
the EU27 average). Furthermore, 29% of workers 
do not work the same number of days every week 
compared to slightly more than 25% in the EU27. 
For 45% of persons in employment working hours 
are set by the company with no possibility of 
changes. This indicates highly flexible working 
time arrangements (56% at the EU27 average). 
Also 46% of persons in employment can adapt 
working hours within certain limits or determine 
working hours entirely by themselves (36% at the 
EU27 average). Atypical work, in particular 
working in the night, in the evening and on 
Sundays is very common while working on 
Saturdays is less widespread than in the EU27 
average. Work complexity is high as about 75% of 
workers perceive their work to involve complex 
tasks (60% at the EU27 average). Furthermore, 
work autonomy is relatively high as measured by 
the ability of workers to change the order of tasks, 
methods of work and speed or rate of work. 
Finally, the team work is much more widespread 
than rotation of tasks between workers. However, 
both workers involved in teams and in tasks 
rotation are considerably more autonomous in their 
division of tasks than in the rest of the EU.    
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, 
Finland has the highest share of companies with a 
high flexibility which aims at satisfying workers' 
work life balance needs and is characterized by 
high levels of flexible working hours, long-term 
leave arrangements, overtime and parental leave 
(33% of all companies). Relative to the EU 
average distribution of companies, Finland has 
also a high share of establishments with 
(85) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
intermediate flexibility which emphasizes 
arrangements to improve work-life balance 
throughout the worker's life course such as early 
retirement and longer periods of leave. To this 
respect, the 'job alternation' scheme, which enables 
employees to take a period of sabbatical leave 
while being temporarily replaced by an 
unemployed person, has been regularly renewed 
since it was first launched in 1996 with the aim of 
cutting unemployment and helping employee at 
work. The present scheme provides for a period of 
leave of between 90 and 359 days, agreed 
voluntarily between the employer and the 
employee with an unemployed person, obligatorily 
hired as a substitute worker during the absence of 
the permanent employee. The compensation for 
longer-serving workers who take leave has been 
increased and a requirement of 10 years prior 
employment introduced. During the leave, 
employees receive compensation equal to 70% of 
the unemployment benefit. 
4.1.3. Wage setting and bargaining systems 
Collective bargaining at branch level is the main 
wage determinant in Finland. Wage bargaining 
rounds at sector level provide the framework for 
company level negotiations. Since sector-level 
collective agreements have erga omnes 
applicability, non-organised employers have to 
observe the collective agreement setting minimum 
terms and conditions of employment for their 
sector, and are not allowed to pay lower wages 
than those stipulated therein. Therefore, collective 
agreements define de facto minimum wages. If 
there is a collective agreement in a given sector, 
but it does not have "erga omnes" applicability, it 
is possible to regard wages that are stipulated in 
this agreement as normal and reasonable in that 
particular sector. If there no collective agreement 
has been signed in a given sector, normal and 
reasonable wages can be based on social partners’ 
recommendations. If there are no such 
recommendations, then a full-time employee 
should be paid at least the wage that would give 
the employee the right to unemployment 
insurance. Employers can also make independent 
agreements with the respective trade unions.  Yet, 
since the 2007 bargaining round there has been a 
significant shift towards company-level 
agreements, where the new sector-level collective 
agreements have delegated much power to the 
company level.  
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4.1.4. Tax and benefit systems (86) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
about 1.4% of GDP (1% at the EU27 average) and 
reflect a relatively high benefit coverage of 
unemployed persons (almost 50% of those wanting 
to work receive unemployment benefits, 44% at 
the EU27 average). Net replacement rates are at 
the beginning of the unemployment spell at 
intermediate to low level compared to the other EU 
countries (67% for the low-wage person and 52% 
for the average wage person), however as they 
taper off only slightly over time they get among 
the highest in the EU after 5 years, in particular if 
topped up with the social assistance (65% and 48% 
respectively). The net replacement rate for one 
earner couple with two children is among the 
highest at the beginning of the unemployment spell 
as well as after 5 years (84% if topped up with the 
social assistance). Tax wedges are relatively high, 
at 38% for the low wage person (37% at the EU27 
average) and at 44% for the average wage person 
(41% at the EU27 average). However, tax wedges 
saw a considerably decline over 2001-2007, for 
both the low wage (by 3.2p.p.) and average wage 
persons (by 2.7p.p.), in particular as a result of a 
decline in personal income tax. Financial 
incentives for unemployed and inactive persons to 
take up low-paid work are low, notably for a 
spouse in a jobless household without children, 
though this family type saw a substantial decline in 
its marginal effective tax rates over 2001-2007. 
This family type also faces relatively high low-
wage trap, which impairs spouse's incentives to 
increase hours worked. On the other hand, 
inactivity and unemployment traps are low for the 
second earner.  
Since the mid-1990s a key objective of Finnish tax 
policy has been to promote employment by 
reducing the taxation of earned income. Work 
incentives for the lowest incomes were improved 
by significant increases in the coverage and 
generosity of the municipal-level earned-income 
tax allowance (EITA) and by relaxing the income 
tax scale in 2006-2007, besides an additional 
(86) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
inflation adjustment of two per cent to the income 
tax scale. In addition, an earned-income tax credit 
(EITC) was also introduced in January 2006, 
which can be used instead of the EITA in 
municipal taxation to lower the tax burden of low 
and medium income earners. The impact of the 
allowances on marginal effective tax rates 
(METRs) varies significantly along the income 
ladder. At low income levels it reduces the METR 
by 16.5 percentage points, while when phased out 
it increases the METR by between 1 and 2 
percentage points. To reduce the negative impact 
of its withdrawal on work incentives for different 
income groups, the phasing out is very gradual and 
virtually every worker benefits from the 
allowance. About 55% of all taxpayers were 
entitled to both allowances in 2007. More recently, 
the Government initiated a comprehensive reform, 
by setting up a Committee in June 2007, to 
evaluate the tax and benefit system with the 
objective of promoting work incentives and 
poverty reduction and securing its financing. The 
resulting proposals for a comprehensive review of 
work incentives were ready in spring 2009, 
involving a €800 million cut in the taxes on earned 
income, and further adjustments to compensate for 
tax rises due to rising incomes. This follows a 
package of tax cuts on labour and improvements in 
benefits already introduced during the fall 2008. 
Pensioners’ taxes will be lowered accordingly in 
order to maintain similar levels in labour income 
and pension income taxes.  
Incentives to work for older workers are also 
affected by early retirement pathways such as the 
"unemployment pipeline" and disability pensions. 
The "unemployment pipeline" allow older persons 
to extend their entitlement to unemployment 
benefits up to the old-age pension. The 
beneficiaries are not subject to the early retirement 
penalty and they continue to pay pension 
contributions, which raise their final pension. 
Qualifying age for drawing on this scheme was 
gradually increased to 57 years in 2005. Another 
route to early withdrawal from the labour market is 
evidenced by a high share of persons receiving 
disability benefits. Finland has among the highest 
shares of medium and highly educated persons in 
the EU benefiting from these benefits. Finally, 
high implicit tax on continued work depresses 
effective labour supply of older workers even 
further.   
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Unemployment insurance (87)   
Eligibility conditions 
In order to qualify for the basic unemployment 
allowance, one must have recorded 43 weeks of 
employment during the last 28 months and at least 
18 hours of work per week during those weeks. A 
repeated claim requires 34 weeks of employment 
in last 24 months. To qualify for the earnings-
related insurance, besides complying with the 
above requirements, applicants must also have be 
insured as a member of an unemployment fund 
(voluntary) for minimum 10 months. People who 
have already received the unemployment 
allowance for the maximum period or do not meet 
the minimum employment requirements for 
entitlement to unemployment allowance can apply 
for unemployment assistance, on the condition of 
completing the qualifying period of 5 months. The 
waiting period does not apply to persons who have 
just completed vocational training. 
Replacement rates 
The basic allowance is a flat rate benefit of € 
24.51/day. Earnings-related benefits amount on 
average up to 45% of the difference between the 
previous daily wage and the basic allowance 
(subject to a threshold). For self-employed, 
benefits are related to the amount of income on 
which contributions have been based over the past 
24 months. Unemployment assistance is a means-
tested benefit equal to the full basic unemployment 
allowance. Labour market support is however paid 
without means-testing for 180 days after the 
unemployment allowance has been paid for a 
maximum of 500 days. 
Benefit duration 
The benefits are paid for maximum 500 calendar 
days (or until retirement if aged over 57). The 
duration of unemployment assistance is unlimited. 
4.1.5. Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
relatively high (about 0.7% of GDP, 0.5% at the 
(87) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
EU27 average) despite a relatively low share of 
persons wanting to work who are included in the 
regular activation (25% compared to 36% at the 
EU27 average). More than half of them are spent 
on training - followed by supported employment 
and rehabilitation, employment incentives and 
direct job creation - which has been increasingly 
gaining on importance compared to the supported 
employment. About one third of persons in 
subsidized employment are placed with 
municipalities while the remaining persons are 
placed with private companies. Public 
expenditures on labour market policy services 
(which cover the costs of providing services for 
jobseekers together with all other expenditures of 
the public employment services, including 
overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are 0.13% of GDP 
(0.19% at the EU27 average). (88) 
Public employment services were comprehensively 
reformed between 2002 and 2007. Since 2004 a 
decentralised network of “one-stop-shop” Labour 
Force Service Centres has been established which 
brings together the resources of the central and 
municipal governments and the Social Insurance 
Institution, to provide more holistic and 
coordinated services to the unemployed, including 
income support, job search, training and activation 
programmes, as well as other medical and 
counselling services. A new “Change Security” 
programme was introduced in July 2005 in the 
framework of the comprehensive incomes policy 
agreement for 2005-2007, aimed at assisting 
workers who lose their jobs due to structural 
change. The programme puts a lot of emphasis on 
fostering co-operation between employment 
offices and the private sector in an effort to get the 
unemployed back into employment as quickly as 
possible through early intervention, training, and 
job search assistance. The programme also 
provides for those who are about to be dismissed 
to spend part of their work time doing on-the-job 
retraining and searching for work. Also if a worker 
(88) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
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takes up training after the dismissal date, a 
supplement to income support can be paid. (89)  
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(90) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Unemployed persons need to register as jobseekers 
at the PES, which in turn informs the Social 
Insurance Institution or the competent Trade Union 
UI Fund of the jobseeker’s unemployment status. 
Unemployment benefits can be paid starting from 
the date of registration-for-placement, not 
retroactively. A waiting period plies, of seven days 
for unemployment benefit and five days for labour 
market support (social assistance). 
Job-search requirements 
The jobseeker is supposed to apply for every 
vacancy and training possibility that is advised by 
the PES. According to the individual action plan, 
jobseekers need to report their job-search actions 
(89) In detail, the programme includes: 1) a new right for the 
employee to get full pay leave during the period of notice 
in order to find a new job or to participate in employment-
promoting measure; 2) the drawing up of an individual 
employment programme by the PES and the employee 
covered by the 'change security'; 3) an employment 
programme allowance to be paid for a total of 185 days on 
top of the unemployment benefit; such allowance is to be 
increased for persons with a long work history and entitled 
to basic daily allowance and to training allowance of the 
same level of the basic training allowance.  
(90) This section is based on information collected in the 
OECD, 2007, Employment Outlook, chapter 5. 
on a weekly or monthly basis, both to the Social 
Insurance Institute or the UI Fund (on how much 
work they have done during the last four weeks), 
and to the placement service, according to an 
agreed schedule. The minimum acceptable 
frequency of job applications and other activities 
appears in the individual job-seeking plan. 
Participants in active labour market programmes 
need to continue active job-search, particularly at 
the end of the programme, and will receive the 
appropriate assistance from the PES. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs 
Most vacancies are advertised on internet by the 
PES, and most employers do not ask for direct 
referrals. About 20% of the vacancies might be 
handled using only direct referrals, if such a 
procedure is agreed with the employer. If a 
thorough pre-selection of candidates is required by 
the employer, it is usually a charged service, to be 
paid for by the employer.  
Intensive interview  
The first intensive interview with the PES is 
supposed to take place within a month starting 
from the initial registration. Newly registered job 
seekers are also invited to a collective information 
session. Intensive interviews take place in line with 
a mutual agreement between the PES and the 
jobseeker and are more frequent for younger 
jobseekers and for those in risk of long-term 
unemployment, and less so for older jobseekers. 
There is no minimum requirement on information 
sessions during the first 12 months of 
unemployment. However, most first-time 
jobseekers attend information sessions dealing 
with jobseekers’ rights and obligations, PES 
services, useful job-seeking channels and the 
labour market situation. Further interviews are 
mutually agreed between the jobseeker and the 
PES. There can be several interviews in a year 
depending on the individual situation of the 
jobseeker. 
Action Plan 
An action plan is created at the latest after five 
months of unemployment. Since 2005, the target 
deadline is one month. Action plans may be 
delayed since extra motivation is often necessary 
to help jobseekers see their added value. 
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Jobseekers are obliged to follow their individual 
action plan, which often consists of active labour 
market measures as well as PES services and 
active job search. Young jobseekers are 
interviewed within a month from registration; for 
them, an individual action plan is established and 
tailored active labour market measures are offered 
within three months of unemployment. 
Referral to active labour market policies 
After being unemployed for 12 months (earlier if 
considered necessary, and youths below the age of 
25 already within the first three months of 
unemployment), all unemployed jobseekers will be 
offered subsidised jobs or training possibilities. 
However, there is no exact unemployment duration 
at which a person is obliged to take part in active 
labour market measures. When an unemployed 
person over 25 years of age has received 500 days 
of labour market support (a flat-rate benefit 
payable after exhaustion of regular unemployment 
insurance benefit) or has been a customer of the 
municipal social services and received income 
support (by the local authorities) for 12 months, 
he/she is entitled and obliged to draw out an 
activation plan together with the PES and/or the 
municipality. This activation plan often consists of 
a variety of ALMPs or rehabilitative work. For an 
unemployed person under 25 years of age, the time 
period is reduced to 180 days of labour market 
support and four months of income support. They 
are offered a wide range of ALMP services both 
by the PES and by municipalities.  
4.1.6. Lifelong learning (91)  
Finland scores in terms of human capital among 
the highest in the EU implying very good 
employability of workers. (92)  Beside favourable 
educational attainment of adults, Finland also has a 
high participation in lifelong learning regardless of 
economic activity, age and education. However, 
there is a large difference in the participation in 
lifelong learning between core workers and less 
(91) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(92) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Finland on the top in the EU in 
terms of on-the-job employability as measured by learning, 
training and task rotation. 
attached worker groups, despite a decline in the 
gap since 2000. 
Finland spent about 6.3% of GDP on education in 
2005 (5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in Denmark, 
around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). The 
educational attainment of adults scores favourably 
compared to the EU15 average as the share of low 
educated is below the EU27 average (19% 
compared to 29% at the EU27 average), the share 
of highly educated workers is the highest in the EU 
(36% compared to 24% at the EU27 average) and 
the share of medium educated adults is close to the 
EU15 average (44% compared to 47% at the EU27 
average). The share of early school leavers (young 
persons with at most lower secondary education 
and not in further education or training) is among 
the lowest in the EU (8% versus 15% 
respectively). 
Participation in lifelong learning (LLL) increased 
since 2000, by almost 6 pps. to 23% (10% at the 
EU27 average), however it is still lower than in 
Sweden (33%), Denmark (29%) and in the UK 
(27%). While participation in LLL is considerably 
above the EU27 average regardless of economic 
activity, age and education, there is a large gap in 
LLL participation between prime age, higher 
educated and more vulnerable workers, such as 
lowed educated, older, unemployed and inactive 
workers. For example, the difference in the 
participation in lifelong learning between all 
workers (23.4%; 10% at the EU27) and older 
workers (13.6%, 5% at the EU27 average) is 
among the highest in the EU, at (9.8 p.p.). This, 
together with the relatively low educational 
attainment of older workers, implies considerably 
lower employability of older workers. Also 
participation in LLL of workers with a high 
education (one third; 19% at the EU27) is 
considerably above the participation in lifelong 
learning of workers with low education (11%; 4% 
at the EU27), this being the case also for employed 
workers (25%, 11% at the EU27 average) 
compared to the unemployed (20%, 8.5% at the 
EU27 average) and inactive workers (17%, 7% at 
the EU27 average).  
The share of firms providing continuous vocational 
training (CVT) courses is among the highest in the 
EU (about 70% compared to almost 50% at the 
EU27 average); however, firms spend on average 
1.5% of total labour costs on CVT against 1.6% at 
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the EU27 average. Participation of workers in 
CVT courses is 40% (one third on average in the 
EU27) and workers spent on average 10 hours on 
CVT courses in 2005 (9 hours at the EU27 
average).  
The Finnish education system is built on the 
principle of lifelong learning, i.e. on the idea of 
providing further study opportunities for people of 
all ages and with any level of education. Both 
certificate-oriented and non-certificate-oriented 
forms of education and training are available for 
adults. Some of these include education and 
training specifically for adults leading to initial 
qualifications, whereas others cover further 
education and training. The adult education sector 
is commonly divided into three parts: a) self-
motivated learning, completely or partially funded 
by the education administration, to provide adults 
education and training appropriate to their own 
objectives, circumstances and level of education; 
b) labour market training for unemployed people, 
financed and managed by the Ministry of Labour; 
c) continuous vocational training, financed by 
individual employers and usually undertaken 
during working hours, with a view to increasing 
productivity and profitability and motivating 
personnel.  
In-service training is promoted both in legislation 
and through general income policy agreements. 
Finnish legislation imposes an obligation on 
employers to provide training in situations where 
termination of employment can be prevented by 
means of vocational further education and training, 
and encourages the use of in-service training in 
situations where an enterprise’s production 
structure changes so that staff competences no 
longer match the enterprise’s operational models. 
The Act on Cooperation within Undertakings (last 
amended in 2005) requires enterprises with at least 
20 employees to draw up annual training plans and 
to update them where the number of employees is 
reduced. Continuous vocational training can also 
be undertaken at school or as apprenticeship.  
Every fourth year the government decides on 
future guidelines for education and training. This 
five-year plan forms the political basis for the 
development and reform of education in the 
coming years. Adult education and training also 
play a prominent role in collective agreements. A 
new scheme to provide financial support to 
employed people to undertake vocational training 
courses on their own initiative was launched in 
2000, as part of a wider programme of adult 
training-related reform agreed by the social 
partners in 1995-1999 (the so-called "training 
guarantee scheme"). The benefit is to be granted to 
employees who have been with the same employer 
for at least one year and with a working history 
totalling a least five years, and only for full-time 
vocational training of up to one and a half year 
duration.  
Further increases of on-the-job training, arranged 
as joint purchases between the labour authorities 
and employers, were decided in 2004, together 
with the introduction of regional action 
programmes to meet the challenges of adult 
education at regional level and the setting-up of a 
working group to introduce adult education 
vouchers in 2007 and to improve the participation 
of under-represented groups in adult education. 
Form its part, the 2004 Central Incomes Policy 
Agreement for the period 2005-2007 increased the 
allowances for redundant workers in the form of 
'training support' for maximum 185 days, to which 
part-time workers also qualify on the condition 
that they have worked for the same employer at 
least 3 years. On-the-job basic vocational training 
and apprenticeship training were expanded in 2008 
to prevent the social exclusion and to improve the 
employment of young people. 
5. FRANCE 
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5.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
5.1.1. Employment protection legislation (93) 
Past attempts to make labour market more flexible 
mainly managed to reduce employment protection 
for temporary workers, which, however, stays high 
for both fixed-term and temporary agency 
contracts.  
Individual dismissals 
Except in cases of serious cause related to personal 
characteristics of the employee, such as non-
performance or lack of competence, or to 
employee's misconduct, individual dismissals are 
considered unfair and subject to a period of notice 
ranging from one to two months for all workers; in 
case of unfair dismissal (i.e. without a real and 
serius case), (94) the employee is also entitled to a 
compensation in addition to the regular severance 
pay. In case of dismissal for medical reasons the 
employer has the obligation to consider alternative 
solutions before dismissing a worker. The trial 
period, which was previously not particularly long 
(1-2 weeks for blue collars, 1 month for white 
collars, 3 months for executives), has been 
extended to between 1 and 4 months in 2008. Both 
the basic entitlement to and the amount of the 
severance pay are strictly dependent on length of 
continuous service and are regulated by law and 
collective agreement and, sometimes, by the 
individual contract of employment. Statutory 
severance pay does not become payable until after 
two years of continuous service and amounts to 
minimum 0.6 months up to 4 months for a job 
tenure of 20 years. Employees with at least 2 years 
(93) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(94) The OECD, EPL sub-indicators quantifying the Individual 
dismissal of workers with regular contracts indicator is 
made of three aspects of dismissal protection: (i) 
procedural inconveniences that employers face when 
starting the dismissal process, such as notification and 
consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance 
pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee; and 
(iii) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the 
circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as 
well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is 
found to be unfair (such as compensation and 
reinstatement).  
tenure and working in enterprises with more than 
11 employees are entitled to an additional 
compensation of 6 months minimum (generally 12 
to 24 months). For employees with less than 2 
years service and /or working in a firm with fewer 
than 11 people, the judge can order compensation 
according to the loss suffered, but without any 
minimum. 
Collective dismissal for economic reason applies 
in the case of more than 10 dismissals within 30 
days. Before proceeding with collective dismissals, 
the employer must take account of criteria such as 
social characteristics, family responsibilities, 
seniority, age, disability and professional 
qualifications. The employees concerned by 
collective dismissals are given priority when 
rehiring during one year. Important procedural 
requirements apply in case of collective dismissal. 
This is reflected in the quite high strictness 
recorded for France in the OECD index on EPL 
concerning collective dismissals. The employer 
must give full information on planned dismissals 
for economic reasons to the personnel delegates or 
works council and hold with them consultation 
meetings. Moreover, the employer must notify the 
departmental labour market authorities. The 
consultations on alternatives to redundancy, such 
as redeployment or retraining, take place in several 
phases and include consultations on a 'social 
compensation plan' which is obligatory in 
companies with 50 or more employees. Employee 
representatives have no veto power, but labour 
market authorities have the possibility to reject the 
social plan. The whole procedure involves delays 
before notice, which amount to 30-60 days in firms 
with 50 or more employees, and 21 to 35 days in 
firms with fewer than 50 employees, depending on 
the number of proposed dismissals. No special 
regulations apply in case of collective dismissals 
concerning the severance pay. 
Temporary contracts  
Fixed-term contracts face quite high strictness 
according to the OECD's EPL index. Their 
recourse is restricted to "objective situations" 
(replacement, seasonal work, temporary increases 
in company activity). The maximum duration is of 
18 month in principle but can vary from 9 to 24 
months, for a maximum of two renewals. A new 
contract on the same post can only start after a 
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waiting period amounting to one third of initial 
contract. Moreover, fixed-term contracts are not 
allowed for a period of six months following 
dismissals for economic reasons. A new regulation 
on the use of fixed-term contracts in the public 
sector, passed in 2005, brought the maximum 
duration of fixed-term contracts to three years, plus 
the possibility to renew a contract up to maximum 
six years in total, after which employment can only 
be continued in the form of permanent contract. As 
concerns older workers, a new form of fixed-term 
employment contract for job seekers aged 57 or 
more, who either have been registered as 
jobseekers for more than three months or have 
signed a 'personal reclassification' agreement, has 
been created in 2006, for a maximum duration of 
18 months and renewable once. 
Also the recourse to temporary work agency 
(TWA) employment is quite restricted. Its use is 
limited to “objective situations” and the maximum 
duration is set at 18 month, varying in practice 
from 9 to 24 months depending on the reason. 
Only one prolongation is possible. A new contract 
on the same post can only start after a waiting 
period amounting to one third of the initial 
contract. TWA contracts are not allowed in a 
period of six months following dismissals for 
economic reasons. The delay before notice is of 
30-60 days in firms with 50 or more employees; 21 
to 35 days in firms with fewer than 50 employees 
(depending on number of proposed dismissals).  
Despite the strict regulation on the use of 
temporary contracts, employers largely recruit on 
flexible forms of employment by taking advantage 
of the various forms of ad hoc fixed-term contracts 
for difficult-to employ target groups (notably the 
young and the low-skilled) which have been 
promoted and financially supported in the course 
of the years by the various governments, de facto 
contributing to shape a segmented labour market, 
as the low conversion rate from temporary to 
permanent contracts (notably among young and 
low-skilled people) clearly shows.  
Recent reforms measures have attempted to reduce 
labour market segmentation. A  new type of open-
ended contract for new recruits in firms up to 20 
employees introduced in 2005, the so-called 
'contrat nouvelle embauche' (CNE), allows for a 
longer probation period of two years during which 
the employee could be dismissed orally with no 
entitlement to severance payment (apart from an 
allowance of 8% of perceived gross salaries) (95) 
A government proposal to introduce a single 
labour contract that gradually increases protection 
with seniority was rejected by the social partners in 
2008.  
The social partners' agreement of January 2008, 
and the ensuing law of June 2008, injects more 
flexibility on termination of employment contracts 
by defining a severance procedure in case firms 
and workers separate by mutual consent. In this 
case, workers benefit from higher severance 
payments (20% of the monthly wage per year of 
tenure instead of 10%) and are entitled to 
unemployment benefits. In the current framework, 
there si the risks that firms will terminate contracts 
with less productive workers aged around 55, 
which will entitled to receive benefits until they 
reach the retirement age without a noticeable loss 
of pension benefits: the cost for public finances 
could be quite significant. Firms benefit from 
greater legal security as the scope for litigation 
after the separation is restricted. Furthermore, 
workers can benefit from some employer-based 
benefits within certain time limit over the 
unemployment spell (e.g. supplementary health 
insurance within 7 months of unemployment) 
which, however, effectively increase severance 
payments as well as net replacement rates. The 
PES must validate the procedure and can make 
interjection within 15 days. The agreement has 
also created a new temporary contract up to 36 
months, on an experimental basis for a period of 
five years, for carrying out a defined assignment 
involving executives and engineers. The contract is 
subject to sectoral agreements and cannot be used 
in order to deal with a temporary increase in the 
workload. Finally, it has lengthened the probation 
period for permanent contracts between 1 and 4 
months. 
(95) The CNE was challenged by the Paris Court of Appeal and 
all CNE's reclassified as open-ended contracts).  
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5.1.2. Working time and work organization (96)   
France has intermediate incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, low incidence of 
atypical work, intermediate work intensity and 
irregularity, relatively low incidence of rotation 
and team work and relatively high work autonomy 
and complexity. In France, close to 40% of 
workers do not have fixed starting and finishing 
time (at the EU27 average). Related, for 54% of 
persons in employment working hours are set by 
the company with no possibility of changes. This 
indicates that flexibility of working time 
arrangements is also close to the EU27 average 
(56%), however considerably lower than in 
Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) and Denmark 
(41%). About 36% of persons in employment can 
adapt working hours within certain limits or 
determine working hours entirely by themselves, 
compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% in the 
Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. Furthermore, 
25% of workers do not work the same number of 
days every week (also at the EU 27 average). The 
incidence of atypical work, in particular working 
in the night, in the evening and in the weekend is 
among the lowest in the EU. Work complexity as 
measured by the share of workers perceiving their 
work to involve complex tasks is close to the 
EU27 average (57%). The ability of workers to 
influence the order of tasks, methods of work and 
speed or rate of work is above the EU27 average 
indicating relatively high work autonomy. Finally, 
team work and rotation of tasks are less 
widespread than in EU27 average. Workers have 
more autonomy in their division of tasks when 
involved in tasks rotation than in teams.  
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, France 
has the highest share of companies characterized 
by high flexibility which is driven in particular by 
companies' operational needs (29%) – such as 
unusual working hours and non-standard 
employment contracts. This company type is also 
the most prevalent relative to the EU average 
distribution of companies. In 2002, France had 
(96) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
about the EU15 average share of companies 
organized as "learning organization" (almost 38%) 
which are associated with high learning and 
problem solving and high job satisfaction. 
Despite the legal workweek of 35 hours, a large 
proportion of workers (80%) worked more than 35 
hours per week in 2007, up from 2003 entirely due 
to an increase in proportion of workers working 
more than 40 hours per week, (97)  but "the annual 
hours worked per employee is among the lowest in 
the OECD" (OECD, 2009). The implementation of 
the 35-hour week has been in practice widely 
eased since the beginning, while recent reform 
measures have further eased working time 
arrangements. In 2004 the possibility was 
introduced to adapt, and were necessary waive, in 
the form of majority agreements, the stipulation of 
sector agreements on working hours to the specific 
needs of each business. To increase labour supply 
on intensive margin, the so-called TEPA law 
implemented in 2007 introduced a tax break on 
overtime work (additional hours worked are 
exempt from social security contributions paid by 
employee and income tax) and increased overtime 
premiums in firms with less than 20 employees 
from 10% to 25%. More recently, with a view to 
ease working time management, the Law on 
‘social democracy and working time reform’ of 
July 2008 gave directly to companies the 
possibility to negotiate the amount of overtime, 
which had so far been set at sectoral level, and 
introduced the 'annualisation of working time', 
allowing for variations in the weekly working time 
according to workload peaks. Overtime agreed by 
individual employees beyond the previous quota of 
220 hours a year now have an upper limit of 405 
hours and no longer require authorisation from the 
labour inspectorate. Time off in lieu is no longer 
mandatory for overtime exceeding the 220-hour 
annual quota.  
5.1.3. Wage setting and bargaining systems 
In France there are three levels of pay bargaining, 
namely multi-industry, industry wide and company 
level bargaining. Agreements at a lower level 
cannot be less favourable that those at a higher 
level. Originally, the industry-wide level was the 
most widespread, being the one at which collective 
agreements were negotiated. Overall coverage by 
(97) See EEAG Report, 2009, Chapter 4. 
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agreements has greatly increased in the last 
decade, with 97.7% of employees in the non-
agricultural private sector covered by sectoral 
collective agreements in 2004. However, the real 
situation is increasingly different, with a mounting 
importance of company level bargaining over 
industry-wide collective agreements. Apart from 
workers who are paid close to the minimum wage, 
for whom pay is to a large extent controlled by 
government decisions regarding the level of 
minimum pay, social contributions and overtime, 
company level agreements are becoming decisive 
in the area of pay for all other employees. Various 
legislative changes have encouraged this shift.  
The results of pay bargaining at company level 
vary significantly depending on company size and 
qualification levels. The trend towards 
individualization of pay and the development of 
non-wage remuneration, such as participation and 
profit-sharing, has also contributed to the increased 
fragmentation of pay bargaining. The loss of 
industry-wide solidarity has led the authorities to 
periodically initiate and facilitate multi-industry 
negotiations. It is indeed with the aim of reviving 
national cross-sector collective bargaining that the 
Law on Modernising Social Dialogue of January 
2007 provides for compulsory consultations on any 
proposed reforms in the field of industrial 
relations, employment and vocational training, 
where the social partners can indicate whether or 
not they intend to embark on negotiations and how 
much time they need in order to reach an 
agreement. 
5.1.4. Tax and benefit systems (98) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
about 1.3% of GDP (1% at the EU27 average) and 
reflect a high benefit coverage of unemployed 
persons (almost 70 out of 100 persons wanting to 
work receive unemployment benefits, 44 at the 
EU27 average). Net replacement rate at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell is high for 
low wage person (70%, 67% at the EU27 average) 
(98) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
and declines only gradually, reaching 46% after 5 
years. Initial net replacement rates for average 
wage person and one earner couple are somewhat 
lower, though above the EU27 average (66% and 
67%, respectively; 59% and 67% at the EU27 
average) and they decline to 31% and 58% after 5 
years. Tax wedges are among the highest in the 
EU, at 44% for the low wage person (37% at the 
EU27 average) and at 49% for the average wage 
person (41% at the EU27 average). However, tax 
wedge for a low wage person saw a substantial 
decline over 2001-2007 (by 3p.p.), in particular as 
a result of a strong reduction in social security 
contributions paid by employers. The interaction 
of taxes with a withdrawal of benefits produces 
high financial disincentives to work, in particular 
for a single parent and a spouse in a jobless 
household with two children. However, 
unemployment and inactivity traps were reduced 
across the board over 2001-2007, notably for low 
wage earners. The August 2008 law also loosed 
the eligibility criteria for accessing unemployment 
benefits from six to four months. 
To tackle high inactivity trap, in particular 
disincentives to take up work among recipients of 
social assistance, France introduced a reform of 
welfare system, replacing the previous social 
assistance RMI with the new Revenu de solidarité 
active (RSA) scheme. This measure, introduced on 
an experimental basis in 2007, was expanded 
nationwide in June 2009. It is a form of earned 
income tax credit for low wage earners and aims to 
reduce inactivity traps. The new RSA system 
allows workers to combine wages with social 
assistance which is gradually reduced as hours 
worked increase. In this way, this reform increases 
incentives to work. The reform is also 
complemented by reinforced personalised support 
services for job searching and by the introduction 
of a single subsidized job creation scheme, the so-
called contrat unique d'insertion (CUI). 
Furthermore, making some benefits means tested 
decreases the inactivity trap even further. While 
this reform creates incentives to take up part time 
work at the minimum wage it also provides 
incentives to reduce the hours worked paid at the 
minimum wage from full time work to part time 
work with an uncertain net effect on hours 
worked. (99)   Furthermore, a potential increase in 
labour supply (hours worked) may not be absorbed 
(99) See EEAG Report, 2009, Chapter 4. 
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due to high minimum wage which poses a 
constraint on labour demand. (100)    
The share of population receiving welfare benefits 
(old age and early retirement, sickness and 
disability and unemployment benefits) is among 
the highest in the EU (data for 1999). Implicit tax 
on continued work is very high.  
Unemployment insurance (101)   
Eligibility conditions 
Eligibility for unemployment insurance is based on 
recent employment history. There is a minimum 
requirement to have worked in contributory 
employment for at least 6 months (182 days) 
during the previous 22 months (applicable since 
2003 - before this the condition was for 4 months 
(122 days) in 18 months). Benefits are normally 
paid only to persons under the age of 60. However, 
persons aged between 60 and 64 may be entitled to 
benefit if they do not have adequate contribution 
history to be entitled to a full pension. Part-time 
workers must have worked at least 507 hours 
during the 335 days preceding the end of the 
employment contract. Seasonal workers must have 
worked at least 182 days during 2 of the last 3 
years. Temporary workers must have worked at 
least 910 hours in the last 22 months.  
Replacement rates 
The amounts of benefit are linked to the previous 
level of earnings from contributory employment.  
40.4% of reference daily wages + 10.46EUR/day 
or 57.4% of the reference daily wages within the 
limit of 75% of the reference daily wages. For 
part-time workers all fixed parts of the benefit (i.e. 
minimum benefit and fixed daily allowances) are 
reduced in relation to hours worked compared to 
full-time work. For seasonal workers - either 
people working only part of the year (e.g. on 
summer camps) or people who have been 
unemployed at the same period of the year for the 
last 3 years - the gross salary and the fixed part of 
benefit or the minimum benefit are reduced in 
accordance with the duration of employment 
(100) See EEAG Report, 2009, Chapter 4. 
(101) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
within the last 12 months. For example, a person 
who has worked 8 months over the last 12 months 
will have these parts of the benefit reduced by one 
third. There is a 7 day waiting period from the time 
of registration until benefits start. 
Benefit duration  
Unemployment insurance is payable for 7 to 36 
months depending on the length of time that the 
person has been insured and on age: 
• 7 months for persons who have worked in 
contributory employment for 6 months in 
previous 22 months 
• 12 months for persons who have worked in 
contributory employment for 12 months in 
previous 20 months 
• 23 months for persons who have worked in 
contributory employment for 16 months in 
previous 26 months 
• 36 months for persons over 50 who have 
worked in contributory employment for 27 
months in previous 36 months. 
Only periods of employment that have not 
previously been used for eligibility to benefit can 
be taken into account to determine the duration of 
former employment on the basis of which the 
duration of benefits is to be calculated.  
For those unemployed persons who have 
exhausted their entitlement to, or who are not 
entitled to, insurance benefits, different types of 
allowance exist, all paid as flat-rate benefits, up to 
an income threshold. In case of income above this 
but below the limit for means testing, the 
difference only is paid. There are three different 
allowances: a) the Specific Solidarity Allowance 
(ASS) for those who have exhausted their rights to 
unemployment benefit or for people aged 50 years 
or more who may opt either for unemployment 
benefit or solidarity allowance. The ASS amounts 
to € 442.20 /month for 6 months renewable, 
subject to reassessment of means and continuation 
of active job-search. In order to qualify for this 
allowance it is necessary to prove 5 years of 
employment during the previous 10 years; b) the 
Temporary waiting allowance (ATA) of € 
191 
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
311.40/month for maximum 12 months, which 
replaces the former Allowance for special 
categories of job seekers (Allocation d’insertion - 
AI) for persons who find themselves in a situation 
where they are not entitled to unemployment 
benefit, either because they have not worked, not 
worked enough or have not yet contributed; c) a 
retirement-equivalent benefit (Allocation 
équivalent retraite - AER) for those who prove 
160 old-age pension contribution quarters. The 
AER amounts to maximum 968 Euro/month and 
can be paid for 12 months renewable. 
5.1.5. Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
relatively high (about 0.7% of GDP, 0.5% at the 
EU27 average) and most of them are spent on 
training (40%) and direct job creation (30%). More 
than 50% of persons wanting to work are included 
in regular activation (36% at the EU27 average). 
Public expenditures on labour market policy 
services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditures of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are relatively high, 
at 0.22% of GDP (0.19% at the EU27 
average). (102)  
Since 2009 the public employment service has 
been reorganized as one-stop shop (Pôle employ) 
as the unemployment insurance agency 
(ASSEDIC) and an organization in charge of 
placement services for job seekers (ANPE) were 
merged. The August 2008 law strengthens the job 
counselling of the PES adjusted to individual 
needs. In particular, on the basis of individual 
plans respecting personal characteristics and job 
preferences a "reasonable offer of employment" is 
prepared which can be refused at most twice 
otherwise sanctions apply. Over unemployment 
spell, however job preferences which enter into 
preparation of a "reasonable offer of employment" 
get looser.  
(102) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(103) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Following the reorganisation of the public 
employment service, a new national organisation 
(France Emploi) will be a) responsible for the 
registration as unemployed and the demand for 
benefits b) contact point for the job seekers; c) 
assist job seekers in defining an individualised 
employment plan that take into account their 
personal qualifications and work experience;  The 
individualised employment plan will identify a 
“reasonable offer of employment”. A person on 
unemployment insurance may not turn down more 
than two such offers without having his or her 
benefits suspended for two months. Overtime 
jobseekers are expected to revise downward their 
pay expectations and to broaden their geographical 
area of interest. A new social agreement on 
unemployment insurance lowers to four months 
(instead of six) the qualifying period for 
entitlement to benefits and foresees a single, 
uniform process, which improves the transparency 
and fairness of the benefit system. The agreement 
broadens the conditions of access to 
unemployment benefits in return for a cut in 
employers’ contributions if the unemployment 
insurance system is in surplus.   
(103) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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5.1.6. Lifelong learning (104)   
France scores intermediate in terms of human 
capital investment, implying average 
employability of workers. (105)  Participation in 
lifelong learning is relatively low regardless of 
economic activity, age and education, though it 
increased since 2000.  
France spent about 5.7% of GDP on education in 
2005 (5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in Denmark, 
around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). The 
educational attainment of adults nearly coincides 
with the one at the EU15 average, though with 
small deviations from the EU27 average: the 
largest share of adults have medium education 
(42%; 47% at the EU27 average) while the shares 
of low educated and high educated persons are 
closer to each other, at 31% and 27% respectively 
(29% and 24% at the EU27 average, respectively). 
The share of early school leavers (young persons 
with at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training) is below the EU27 
average (12% versus 15% respectively). 
Despite of an increase in the participation in LLL 
(by 5pp since 2000), employability of workers may 
be hampered as only 8% of workers participate in 
LLL (10% at the EU27 average, 33% in Sweden, 
29% in Denmark, 27% in the UK). Participation in 
LLL is relatively low regardless of educational 
attainment, though it is 10pp higher for workers 
with a high education (13%; 19% at the EU27 
average) than for workers with a low education 
(3%; 4% at the EU27 average). Also participation 
in LLL for employed and unemployed at 8% is 
relatively low (11% and 9%, respectively at the 
EU27 average) as well as for inactive at 5% (7% at 
the EU27 average). Finally, employability of older 
workers tends to be the lowest as only 3% of older 
workers participate in LLL (5% at the EU27 
average). 
CVT is considerably more important in France. 
The share of firms providing CVT courses is 
among the highest in the EU (about 70% compared 
(104) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(105) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores France close to the EU27 average 
in terms of on-the-job employability as measured by 
learning, training and task rotation. 
to almost 50% at the EU27 average) and they 
spend on average 2.3% of total labour costs on 
CVT (1.6% at the EU27 average). Also 
participation of workers in CVT courses is 
relatively high (above 45% compared to one third 
on average in the EU27) and they spent on average 
13 hours on CVT courses in 2005 (9 hours at the 
EU27 average).  
Various attempts have been made in recent years 
to improve the training system. The inter-sectoral 
agreement of September 2003 provided for the 
creation of an individual training entitlement, as 
well as for introduction of a "professionalisation 
contract" to promote the integration of young 
people and the reintegration of job seekers, and for 
improvements in the lifelong information and 
guidance systems. The Individual Right to 
Training (DIF) in particular, confirmed by Law of 
May 2004 and further extended to the public sector 
employees, aims to be one of the career tools for 
employed people. Employees with over a year of 
service in a company benefit from a credit of 20 
hours training per year (pro-rata equivalent for 
part-time employees) which can be built up over 
six years. This credit enables employees to receive 
training during or outside working hours, in 
accordance with the provisions of the relevant 
sector-wide or company agreement. For hours of 
training received during working hours, the 
employee receives the normal salary, whereas 
hours of training received outside of working 
hours are paid at a rate of 50% of the net salary. 
The employee must take the initiative to 
implement his or her right to training although this 
must be covered by a formal agreement with the 
employer. Following the agreement of 2003, a 
large scale programme for the improvement, 
development and modernisation of apprenticeship 
was also launched in 2004, with the objective of 
raising the number of apprentices to 500,000 by 
2009, and providing for assistance to replace 
employees on training leave to facilitate the 
development of training in SMEs. The 
apprenticeship system was further developed in 
2005, with the involvement of the State, Regions 
of trade organisations.  
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In January 2009 the social partners reached a new 
agreement on vocational training, professional 
development and career security. Among its 
provisions: a) the establishment of a career 
security fund, to which labour and management 
would contribute equally, to support training for 
job seekers and less skilled workers; b) the 
possibility for the unemployed to retain individual 
training rights acquired in a previous job;  
c) an individual education leave, allowing workers 
to take training for up to one year, leading to a 
qualification or a diploma; d) the introduction of 
training to develop a “socle de competences”, a 
basic set of knowledge and skills (teamwork, 
mastery of computer tools, competence in English, 
etc.) to facilitate adaptation and transition between 
jobs throughout a person's working life. 
6. GERMANY 
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6.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
6.1.1.  Employment protection legislation (106) 
According to the OECD indicator of employment 
protection, Germany has relatively strict 
employment protection legislation (EPL) for 
regular contracts (2.8), in particular due to relevant 
procedural inconveniences, with a high uncertainty 
concerning court ruling and the length of 
procedures, despite recent reform measures. EPL 
for collective dismissals is also high (3.8) 
involving a strict definition of collective 
dismissals, additional notification procedures, 
other special costs and delays.  
Germany managed to introduce only partial (two 
tier) reforms over the last 20 years, which have 
lead to increased flexibility at the margin. In 
particular, the use of fixed-term and temporary 
agency work was gradually liberalized, resulting in 
relatively low EPL for temporary contracts (2).  
This has contributed to a strong increase in 
atypical employment. (107)   The first two ‘Hartz 
Laws’ (entered into force in January 2003) 
promoted the use of temporary agency work and 
supported the recourse to mini-jobs (108)  offered 
to the unemployed by the local PES and to self-
employment, the latter with the introduction of the 
so-called 'Ich-AG's' (Me-Inc.) state subsidy for 
setting-up a one-person company. Under the new 
regulations, publicly-funded personnel service 
agencies (PSA) were created to employ 
unemployed people and hire them out on a short-
term basis. 
As a general criterion, protection against 
individual dismissal is applicable only if the 
worker is employed in an establishment regularly 
employing more than 10 employees and has been 
working there without interruption for longer than 
6 months (which is the length of the trial 
(106) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(107) See OECD, 2006, Economic surveys, Germany.  
(108) The mini/midi jobs are offered to the unemployed by the 
local PES against a small hourly compensation. They were 
introduced to supplement welfare benefits without 
replacing the jobs offered on the labour market.  
period). (109)  Employment relationships which do 
not meet these criteria can be terminated by the 
employer without any justifying reason. 
Otherwise, the employment relationship may be 
terminated by the employer with valid legal effect 
only by way of three exceptions: dismissal on 
grounds of personal capability; dismissal on 
grounds of conduct; redundancy. Dismissals in 
cases where the employee can be retained in 
another capacity within the same establishment or 
enterprise, and redundancy dismissals where due 
account has not been taken of “social 
considerations” (e.g. seniority, age, family 
situation) are deemed to be unfair. The notice 
periods vary according to the length of service and 
are respectively of 4 weeks, 1 month or 7 months, 
after 9 months, 4 years or 20 years of service with 
the same employer. If a dismissal is based on 
business needs or compelling operational reasons, 
the employee has a right to a severance payment if 
he does not bring his case to the court within 3 
weeks. The amount of the severance payment is a 
half month pay for each year of tenure. Following 
unjustified dismissal, a reinstatement is possible, 
although rarely taken up by the employee 
concerned. Compensation up to 12 months, 
depending on the length of service, may be 
requested for by employees or employers during 
court action. It can be extended to 15 months for 
employees aged above 50 with at least 15 years of 
job tenure, and to 18 months for employees aged 
above 55 with at least 20 years of job tenure. In 
some cases, additional liability can be requested 
for wage losses from the expiry date of the notice 
to the conclusion of the court hearing. 
In establishments where there are work councils or 
staff councils, protection against individual 
dismissal is supplemented by collective-law 
provisions. Under these provisions, the employer 
must inform the works council or staff council of a 
proposed dismissal and give it the opportunity of 
stating its position on the matter. If the employer 
pronounces a dismissal before the council has 
responded, or before one week in case of ordinary 
(109) The threshold number of employees above which dismissal 
protection legislation is binding was raised from 5 to 10 
employees in 2003 with regard to new hirings (apprentices 
are not counted and part-time employees are only counted 
proportionally). Employees in companies with more than 
five but not more than 10 employees will keep their 
statutory protection if employed before 1 January 2004.  
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dismissals with notice (three days in case of 
summary dismissals), the dismissal is invalid, 
irrespective of whether or not it is lawful in other 
respects. The works council or staff council has the 
right to object to a dismissal if it contravenes one 
of the agreed company guidelines on personnel 
policy, if the employee could continue to be 
employed in a vacant job in the same 
establishment or another establishment of the same 
company, or if re-training or further training can 
be offered by the employer or an amendment of 
the contract of employment would make continued 
employment possible. An objection by the works 
council or staff council has no direct effect on the 
validity of a dismissal. However, if a dismissed 
employee applies to the courts for protection 
against dismissal, an objection issued by the works 
council or staff council, if considered justified by 
the court, means that without any further 
assessment of the interests involved the court rules 
the dismissal to be unfair. An objection also 
secures the right for the employee to continued 
employment during dismissal proceedings. 
In case of collective dismissals, establishments 
employing more than 20 employees must follow a 
special procedure, which is mainly intended to 
ensure that the employment authorities are given 
early warning of impending collective dismissals 
and hence have enough time to make arrangements 
to avoid dismissals and place employees in other 
jobs. Under German law, collective dismissal is a 
situation where, within a given period of 30 days, 
the employment relationships of a relatively large 
number of employees are actually terminated by 
the employer by way of ordinary termination with 
notice. The precise number of dismissals necessary 
to meet the definition depends on the size of the 
establishment; the figure lies between around 10 
and 25 percent of the workforce for medium-sized 
establishments and decreases with increasing size 
of establishment (5+ workers in firms with 21-59 
employees; 10% or 25+ workers in firms with 60-
499; 30+ workers in firms with 500+ employees). 
The dismissal of at least 30 employees is always 
deemed to constitute collective dismissal.  An 
employer who is planning collective dismissals 
must inform the works council at an early stage 
and consult with it on whether and how the 
measures envisaged can be avoided or mitigated. 
Before actually proceeding with collective 
dismissals, the employer must also notify the local 
PES; dismissals may not take effect until a period 
of one month has elapsed after this notification. 
The PES can reduce this period or extend it to a 
maximum of two months, during which time it can 
authorize the introduction of short-time working 
arrangements. The 2003 reform operated a 
simplification of selection criteria to be considered 
by the enterprise in case of dismissals for 
operational reasons (now limited to disability of 
the employee, job tenure, age and presence of 
dependants in the household). Employees with 
special skills and employees necessary to maintain 
a well-balanced structure of the workforce can be 
excluded from dismissal. The possibility was also 
introduced for employees facing dismissal for 
operational reasons to choose between either 
seeking legal action against the dismissal or 
accepting a severance payment, equal to half 
month pay for each year of tenure.  
Temporary contracts 
Fixed-term contracts can be concluded without any 
justification being required for a maximum term of 
up to 2 years, or up to 4 years (since 2004) for 
newly created enterprises during the first four 
years after start-up. Four renewals are possible in 
total. Nevertheless, successive fixed-term contracts 
with objective reason can be concluded without 
any restrictions if there is an objective reason 
justifying each successive contract. With 
employees over 52 years of age and unemployed 
for more than 4 months or who participated in a 
public employment measure for more than 4 
months, fixed-term contracts are possible for up to 
60 months. Employers are obliged to inform with 
fixed-term employees about vacant permanent 
jobs, to allow them to participate in training 
measures and inform employee representatives 
about the proportion of fixed-term employment 
relationships within the company. 
The assignment period for temporary agency work 
(TWA) was extended stepwise until 2004, when 
the upper limit was completely abolished, so that  
the duration of agency work is now unlimited. 
TWA employment is allowed for all types of work, 
with the exception of constriction industry. 
However, the set-up of TWA agencies is 
cumbersome as it requires the authorisation by 
labour authority and regular reporting obligations. 
Temporary agency workers are entitled to equal 
pay and conditions with permanent workers in 
user-company, while collective bargaining over 
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their terms and conditions are promoted. The 
principle of equal treatment can indeed be waived 
as far as the employees are protected by applicable 
collective agreements in the TWA sector. 
6.1.2. Working time and work organization (110)   
Germany has intermediate incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, relatively low work 
intensity and irregularity, relatively low incidence 
of rotation and team work, low work autonomy 
and high work complexity. In Germany, about 
35% of workers do not have fixed starting and 
finishing time (almost 40% at the EU27 average). 
For 58% of persons in employment working hours 
are set by the company with no possibility of 
changes. Relative to the EU27 average (at 56%) 
this indicates somewhat flexible working time 
arrangements, though they are less flexible than in 
Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) and Denmark 
(41%). About 30% of persons in employment can 
adapt working hours within certain limits or 
determine working hours entirely by themselves, 
compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% in the 
Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. Furthermore, 
slightly more than 25% of workers (at the EU27 
average) do not work the same number of days 
every week. Atypical work, in particular working 
in the night, in the evening and on Sundays is low. 
Work complexity is among the highest in the EU 
as more than 70% of workers perceive their work 
to involve complex tasks (60% at the EU27 
average) while work autonomy as measured by the 
ability of workers to change the order of tasks and 
speed or rate of work is low. Finally, team work 
and rotation of tasks is somewhat above the EU27 
average, as well as the autonomy of teams and 
workers involved in tasks rotation in their division 
of tasks.  
In terms of practices to organize working time 
flexibly, Germany has the highest share of 
companies with intermediate flexibility in 
particular with a high incidence of overtime (23% 
of all companies). Relative to the EU average 
distribution of companies, Germany also has a 
(110) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
high share of companies with intermediate 
flexibility, characterized by a high take-up of part-
time work and a high incidence of unusual 
working hours which help these companies to cope 
with short-term (within a day or week) variability 
of the workload. Furthermore, Germany has a 
relatively high share of companies with a high 
flexibility which aims at satisfying workers' work-
life balance needs and is characterized by high 
levels of flexible working hours, long-term leave 
arrangements, overtime and parental leave.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s an increasing use 
of firm-level agreements (opening clauses from 
multi-firm collective contracts, single-firm 
collective agreements, contracts not covered by 
collective agreements) has contributed to the 
increased incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements. The 2000 Act on part-time work 
provided for great flexibility in the recourse to 
part-time work. Employers must now enable 
employees to switch from full-time to part-time 
work and employees are entitled to reduce their 
working time. Part-time workers requesting an 
increase of their working time or a transfer to their 
former full-time work are to be given preference 
when suitable vacancies are being filled unless 
their requests are contrary to urgent operational 
requirements, or conflict with working time 
requests of other workers enjoying higher priority. 
Collective agreements at sectoral level have 
significantly boosted working time flexibility over 
recent years, with measures such as the 
introduction of 'long-term working time accounts' 
in the chemical industry in 2003, allowing 
employees to save working time 'credits' over a 
period longer than 12 months, or the extension of 
existing individual working-time accounts in the 
Volkswagen plants in 2004, or the reduction and 
extension of working time, with and without wage 
compensation, in the metalworking sector also 
since 2004. 
In the case of temporary production shortfalls, 
companies can also apply for short-term benefits 
for their workers.  The short-time allowance spans 
from 60% to 67 % of monthly earnings and is paid 
in proportion to the duration of non-productive 
times. Employers can apply for the allowance 
when the work-cut would affect at least 1/3 of the 
employees and would incur a gross salary loss of 
at least 10%. Normally, the benefit is terminated 
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within six months. Exceptions are allowed up to 24 
months. In this case workers can be placed in other 
companies by the labour office. During the 
financial crisis that has hit the German labour 
market since the last quarter of 2008 exceptional 
conditions were temporarily set for the use of 
short-time work schemes (see the section on the 
short term response to the crisis). 
6.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining systems 
In Germany, the coverage of collectively agreed 
wages is much higher than the share of union 
members in the workforce. The collective 
agreement is legally binding only when the 
employee is member of the trade union concerned 
and the employing enterprise is member of the 
employers association, or it is party in the wage 
agreement. Typically, the contract is extended by 
individual agreement between the employers 
concerned and those employees that are not 
member of the trade union. The collective 
agreement can also be declared generally binding 
by the government. In this case it would apply to 
all employees and enterprises irrespective of their 
membership in the trade union and association, 
respectively. In practice, this implies that the 
government can fix sector-specific minimum 
wages. Wage agreements also continue to hold 
until they expire even if the enterprise leaves the 
employers’ association. Thereby, enterprises which 
are member of employers' association have no 
possibility to adjust wages to firm-specific 
conditions unless an opt-out clause is explicitly 
agreed in the collective agreement. 
Despite all this, the degree of flexibility embedded 
in the system has considerably improved over 
time. Social partners have increasingly agreed on 
including flexible elements in collective 
agreements. Opt-out clauses have gained a 
growing role since the mid-1990s. In 2005, 75% of 
establishments covered by collective bargaining 
made use of one or more opening clauses, aimed at 
ensuring the level of employment or the survival of 
the firm against concessions on pay or working 
conditions. Only a small share of these open 
clauses addresses basic pay, most of them aiming 
at a reduction of labour costs through one-time 
measures or changes in working time. Reportedly, 
breaches of contracts have also become more 
common, especially in East Germany. These 
developments have increased flexibility at the firm 
level, without substantially undermining the 
system of collective wage bargaining.  
6.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (111) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
among the highest in the EU (1.6% of GDP 
compared to 1% at the EU27 average) as a result 
of a relatively high unemployment rate, including a 
high long term unemployment rate, as well as a 
high benefit coverage of unemployed persons 
(there are more unemployment benefit recipients 
than persons wanting to work; at the EU27 
average, about 44 persons out of 100 persons 
wanting to work are recipients of unemployment 
benefits). Initial net replacement rates for low 
wage and average wage persons are at 59% (at 
66% and 59% at the EU27) and for one earner 
couple with children at 65% (at 67% at the EU27). 
After 5 years, if topped up with social assistance, 
they are at 47%, 34% and 60%, respectively.  
With the so-called Hartz III Reform, cuts in the 
duration of unemployment benefits were 
introduced with effect from 2006, (112) and job 
acceptance requirements for eligibility to 
unemployment benefits tightened and enforced 
more strictly. Recipients of unemployment benefits 
are now obliged to accept any legal job offer, 
regardless of the level of pay. If a recipient rejects 
a job, he/she will have to face sanctions in the 
form of a reduction of unemployment benefits for 
a limited period of time. 
A set of measures for the activation of the 
unemployed, and in particular the long-term 
unemployed, were also included under the Hartz 
IV reform package (December 2003). As of 
January 2005, the wage-related unemployment 
assistance scheme and the flat-rate social 
assistance scheme were merged into the means-
(111) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
(112) Prior to 2006, 12 up to 32 month of full unemployment pay 
(60-67% of previous salary) were followed by 
unemployment benefits of 53-57% of the last net salary 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe). From February 2006 on, reception of 
the full unemployment pay is restricted to 12 months in 
general and 18 months for over-55-year-olds. 
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tested Unemployment Benefit II Programme, 
Arbeitslosengeld 2 - ALG2), which is conditional 
on job search. This reform involved substantial 
cuts in the unemployment benefits, approximately 
at the level of social assistance. However, it 
produced little improvements in work incentives 
for unemployed who exhaust their eligibility 
period to unemployment benefits, as they are 
eligible to two-year long supplementary benefits 
paying, in the first year, two thirds of the 
difference between the level of ALG2 and former 
unemployment benefit, and, in the second year, 
half of this amount. Furthermore, while this reform 
entailed a cut in benefits for a majority of 
unemployment assistance recipients, some social 
assistance recipients experienced an increase in 
benefits (for instance, the supplementary and one-
off benefits, which were not paid automatically in 
the old system, are now integrated into ALG2) and 
their incentives to work may therefore be reduced. 
Recipients of ALG2 can also temporarily (for 6 
months) benefit from employment schemes in the 
secondary labour market such as work opportunity 
schemes. In particular, a new category of low-
paying jobs - the so-called 'mini-jobs' and 'midi 
jobs' - was introduced to supplement welfare 
benefits. The mini/midi jobs, which aim to test 
work availability of welfare recipients and 
facilitate their access to the primary labour market, 
are offered to the unemployed by the local PES 
against a small hourly compensation. Since they 
are treated preferentially in terms of taxation, may 
increase the overall income of ALG2 recipients 
beyond their potential market wage. (113) 
Therefore, ALG2 recipients benefiting from 
mini/midi jobs may face disincentives to take up 
work on the primary labour market. A step in the 
direction of bringing welfare recipients back to 
work was undertaken in 2005 when unemployment 
benefit withdrawal rates were reduced, allowing 
welfare recipients to combine income from the 
primary labour market with benefits up to a certain 
income, dependent on the family situation.  
(113) See OECD, Economic surveys: Germany, 2006. 
The tax wedge in Germany is among the highest in 
the EU and is at 47% for the low wage person 
(37% at the EU27 average) and at 52% for the 
average wage person (41% at the EU27 average). 
Interaction of taxes and benefits produces high 
financial disincentives to take up work. In 
particular, as out-of work benefits are not taxed, 
labour taxation contributes considerably to 
inactivity and unemployment trap. Marginal 
effective tax rates are high for all family types with 
children, in particular for a second earner in a 
household. For the latter, financial disincentives 
largely stem from a joint taxation with the first 
earner, which generates high marginal effective tax 
rate when second earner takes up work and its 
income reduces the so-called "splitting advantage". 
For the same reason, second earner faces a high 
low-wage trap, which explains relatively low 
number of hours worked of married women. 
Furthermore, preferential taxation of mini-jobs 
explains a high take-up rate of these jobs by 
second earners. For women, also non financial 
incentives to work, such as lack of childcare 
provision, matter and they tend to reduce their 
participation decision and hours worked.  
Past reform measures have also aimed at 
increasing incentives to work of older workers, and 
have indeed contributed to considerably increasing 
the employment rate of older workers over the last 
years, helping Germany to reach the corresponding 
Lisbon target in 2007. Yet, the initial reduction of 
unemployment benefit duration for older workers 
above 58 from 32 to 18 months and a uniform 
imposition of 12 months of unemployment benefit 
duration for other workers in 2006 were partly 
reversed in 2007. In particular, the unemployment 
benefit duration was raised from 18 to 24 months 
for older workers above 58 and from 12 to 15 
month for workers in the age 50-54 years; however 
this reform was accompanied by job search 
requirements and subsidies to wage costs. 
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Unemployment insurance (114)  
Following recent reforms (Hartz 2) these are the 
new main benefit features of unemployment 
benefit system. 
Eligibility conditions 
To be eligible for benefits, job seekers must have 
done 12 months of contributory employment in the 
past 2 years. Income from any part-time work (less 
than 15 hours per week) reduces entitlement to 
unemployment benefit. An amount of €165 is not 
taken into account. Other income or assets are 
neither taken into account. 
Replacement rates 
Benefits correspond to 60% of net earnings (67% 
with children). Benefits are based on the salary, on 
the fiscal category figuring in the tax card and on 
the existence or not of children. The earnings taken 
as reference are the average daily wage during the 
last year up to a ceiling of benefits of €5250 per 
month in the old Länder and €4550 per month in 
the new Länder. 
(114) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
Benefit duration 
Unemployment benefits are payable for 12-36 
months depending on age and duration of 
contributory employment. 
6.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
at the EU27 average (0.5 % of GDP). Almost 30 
out of 100 persons wanting to work benefit from 
regular activation (36 persons at the EU27 
average). Reform measures in the last years 
reversed the structure of active labour market 
policies towards more training and job search 
assistance while traditional active labour market 
policies such as large scale work provision 
schemes were cut. Therefore, about 55% of 
expenditures are devoted to training, followed by 
start up incentives (16%), direct job creation (13%) 
and employment incentives (12%). Also, public 
expenditures on labour market policy services 
(which cover the costs of providing services for 
jobseekers together with all other expenditures of 
the public employment services, including 
overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are among the 
highest in the EU, at 0.27% of GDP (0.19% at the 
EU27 average). (115) 
(115) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
Box 6.1: Description of the German joint taxation system
A specific factor at play in the German case is the system of joint taxation (Ehegattensplitting) whereby the 
income tax of a married couple is calculated by first applying the tax function to half the sum of the spouses’ 
income and then doubling the resulting tax amount. Thus, for married couples the income tax amount (on a 
given household income) is always the same, regardless of how the income is split between the two. This 
system results in a “splitting advantage”, equal to the difference in income tax payments compared with a 
non-married couple, which depends on the income distribution between husband and wife.3 The maximum 
tax advantage of joint taxation (with only one earner) is reached at a yearly household income of € 104 304 
and adds up to € 7 914 (referring to year 2006; Sachverständigenrat, 2007). The more the second-earner 
contributes to household income, the smaller is the gain from joint taxation vis-à-vis a non-married couple. 
In other words, the second-earner’s income has to offset the decrease in the splitting advantage before 
contributing to family net income. The marginal tax rate on second-earners thus is higher than for singles or 
in a system that taxes the individual and there is no fiscal incentive to distribute work more evenly among 
spouses. 
Source: OECD, Economic Surveys, 2008.  
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The Hartz III reform package introduced an 
institutional reform of the PES, giving more scope 
for outsourcing to private employment services, 
and intensifying counselling and individual 
support for jobseekers and services for employers. 
Under the new activation rules, job seekers have 
access to a standardised and integrated system of 
provision of welfare benefits and active assistance 
at local level, while benefit eligibility criteria are 
enforced more strictly. The long-term unemployed 
and young people under the age of 25 have access 
to special assistance in the form of training, 
employment or qualification measures, while, to 
encourage the long-term unemployed to take a first 
step back to work, a new category of low-paying 
jobs (so-called “1-euro-jobs") was introduced to 
supplement welfare benefits. The 10 regional 
headquarters of the Employment Agency were 
made responsible for planning and control, and the 
180 Labour Agencies given more powers. 
Integrated Labour Agency's Customer Centres 
were created, where employers are assigned 
permanent contact partners. As administering of 
ALG2 and designing of employment services for 
unemployment benefit recipients is divided 
between national and local governments, while the 
Federal Labour Office is responsible for financing 
of ALG2, their efficient interaction in achieving 
policy goals to avoid potential perverse effects is 
essential. (116)  
Various other targeted labour market policies were 
also introduced during the last decade (e.g. 
benefits towards employment promotion and other 
wage subsidies, in-work benefits notably in the 
form of wage-supplementing payment for older 
workers, there including the "work opportunities" 
initiative with top-up compensation - the 1-euro-
jobs - available to long-term unemployed and older 
unemployed for up to three years, publicly funded 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
(116) For example: (1) as municipalities and welfare institutions 
obtain a transfer from the Federal Labour Office if they 
offer WOs, they might have an interest in keeping WO 
workers on their scheme rather than fostering their 
transition into the primary labour market (2) Given that the 
Federal Labour Office is responsible for the financing 
ALG2, the municipalities may have an incentive to shift 
costs by classifying persons as being able to work who 
would otherwise obtain municipal social assistance 
benefits. See OECD, Economic surveys: Germany, 2006. 
employment for the long-term unemployed), to 
improve the integration of long-term unemployed 
persons and of specific target groups such as the 
young, low-skilled and older workers. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(117)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
The registration as unemployed is tantamount to 
the application for the unemployment benefit and 
separate application is not required. The benefit is 
paid from the date of the registration, while 
retroactive payment is not possible. Employees 
need to register immediately after receiving notice, 
otherwise they can be sanctioned. When 
unemployed clients are placed in a job the same 
day that they register, they are not eligible for 
benefit payment. An application for benefit is not 
refused or delayed when a job is immediately 
offered, but a benefit sanction can be applied if the 
person does not accept a reasonable job offer. 
Job-search requirements 
With the initial registration, the unemployed 
person declares his/her obligations to notify 
changes in the unemployment status. There are no 
regular set intervals at which an unemployed 
person must report, nor general minimum 
acceptable frequency of job-search activities. Yet, 
(117) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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the PES can at any time ask clients to come for an 
interview and review whether the preconditions for 
the benefits still exist. Upon the request of the 
PES, unemployed clients must provide evidence of 
their independent job-search activities. In addition, 
independent activities are discussed during each 
counselling interview. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
A job offer is supposed to be discussed with the 
jobseeker in person or by telephone before a direct 
referral takes place. Upon the request of an 
employer, pre-selection interviews are possible; 
this, however, usually is not the case. Of all 
advertised vacancies, 9 out of 10 are completely 
open, where applicants can directly contact the 
employer concerned (48% of all PES vacancies). 
Intensive interview  
The intensive interview takes place as early as 
possible – the current target being ten working 
days – after the first contact with the employment 
agency. Basically, an action plan is established in 
the first interview after initial registration. PES 
offices are required to draw up, together with the 
unemployed, an action plan ("individual 
integration agreement"), that details the office’s 
placement support and the client’s own placement 
efforts. The action plan is to be reviewed at the 
latest after six months for adults and three months 
for young persons. However, progress is reviewed 
during each further contact and the action plan is 
revised, if necessary. 
Referral to ALMPs 
Whether a jobless person is called upon to 
participate in ALMPs does not depend on the 
duration of unemployment but on the discretion of 
the PES counsellor. ALMPs are mainly used to 
avoid long-term unemployment and are laid down 
in an 'integration agreement' with the jobseeker. 
Refusal to participate entails suspension of benefit. 
Young school leavers can be provided by the PES 
with a place in a vocational training measure or 
various other measures. The Social Code 
prescribes particular target groups including long-
term unemployed, severely disabled persons, 
elderly who are difficult to place, people re-
entering the labour market, low-skilled persons 
and women. 
6.1.6.  Lifelong learning (118)   
Germany scores intermediate in terms of human 
capital investment, implying average 
employability of workers. (119)  The country spent 
relatively little on education in 2005 (4.5% 
compared to 5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in 
Denmark, around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). 
However, the education of adults is relatively 
good, with a low share of adults with low 
education (16%; 29% at the EU27 average), high 
share of adults with medium education (60%; 47% 
at the EU27 average) and the EU27 average share 
of adults with high education (24%). The share of 
early school leavers (young persons with at most 
lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training) is close to the EU27 average 
(14% versus 15% respectively). Among the 
specific joint objectives agreed by the federal 
government and the governments of the federal 
states at the education summit on 22 October 2008, 
is the allocation of 10 per cent of the German GDP 
to education and research by 2015 (currently 8.9 
per cent) and to halve the number of young 
persons who drop out of school or do not complete 
vocational training. 
Despite the relatively favourable educational 
structure of adults, employability of workers may 
be hampered as only 8% of workers participate in 
LLL (10% at the EU27 average, 33% in Sweden, 
29% in Denmark, 27% in the UK) with only a 
small increase since 2000 (by almost 3pp). 
Participation in LLL is relatively low regardless of 
educational attainment, though it is 10 pps. higher 
for workers with a high education (13%; 19% at 
the EU27 average) than for workers with a low 
education (3%; 4% at the EU27 average). 
Participation in LLL is also very low for 
unemployed (5%; 9% at the EU27 average), while 
participation of employed and inactive is the same 
at 8% (11% at the EU27 average and 7% at the 
EU27 average, respectively). Finally, 
employability of older workers tends to be the 
lowest as only 3% of older workers participate in 
LLL (5% at the EU27 average). 
(118) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(119) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Germany close to the EU27 
average in terms of on-the-job employability as measured 
by learning, training and task rotation. 
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About 55% of firms provide CVT courses (almost 
50% at the EU27 average, more than 80% in 
Denmark, around 70% in Sweden, France, the 
Netherlands and Finland), however, they spend on 
average 1.3% of total labour costs on CVT (1.6% 
at the EU27 average). About 30% of workers 
participate in CVT courses (one third in the EU27) 
with almost no change since 1999 and they spent 
on average 9 hours in 2005 on CVT courses (equal 
to the EU27). 
A great deal of attention was paid to the 
development of the vocational and training 
activities over recent years. The First Act on 
Modern Services on the Labour Market (or Hartz 
I), passed in 2002, simplified the right to training 
support with the introduction of training vouchers 
for employees for whom the employment office 
has established a training requirement. Labour-
market conditions are now taken into account to 
identify the need for continuing vocational training 
and as a further condition for participation in a 
continuous vocational training programme 
beneficiaries need to have fulfilled a "pre-
employment period". The reform process further 
initiated in 2004 involved the modernisation of the 
vocational training system in the direction of better 
integration of existing educational structures, 
experience and activities, so as to provide a more 
flexible framework for lifelong learning, and a 
better focus on persons with low qualifications, 
disadvantaged youth and older people.  
Following the introduction of training vouchers for 
the unemployed and of an accreditation system of 
training providers in 2003, a new Vocational 
Training Act was passed in April 2005, providing 
for the revision of curricula, the approval of 
training components, more training opportunities 
for disadvantaged young people and the 
regionalisation of the system. More recently, the 
National Pact for Training and young Specialists, 
initially to expire by the end of 2007, was also 
extended for three more years in 2006, while a 
skills initiative “career through education” was 
launched in 2007, including a) improving upward 
mobility in training; b) improving chances for 
women; c) promoting life-long learning; d) an 
apprenticeship subsidy for employers engaging 
disadvantaged young people participating in 
preparatory measures for dual training. The 
initiative "Promotion through education" adopted 
by the federal government in early 2008, including 
the introduction of a training bonus for employers 
providing additional training places for the so-
called "old applicants", shall further improve the 
quality and effectiveness of the German training 
and further training system.  
7. GREECE 
204 
7.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
Greece belongs to the group of Mediterranean 
countries with low flexibility/adaptability and 
relatively low security/income protection. 
However, Greece is a unique case among 
Mediterranean countries to have overall 
employment protection legislation (EPL) for 
permanent workers below the EPL for temporary 
workers, with EPL for white-collar permanent 
workers being considerably stricter than the one 
for blue-collars. This calls for reform measures to 
facilitate the entrance to the labour market, 
combined with properly designed active and 
passive labour market policies to provide 
employment and income security.  
7.1.1. Employment protection legislation (120) 
Greece has one of the strictest employment 
protection legislations in Europe. According to 
OECD, the overall EPL indicator in 2008 was at 
3.0, well above the un-weighted EU average (2.4) 
and with only two other countries doing worse, 
Spain (3.0) and Luxembourg (3.4). Interestingly, 
the country performs relatively well in the 
dismissal of individual workers with regular 
contracts (2.3, as for the EU average) and in 
collective dismissals (3.3 versus 3.2), while it has a 
very strict legislation for temporary jobs, with the 
relative index amounting to 3.5 against an EU 
average of 2.2. EPL for open-ended contracts is 
much stricter for white collars than for blue-collar 
workers (and the gap is much wider compared to 
other countries differentiating EPL by type of 
worker, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark and 
Italy). This largely depends on the considerably 
higher level of severance payments for white 
collars as compared to blue collars. While 
remaining below the level of strictness for regular 
workers, EPL for temporary workers is also 
relatively high. This is reflected in the share of 
temporary workers, which is below the EU average 
(at 11%).  
(120) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
Individual dismissals 
The termination of an employment contract 
according to Greek law is a unilateral, non-
causative legal act, except for those cases 
stipulated otherwise by law (e.g. discrimination). 
The definition of fair or unfair dismissal is based 
on case law. Generally, dismissals for non-
performance of business needs are considered fair. 
In larger companies, dismissals have to be a "last 
resort" possibly only after exhaustion of oral and 
written warnings, pay reductions and suspensions, 
and after consultation with employer 
representatives. Protection in case of individual 
dismissal applies after a quite short trial period of 
two months for all employees.  In case of unfair 
dismissal, the worker is entitled to a compensation 
corresponding to the regular severance pay plus a 
sum equal to earnings between the dismissal and 
the legal settlement of the case. Severance 
payments vary according to the length of service 
and according to the status of the employee. For 
example, severance payment amounts to 5.5 
months of salary after 30 years for blue-collar 
workers (121)  and to 12 months salary after 28 
years for white-collar workers (24 without 
notification). The rule for white collars is in fact 
that the severance pay corresponds to half the 
notice period if written notice is given; otherwise, 
it equals the months of pay corresponding to the 
schedule for notice. Indeed, only white collar 
personnel must be notified in advance (30 days 
with between 2 months and 1 year of job tenure, 
60 days with up to 4 years of job tenure, 3 months 
with maximum 6 years in the firm, 4 months<8 
years, 5 months<10 years, plus one month per year 
of service, up to a maximum of 24 months). Notice 
can be waived if full severance pay is given. 
Reinstatement orders are frequent, accompanied by 
indemnity for the period of time between notice of 
termination and court ruling, unless a severance 
pay has been requested. 
The definition of collective dismissals is large, as 
it covers all cases where, in the lapse of one 
month, at least four workers are dismissed in firms 
with between 20 and 200 employees; >2% or >30 
workers in firms with at least 200 employees (at 
(121) For shorter job tenures, severance pay for blue collars are 
as follows: 5 days < 1 year, 7 days <2 years, 15 days < 5 
years, 30 days <10 years, 60 days <15 years, 100 days<20 
years, 120 days<25 years. 
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the beginning of the month). The employer must 
notify both employee representatives and the 
Prefect and Labour Inspection, with request for 
approval. In case no agreement is reached with 
employee representatives on dismissal procedures, 
then the Labour Ministry can impose its own 
terms. No special regulations apply concerning 
severance pay for collective dismissals.  
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts are allowed for objective 
reasons only. If three renewals are made within a 
period of two years and in any case if the duration 
of successive fixed-term contracts exceeds two 
years in total, then the contract is assumed to cover 
a constant need of the firm and it is converted into 
an employment contract of an indefinite duration.  
The employment of temporary workers agency 
(TWA)'s workers is permitted in all forms of 
employment, but the length of time the temporary 
worker is employed may not exceed 8 months. A 
renewal with the same indirect employer is 
permitted on the condition that the total length of 
the renewal does not exceed eight months. In the 
event the employee continues in the employment 
of the indirect employer after the contract and any 
renewal thereof expires for a period of over two 
months, the employee's contract with the TWA 
shall be deemed to have been converted into an 
open-ended employment contract between the 
employee and the indirect employer. The 
maximum cumulated duration of TWA contacts is 
16 months. Tit is set by law that the amount of the 
employee's pay cannot be lower than that set by 
the sectoral, occupation-based or enterprise-level 
collective agreements applicable to the indirect 
employer's staff. The procedure for setting up a 
temporary work agency is burdensome, as it 
requires administrative authorisation from the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Protection. 
The TWA is obliged to submit a report of activity 
(including in general elements of the contracted 
TWA work contracts) to the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection every six 
months, with copy to the national Employment 
Observatory. 
Over 1998-2008, Greece slightly reduced EPL, 
mainly for temporary workers. Temporary Agency 
Employment was fist introduced in 2001, with the 
provision that a temporary contract may not 
exceed 8 months in total, while some restrictions 
were introduced regarding the use of successive 
fixed-term employment contracts. On the other 
hand, the basic laws regulating the termination of 
contracts date from the Twenties and have so far 
remained largely intact. Severance payments and 
notice requirements were reduced in 1990 and 
raised slightly by the 2003 National General 
Collective Agreement. More recently, the 
compensation levels for blue collar workers were 
modestly raised in the context of the National 
General Collective Labour Agreements for 2004-
2005 and 2006-2007. This trend has increased the 
incidence of temporary work among young, thus 
facilitating their entry into the labour market. Yet, 
these reforms should be ideally combined with a 
reduction of the level of protection for white-collar 
permanent workers, so as to ensure that youth who 
start into temporary jobs can move into permanent 
arrangements and fully exploit their potential, and 
that those groups which are most subject to entry 
or re-entry problems, there including women and 
the long-term unemployed, are not harmed in their 
longer term employment prospects. 
7.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (122)   
Greece has a relatively low incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, intermediate work 
intensity and irregularity, intermediate to high 
incidence of rotation and team work as well as low 
work autonomy and complexity.   
About 35% of workers do not have fixed starting 
and finishing time (almost 40% at the EU27 
average). Related, for almost 60% of persons in 
employment working hours are set by the company 
with no possibility of changes. This indicates 
somewhat less flexible working time arrangements 
than in the EU27 average (56%), and considerably 
less than in Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) and 
Denmark (41%). About 37% of persons in 
employment can adapt working hours within 
certain limits or determine working hours entirely 
by themselves, compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% 
in the Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. 
(122) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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Furthermore, only about 17% of workers do not 
work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. The 
incidence of atypical work, in particular working 
in the night, in the evening and in the weekend is 
among the highest in the EU. Work complexity as 
measured by the share of workers perceiving their 
work to involve complex tasks is close to the 
EU27 average (57%). Work autonomy is relatively 
low as about 60% of workers can influence the 
order of tasks and methods of work (about 65% at 
the EU27 average). Finally, compared to the EU27 
average, team work is somewhat less and tasks 
rotation somewhat more widespread, however, 
teams and workers involved in tasks rotation are 
less autonomous in their division of tasks than in 
the rest of the EU.    
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, 
Greece has half of all companies characterized by 
low flexibility (51% of all companies) which is 
more than double of the respective share in the EU 
(at 21%). This company type is also the most 
prevalent relative to the EU average distribution of 
companies. 
New rules on overtime work and working time 
arrangements were adopted in 2005, with the 
introduction of two systems of working time 
arrangements, one on a four-month period and one 
on annual basis, and other forms of increased 
working time flexibility there including reduced 
rates for overtime exceeding maximum working 
hours. 
7.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining systems 
Greece is confronted with a rigid wage formation 
system, which hampers its labour market 
performance, contributes to a high share of 
informal economy as well as to high long-term 
unemployment rates. The basis for setting wages in 
the private sector is the National General 
Collective Labour Agreement (EGSSE), which 
usually has a term of two years and sets the overall 
minimum wages for white- and blue-collar 
workers in the private sector. Intermediate levels 
of bargaining (by industry or occupation) are 
widespread; they set minimum levels for the 
workers they cover and are coupled with 
extensions to the whole industry or occupation if 
parties to an agreement cover more than 51% of 
workforce in an industry or occupation. Industry-
wide and enterprise-level agreements usually 
contain more favourable provisions than the 
EGSSE. Furthermore, if a new EGSSE sets 
minimum wages for some workers that are higher 
than those set by another collective agreement or 
arbitration decision, then these agreements cease to 
apply and the minimum levels set in the new 
EGSSE are applicable. Finally, where no 
agreement applies, either of the sides can take the 
initiative to request an arbitration decision, which 
has the character of a collective agreement and is 
binding.  
This wage setting and bargaining system has 
contributed to unfavourable matching of wage 
growth with productivity growth with an adverse 
impact on competitiveness, in particular relative to 
the rest of the euro area. Furthermore, due to the 
lack of an adequate benefit system, differentiated 
minimum wage is the only policy instrument to 
tackle poverty (of employed) prior to retirement in 
Greece, thus further reducing wage flexibility. (123)    
7.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (124)  
Greece does not have a well developed benefit 
system and mainly attempts to tackle in-work 
poverty with a differentiated minimum wage. (125)   
Thus, Greece spends considerably below the EU27 
average on passive labour market policies (about 
0.4% of GDP compared to 1% at the EU27 
average). Initial net replacement rate are among 
the lowest in the EU, at 49% for low wage persons 
(at 66% at the EU27 average), at 36% for average 
wage persons (at 59% at the EU27 average) and 
52% for one-earner couples with children (at 67% 
at the EU27 average). However, the risk of poverty 
rate of unemployed is somewhat below the EU15 
average and temporary workers are not 
(123) OECD, 2007, Economic Surveys, Greece.  
(124) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
(125) OECD, 2007, Economic Surveys, Greece. OECD 
recommendation: a well targeted tax and benefit system 
rather than differentiated minimum wage should be the 
instrument to address the need of low income earners with 
families. 
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disadvantaged in accessing the unemployment 
benefits compared to permanent workers.  
Greece does not provide any financial support to 
unemployed who exhaust their unemployment 
benefits and their net replacement rates drop to 
zero. Due to the absence of social assistance, long-
term unemployed persons remain practically 
without any income and have to rely on family 
support. As the long-term unemployment rate is 
very high (3.7% in 2008), the absence of social 
security net implies high at-poverty-risk rates.  
Tax wedge is at about the EU27 average, at 37% 
for the low wage person and at 42% for the 
average wage person. Tax wedge for the average 
wage person saw a considerably increase over 
2001-2007 (by 4.2 pps.), in particular as a result of 
an increase in personal income tax. Unemployment 
traps and inactivity traps are low, in particular due 
to low net replacement rates and practically absent 
social assistance and do not produce per se any 
financial disincentives to work.  On the other hand, 
despite the adoption of incentives to prolong 
working life, the regulation of the pension system 
seems to remain an important impediment to the 
employability of older workers. The pension 
reform of 2008 stipulates a set of incentives to 
retire later in both the private and public sector, 
mainly in the form of increasing pension benefits 
for older workers opting for extension of working 
life up to 3 years and of a pension reduction of 6% 
for every year of retirement prior to normal 
retirement age. 
Unemployment insurance (126)   
Eligibility conditions 
Unemployment benefit applicants must have been 
occupied 125 days in contributory employment 
during the previous 14 months or at least 200 days 
in the previous 2 years, without taking into account 
the working days of the last two months. For first-
time claimants the threshold is reduced to 80 days 
in the past 2 years. Special conditions apply for 
seasonal workers, while the self-employed persons 
are not covered. 
Replacement rates 
Basic unemployment benefit corresponds to 50% 
of the daily wage of blue-collar workers.  An 
additional 10% increase of unemployment 
allowance is calculated for each dependent. 
Seasonal unemployed persons receive an annual 
lump-sum. 
Benefit duration 
A waiting period of 6 days applies before benefits 
are payable. The duration of payments is related to 
previous periods of employment and range from 5 
months (in case of the minimum 125 days 
employment) up to 12 months (for 250 days of 
employment). Young persons, new to the labour 
market, may get a special benefit for 5 months. 
To improve the situation of those not covered by 
the unemployment insurance, an annual income 
allowance for poor households (from 293,5 to 587 
€) and a monthly allowance for low-income long-
term unemployed aged 45-65 (€ 140,9 for 
maximum 12 months) were introduced in 2002. 
More recently, a Special Fund for Social Solidarity 
(ETKA) was set up in 2007, to provide increased 
incomes and social protection to long-term 
unemployed aged over 50, previously working in 
declining sectors or regions and at risk of social 
exclusion. The fund finances income support 
measures for the unemployed participating in 
(re)training activities by subsidising geographic, 
professional mobility and social work. The support 
granted to workers consists of either 80% of pay at 
(126) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
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the time the employment relationship is terminated 
or of a sum of up to €900 for people taking part in 
training and retraining programmes. The 
regulatory framework of the unemployment 
insurance was slightly rationalised in 2008, 
concerning both the level and mode of calculation 
of benefits. 
7.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Greece has very low expenditures on ALMP 
(about 0.1% of GDP compared to 0.5% of GDP at 
the EU27 average) despite the unemployment rate 
above the EU27 average and high long-term 
unemployment rate. Greece also spends a very low 
share of labour market policy expenditures on job 
search assistance and job counselling, which tend 
to be amongst the most effective instruments for 
re-employment. As incentives to work do not seem 
to be a problem due to low (unemployment and 
inactivity) traps, a development of well targeted 
ALMP - which typically focus on direct job 
creation and employment subsidies - may help to 
address the problem of skill-mismatch or low 
geographical mobility, thus reducing long term 
unemployment rate. 
To improve the effectiveness of the job placement 
services, Employment Promotion Centres (KPA) 
were introduced in 2000 to provide first 
individualised services to the unemployed, while 
in 2003 the Government introduced an integrated 
system to registers the needs of the labour market 
at national and local level, aimed at facilitating the 
connection between labour supply and demand. 
Yet, these efforts seem to be quite limited and 
further adjustment and improvement in the 
capacity of ALMP should be foreseen to ensure 
employability of low-skilled workers, also in view 
of the further restructuring of Greek economy. The 
foreseen merger of the employment promotion 
centres and the local insurance services into a 
network of one-stop-shops across the country, to 
be completed by 2010, should go in the right 
direction. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(127) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
The unemployed person needs to register for 
placement before applying for benefit. The 
unemployment benefit is paid from the day of 
applying for the benefit. When an unemployed 
person is referred to a vacancy at initial 
registration, his/her benefit application will not be 
delayed or suspended.  
Job-search requirements 
Unemployed clients (including those who 
participate in an ALMP) are not required to prove 
independent job search. Therefore, applications for 
vacancies are not a prerequisite for benefit 
payment. However, if during the benefit period the 
jobseeker refuses a placement within his/her 
professional sector, the provision of the benefit is 
interrupted. After initial registration the 
unemployed person reports once a month to the 
PES in order to sign in and declare any changes in 
the unemployment status. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
The great majority of PES-advertised vacancies are 
published on the internet and are semi-open. 
jobseekers interested in a specific vacancy need to 
address a job counsellor for contact details and 
specific vacancy characteristics. There is no pre-
selection procedure. The employment counsellor 
refers the unemployed person to relevant 
vacancies, provided the person has a clear 
occupational goal and is suitable for the job. 
(127) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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Intensive interviews  
An intensive interview takes place immediately 
after initial registration or within two or three days. 
Newly registered unemployed are not obliged to 
participate in any other specific events, but they 
are encouraged to engage in activities (such as 
collective information sessions) agreed within the 
framework of the personal action plan. There is no 
minimum or maximum number of interviews. The 
frequency of intensive interviews is decided by 
agreement between the jobseeker and the job 
counsellor and depends upon the needs of the 
jobseeker.  
Action plan 
The personal action plan is discussed between the 
counsellor and the jobseeker and established as 
soon as possible after registration with the 
employment service. A thorough analysis of the 
jobseeker’s situation and occupational profile is 
conducted in order to build a realistic action plan. 
Two or three separate interviews are usually 
involved in establishing the initial action plan. 
More specifically, during the first interview within 
the framework of the personal action plan, the 
appropriate course and actions to be taken are 
defined, and during the second interview the 
progress achieved is monitored and the personal 
action plan finalized. The unemployment course is 
monitored every 3, 6 and 12 months after the 
establishment and acceptance of the initial action 
plan. However, this is mainly carried out by letter 
or telephone, and more rarely by means of a 
personal interview, unless this is requested by the 
unemployed. 
Referral to ALMPs 
Participation in ALMPs is not compulsory, but 
decided by agreement between the jobseeker and 
the job counsellor, as laid down in the individual’s 
personal action plan. Jobseekers are strongly 
encouraged to act as agreed in the action plan and 
be engaged if necessary in an ALMP.  The 
frequency of contacts is laid down in the personal 
action plan and adjusted for participation in active 
employment measures. Jobseeker activities are 
followed up at 3, 6 and 12 months from the 
creation of the action plan and at 3, 6 and 12 
months after the completion of the first active 
measure. 
7.1.6.  lifelong learning 
Greece scores relatively poor in terms of human 
capital accumulation, implying relatively low 
employability of workers and poor adoption of 
new technologies (harmful for productivity 
growth). It has a relatively low educational 
attainment of adults (about half of adults have at 
most the lower secondary education) though 
around the EU27 average the share of early school 
dropouts. A lower employability of workers is 
further emphasized through very low participation 
of adults in life-long learning (LLL) (barely 2%), 
very low participation in continual vocational 
training (CVT) (15%), the lowest investment by 
enterprises in training of adults in the EU (less 
than 1%), poor pupils' performance according to 
the PISA study and among the lowest share of 
public expenditures on education (as a % of GDP). 
Recent policy initiatives have attempted to 
improve the links between education, initial and 
continuing training, and labour market needs and 
also to regulate the provision of LLL services. The 
framework law adopted in 2003 was the first to 
provide for the development of a national system 
combining vocational education and training with 
employment, while the 2005 law on lifelong 
learning tried to rationalised the institutional set up 
for the provision of services in the field of lifelong 
learning. Following these laws, a "National 
Committee for Lifelong Learning" was created in 
2006, to help boost mobility in the labour market 
and improve the matching between skills and jobs, 
and was charged with the diagnosis of the needs 
for lifelong learning and vocational training, with 
the general evaluation and coordination of the 
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different services and with their connection with 
the National System Linking Vocational Education 
and Training to Employment (ESSEEKA). A 
National Scheme for the Certification of Job 
Qualifications was also discussed.  
8. IRELAND 
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8.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
8.1.1. Employment protection legislation (128)   
The OECD's overall index at 1.4, against an EU 
un-weighted average of 2.4, implies that Ireland 
has one of the less stringent legislation on EPL in 
Europe (only UK has a less strict one). This score 
derives from a relatively low index (1.7 against an 
average of 2.3 for the EU countries), and, 
therefore, less onerous legislation, for dismissal of 
individual workers with regular contract, and a 
very low (i.e. less rigid rules) for both temporary 
jobs (0.7 against an average of 2.2 for the EU 
countries) and collective dismissals (2.4 against an 
EU average of 3.2). (129)  For termination of open-
ended contracts, notice periods are among the 
shortest in Europe (130) and the administrative 
procedures manageable. Similarly, severance 
payments are due only in redundancy cases and for 
long tenures: even in redundancy cases nothing is 
due for tenure less than 2 years, while after 4 years 
of tenure, the severance payment amounts to 9 
weeks salary and after 20 years it amounts to 41 
weeks salary. 
Individual dismissals  
There are no prescribed notification procedures in 
the case of individual dismissal of a worker with a 
regular contract. Notice may be oral or in writing 
but must be certain. There is no specific procedure 
outlined in the Minimum Notice and Terms of 
Employment Act 1973, but there is a Code of 
Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedure, 
which sets out best practice in terms of procedures 
to be followed. In case of redundancy, a copy of 
official redundancy form has to be sent to the 
Department of Employment. In the legislation 
there are no specific details about delay involved 
before notice can start. In case of individual 
termination, it is advisable to give notice in writing 
(128) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(129) Much of the cross-country variation in employment can be 
attributed to differences in the regulation for temporary 
employment (OECD, 2009). 
(130) The notice period is proportional to the tenure and it goes 
from a minimum of 1 week to a maximum of 8 weeks for 
longer tenures.  
after warnings, specifying what aspect of 
behaviour is sub-standard. For all workers covered 
by the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment 
Act, excluding inter alia, Defence Forces, Police 
and certain Merchant Shipping employment 
agreements, notice periods vary with tenure 
durations. (131)  Severance payment is not 
previewed, unless in redundancy cases with at least 
two years tenure. In this case, it amounts to 1 
week’s pay ('bonus week'), plus two weeks’ pay 
per year worked, subject to a ceiling on weekly 
pay of 600 EUR. Employers are reimbursed 60% 
by the redundancy fund financed by ordinary 
employer and employee social security 
contribution. Dismissals for lack of ability, 
competence or qualifications, conduct, or 
redundancy are allowed, while dismissals 
reflecting discrimination on grounds of race, 
religion, age, gender, etc., including when these 
factors bias selection during redundancies, can be 
considered unfair. The length of the trial period is 
normally fixed at 12 months (shorter trial periods 
are commonly agreed between employer and 
employee). In case of unfair dismissal, the 
maximum compensation amount to 104 weeks’ 
pay. The compensations awarded are based on 
financial loss incurred by the fired worker. Where 
no loss is established, the maximum amount is 4 
weeks’ pay (average employment appeals tribunal 
awarded in 2007 was 7280 EUR). A reinstatement 
order, with back pay from the date of dismissal, is 
possible. Also re-engagement from a date after the 
dismissal with no back pay from date is possible. 
The deciding body must specify why the re-
instatement/re-engagement was not applied if the 
compensation is awarded. In 2007, reinstatement 
was ordered in one case and re-engagement was 
ordered in four cases. An unfair dismissal claim 
can be made in 6 months from the dismissal 
notification (extendable to 12 months in 
exceptional circumstances). 
(131) With less than 13 weeks of tenure, there is no notice 
period; with a tenure between 13 weeks and 2 years the 
notice period lasts 1 week; it doubles to 2 weeks for 
workers up to 5 years of tenure; it doubles again to 4 weeks 
with tenure less than 10 years; it goes up to 6 weeks with a 
tenure of less than 15 years and finally it rises to 8 weeks 
for longer tenures. 
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Collective dismissals  
The procedure for collective dismissals can be 
called for if, within 30 days, firms are planning to 
dismiss a number of workers that depends on the 
size of the firm. (132)  When the employer intends 
to open such procedure, he must inform and 
consult the competent trade union or employee 
representatives in non-union employment. 
Furthermore, the decision must be notified to the 
Ministry competent for Labour and Employment. 
Information to trade unions and to the Ministry is 
expected 30 days before the implementation. The 
consultation with trade unions is aimed at finding 
alternatives to redundancy and ways to mitigate its 
effects. Since 2000 Regulations, consultations 
must include employee representatives for non-
unionised employment. Criteria for selection of 
workers to dismiss are not specified by the law. 
Also for severance payment there is no specific 
regulation but in case of mass redundancies legally 
required severance payments are usually topped 
up.  
Temporary contracts 
Employers do not have to justify recourse to initial 
fixed-term contracts. The initial fixed-term 
contracts have no restrictions. The Protection of 
Employees Act 2003 provides that when an 
employer proposes to renew a fixed-term contract, 
the employee shall be informed in writing, not 
later than the date of renewal, about the objective 
grounds justifying the renewal and the failure to 
offer an open-ended contract. There is no limit for 
the number of renewals in case of objective 
grounds. However the maximum cumulated 
duration is 4 years. There is some possibility for 
unfair dismissal/penalisation claims under unfair 
dismissals/fixed-term legislation after having been 
employed for successive contracts.  
The temporary-work agencies employment in 
Ireland is among the less restricted in Europe. 
There are no restrictions for types of work 
allowed, as well as for the number of job renewals, 
(132) In firms with a number of employees between 20 and 49 
the planned dismissals must be more than 5; in firms with 
50-99 employees the number must be more than 10; in 
firms with 100-299 employees, the planned dismissals 
must amount to 10% of the total; finally in firms with more 
than 300 employees the planned dismissals must be more 
than 30. 
the maximum cumulated duration and the specific 
obligation for equal treatment of regular and 
agency workers at the user firm. The Protection of 
Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 does not 
apply to agency workers placed by a temporary 
work agency at the disposition of a user enterprise. 
The set-up of a Temporary Workers Agency 
requires a special administrative authorisation but 
no periodic reporting obligations. 
8.1.2.  Working time and work organization 
Ireland has an intermediate incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, intermediate work 
intensity and irregularity and an intermediate 
incidence of rotation and team work as well as 
relatively high work autonomy and complexity.    
In Ireland, 37% of workers do not have fixed 
starting and finishing time (almost 40% at the 
EU27 average). Furthermore, 17% of workers do 
not work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. 
However, for about half of the persons in 
employment, working hours are set by the 
company with no possibility of changes. This 
indicates that flexibility of working time 
arrangements is somewhat above the EU27 
average (56%), however considerably lower than 
in Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) and Denmark 
(41%).Almost 40% of persons in employment can 
adapt working hours within certain limits or 
determine working hours entirely by themselves, 
compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% in the 
Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. The incidence 
of atypical work, in particular working in the 
evening, in the night and on weekend, is more 
frequent than in the EU27.  
Ireland has a high incidence of overtime work 
(29% of all companies). Relative to the EU 
average, Ireland has also a high share of 
companies with intermediate flexibility 
characterized by a high take-up of part-time work 
and a high incidence of unusual working hours 
which help these companies to cope with short-
term (within a day or week) variability of the 
workload (10% of all companies).  
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8.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining 
systems (133)   
Irish wage formation is regulated by a mixture of 
voluntary collective bargaining and statutory 
minimum wage legislation. Collective bargaining 
in Ireland, covering the unionized private and 
public sectors, is regulated by tripartite ‘social 
partnership’ agreements of which national wage 
agreements have been the central feature. There 
have been seven successive national wage 
agreements since 1987. The most recent national 
wage deal, concluded in September 2008, is called 
‘Towards 2016’ Review and Transitional 
Agreement 2008 - 2009.. 
In recent years voluntarism and centralized 
collective bargaining have been supplemented as 
the primary wage-fixing mechanisms by  increased 
legal regulation – notably through the introduction 
of a statutory national minimum wage. In addition, 
Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) are bodies 
established under the Industrial Relations Act, 
1946, to provide a tool for fixing statutory 
minimum rates of pay and conditions of 
employment in various low pay sectors (pay and 
conditions are set by the statutory Employment 
Regulation Orders (ERO’s). (134)   
Since 1987, collective bargaining in Ireland has 
primarily taken place at national level through 
seven successive national wage deals. Since 1987, 
centralised tri-partite agreements have established 
guidelines on minimum and maximum wage 
increases for companies and unions at company 
level. However, there is a certain paradox in the 
Irish industrial relations system, because although 
tri-partite bargaining at the macro level is the 
dominant form of collective bargaining, this has 
coincided with an increasing trend towards the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining to the 
micro level of the enterprise (company/workplace), 
(133) See European Industrial Relations Observatory, Wage 
formation in the EU, 2009. 
(134) JLCs may be established by the Labour Court on the 
application of: the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, or a trade union, or any organisation 
claiming to be representative of the workers or the 
employers involved. A JLC is made up of equal numbers of 
employer and worker representative appointed by the 
Labour Court and a chairman and substitute chairman 
appointed by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment. JLCs, of which there are currently sixteen, 
operate in areas where collective bargaining is not well 
established and wages tend to be low. 
beginning in the 1980s and 1990s. This paradox of 
centralized bargaining and a trend towards single-
employer enterprise bargaining was influenced by 
factors such as the increasing numbers of multi-
national companies locating in Ireland, the growth 
of international competition in domestic and 
foreign product markets and the increasing 
emphasis that employers placed on company level 
competitive strategy. As a consequence, sectoral 
bargaining has declined significantly, although it is 
still present in sectors characterised by the 
existence of many small to medium sized 
businesses operating in competitive product or 
service markets - for instance, printing, hotels and 
the construction industry. Also relevant here are 
the labour intensive and low-pay industries 
regulated at industrial (sectoral) level by JLCs. In 
the public sector, as well as being regulated by 
centralized pay bargaining, organisations may also 
negotiate over various issues at company level. 
The industrial relations system in Ireland has been 
typified by a relatively stable employment 
relations environment, particularly as regards 
collective disputes. Social partnership agreements 
at national level and public agencies are charged 
with responsibility for assisting dispute resolution.  
The most prominent of these institutions, the 
Labour Court, was established under The 
Industrial Relations Act (1946). (135)  However, 
the Court’s recommendations are - apart from its 
special adjudication role in cases of disputes 
arising where it is not the practice of employers to 
engage in collective bargaining negotiations - not 
legally binding and the parties are not obliged to 
utilise the services of the Court in the event of a 
dispute. Moreover, access to the Court is 
dependent on both parties having exhausted all 
other dispute resolution procedures. 
Since 1990, the Court’s conciliation service has 
been taken up by the Labour Relations 
Commission (LRC), which was established under 
the Industrial Relations Act (1990). The LRC also 
(135) The Labour Court is an independent tri-partite body that 
was originally established to support collective bargaining 
through a conciliation and mediation service. The Court’s 
duties involve the investigation of industrial disputes that 
have not been resolved by the Labour Relations 
Commission (LRC), on the basis of submissions made by 
both employee and employer representatives, and the 
issuing of recommendations on the basis of this. 
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provides an advisory service for employers and 
unions, with the intention of promoting ‘good 
industrial relations’. 
In recent years, a new high-level informal dispute 
resolution institution, known as the National 
Implementation Body (NIB), has played a major 
role in resolving serious collective bargaining 
disputes. The NIB was created under Ireland’s 
social partnership process and, as such, is not a 
formal dispute resolution agency. (136)   
8.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (137) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
somewhat below the EU average (0.9% of GDP 
compared to 1% at the EU27 average). The benefit 
coverage of unemployed persons is high (about 
80% of persons wanting to work are recipients of 
unemployment benefits compared to 44% at the 
EU27 average). Initial net replacement rates for 
low wage and average wage persons are at 77% 
and 56%, respectively (66% and 59% at the EU27 
average), however they are considerably lower (at 
49% and 36%, respectively) if they are not topped 
up with social assistance. Initial net replacement 
rate, however, is very high for one-earner couple 
with children, in particular if combined with social 
assistance (at 106%). As net replacement rates do 
not decline over unemployment spell, they are 
among the highest in the EU after 5 years of 
unemployment for all respective family types. 
High initial net replacement rates for either 
inactive or unemployed spouse in a jobless 
household (with or without children) are translated 
into large financial disincentives to take up low-
paid work, despite substantial in-work benefits. 
Family types with children, in particular lone 
parent and one-earner couples, face also high low-
wage trap, which may depress total hours worked. 
Tax wedge is among the lowest in the EU, for both 
(136) Its members are the general secretary of the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions, the HR/IR director of the Irish Business 
and Employers Confederation and the secretary general of 
the Department of An Taoiseach (Prime Minister). 
(137) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates and net 
replacement rates are calculated for a person, 40 years old 
and with 22 years of uninterrupted employment record, 
living in a household without or with two children. The 
information in this section is based on the Joint European 
Commission-OECD project and Labour Market Reforms 
Database LABREF. 
low wage person (15% vs. 37% at the EU27 
average) and average wage person (22% vs. 41% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, tax wedges 
saw a considerable decline over 2001-2007, for 
both the low wage (by 2.3 pps.) and average wage 
(by 3.5 pps.) persons, in particular as a result of a 
decline in personal income tax. 
In Ireland two schemes have been set in order to 
support incomes of unemployed workers: 
unemployment insurance and unemployment 
assistance. For both schemes, the main condition 
to be entitled is to be unemployed, to be available 
for job and to be capable of and genuinely seeking 
work. 
Unemployment insurance  
Eligibility conditions 
The worker must have paid or credited 39 weekly 
contributions the year preceding the benefit year 
and 104 weekly contributions in total. The benefit 
is not means tested and the waiting period is short, 
only 3 days.  
Replacement rates 
There is no link with the previous earnings. The 
benefit is flat-rate and in 2009 it amounted to Euro 
204.30 per week. Some supplements are previewed 
for family dependants: for an adult dependant the 
supplement amounts to Euro 135.60 per week, for 
child dependant the supplement amounts to Euro 
26 per week. Benefits are subject to taxation (but 
the first Euro 13 of each weekly pay is exempted). 
Benefit duration 
12 months, limited to 9 if applicant has paid less 
than 260 weekly contributions since first entering 
insurance. If applicant is 65, the allowance will be 
paid until 66 (pension age) if 156 weekly 
contributions have been paid. 
Unemployment assistance 
Eligibility conditions  
To have access to unemployment assistance, the 
workers must have insufficient resources. The 
benefit is means tested and the means test takes 
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into account the actual income, as well as the 
income of other relevant adults of the household. 
Replacement rates 
The amount of the benefit is flat-rate and equal to 
the unemployment insurance benefit. However this 
is not subject to taxation. Family supplements are 
the same. 
Benefit duration
No limit up to the age of 66. 
8.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
at the EU27 average (about 0.5% of GDP) as also 
the share of persons wanting to work who are 
included in regular activation (about 36%). Most 
of expenditures are directed towards training and 
direct job creation (about 45% each). Public 
expenditures on labour market policy services 
(which cover the costs of providing services for 
jobseekers together with all other expenditures of 
the public employment services, including 
overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are also at the EU 
27 average, at about 0.2% of GDP.(138) 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
(138) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(139)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement  
In Ireland, registration for unemployment benefit 
precedes that for placement. Further, after initial 
registration, entitlement to benefit can be 
retroactive back to the date of loss of work, but 
only if claimants convince deciding officers that 
there is a good reason for doing so. However, the 
extent of such back pay is reduced by a waiting 
period of three days. The first detailed interview 
can be taken up to one month later than 
registration: it is possible that a certain number of 
potential matches of jobseekers to suitable 
vacancies are missed. Reporting once a month to 
the PES is mandatory for the jobseeker and 
personal attendance is expected in most cases.  
Job-search requirements  
The frequency at which unemployed have to report 
their job-search activities is variable. The number 
of searching actions to be reported depends mainly 
by individual action plans or by decisions taken by 
a placement officer on the basis of client 
characteristics and the local labour market. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
Direct referrals are not widely used by PES in 
Ireland. According to OECD, direct referrals are 
1.5 per unemployed person-year. In general, 
Ireland is among the countries in which job 
advertising is fully open in the majority of cases. 
PES can also undertake more intensive pre-
screening of candidates on the special request of 
employers, even if this practice may be rare. 
Intensive interview  
OECD estimates that during the unemployment 
spell, intensive interviews are scheduled from 
three to four times on average, between three and 
twelve months of unemployment. Furthermore, 
usually after three months of unemployment, an 
individual action plan is created by PES.  
(139) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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Referral to ALMPs 
There is no obligation to participate in ALMPs 
programs at a certain point of the unemployment 
spell. However, when this is referred by PES, 
participation is compulsory. During participation 
in ALMPs programs, job search requirement and 
verification are suspended. 
8.1.6.  Lifelong learning 
Continuous Vocational Training (CVT) has not yet 
acquired the status of an individual statutory right 
in Ireland – for instance, through provisions for 
statutory leave periods for further training and 
education. Take-up of CVT is still voluntary – in 
other words, negotiated between employers and 
employees and/or their representatives. The 
National Training Agency, FAS (Foras Aiseanna 
Saothair), plays a central role in the Irish CVT 
system. The Labour Services Act (1987) 
established a number of important functions for 
FAS including: the provision of training and 
retraining, the management and co-ordination of 
employment schemes, and the provision of an 
advisory service. However, in the period since 
1987 there have been a variety of changes to its 
role. For instance, it has increasingly operated as a 
local or community service, and it has initiated 
reforms of the apprenticeship system. It has also 
placed an increased emphasis on job training 
schemes for the unemployed, in addition to 
providing CVT. There is a single national system 
in the sense that FAS is responsible for CVT on a 
nationwide basis. But within that national 
structure, there are different 
regional/sectoral/occupational CVT provisions. 
Through a regional network of 66 offices and 
twenty training centers, FÁS operates training and 
employment programs; provides a recruitment 
service to jobseekers and employers, an advisory 
service for industry, and supports community-
based enterprises. The organization operates 
throughout Ireland, divided into eight regions. 
In excess of 115,000 employees, representing just 
under 7% of those at work, received formal 
education in 2003, including various FAS 
programs, as well as other formal educational 
programs. Overall, in 2003, 48% of employees 
participated in some form of training provided by 
their employer over the previous two years. 
All FÁS CVT programs are aligned to the ‘One 
Step Up’ concept, that is training programs assist 
individuals to obtain a recognized qualification 
within the National Framework of Qualifications. 
One Step Up aims to encourage employee training 
to increase competency levels and promote an 
ethos of lifelong learning in the workplace by 
striving to provide easy access to a range of 
learning initiatives such as tutor-led training and e-
learning. The intention is to ensure that skill levels 
in the workforce match present and future human 
resource requirements for continuous economic 
growth and competitive advantage. It is also aimed 
at enabling employees to cope with ongoing 
changes in work practices. 
Total FÁS expenditure in 2006 on its various 
programs for the employed and unemployed 
amounted to Euro 777.503. A substantial 
proportion of FÁS expenditure was on training 
allowances and wage payments to participants on 
employment programs. But funding to specifically 
encourage and assist CVT for companies and 
people in employment (Euro 40 million) remains 
low relative to the total spent by FAS on training 
in 2006 (Euro 314 million) – of which Euro 113 
million was spent on apprenticeships. 
In terms of private expenditure on CVT, total 
expenditure by employers on training costs is 
estimated to have been around Euro 1 billion in 
2003. This figure includes both the direct costs of 
training, including tuition fees, and the wage costs 
of employees while engaged in training. In Ireland, 
as of 2000, average expenditure by enterprises on 
training courses for employees was estimated to be 
2.4% of total labour costs, which is near but still 
below the EU average. 
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9.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
9.1.1. Employment protection legislation (140)    
According to the OECD's overall index of EPL, 
the Italian legislation is relatively more stringent 
than in many Member States (with an EPL score of 
2.6, against an EU un-weighted average of 2.4). 
This score derives from a relatively low index (1.7 
against an average of 2.3 for the EU countries), for 
dismissal of individual workers with regular 
contract, and a relatively higher index (i.e. more 
rigid rules) for both temporary jobs (2.5 against an 
average of 2.2 for the EU countries) and collective 
dismissals (4.9 against an EU average of 3.2) – the 
rules concerning the latter being the most rigid in 
the OECD. (141)  For termination of open-ended 
contracts, notice periods are relatively (142) short 
and the administrative procedures manageable. 
Similarly, severance payments following 
unjustified dismissal are moderate while for the 
just cause inexistent. Individual or collective 
dismissals for costs saving are not admitted. 
Individual dismissals are only allowed when there 
is a just cause. The provisions following 
unjustified dismissal differ, depending on the 
firm size. Firms with more than 15 employees may 
be required to reinstate an unfairly dismissed 
employee in his/her previous position and pay  
him/her the equivalent of the salary accrued 
between the date of dismissal and the date of 
reinstatement. Companies employing less than 15 
employees, accounting for 51% of total 
employment, may choose between the 
(140) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(141) Much of the cross-country variation in employment can be 
attributed to differences in the regulation for temporary 
employment (OECD, 2009). 
(142) Open-ended contracts are indefinite contracts with no 
specified contractual end date. In the case of workers with 
long tenure, the notice periods amounts to 12 days for blue 
collars and 4 months for blue collars, among the lowest 
notice periods in the EU. If the employers exempt the 
employee from working during the notice period, the 
employee receives always a payment equal to the normal 
salary with the exception of when the dismissal is for just 
cause or occurs during the trial period. Finally, collective 
bargaining does not make notice periods or severance 
payments provisions more generous than those in the 
legislation as for example in Germany and Austria. 
reinstatement or a compensation equivalent to 2.5-
6 months of salary (tutela obbligatoria) depending 
on firm size and seniority (up to 10 or 14 months 
of salary for seniority longer than 10 or 20 years 
respectively). The probation period, i.e. the 
period during which regular contracts are not 
covered by the protection legislation and workers 
cannot claim unfair dismissals, is short, about 1-2 
weeks for blue collars and 3-8 for white collars 
against 6 months in Germany, 9 (12) for blue 
(white) collars in Denmark, not less than 2 months 
in Spain. 
From the worker perspective, the restriction 
applied to firms with more than 15 employees does 
not provide an effective protection as the 
procedure entails long lags in courts’ decisions and 
is highly uncertain. (143)  Some contend that the 
different treatment of small and medium/large 
firms in the provision for unfair dismissal may 
discourage firms from growing above the threshold 
of 15 employees. (144) The small firm exemption 
also creates an asymmetry in the cost-reduction 
behaviour of small and medium/large firms, with 
the former adjusting more at the extensive margin 
(i.e. firing) and the latter more at the intensive 
margin (i.e. working hour adjustment) and/or with 
a larger use of non-standard forms of work (e.g. 
Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). The uncertainty of the 
litigation process is also a cost for firms, which 
may refrain from starting the procedure of 
dismissal even when they consider this 
appropriate. The long court proceedings (about 25 
months, higher than in any EU countries) may add 
significantly to the costs of hiring and firing, 
making the tightness of the legislation effectively 
higher than what suggested by the OECD score.  
(143) According to the OECD (2004), the dismissal procedure 
takes about 2 years while 55% of all cases are ruled by the 
courts in favour of workers. In addition, the widespread use 
of non-regular contracts with workers’ right not clearly 
defined increase the role of judges in the enforcement of 
EPL, adding to the uncertainty of the outcome. Ichino, A. 
Polo, M. and Rettore, E. (2003) show that local market 
conditions influence courts’ decisions. Hence as long as 
these conditions are uncertain, the outcome of the litigation 
is uncertain as well.  
(144) Schivardi, F and R. Torrini (2003), "Firm size distribution 
and EPL in Italy", William Davidson Institute WP No 613;  
EPL does influence firm size distribution but the effect is 
small as the average firm size would increase by less than 
1% when removing the threshold effect.  
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construction sectors. ( )  
Collective dismissals are possible only in the case 
of restructuring. Italy's definition for collective 
dismissals is relatively broad and procedures 
particularly cumbersome. Independently from the 
firm size, (145) the provisions for collective 
dismissals apply for firms with 15 and more 
employees, when the employer intends to dismiss 
at least 5 employees over a period of 120 days. 
The procedure to implement a collective dismissal 
lasts up to 75 days (37.5 days if the number of 
involved employees is less than 10). The employer 
must inform the work council and the trade unions 
of the intention of collective dismissals, indicating 
the reasons why it is not possible to take 
alternative measures, the number and the 
qualification of those to be made redundant and the 
date at which the dismissal is supposed to take 
place. The employees' representative may request a 
consultation examining the reasons for the excess 
labour and the possibilities of using the workforce 
differently. If the consultation reveals that 
dismissal is the only solution, social parties should 
find measures for retraining and re-employing 
dismissed workers. Failure to follow the procedure 
leads to the obligation to reinstate the employees 
unlawfully dismissed.(146)  There is also a 
financial burden associated with collective 
dismissals. Dismissed employees in the industrial 
and construction sectors are entitled to be in the 
so-called mobility lists, from which other 
employers can hire at reduced social security 
charges. For every dismissed worker the employer 
is required to pay a contribution equal to six times 
the first month mobility allowance (which amount 
to 100% and 80% of the Cassa integrazione 
Guadagni Ordinaria for respectively the first 12 
months and the successive periods). An income 
support (Cassa integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria) 
to employees suspended from work as a 
consequence of a reduction of production activity 
can temporarily be paid in the industrial and 
147
ct lasts for more than 3 years, it is 
automatically transformed in an open-ended 
contracts, excluding for firms which have resorted 
to collective dismissals in the previous six months.  
(145) In countries such as Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands 
the number of employees triggering a collective dismissal 
depends on firm size.  
(146) If the infringement relates solely to the selection criteria 
applicable, the employer must reinstate the employees but 
is then able to proceed with the dismissals immediately, 
without needing to repeat the entire procedure, by applying 
the criteria correctly.  
(147) Compared to the mobility allowance, the CIG allow 
employers not to have to terminate the employment 
relationship, while waiting for a recovery. 
Temporary contracts 
Fixed-term contracts are allowed when justified 
by technical, organisational and productive reason, 
including the need to replace other employees 
(with the only exception of companies engaging in 
collective dismissals). Only one renewal is 
possible, provided that the duration initially agreed 
is less than 3 years. Where the procedure for a 
fixed-term contract agreement is not followed or 
the contra
contract.  
Temporary work agencies (TWA) were 
liberalised in 1997, yet according to the OECD 
scoring method, their regulation is relatively 
stringent. (148)  Indeed, the 1997 Treu law 
established that TWA employment is allowed in 
almost all cases, (149) summarised in a low OECD 
score given for the types of work for which these 
contracts are allowed – lower than in countries 
such as France and Spain (3), as high as in 
Germany (1.5) but still higher than Ireland, UK, 
the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries. As 
Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain, Italy 
requires that there are ‘objective reasons’ for using 
agency workers (e.g. temporary increases in 
workload or the need to replace a temporarily 
absent worker). There is no legal maximum 
duration of TWA contracts, but it is set by 
collective agreements applied by TWAs. Among 
the characteristics affecting the stringency of TWA 
regulation, two are particularly tight. The first 
concerns the cost of using temporary agency 
workers relative to hiring workers on permanent 
contracts. The law establishes equal pay and 
conditions between agency workers and equivalent 
workers in the user firm. The second relates to the 
periodic reporting obligations necessary to 
maintain the administrative authorisation. In 
addition to TWA workers there now exists staff 
leasing i.e. the supply of workers on permanent 
(148) TWA employment is a triangular contract whereby an 
agency hires a worker for the purpose of placing him/her at 
disposal of another firm for a temporary assignment. 
(149) Exceptions are: to substitute workers on strike, firms 
experiencing collective dismissals in the previous 12 
months and jobs requiring medical vigilance. 
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9.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (150)   
Italy has an intermediate incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, relatively low work 
intensity; irregularity and low incidence of rotation 
and team work as well as relatively low work 
autonomy and complexity.  In Italy, close to 50% 
of workers do not have fixed starting and finishing 
time, against 40% at the EU27 average; about 32% 
of workers do not work the same number of days 
every week against  more than 25% in the EU27. 
Working hours are set by the company with no 
possibility of changes for about half of Italian 
employees against an average of 56% for the EU, 
and less than 40% for Sweden, Netherlands and 
Denmark. Similarly, almost 44% of employed can 
adapt working hours within certain limits or 
determine entirely their working hours, compared 
to an average of 60% of Sweden, 53% of the 
Netherlands and 50% of Denmark. From this 
perspective, Italy has relatively flexible working 
time arrangements, yet less flexible than the best 
performers as far as the labour market is 
concerned. Working in the evening and on 
Sundays is relatively common. Work complexity is 
relatively low, as only about 50% of workers 
perceive their work to involve complex tasks 
(against an EU27 average of 60%). Finally, the 
incidence of team work and rotation of tasks is 
among the lowest in the EU and workers involved 
either in teams or in task rotation are less 
autonomous in their division of tasks than in the 
rest of the EU.    
When considering the distribution of companies 
according to the flexible work organisation 
practices, Italy has the highest share of companies 
characterized by low flexibility (40% of all 
companies). Relative to the EU average, Italy also 
has a high share of companies with intermediate 
flexibility, in particular with a high incidence of 
overtime work (26% of all companies). 
(150) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
9.1.3.  Tax and benefits (151) 
The Italian welfare system does not provide a 
generous support to the unemployed and is 
practically missing for those experiencing long 
periods of unemployment. While the initial gross 
replacement rates are relatively high (at 60% for 
the first six months and at 50% for the following 
two months), they drop to zero after 8 months (12 
months for workers aged over 50). Tax wedge is 
somewhat above the EU average, at 42% for the 
low wage person and 46% for the average wage 
person. Financial incentives for unemployed to 
take up low-wage work (as measured by marginal 
effective tax rates, METR) tend to be somewhat 
around the median in the EU, depending on the 
family type. In contrast to other EU countries, 
marginal effective tax rates in Italy tend to be 
higher for families without children as family 
benefits are conditioned on taking up work. In 
addition, financial incentives to take up low-wage 
work for family types with children, in particular 
for one earner couple with 2 children, are among 
the highest in the EU. The most generous schemes, 
however, is confined to a tiny minority of workers 
who risk losing their jobs when redundancies 
occur in large firms in the industrial sector. 
Moreover, when the period of receipt of 
unemployment benefits has expired there are no 
means-tested benefits supplementing the loss of 
income and the METR falls to low levels.  
As the social security net is relatively less 
comprehensive, the risk of poverty for the long-
term unemployed before and after social transfers, 
a risk that concerns about 45% of unemployed, is 
higher than the EU average. In addition, complex 
eligibility rules imply that only few unemployed 
actually receive such benefits. Only about 15% of 
those willing to work and about 40% of 
unemployed according to the LFS are recipients of 
unemployment benefits. This benefit coverage of 
unemployed, among the lowest in the EU, reflects 
also the difficult access of temporary workers to 
(151) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
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ordinary unemployment benefits. (152)   As a 
result, Italy spends below the EU27 average on 
passive labour market policies (0.7 % of GDP, 1% 
at the EU27 average).  Persons with no or little 
work experience, or employed with atypical 
contracts, have very limited access to benefits and 
often have to rely on family support. The lack of a 
comprehensive social safety net probably 
contributes to an inefficient labour reallocation 
across sectors, occupations and regions, implying 
low regional and occupational mobility. Moreover, 
the very low female employment could be to some 
extent related to low incentives for a second earner 
with children to take up work as the principal 
earner benefits from a tax rebate for dependant 
inactive persons – which include both children and 
second earner – while the access to early childcare 
is lower than in most EU countries. 
Unemployment insurance (153)    
The unemployment insurance system is 
characterized by a large number of schemes 
unevenly distributed across the different categories 
of workers as to eligibility conditions, replacement 
rates, duration of the benefits, usually without link 
with active policies and incentives to work.  
There are three main types of unemployment 
benefits: a) ordinary unemployment benefits; b) 
the ordinary wage guarantee fund (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni ordinaria or CIGo); c) the 
special guarantee fund (Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni speciale or CIGs) d) mobility 
allowances (Indennità di mobilità).  
Eligibility conditions 
Benefit eligibility depends on the accumulation of 
contributions, which leaves those searching for 
their first job and with frequent career 
interruptions exposed to income fluctuations.   
• Ordinary Unemployment Benefits are limited in 
time and in access. They are paid to laid off 
(152) Although temporary workers can benefit from an 
alternative scheme in case they fulfil eligibility criteria.  
(153) The information in this section is based on Joint European 
Commission-OECD project LABREF, and European 
Commission, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, Veneto 
Lavoro Agenzia Lavoro Lazio, Agenzia della Campania 
per il Lavoro (2007), " Flexicurity in the Italian Labour 
Market: Evaluation of Implemented Policy Measures". 
workers who have paid contributions for at 
least 52 weeks during the two-year period 
preceding unemployment or whose 
contribution seniority is of at least two years at 
the time of the application (ordinary 
requirement). Benefits may also be paid to 
those who worked at least 78 days over the last 
year with the same employer (reduced 
requirement). In the latter, the allowance is 
lump-sum and is computed on the number of 
days worked over the previous year, with a 
minimum of 3 up to a maximum of six months 
(i.e. the benefit is an ex-post income-support 
related to the labour market status during the 
previous year). Historically, the reduced 
requirement was introduced for seasonal 
workers in agriculture and for those employed 
in construction sector. (154) The lack of 
monitoring and the upward trend in temporary 
employment considerably increased the use of 
this scheme, also on a regular basis. (155)   
• Ordinary Wage Guarantee Fund (CIGo) is an 
income integration paid to individuals 
employed in manufacturing, experiencing 
temporary suspension or reduction of their 
working hours owing to cyclical fluctuation or 
to specific circumstances not attributable to 
employers or employees (e.g. interruption due 
to a natural disaster), while the employment 
contract is still ongoing. Workers of firms with 
less than 15 employees are not entitled to CIGo
allowances.  
• Special Wage Guarantee Fund (CIGs) is an 
income integration in case of collective 
dismissal paid to individuals experiencing a 
total or partial reduction of their working hours 
because of restructuring, or asset liquidation 
under bankruptcy procedures. Workers entitled 
are those employed in manufacturing firms 
with more than 15 employees, and in 
publishing and trade companies with more than 
200 employees.  
• Mobility allowances (Indennità di mobilità) are 
benefits paid to workers - with at least 12 
months of insurance, including at least 6 
(154) Special unemployment benefits (building industry): 10 
monthly or 43 weekly contributions during the past 2 years.   
(155) See Sestito, 2005, Indicators and policies to make work 
pay: an Italian perspective, European Economy, Special 
Report, No 2.   
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months of effective work - dismissed from 
firms usually after a period of Special Wage 
Guarantee Fund (i.e. when the firm is not able 
to re-employ them) and waiting to be placed in 
other jobs. (156)  Social security rebates to hire 
workers in mobility lists are paid to employers,  
while workers in these lists are required to 
accept job offers or the participation to training 
courses. Failure to do this would cause the 
exclusion from the list.  
Replacement rates 
• Until 2004, Ordinary Unemployment Benefits 
were paid at 40% (increased to 50% in 2005) of 
the last monthly wage for 6 months. Recent 
reforms (2005-2007) have increased the 
replacement rate, to 60% of reference salary for 
the first 6 months and to 50% for the following 
two months. After the first eight months, the 
benefit is set at 40% for workers aged 50 or 
above 4 additional months. In the case of 
reduced requirements, the replacement rate has 
been increased from 30% to 35% for the first 
120 days and is set at 40% for the remaining 60 
days. Different amounts hold for workers in the 
agricultural and in the building sector.   
• The allowance for both CIGo and CIGs is 80% 
of total gross earnings lost due to non-worked 
hours, with a limit in 2008 of 858 euros (or  
1031 euros for monthly wages higher than 
1857 euros). It is co-financed by the employer.  
• Mobility benefits are at 100% of CIGs for the 
first 12 months and reduced by 20% thereafter. 
Benefit duration 
• The maximum duration of the ordinary 
unemployment benefits has been recently 
(2005-2007) increased from 6 months to 8 
months for the  unemployed under 50 years old 
and from 9 to 12 months for unemployed aged 
(156) The CIGo benefit corresponds to 80% of total 
remuneration for a maximum period of 12 months. An 
upper limit is put on such benefit for the second period of 6 
months. The CIGs provides also 80% of total pay with 
upper limit for hours not worked, for a maximum period of 
36 months. The mobility allowance can last 36 months (48 
months in Southern Italy) and provides 100% of the CIGs 
for the first year and 80% for the following months, with 
the same ceilings as for the ordinary unemployment 
benefit. It usually intervenes after the CIG has expired. 
over-50. In the case of reduced requirements, 
duration is equal to the number of days 
previously worked. Different durations hold for 
workers in the agricultural and in the building 
sector.  
• CIGo is granted for 13 weeks with possible 
prorogations until 12 months (24 months in 
some regions), whether consecutive or non-
consecutive, over a period of two years. 
• CIGs is granted for 12 to 24 months plus two 
prorogations of 12 months each if restructuring 
lasts more than 24 months, up to a maximum 
overall of not more than 36 months over 5 
years. 
• The duration of mobility benefits depends on 
the age of the recipient, on the location of the 
job, on the firm size (different from sector to 
sector). For instance, the reference length is of 
12 months, which is increase up to 24 and 36 
months for workers over 40 and 50 years old 
respectively. In the South and other 
disadvantaged regions, the duration is raised to 
24, 36 and 48 months respectively.  
9.1.4.  Active labour market policies 
In terms of both beneficiaries and type of 
instruments, ALMPs are not less unbalanced than 
the unemployment benefit system. The lack of an 
efficient system of monitoring and sanctions 
obliges ALMPs to be based on automatic 
incentives, mainly tax credits granted to employers 
to hire young people. (157)  Consequently, their 
training content is very limited.  
Italy spends 0.4% of GDP on active labour market 
policies (0.5% of GDP at the EU27 average) and 
per beneficiary it spends less on active than on 
passive measures. Most active labour market 
policy expenditures are directed towards training 
(almost 50%), followed by employment incentives 
(40%). The coverage of persons wanting to work 
in regular activation measures is somewhat below 
the EU27 average as about 26 out of 100 persons 
wanting to work benefit from regular activation 
(36 persons at the EU27 average). Labour market 
policy expenditures on services (which cover the 
(157) Youth measures absorb about 45% of all expenditures for 
ALMPs.  
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costs of providing services for jobseekers together 
with all other expenditures of the public 
employment services, including overheads and 
functions such as benefit administration where 
relevant) are among the lowest in the EU (less than 
0.05% of GDP against 0.2% of GDP at the EU27 
average). (158) 
With the abolition of the public monopoly on 
employment services and the liberalisation of job 
placement services in 1997, competences in the 
area of active labour market policies have been 
devolved to regions. Devolution to regions has 
increased the heterogeneity in the efficiency of the 
services provided, Northern regions usually being 
more efficient. Law 30/2003 further promoted the 
creation of Temporary Employment Agencies (i.e. 
private companies authorised to engage in 
activities such as staff leasing and job placement 
services, personnel recruitment and selection, and 
to support worker redeployment and 
outplacement). Yet, the public employment offices 
do not ensure any effective mediation between 
labour supply and labour demand. According to 
ISTAT (2008), only 25% and 20% of the 
unemployed search for a job through public or 
private agencies, while less than 5% find a job 
through PES. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level of training, job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
(158) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(159)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Registration with the PES is a condition for 
entitlement to ordinary unemployment benefits 
which can be retroactive to the date of loss of 
work; yet the back payment is reduced by a 
waiting period of seven days. In the construction 
sector, registration is a condition both for payment 
and for the start of entitlement. Applying for 
vacancies is not a condition for benefits. There is a 
large variety across regions in the time required for 
a full registration and the interview following the 
initial registration, which should be done within 
three month. Thus, in some instances, long waiting 
periods between initial and detailed registration 
may lead jobseekers to miss suitable vacant posts. 
For ordinary unemployment benefit, there are no 
data about how frequently people lose 
unemployment status as a consequence of the 
refusal of a job offer or lack of cooperation with 
the PES, but the Ministry of Labour feels that this 
situation is not frequent and sanctions are applied 
only rarely. 
Job-search requirements 
In addition to previous requirements of 
“joblessness” and “immediate availability for 
work”, the Decree No. 297/2002 has included the 
requirement for the unemployed to engage in “the 
search for gainful employment in ways agreed 
with the relevant services” (EEOR, 2003, p. 19), 
which might have increased the search effort at 
initial registration. However, the bulk of people 
previously registered were transferred to the new 
status with no evidence of implementation of the 
job-search plans agreed by the individual and the 
PES. People registering to PES are required to 
declare at the moment of the initial registration that 
they have undertaken some search actions to find 
work, but there is no evidence that this principle 
has been enforced and monitoring of job-search 
activities is rare.  
(159) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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Direct referrals to vacant jobs 
There are no open vacancies (i.e. vacancies are not 
advertised). The PES provides information on the 
employer only at request of the jobseeker.  
Intensive interview  
There is no established practice. The interview can 
occur at the registration or within three months of 
registration as unemployed. There is usually no 
schedule of intensive interviews, except for certain 
PES offices with specific career guidance services. 
Individual action plan is established at initial PES 
registration or during the first intensive interview. 
Referral to ALMPs 
Participation in ALMPs after having experienced 
certain unemployment spell is not compulsory, but 
there is the obligation to participate if this is 
required by the PES. Yet, a strong limit is that PES 
is not required to verify job-search activities. 
9.1.5.  Lifelong learning 
Italy has a relatively low educational attainment of 
adults (almost 50% of adults have at most the 
lower secondary education) and above EU27 
average share of early school dropouts (over 20% 
of young have at most lower secondary education 
and are not in further education or training). A 
relatively low employability of workers is further 
emphasized through low participation in life-long-
learning, the relatively low participation in 
continual vocational training (CVT), the low 
investment by enterprises in training of adults, low 
pupils' performance according to the OECD's 
PISA indicators and below EU average public 
expenditure in education (as a % of GDP). 
The Italian continuous vocational training (CVT) 
system is very recent: its design started in 1993 
and was achieved in 2003 with the establishment 
of the CVT Observatory involving both public 
institutions and social partners, reflecting the key 
role of tripartite social dialogue over time. The 
system is not yet complete because of the lack of 
nationwide professional and training standards and 
because of incomplete monitoring from the 
Regions, which are responsible for the 
management and the administration of dedicated 
public funds. However, public financing play a 
minor role in firms training expenditure because of 
administrative costs.  
The regulation of self-employment in Italy (160)  
The notion of self-employment comprises different 
forms of work, from occupations with professional 
registers (lawyers, doctors, notaries etc.) to 
personal services, to new occupations produced by 
the restructuring of the economy since the 1970s. 
It includes also the para-subordinate work, which 
is midway between dependent and self-
employment. Within this typology, employer-
coordinated freelance work or project work 
become most widespread in recent years. The 
employer-coordinated freelance work is defined 
by: a) the continuity of the contractual obligation 
which concerns the generic availability of the 
worker to perform certain activities during a 
certain span of time; b) even if work does not 
involve subordination, it must be coordinated with 
the functional requirements of the principal’s 
organisation; c) the work must mainly involve the 
use of personal labour, means and equipment, but 
must not extend into entrepreneurial activities. 
Recent regulation relates the freelance relationship 
to the contractual form regulating ‘project work’, 
defining more stringent criteria for its use.  
Project workers autonomously manage a specific 
project and their relative employment contract 
expires when the project is completed. On-call 
contracts can be made with unemployed workers 
aged under 26 and workers aged 45+ who have 
been made redundant or are on mobility schemes 
or registered as unemployed. Contracts can be 
either with or without a standby allowance. Where 
a stand-by allowance is paid, the worker is bound 
to accept an offer to work. Refusal to work in this 
situation is grounds for termination. On-call 
contracts can be used in all firms except public 
administration and those which have made workers 
redundant in the last six months. Project- and on-
call workers, account for 7% of total employment 
(OECD, 2009) and are exempt from employment 
protection. 
Para-subordinate work usually is not covered by 
legal and/or trade-union protections of subordinate 
(160) Italy: self employed workers, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/comparative/tn0801018s/i
t0801019q.htm  
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workers while many self-employed are under the 
umbrella of ordini or some other professional 
association. As regards social security, old-age 
protection for self-employed workers is mainly 
provided by public schemes financed by 
compulsory insurance or by basic pension 
schemes. For dependent employees, 2/3 of the 
contribution is paid by the employer and 1/3 by the 
worker, while the entire amount is paid by self-
employed workers. In the case of the social 
security schemes managed by the INPS (National 
Institute for Social Protection), the contribution 
rates differ considerably between subordinate 
employees and self-employed workers: the former, 
in fact, pay 33%, while self-employed workers and 
para-subordinate workers enrolled with the INPS 
pay rates varying between 17% and 25%. The 
1995 pension reform introduced a special scheme 
which extended social security coverage to certain 
categories of self-employed workers. This scheme 
finances a compulsory fund which guarantees a 
pension calculated using the contributions-based 
system if a minimum of five years’ contributions 
have been paid. There are currently two rates for 
semi-subordinate work: the first rate - applying to 
all workers not covered by compulsory schemes 
other than the INPS separate scheme - is 
25.72%(161); the second rate (17%) applies to 
workers and professionals enrolled with other 
compulsory social security schemes, to direct 
pension-holders (that is, persons entitled to 
pensions deriving from contributions paid), and to 
the holders of a survivor’s pension. For para-
subordinate workers, 2/3 of social security 
contributions are paid - as for subordinate 
employees - by the firm and 1/3 by the worker. 
(161) It also includes a contribution of  0,72% for financing 
family, sickness and maternity allowances, 
In order to prevent the abuse of semi-subordinate 
work, the 2003 labour market reform introduced 
the project work, whereby the job is referred to one 
or more specific projects thereby reducing the 
range of application of employer-coordinated 
freelance contracts. The reform extended to 
freelancers the health and safety rules applying to 
dependent employees when the work is performed 
on the principal’s premises; it also allowed 
employer-coordinated freelancers to protection in 
case of pregnancy, sickness and injury. In these 
cases, the principal cannot resolve the contractual 
relationship as previously; only the pay is 
suspended, for not more than one sixth of the 
established duration of the contract. For pregnant 
female freelancers the duration of the relationship 
is extended by at least 180 days. Since 1 January 
2007, employer-coordinated freelancers enrolled 
with the separate INPS scheme and not 
contributing to other compulsory social security 
schemes, have been entitled to a daily sickness 
allowance, for episodes lasting no more than four 
days and with a maximum number of days equal to 
1/6 of the general duration of the employment 
relationship (and in any case for no less than 20 
days in the calendar year). The level of the 
allowance is 50% of the amount paid to this 
category of workers for hospitalisation. The same 
law introduced an allowance for parental leave 
which is paid for a three-month period within the 
first year of the child’s life and to an amount equal 
to 30% of the income taken as the benchmark for 
calculation of maternity allowance.  
10. LUXEMBOURG 
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10.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
Luxembourg's labour market institutions are 
characterized by very strict employment protection 
legislation, especially for the regulation of 
temporary contracts and collective dismissals. The 
design of the unemployment benefit system 
presents potential disincentives to work.  
10.1.1. Employment protection legislation (162)   
Luxembourg has the strictest employment 
protection legislation in Europe (among the OECD 
countries only Turkey has a stricter one). The 
overall average score of the OECD's EPL indicator 
is 3.4, against an EU un-weighted average of 2.4. 
This overall performance is confirmed in each sub-
indicator, but it is particularly evident for the 
temporary jobs, whose strictness indicator peaks 
3.9 against an EU average of 2.2. The indicator 
regarding dismissal of individual workers with 
regular contracts registers an average of 2.7 against 
a European average of 2.3. Finally, the indicator of 
strictness of collective dismissals is at 3.9 against 
an EU average of 3.2. 
Individual dismissals 
Along with employees, the labour inspectorate and 
the enterprise's works council (if applicable) must 
also be notified of impending dismissals. The 
notice period starts either on the 1st or 15th day of 
the month following notice being received by the 
employee, whichever is earliest. In the event of 
dismissal, the employment contract ends: after two 
months' notice for an employee with less than five 
years' continuous service; after four months notice 
for an employee with between five and ten years of 
continuous service; after six months notice for an 
employee with ten years of continuous service. 
Employees with at least five years of continuous 
service are entitled to severance pay if their 
indefinite contract is terminated by the employer. 
The severance pay shall not be less than one month 
salary after five years service; three months after 
15 years service; six months after 20 years service; 
nine months after 25 years service; and 12 months 
(162) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
after 30 years' continuous service. Firms with less 
than 20 employees can choose between making 
severance payments or giving additional notice 
equivalent to the amount of severance pay. 
Dismissal is fair if it is based on serious 
misconduct, worker capability, and economic 
needs of the business. In assessing the conduct of 
the employee in unfair dismissal cases, judges take 
into account education, work histories, social 
status and elements affecting the employee's 
responsibility and consequences of dismissal. The 
maximum length of the trial period for a contract 
of unlimited duration is 6 months. If the dismissal 
is found to be unfair, the employer may be 
required to pay damages to the employee. In 
determining the amount of damages, the court will 
consider a period which should have been 
sufficient for the employee to find a new job 
(typically 4-6 months). The dismissed employee 
must demonstrate that he/she has taken necessary 
steps to find a new job. The court also takes into 
account various factor such as seniority, age and 
family situation. The typical compensation at 20 
years of tenure is 5 months. When ruling of unfair 
dismissal, judges may request that the employee is 
reinstated. If the employer does not want to 
reinstate the employee, he/she can pay additional 
compensation of one months' salary. The time 
limit for making a claim of unfair dismissal is 
three months from the date of the dismissal or the 
date when the employee requested/received 
reasons for dismissal. 
Collective dismissals 
Additional regulations apply for dismissals of 7 or 
more workers within a 30 day period or 15 or more 
workers within a 90 day period. Once notification 
has been given, negotiations start on a social plan, 
which must be finalised within 2 weeks. After the 
social plan has been agreed to, individual 
notification can be given to workers after 75 days. 
The social plan typically contains internal and 
external reclassification measures and the amount 
of additional compensation payable. 
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts can be used in one of the 
following cases: to replace temporarily absent 
employees (except where the absence is due to an 
industrial dispute); where the work is of a 
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seasonal, temporary, urgent or occasional nature; 
in response to a temporary increase in work in the 
enterprise; to hire approved categories of 
unemployed persons register with the Employment 
Administration (authorisation takes into account 
age, training and duration of unemployment); and, 
with the authorisation of the Labour Ministry, to 
promote the hiring of some categories of workers 
or to engage in training. A fixed-term contract can 
be renewed twice. The contract cannot exceed 24 
months in duration (including renewals). Fixed-
term contracts for seasonal work cannot exceed 10 
months in a 12 month period. Some categories of 
workers (teachers, artists, performers, athletes, 
coaches) are not subject to restrictions on renewals 
of fixed-term contracts. 
Temporary work agency (TWA) workers may 
be employed in the following circumstances: to 
replace absent people or employees whose 
employment contract is suspended for a reason 
other than labour dispute; to replace an employee 
whose position became vacant before the entry 
into service of his successor; for seasonal jobs; for 
jobs in specific sectors or occupations where the 
nature of the work is temporary; and to perform 
urgent work. The contract can be renewed twice, 
but except for seasonal jobs, the contract should 
not exceed 12 months in duration for the same 
employee in the same job, including renewals. In 
order to operate, TWA require authorization from 
the Ministry of Labour, which is granted initially 
for 12 months. A request for extension of 
authorization must be made three months before 
the expiry of the authorisation. If granted, 
authorisation runs for a further two years. After a 
period of three years of authorised operation, the 
agency will be granted unlimited authorisation. A 
TWA worker is required to receive the same pay 
and conditions as an employee with the same or an 
equivalent qualification hired by the user firm as a 
permanent employee. 
10.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (163)   
Luxembourg has an intermediate incidence of 
flexible working time arrangements, low work 
intensity and irregularity and an intermediate 
incidence of rotation and team work as well as 
relatively high work autonomy and complexity.     
In Luxembourg, about one third of workers does 
not have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 
40% at the EU27 average). Furthermore, 17% of 
workers do not work the same number of days 
every week compared to more than 25% in the 
EU27. Working hours are set by the company with 
no possibility of changes for 57% of persons in 
employment. This indicates that flexibility of 
working time arrangements is close to the EU27 
average (56%), however, considerably lower than 
in Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) and Denmark 
(41%). In addition, only 35% of persons in 
employment can adapt working hours within 
certain limits or determine working hours entirely 
by themselves, compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% 
in the Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. The 
incidence of atypical work, in particular working 
in the evening, in the night and on weekend is 
among the lowest in the EU27.  
Luxembourg has the highest share of companies 
characterized by low working time flexibility (23% 
of all companies). Relative to the EU average, 
Luxembourg has also a high share of companies 
with intermediate flexibility characterized by a 
high incidence of overtime work. 
10.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining 
systems (164)   
Wage setting in Luxembourg depends either on 
legislation (in the case of public sector pay and the 
minimum (social) wage) or on collective 
agreements, while it may also be negotiated 
individually by the two parties in an employment 
contract. The latter, however, must take account of 
the existence of a minimum social wage or pay 
(163) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
(164) See EIRO (2009). 
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scales specified in applicable collective 
agreements. 
The minimum (social) wage is set by law. Every 
two years the government submits a report to the 
Chamber of Deputies on changes to overall 
economic conditions and incomes, and on the basis 
of this the minimum wage may be increased. The 
law specifies a minimum wage for unskilled 
workers and for skilled workers (20% higher than 
that for unskilled workers). Workers are 
considered to be skilled if they are working in a 
job that requires a professional qualification, 
normally acquired through education or training 
and resulting in an official certificate. The 
minimum wage for workers aged below 18 years is 
fixed as a percentage of the minimum wage for 
adult workers (80% for 17-18 year olds and 75% 
for 15-17 year olds). 
Salary and wage levels deriving from a law, 
collective agreement or employment contract are 
adjusted to reflect variations in the cost of living. 
This means that a loss of purchasing power due to 
inflation is automatically compensated for by an 
increase in income (wages and salaries but also 
benefit payments, etc.). This price-indexation 
mechanism operates according to a threshold 
system: as soon as the cumulative increase in 
consumer prices reaches 2.5%, the mechanism is 
triggered, and an increase becomes due. The 
system is based on a non-centered six-monthly 
average in order to smooth out extreme variations 
in prices. 
Collective bargaining is a major determining factor 
in wage formation. Depending on the sector, 
negotiation at the sectoral level has an impact on 
all companies in the sector concerned (when these 
agreements become general obligations). In the 
tertiary sector, security and caretaking companies, 
insurance companies, banks, private coach 
companies, the graphics industry, road haulage and 
the cleaning sector also have collective agreements 
which apply to all companies in these sectors. The 
agreements can also be signed at the company 
level or by a group of companies. All disputes that 
arise during collective agreement negotiations are 
required to undergo a conciliation process at the 
National Office for Conciliation. This body has 
been set up under the auspices of the Minister of 
Labour. It is chaired by the Minister or his 
representative, and is made up of a joint 
commission of eight members (four from the 
employers’ federations and four from the trade 
unions). 
10.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (165) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
relatively low (0.5% of GDP compared to 1% at 
the EU27 average) as a result of relatively low 
unemployment rate. The benefit coverage of 
unemployed is high (about 66% of persons 
wanting to work are recipients of unemployment 
benefits compared to 44% at the EU27 average) 
and initial net replacement rates are among the 
highest in the EU, either for low wage, average 
wage persons or one-earner couple with children 
(85%, 87% and 95%, respectively). Despite net 
replacement rates decline substantially after 1 year 
for low wage and average wage person, they 
remain substantially above the EU average after 5 
years for one-earner couple, though only if topped 
up with the social assistance. Tax wedge is below 
the EU27 average for both low wage (31%; 37% at 
the EU27 average) and average wage person (38%; 
41% at the EU27 average). A withdrawal of 
benefits substantially reduces financial incentives 
to work, in particular of unemployed persons, 
regardless of their family type, as well as of an 
inactive spouse in jobless households (with or 
without children).   
Unemployment insurance (166)
Eligibility conditions 
Unemployment insurance is compulsory. The 
claimant has to be registered and to be available 
and fit for work. It is available for people aged 
between 16 and 64. Moreover, the claimant needs 
to be resident in Luxembourg and must have been 
employed for 26 weeks in the 12 months preceding 
unemployment.  
(165) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates and net 
replacement rates are calculated for a person, 40 years old 
and with 22 years of uninterrupted employment record, 
living in a household without or with two children.   
(166) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
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Replacement rates 
A benefit of 80 per cent of the average wage 
during the three months immediately preceding 
unemployment is increased to 85 per cent if the 
beneficiary has dependent children. The maximum 
benefit level amounts to 250 per cent of the social 
minimum reference salary for the first six months, 
200 per cent afterwards. The benefit is not income 
tested anymore. Income from accessory work is 
compatible with the unemployment benefit as long 
as it does not exceed 10% of the reference salary 
(3 months are taken for the computation of 
reference salary). If the income is higher than 10% 
of the reference salary, the amount in excess is 
deducted from the benefit. Unemployment benefits 
are taxable. The tax base is the same as that for 
earned income, including the work-related 
expenses allowance. Social contributions are due 
for health care, long term care and for pensions 
(old age, disability and survivors). 
Benefit duration 
The maximum benefit period is 1 year in a 24-
month period. The benefit is paid from the first day 
of unemployment; there is no waiting period. 
10.1.5. Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
at 0.4% of GDP (0.5% at the EU27 average) 
despite a large coverage of persons in regular 
intervention. Namely, the number of persons 
benefiting from regulation intervention exceeds the 
number of persons wanting to work. A majority of 
expenditures (57%) are directed towards 
employment incentives and about 27% to training. 
Public expenditures on labour market policy 
services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditures of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are among the 
lowest in the EU, at 0.05% of GDP (0.19% at the 
EU27 average).(167) 
(167) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
Activation policies
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply.(168) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
The entitlement to unemployment benefit starts 
before the registration for placement. The benefit 
is paid retroactively back to the date of loss of 
work. Within two weeks, the unemployed is 
evaluated in order to assess whether he/she is 
available to work and can be placed immediately 
in a vacant job. After the registration, every 2 
weeks the unemployed reports his/her status. 
Job-search requirements 
Up to 2006, no specific requirements of reporting 
job-search activities had to be fulfilled. Since 
2007, the unemployed person has to prove his/her 
searching activity. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
Vacancies in the PES are not published but can be 
consulted under anonymity by all job-seekers 
through some interactive databases. An estimate, 
done by the Government for the OECD in 2004, 
reports that on average there are 5 direct referrals 
per each unemployed person. Before being 
interviewed by the potential employer, the job-
seeker may be called by the PES for a pre-
selection interview. 
(168) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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Intensive interview  
Every two months an intensive interview is 
scheduled for the unemployed worker. Within 
three months of unemployment t spell for youth 
and within six months for others, an individual 
action plan is created. 
Referral to ALMPs 
Participation in ALMPs is not compulsory at any 
point of the unemployment spell, unless it is 
referred by PES. A negative feature is that, during 
participation to ALMP programs, there is no 
requirement to continue job searching. 
11. MALTA 
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11.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
11.1.1. Employment protection legislation (169) 
The OECD score of tightness of EPL is not 
available for Cyprus and the information on EPL is 
taken from a third source. (170)     
Individual dismissals are only allowed on the basis 
of: 
• a good and sufficient cause- a term which has 
no statutory definition;  
• redundancy. The employer has to terminate the 
contract of the last person engaged in 
employment (“Last In First Out”), with the 
exception of when the employer the last 
employed are related by consanguinity or 
affinity up to the third degree, in which case 
the employer may, instead of terminating the 
employment of such person, terminate that of 
the person next in turn; 
• the employee reaching retirement age. 
The trial period, i.e. the period during which 
regular contracts are not covered by the protection 
legislation and workers cannot claim for unfair 
dismissals - provided that at least 1 week’s notice 
of termination is given by the terminating party to 
the other party where the employment relationship 
has exceeded 1 month-, is relatively short (6 
months unless the parties agree to a shorter term). 
By way of exception to this rule, in the case of 
contracts of service, or collective agreements in 
respect of employees holding technical, executive, 
administrative or managerial posts whose wages 
are at least double the applicable minimum wage, 
such probation period is of 1 year unless a shorter 
period is agreed upon in the contract of service or 
in the collective agreement.  
(169) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(170) This information draws heavily on Zammit & Associates 
Advocates (2009) Employment law overview: Malta 
http://www.zammit-law.com/legal-articles/employment-
law-malta.pdf  
The advance notice to be given by the terminating 
party to the other party is calculated according to 
the period for which the employee has been in the 
employment of the same employer continuously up 
to a maximum of 20 weeks for tenure longer than 7 
years. Longer notice periods may be agreed upon 
in the case of technical, administrative, executive 
or managerial posts due to the nature or 
responsibilities involved in such roles and the 
hand-over usually required in such cases. 
In cases where employment is terminated for good 
and sufficient cause, the employer is not required 
to give advance notice of termination and/or pay 
the employee for any wages relating to such notice 
period or the unexpired period of a definite term 
agreed upon. Typically, the employer would be 
expected to provide a very compelling reason for 
the dismissal of any employee on this ground, 
particularly more so when the dismissal is not 
preceded by any verbal or written disciplinary 
warnings given by the employer to the employee 
over a period before the dismissal. Two written 
warnings given by the employer over a reasonable 
period of time prior to the final warning and 
contemporaneous dismissal should serve to 
demonstrate a degree of prudence on the part of 
the employer if such dismissal is challenged by the 
employee as unfair. If the business in which the 
employee is engaged has undergone a transfer of 
ownership, the employer is not allowed from using 
the "good and sufficient cause" for terminating the 
employment of any employee/s. 
Additional protection from termination of 
employment is given to:  
• employees suffering from any personal injury 
by accident in the course of their employment 
or any occupational disease occurring in the 
service of that employer;  
• full-time female employees during the period 
of maternity leave for the period of 5 weeks 
following the end of such maternity leave, 
during which she may be incapable of working. 
However, if the employee does not resume 
work after the birth of her child or, having 
resumed work, terminates her employment 
without good and sufficient cause within 6 
months of the resumption of work, she would 
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liable to refund the wages received during the 
maternity leave. 
Collective dismissals 
In any such circumstances, the employer is 
expected to comply with the procedure of 
consulting with the employee’s representative 
covering ways and means of avoiding the 
collective redundancies or reducing the number of 
employees affected by such redundancies. The 
employer must also provide the employees’ 
representative and the Director of Labour with a 
written statement providing information about the 
reasons for the redundancies, the number of 
employees he intends to make redundant, the 
number of employees normally employed by him, 
the criteria proposed for the selection of the 
employees to be made redundant, details regarding 
any redundancy payments which are due and the 
period over which redundancies are to be effected.  
The collective redundancies may only become 
effective within 30 days from the date when the 
employees’ representative and the Director of 
Labour are notified about the intended 
redundancies, unless this 30 day period is 
shortened or extended by the Director of Labour. If 
no resolution to the redundancies is attained, the 
employer would be bound to lay off the persons 
engaged last in the employment types affected by 
such redundancies. 
Temporary contracts 
A fixed-term contract can be successively renewed 
up to a maximum of 4 years, after which the 
contact is transformed in an open-ended contract. 
The exception occurs when the employer has 
justifiable reasons for retaining the employee on a 
fixed-term contract. If the employer does not offer 
a contract within 12 days following the expiry of 
the previous fixed-term contract, the contract is 
transformed in an open-ended contract. 
Termination of the contract by one of the party 
before the established term requires the 
terminating party to pay to the other a penalty 
which equals half the wages that the employee 
would have earned in the remaining period of 
employment. The employee with an indefinite 
term contract, on the other hand, is free to 
terminate the contract without any reason. 
11.1.2.  Working time organization (171)   
Malta has a low incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements, intermediate to low work intensity 
and irregularity, intermediate incidence of rotation 
and team work as well as high work autonomy, 
though low work complexity. 
In the 2008 Budget, Government announced the 
launch of a part-time work register for individuals 
wishing to work on part-time basis only. The 
register is mainly intended to provide assistance to 
those who wish to obtain employment that is 
flexible and helps them combine work and family 
life. The register may be considered as one 
measure that assists part-time workers and follows 
the lowering of national insurance contributions 
that have to be paid by part-time workers.   
In Malta, only 27% of workers do not have fixed 
starting and finishing time (almost 40% at the 
EU27 average). Furthermore, for almost ¾ of 
employed, working hours are set by the company 
with no possibility of changes. This indicates a low 
incidence of flexible working time arrangements 
(56% at the EU27 average), in particular if 
compared with Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) 
and Denmark (41%). Only about ¼ of persons in 
employment can adapt working hours within 
certain limits or determine working hours entirely 
by themselves, compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% 
in the Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. 
Furthermore, only about 18% of workers do not 
work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. The 
incidence of atypical work, in particular working 
in the night and on weekend is more frequent than 
in the EU27 average while working in the evening 
is relatively uncommon. Work complexity is low 
as about half of workers perceive their work to 
involve complex tasks (60% at the EU27 average). 
However autonomy at work is high as measured by 
the ability to choose or change the order of tasks, 
methods of work and speed or rate of work. 
Finally, rotating tasks between workers is as 
common as in the EU27 while team work is 
(171) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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considerably more widespread. However, both 
workers involved in teams and in tasks rotation are 
less autonomous in their division of tasks than in 
the EU27 average.  
11.1.3.  Tax and benefit systems (172) 
Malta spends considerably below the EU27 
average on passive labour market policies (about 
0.4% of GDP compared to 1% at the EU27 
average). This is due to both, relatively low benefit  
coverage of unemployed persons (about 37% of 
persons wanting to work are recipients of 
unemployment benefits compared to 44% at the 
EU27 average) as well as relatively low initial net 
replacement rates for low wage, average wage 
persons and one-earner couples, even if topped up 
with the social assistance (at 59%, 45% and 65%, 
respectively compared to 66%, 59% and 67% at 
the EU27). However, net replacement rates 
practically do not change over the unemployment 
spell, thus remaining at a relatively high level after 
5 years of unemployment. Tax wedge is among the 
lowest in the EU, for both low wage persons (19%; 
37% at the EU27 average) and average wage 
persons (24%; 41% at the EU27 average). Overall, 
the interaction of taxes with a withdrawal of 
benefits tends to keep financial incentives to work 
relatively high, though it may contribute to long-
term benefit dependency. 
Unemployment insurance (173)    
Eligibility conditions 
All individuals making at least 52 monthly 
contributions, of which 20 should have been 
contributed in the benefit year, are entitled to 
unemployment benefits or the Special 
Unemployment Benefit. To be able to receive the 
unemployment benefit (a contributory short-term 
benefit) a person: a) must be registering for work 
with the national employment agency; b) the 
(172) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
(173) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
person must be over 16 but under 61 years old. If 
the criteria for social assistance are satisfied the 
Unemployment Benefit is increased and converted 
to, a Special Unemployment Benefit (SUB).  
Should the SUB not be sufficient for the 
unemployed person, this is complemented by 
additional social assistance. Self-employed persons 
who become unemployed are not entitled to UB or 
SUB but may qualify for Unemployment 
Assistance if they satisfy the means test criteria. A 
person may be deprived of the Unemployment 
Benefit or the Special Unemployment Benefit, 
should s/he fail to: 
• attend interviews for potential jobs indicated by 
the employment service (ETC) and/or decline 
any offer for employment  
• attend any training which the ETC deems 
suitable for increasing the unemployed chances 
of finding a job 
• is found working whilst registering for work 
Benefit duration  
The Unemployment Benefit or Special 
Unemployment Benefit is given for a maximum of 
156 days to employees only and depends on the 
number of contributions made.  On exhaustion of 
special unemployment benefit, a client becomes 
normally entitled to unemployment assistance on 
re-assessment. 
Unemployment assistance 
Unemployment assistance is given to those persons 
who are unemployed and who have their 
application reassessed following 6 months from 
the receipt of Unemployment Benefit or Special 
Unemployment Benefit.  In order to qualify for the 
receipt of such benefit, the applicant must satisfy a 
means test.   Other eligible persons are applicants 
(employees) who have not enough social security 
contributions to qualify for UB or SUB as well 
self-employed persons who become unemployed. 
Unemployment assistance is given to employees 
when the 156 days of unemployment benefit or 
special unemployment benefit have elapsed.  
Another way of getting unemployment assistance 
is when an employee who has become unemployed 
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has not enough social security contributions to 
qualify for UB or SUB.  Unemployment assistance 
can also be availed of by the self-employed.  
Unemployment Assistance is given for an 
indeterminate period or until the head of household 
stops registering for work with the public 
employment office or when capital and income 
means test is exceeded through changes in the 
family’s financial situation.  
Employment conditional benefits 
Government Statutory Bonus and Income 
Supplement are given to all employees. Payment 
of the statutory bonus is effected in June and 
December, whereas payment for the income 
supplement is effected in March and September. 
11.1.4.  Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
among the lowest in the EU (about 0.03% of GDP 
compared to 0.5% at the EU27 average) which 
reflects a very low coverage of persons wanting to 
work in regular activation measures. In particular, 
only 3 out of 100 persons wanting to work benefit 
from regular activation (36 persons at the EU27 
average). About 46% of expenditures are directed 
towards training and about 41% to employment 
incentives. Public expenditures on labour market 
policy services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditures of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant) are at 0.11% of 
GDP (0.19% at the EU27 average).(174) 
Direct job creation and employment subsidies 
The ETC submitted an application for funding 
under the European Social Fund Programme 2008-
2013 to launch an Employment Aid Programme. 
The aim of the programme is to promote access to 
employment of disadvantaged groups (youth, 
inactive, individuals over 50 years of age, long-
term unemployed, individuals who had a substance 
abuse problem, individuals leaving correctional 
(174) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
facilities and persons with disability). Employers 
who employ individuals from these target groups 
will benefit from a subsidy consisting of half the 
minimum wage and half the national insurance 
contributions paid by the employer for a minimum 
of 26 weeks to a maximum of 52 weeks. The 
Budget for 2008 expounded on the Gozo (175)   
Employment Aid Scheme, which finances a 
substantial part of the expenses incurred by 
employers who employ unemployed individuals. 
The original scheme requested the creation of 5 
new jobs to be eligible for assistance. The 
eligibility criterion was changed to one new job in 
order to make the scheme more attractive to micro 
enterprises are even more prevalent than in Malta.  
The scheme announced in the 2007 NRP was 
launched to target the long term unemployed. 
Individuals participating in this scheme are 
employed for a period of three months working a 
maximum of 30 hours per week with private 
companies. Government contributes towards 75 
per cent of the national minimum wage. 
All schemes are intended to encourage employers 
in employing individuals who are most at risk of 
becoming long term unemployed. Alleviating their 
training costs and giving them the work exposure 
required to make them adaptable. These schemes 
are intended mainly to interact with training 
measures by the public employment services to 
train unemployed and employed individuals.  
Public employment services 
The ETC has launched a Youth Strategy for 2008 
and 2009 targeted to youth who between 16 and 25 
years not in post-secondary or tertiary education to 
help them make a successful transition to work by 
offering them specialised services covering job 
search assistance, training and work exposure. 
Apart from accessing ETC mainstream 
programmes youth will have the possibility to 
participate in programmes that are tailor made to 
their needs and circumstances. Initiatives include a 
youth employment programme that covers job 
search assistance to youth, career guidance 
services, and employment schemes, ICT job search 
facilities in the community, basic skills training 
(175) Gozo is the second largest island of the Maltese 
Archipelago. 
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and out reach programmes that target early school 
leavers.   
To help the unemployed, particularly youth, to 
acquire work experience while seeking more stable 
forms of employment, registered unemployed 
accepting temporary employment arrangements 
will not lose their ranking order on the 
unemployment register. Social security 
contributions will be credited by the Government 
once their temporary employment ends. 
11.1.5.  Lifelong learning 
The Budget for 2008 announced the setting up of a 
Research and Training Centre in partnership with 
the University of Malta. Apart from initiating 
reforms in the training given to public sector 
employees, the Centre also conducts research in 
policy areas which are of relevance to Malta. 
Government committed €93,100 as “seed capital” 
for the immediate launching of the project.   
Another initiative targeting lifelong learning in the 
country is the Government scholarship scheme for 
Masters and Ph.D. level degree courses. The 
scheme was reissued for the third consecutive year. 
The Budget for 2008 allocated €465,900 for this 
initiative. Furthermore, the Malta Council for 
Science and Technology has applied for funding 
under the European Social Fund 2008-2013 to 
introduce a bursary scheme for postgraduate 
studies at both Masters and Doctoral level. The 
latter initiative was reported in the National 
Reform Programme of 2007. 
 In order to continue consolidating Malta’s 
strength in the ICT sector, the Budget for 2008 
provided additional funds to the My Potential II 
initiative, in order to extend the range of training 
and certification opportunities available under this 
programme. The initiative provides financial 
assistance to approximately 330 students and 
unemployed wishing to train in technology, as well 
as loan arrangements with banks. 
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12.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
The Wassenaar Agreement of 1982 can be 
considered as a landmark in the transformation of 
the Dutch economy, and more particularly, of the 
Dutch labour market. The main terms of the 
agreement included moderate wage increases (with 
overall productivity growth as the main guideline), 
more room for part-time jobs in order to allow for 
a certain redistribution of jobs among workers and 
the unemployed, and more labour market 
flexibility. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
several measures were taken to allow for more 
flexible labour contracts and gradually flexible 
workers became an accepted phenomenon (see for 
all the Flexibility and Security Act, entered into 
force in January 1999). Today, the Dutch labour 
market functions well, but still faces strong 
employment gaps between insiders and outsiders, 
in particular related to the position of the low 
skilled, disabled and older workers, while the 
work-life balance and the career opportunities for 
women are another key challenge. 
12.1.1.  Employment protection legislation (176) 
EPL is among the highest in the EU for regular 
workers, in particular as a result of high regular 
procedural inconveniences and difficulty of 
dismissals, while for temporary workers EPL is 
low. (177)  
(176) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(177) The OECD employment protection indicators are compiled 
from 21 items covering three different aspects of 
employment protection: Individual dismissal of workers 
with regular contracts: incorporates three aspects of 
dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences that 
employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as 
notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice 
periods and severance pay, which typically vary by tenure 
of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of dismissal, as 
determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to 
dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the 
employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as 
compensation and reinstatement). Additional costs for 
collective dismissals: most countries impose additional 
delays, costs or notification procedures when an employer 
dismisses a large number of workers at one time. This 
measure includes only additional costs which go beyond 
those applicable for individual dismissal. It does not reflect 
the overall strictness of regulation of collective dismissals, 
Individual dismissals are considered unfair in case 
of “obviously unreasonable” terminations, and in 
case of dismissals of pregnant women, disabled, 
new mothers and works council members. Lay-
offs have to obey to quite cumbersome procedures 
and can occur through two channels: a) a private 
sector employer wishing to terminate unilaterally 
an employment contract can require prior 
permission from a public administrative body, the 
Centre for Work and Income (CWI). This 
procedure acts as a preventive check to determine 
the reasonableness of any intended dismissal. It is 
financially less onerous than the alternative but 
much longer; b) instead of turning to the public 
employment service, both employers and 
employees can request a local court to dissolve the 
employment contract “for important reasons”. 
While in the first case employers are faced with 
long notice periods (from one to three months, 
depending on the tenure of the employee) and a 
more bureaucratic and time-consuming dismissal 
procedure, the second route is faster, but also more 
expensive as firms are faced with much higher 
severance pay obligations, especially for long job 
tenures (from 6 up to 35 months for job tenure of 
20 years). (178) Nevertheless, this route has 
increasingly been taken, in particular by large 
companies, as the costs for an individual layoff 
rapidly declines relative to the CWI route when the 
salary of the person concerned increases, as it 
usually does with the size of the company. 
Severance payments are tenure dependant (1 
month of salary per year up to the age of 40, 1.5 
months of salary per year up to the age of 50 and 2 
months of salary per year up to the age of 65). 
Somebody with 20 years of job tenure who gets 
fired at age 60, will receive 35 months of 
severance pay according to this scheme. The trial 
period – i.e. the period within which, regular 
which is the sum of costs for individual dismissals and any 
additional cost of collective dismissals. Regulation of 
temporary contracts: quantifies regulation of fixed-term 
and temporary work agency contracts with respect to the 
types of work for which these contracts are allowed and 
their duration. This measure also includes regulation 
governing the establishment and operation of temporary 
work agencies and requirements for agency workers to 
receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent 
workers in the user firm, which can increase the cost of 
using temporary agency workers relative to hiring workers 
on permanent contracts. 
(178) Recently the formula for the calculation of severance pay 
has been changed, essentially lowering it. 
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contracts are not fully covered by employment 
protection provisions and unfair dismissals cannot 
usually be made - is of 1 month for contracts of up 
to 2 years; 2 months for contract with more than 2 
years duration. The option of reinstatement is 
rarely made available to the employee. 
Notwithstanding court rulings, employers in 
practice can choose to replace reinstatement in the 
previous job by payment of compensation. The 
amount of compensation is governed by the 
application of a regular severance pay formula. 
Collective dismissals occur in case at least 20 
workers have been dismissed by one employer in 
the same region over a period of three months. In 
this case, the employer must provide data on the 
financial state of the company, prove that 
alternatives to redundancy have been considered, 
and justify the selection of dismissed employees 
(“last in – first out” principle, or age/sex balance of 
the workforce, for example). The employer must 
inform and consult with works council and trade-
union delegates on alternatives to redundancy and 
ways to mitigate the effects and notify the 
competent regional employment office. A social 
plan will normally be agreed outlining transfers, 
re-training, early retirement measures and financial 
compensation. A thirty days' waiting period allows 
for social plan negotiations, unless the social 
partners have agreed in writing to refrain from the 
waiting period. While there is no legal entitlement 
to severance pay in case of collective dismissal, 
social plans often contain severance pay or top-ups 
to unemployment benefits. 
Temporary employment 
Law permits three successive fixed-term contracts 
not exceeding an overall period of 3 years. A 
fourth renewal or a renewal exceeding a total 
period of 3 years will alter the fixed-term contract 
automatically into a contract of indefinite time. 
The number of renewals and/or the duration can be 
changed (more/less) by collective agreement. No 
limit applies on the duration for the first fixed-term 
contracts, but the 3 years rule applies in case of 
renewals. 
Temporary work agency (TWA) is also generally 
permitted, with the exception of seamen. After the 
first year, 8 renewals are allowed, each for 3 
months. After 3 years of cumulated duration, the 
contract will be transformed into a contract for an 
indefinite period with the temporary work agency. 
The current set up for TWA employment largely 
results from the 1999 Flexibility and Security Act. 
The Act abolished the permit system of temporary 
agencies with respect to their placement services 
and established a standard employment contract 
between the TWA and the worker. Temporary 
agency workers were given, depending on tenure, 
a right to fixed-term or permanent contract with 
the agency, an individual budget for training and 
pension. A key role was given to collective labour 
agreements in the TWA sector. Furthermore, only 
after 26 weeks of working for the same company, 
TWA workers are on par with employees in that 
company concerning pay.  
12.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (179)   
In the Netherlands, almost 50% of workers do not 
have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, 28% of 
workers do not work the same number of days 
every week compared to slightly more than 25% in 
the EU27. Only 36% of persons in employment 
working hours are set by the company with no 
possibility of changes. This indicates highly 
flexible working time arrangements (56% at the 
EU27 average). Also, 53% of persons in 
employment can adapt working hours within 
certain limits or determine working hours entirely 
by themselves (36% at the EU27 average). 
Atypical work, in particular working in the night 
and on Sundays is relatively infrequent and below 
the EU 27 average while working in the evening 
and Saturdays is somewhat more widespread than 
in the EU27. Work complexity is relatively high as 
about 65% of workers perceive their work to 
involve complex tasks (60% at the EU27 average). 
Furthermore, work autonomy is high as measured 
by the ability of workers to change the order of 
tasks, methods of work and speed or rate of work. 
Finally, the incidence of team work and rotation of 
tasks are among the highest in the EU. Workers 
involved either in teams or in tasks rotation are 
(179) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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considerably more autonomous in their division of 
tasks than in the rest of the EU.    
Looking at the distribution of companies according 
to the practices used to organize working time, the 
Netherlands has the highest share of 
establishments with intermediate flexibility. The 
Netherlands has also a high share of companies 
with intermediate flexibility, characterized by a 
high take-up of part-time work and a high 
incidence of unusual working hours. These 
working time arrangements help companies to 
cope with short-term (within a day or week) 
variability of the workload.  
Despite flexible working time arrangements, the 
overtime regulation does not allow for annual 
working time accounts as working time cannot 
exceed 48 hours per week over 16 week period and 
60 hours per week. This contributes to the low 
usage of overtime which is below the EU average. 
The standard working week is restricted by 
collective agreements and totals on average 37 
hours per week. 
Two acts have been essential for increasing 
internal and functional flexibility: the Prohibition 
of Discrimination by Working Hours Act and the 
Working Hours Act (WHA). The first one forbids 
employers to discriminate between employees on 
the basis of a difference in working hours in the 
conditions under which those employees enter, 
extend or terminate a contract of employment. The 
amendments to the Working Hours Act, introduced 
in 1996 to encourage the development of more 
flexible work patterns, provide more opportunities 
for employers and employees to come to a joint 
agreement on working hours, within certain limits. 
The further simplification of the Working Hours 
Act passed in 2006 gives employers and workers 
more opportunity to negotiate working hours at the 
local/organisational level. Several limitations and 
restrictions, following from the WHA, were also 
relieved and maximum daily working hours were 
increased form 10 to 12 hours. The Working Hours 
Adjustment Act adopted in 2000 further supports 
flexibility as it allows workers to increase or 
reduce their working hours irrespective of their 
reasons for wishing to do so. Employers can only 
refuse a request to adapt weekly working hours if 
such a reduction or increase would lead to serious 
problems for the organisation itself.  
Employers can also draw either from a general tax-
favoured savings scheme or a life-course saving 
scheme. The latter scheme allows workers to save 
income or time to be spent on leave periods. 
Individuals can save a maximum of 12 percent of 
yearly gross income up to 210 percent of their 
annual pay, for a maximum of three years of leave 
(against 70 percent of the wage). Employers may 
contribute to such a scheme, which can be 
specified in collective agreements. The employee 
can save for periods of unpaid leave, e.g. care-
leave, sabbatical, terminal care, parental leave, 
training leave or early retirement. The most 
important part regarding this scheme is that 
pension rights are kept during leave. A sabbatical 
will therefore not lead to future lower (pension) 
earnings.  
Collective bargaining parties are expected to 
incorporate and facilitate the Life Course Savings 
scheme into their agreements, and employers are 
obliged to offer the Life Course Savings scheme to 
their employees. 
12.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining systems 
The system of wage formation in the Netherlands 
is fairly stable. Collective bargaining coverage is 
more than 80% (including extension). The sector 
level is dominant, but the number of wage 
agreements at company level is increasing. When 
employees are not covered by an agreement, the 
employer and the individual employee negotiate 
the wage. In some cases, works councils negotiate 
the wage agreement. There are also companies that 
closely follow their sector's agreement, without 
being legally bound to do so. 
12.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (180) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
relatively high (1.4% of GDP compared to 1% at 
the EU27 average) as well as the benefit coverage 
of unemployed (almost 75 persons out of 100 
wanting to work receive unemployment benefits, 
(180) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
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compared to 44 persons at the EU27 average). 
Also, net replacement rates are high at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell - at 73% for 
the low wage and average wage person (at 66% 
and 59%, respectively at the EU27 average) and at 
89% for the one earner couple (67% at the EU27 
average). As net replacement rates taper off only 
gradually over the unemployment spell or even 
slightly increase (in particular if topped up with the 
social assistance), they are among the highest in 
the EU after 5 years. The Netherlands has 
relatively high tax wedges, at 40% for the low 
wage person (37% at the EU27 average) and at 
44% for the average wage person (41% at the 
EU27 average). Tax wedge for the average wage 
person saw a considerably increase over 2001-
2007 (by 4.2 pps.), in particular as a result of an 
increase in social security contributions paid by 
employers and personal income tax. 
Despite social transfers are very effective in 
reducing poverty rate, in particular of the 
unemployed, inactive and low educated, the fast 
withdrawal of benefits and their interaction with 
taxes produce low incentives to work across the 
board, in particular of inactive persons. In 
particular, the second earner's incentives to work 
are strongly affected by the general tax credit of a 
non-participating partner which is transferred 
within a couple for income levels below 6070 €. 
Women's participation is further discouraged by 
unconditional child benefits and income-tested 
child tax credit.(181) A phasing out of the 
transferability of the general tax credit was started 
in 2009, while in 2008 the tax discount for children 
was converted into a child allowance, with 
foreseeable positive impact on the reduction of the 
inactivity trap. According to the government's 
estimations, women account for approximately 
75% of the untapped labour resources in the 
Netherlands. To encourage women to take up a 
job/increase their number of hours worked, the 
government is taking several measures, including 
investments in child care and measures aimed at 
reducing the high marginal tax on the second 
earner. Individual child tax credit and child tax 
credit for second earners aim to support work 
incentives for women, though a greater shift from 
the family income based child tax credit to the 
individual or second earners child tax credit would 
(181) See OECD, Employment Outlook, 2006. 
help to increase labour supply of women even 
further. (182)   
Older workers also face disincentives to work 
longer despite reform measures that removed tax 
incentives for early retirement and eliminated pre-
pension schemes. (183) Older workers represent in 
fact the second largest source of untapped labour 
potential in the Netherlands. As unemployment 
benefit duration is relatively long and 
unemployment benefits can be topped up with 
severance payments, which are tenure dependant, 
older workers may use unemployment as a 
transition to retirement. Furthermore, labour 
contracts legally end together with the obligation 
to pay severance payments when workers get 65 
years old. As employers continue to be obliged to 
pay wages for the first two years of sickness 
absence, they generally prefer to terminate the job, 
thus depressing labour demand.  
Unemployment insurance
Eligibility conditions 
In order to receive salary-related benefits, 
applicants must fulfil the weeks' condition and the 
years condition, i.e. they must have completed at 
least 26 weeks of employment during the last 36 
weeks (1 day/week is sufficient to qualify as a 
working week). Weeks during which claimants 
worked as self-employed do not count. Applicants 
must also have been in employment in at least 4 
years during the last 5 calendar years, in each of 
which a salary over 52 days was paid (4-out-of-5 
condition). It is not required that these 52 days be 
an uninterrupted period of time (1 day/week is 
enough) and the number of hours of work are 
irrelevant. Years spent caring for children aged 
below 6 are fully taken into account in this 
calculation and years spent caring for those aged 6-
12 count for 50%. People working less than 5 
hours per week do not qualify for unemployment 
benefits.  
Replacement rates 
In the first 2 months the replacement rate is of 75% 
of the wage most recently earned (maximum € 
177.03 per day), thereafter it stands at 70%. Levels 
(182) See OECD, Economic Surveys: Netherlands, 2008. 
(183) See OECD, Economic Surveys: Netherlands, 2008. 
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of benefit below the social minimum can be topped 
up under the Supplementary Benefit Act. 
Benefits duration 
The benefits will be payable for as many months 
as the number of years in employment (with a 
maximum of 38 months). 
12.1.5. Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
relatively high (about 0.7% of GDP, 0.5% at the 
EU27 average) and most of them are spent on 
supported employment and rehabilitation (70%), 
followed by employment incentives and training 
(about 15% each). About 40 out of 100 persons 
wanting to work benefit from activation (36 
persons at the EU27 average). Public expenditures 
on labour market policy services (which cover the 
costs of providing services for jobseekers together 
with all other expenditures of the public 
employment services, including overheads and 
functions such as benefit administration where 
relevant) are the highest in the EU, at 0.4% of 
GDP (0.19% at the EU27 average).(184) 
The job availability requirement index calculated 
for 2004 shows that the Netherlands have the 
strictest activation strategy in Europe. To further 
support incentives to work, unemployment benefit 
duration was reduced from 5 years to a maximum 
of 38 months in 2006. In 2007, a new system of 
monitoring job search was introduced, which is 
based on individual targets and after 6 months the 
initial definition of a suitable job is widened. (185) 
Concerning social assistance, the efficiency of 
municipalities in monitoring and activating social 
assistance benefit recipients was raised in 2004 
when the budgetary and implementation 
responsibilities of the social assistance scheme 
were transferred from the national level to the 
municipalities, allowing them to use the budget 
surpluses for other purposes. Social assistance 
benefit recipients are offered a job or training from 
(184) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
(185) Recently, mobility centres were set up to facilitate re-
activation. 
the start and they can top-up income from work 
with benefits. To reduce the high inactivity trap for 
second earners, transferability of the general tax 
credit within a couple will be gradually phased out 
(over a period of 15 years) with some exceptions 
concerning mothers with children under the age of 
6 years and tax payers born after 1971. 
The public employment service (CWI) places job 
seekers into two profiles according to their 
characteristics to reintegrate into employment. In 
the first profile everyone is capable of job search 
while in the second profile job seekers face certain 
obstacles for job searching and reintegration. The 
unemployment agency (UWV) further profiles job 
seekers that are contracted out to private 
replacement providers, which provide most of job 
placement and reintegration services. Recent 
reform strategies have focused on improving the 
employment prospects of target groups most 
difficult to employ, through training, education, 
apprenticeships, wage subsidies and/or working 
while retaining benefits. Benefits for young people 
under 27 years of age were scrapped in 2007 and 
replaced by an apprenticeship/work obligation, 
with the social partners contributing to create more 
apprenticeship positions. New individualised 
action plans were also decided, to reduce the 
number of young people on disability benefit, 
whose number has increased as the conditions to 
access unemployment schemes were tightened. In 
addition, some 10,000 subsidised ‘bridging 
positions’ were created in 2007, for cases where 
disability claimants lose their benefits as a result of 
their claims being re-examined. An Action Plan 
45+ was also adopted in 2007 to improve the 
labour market prospects of older workers, while 
wage subsidies of up to 50% of the statutory 
minimum wage were introduced in 2008 to help 
the long-term unemployed back to work.  
Activation policies 
The role of activation strategies is to enhance the 
search effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
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and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(186) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
In order to be eligible for benefits, the unemployed 
needs to register both for placement and benefit at 
the local PES (CWI). Since work availability and 
active job search are the main aspects of the 
conditionality of benefits, the PES (CWI) assesses 
these aspects at the beginning of the process. 
However, the CWI cannot refuse to support people 
applying for benefits. The unemployment agency 
(UWV) and municipalities make the final 
assessment of entitlement to benefits. 
Job-search requirements 
The continuation of the unemployment status is 
discussed in the context of regular interviews at 
CWI which, however, does not confirm the 
entitlement to the benefits. An agreement on job-
search activities is normally concluded between 
the jobseeker and the CWI counsellor/case 
manager. This agreement sets the framework for 
monitoring and assessing the efforts of the 
jobseeker, where specific requirements depend on 
the capabilities of the individual jobseeker. In 
accordance with individual possibilities, periodic 
targets for job search are set on an individual basis 
and controlled by the case managers. The 
periodicity of the monitoring depends on the 
capabilities of the individual jobseeker. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs 
Employers can request a particular number of 
jobseekers to be referred to a vacancy. In the case 
of both “closed” and “semi-open” vacancies, the 
adviser may send jobseekers a letter drawing their 
attention to suitable vacancies. Pre-selection 
interviews may take place if this is agreed with the 
employers. 
(186) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5.  
Intensive interview  
At the initial registration, the jobseeker’s distance 
from the labour market is assessed by the CWI. 
Those who are ready to work may be asked to 
attend collective information sessions. Those who 
are not job-ready receive another intensive 
interview to formulate an advice with regard to 
reintegration activities, after which they are 
transferred to the UWV or municipalities for a 
“reintegration trajectory”. The frequency and 
intensity of the interviews depend on the 
circumstances of the individual jobseeker. In 
general, the support becomes more intensive as the 
unemployment spell increases in duration. 
Referral to active labour market policies 
The CWI does not create action plans for those 
clients who are ready to work, but provides 
reintegration advices to UWV and municipalities 
after a qualifying interview for clients that are not 
considered "job-ready". These advices on 
reintegration activities could be understood as an 
action plan. UWV and the municipalities are 
responsible for the reintegration of hard-to-place 
clients, who tend to be contracted out to private 
and community providers. Participation in these 
activities is compulsory and does not depend on 
the duration of the unemployment spell. The CWI 
co-operates with the Taskforce Youth 
Unemployment to enhance the efforts to integrate 
young people in the labour market. There is a 
variety of opportunities for young people promoted 
by CWI, e.g. work experience or training on the 
job. The targets of the Taskforce (40 000 jobs for 
youth) was reached in 2007, so the Taskforce has 
ended recently. 
12.1.6.  Lifelong learning 
The Netherlands scores favourable in terms of 
human capital and good employability of workers. 
Its share of public expenditures on education in 
GDP is close to the EU15 average (5.2 %). The 
education of adults scores favourable compared to 
the EU15 average, with an equal share of medium 
educated adults (42%), below the EU15 average 
share of low educated (27%) and above the EU15 
average share of high educated workers (31%). 
The share of early school leavers is below the 
EU27 average. The Netherlands has relatively high 
on-the-job employability as measured by learning, 
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training and task rotation. (187) Participation in 
lifelong learning (17%) is above the EU average 
regardless of economic activity, age and education. 
However, it has remained largely stable over 
recent years, despite an ambitious national target 
(20% by 2010) and commitments of social 
partners. Moreover, the difference in the 
participation in lifelong learning between older 
(7.9%) and prime age (16.6%) workers is among 
the highest in the EU implying considerably lower 
investment in the employability of older workers. 
Furthermore, participation in lifelong learning of 
inactive (10%) is much lower than participation in 
lifelong learning of employed and unemployed 
(18% both). Participation in continuous vocational 
training courses is slightly above the EU25 
average and expenses on continuous vocational 
training (CVT) courses account for almost 2% of 
total labour costs.  
The Dutch system of CVT is based on the 1996 
Adult and Vocational Training Act, which does not 
set any individual statutory right to educational 
leave for employees, but gives them the possibility 
to save money for leave periods,  through the so-
called "life course" arrangement since 2006.  
(187) See Pacelli for the construction of the indicator, 2008. 
While the government is responsible for the 
education of the unemployed in the context of 
reintegration measures - where the UWV, besides 
providing unemployment benefits, also reimburse 
the costs of work-oriented training for a period of 
maximum three months - employers and 
employees are responsible for the education of 
workers beyond initial education. To this end, they 
have established the so-called Education and 
Development Funds to promote vocational 
training- and employability policies at company 
level and to fund vocational training of individual 
companies. 
With the aim of increasing the share of people with 
intermediate vocational training and of stimulating 
additional education both by the employed and 
unemployed, a 'temporary agency on work and 
education programmes' was launched in 2005, 
initially for a period of two years, then further 
extended till 2011. Its aim was to develop and 
implement individual projects combining learning 
and working and jointly organised by employment 
agencies, employers and education institutions, as 
well as to implement education projects for the 
weakest groups of unemployed people; and to 
provide young workers with a certification of 
competencies and experience acquired.  
13. PORTUGAL 
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13.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
Portugal belongs to the group of Southern Europe 
countries with low flexibility/adaptability and 
relatively low security/income protection. Current 
labour market institutions have not allowed for a 
smooth adjustment to globalization after Portugal 
entered EMU. Addressing rigidities in the labour 
market within the flexicurity framework (as a 
policy package) is essential to enhance the 
adaptability of the labour force and to address 
long-term labour market challenges. This is also a 
major focus of the first flexicurity pathway. 
The new labour code adopted in September 2008 is 
a first step in the direction of reducing the 
segmentation of the labour market and increasing 
its adaptability. Besides facilitating and 
streamlining the procedural requirements for 
dismissals, it has facilitated internal flexibility for 
companies, rationalised collective bargaining and 
encouraged firm-level agreements. 
13.1.1.  Employment protection legislation (188) 
Portugal has the highest employment protection 
legislation for regular workers in Europe, with 
particularly high severance payments. The OECD's 
indicator for the strictness of employment 
protection for regular workers is at 3.5 (2.3 at un-
weighted EU average). This has produced a high 
share of fixed-term workers, despite relatively high 
employment protection legislation for fixed-term 
workers (the employment protection index is at 2.8 
against 2.2 at the EU average). While the 
conversion rate from temporary to permanent 
contracts was relatively high at the beginning of 
2000 (about half of all temporary contracts were 
converted to permanent contracts from 2000 to 
2001) it dropped enormously in mid-2000 (only 
about 10% of all temporary contracts were 
converted to permanent contracts from 2005 to 
2006 ). On the contrary, the indicator related to 
collective dismissals is at 1.9, the lowest in 
Europe. 
(188) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
Individual dismissals are permitted for economic 
reasons and for lack of professional or technical 
capability. Dismissals for individual redundancy 
must not involve posts also manned by people on 
fixed-term contracts. Dismissals for lack of 
competence are only possible after the introduction 
of new technology or change to job functions. 
Where some of the formalities are not followed or 
where the grounds for dismissal are declared 
unfounded by a judge or lacking fundamental 
procedural aspects, then the dismissal is deemed to 
be unfair. The burdensome of procedural 
requirements associated with individual dismissals 
score high in the OECD's EPL index. The 
employer must address a written notice to 
employee and employee representatives justifying 
the reasons for dismissal and the lack of suitable 
alternatives. In case of individual termination for 
unsuitability, a replacement must be hired. In case 
of economic redundancy, the employee and the 
employee’s representatives have, if they wish, 3 
working days to call in the Labour Inspectorate 
and the latter has 7 days to react and verify 
justification of dismissal. The notice period varies 
according to tenure durations, and it stands at 15 
days for 9 months tenure, 30 days for 4 years 
tenure, and at 75 days for 20 years tenure. The 
severance pay is one of the highest in the EU, and 
amounts to 1 month pay per year of service for all 
workers, starting from a minimum of 3 months. 
The trial period for open-ended contracts, that’s' 
the period during which the protection against 
individual dismissal does not apply, is relatively 
long as it stands at 90 days for general workers, 
180 days for jobs with technical complexity or 
requiring special skills or trust or that imply high 
levels of responsibility, and 240 days for managers 
and senior officers/top executives. In case the 
dismissal is irregular because some of the 
formalities have not been properly followed, the 
worker has no right to back pay, nor to 
reinstatement, but only to a compensation of 7.5-
22.5 days of pay per year of service (typically up 
to 15 days per year of service). In case of illegal 
dismissal because the grounds for dismissal are 
declared unfounded by a judge, back pay is limited 
to one year and the worker can choose between 
reinstatement and compensation, typically of one 
month of pay per year of service (with minimum 
payment of 3 months). In the second half of 2008, 
the government put forward new legislation that, 
starting from 17 February 2009, will significantly 
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simplify dismissal procedures. The most important 
changes include notice periods for dismissals being 
reduced for employees with less than four years 
tenure, a distinction to be made between dismissals 
that are illegal and those that are merely irregular, 
and the length of time that employees will have to 
launch an unfair dismissal claim will be reduced 
from one year to 60 days. 
The procedure and guarantees for collective 
dismissals apply already when only 2 or more 
workers are dismissed within 90 days in firms with 
less than 51 employees or 5+ workers in firms 
employing at least 51 employees for structural, 
technological or market reasons. All in all, the 
criteria to be applied in case of collective dismissal 
are less strict than for individual dismissals. The 
employer has the duty to inform and consult with 
works council or trade union delegations on 
alternatives to redundancy, on the selection 
standards and on possible ways to mitigate the 
effects of collective dismissal. It must also notify 
the service in charge of labour relations. No 
specific regulations exist concerning severance pay 
or selection criteria to apply in case of collective 
dismissal. In particular, there is no duty to retrain 
or transfer workers to another post and no priority 
rules exist based on tenure or occupation. 
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts are permitted, inter alia, for 
a) business start-ups, b) launching a new activity 
of uncertain duration and c) recruiting workers in 
search of their first job and long-term unemployed. 
Since the reform of the Labour Code adopted in 
2008, the maximum duration of fixed-term 
contracts is three years when there is a fixed date 
of termination and six years where there is no 
fixed date of termination (e.g. for completion of a 
particular task), for a maximum of four renewals. 
Temporary work agency (TWA) employment is 
allowed to cover “objective situations”, including 
seasonal activity and substitution of absent 
workers. Work contracts are concluded between 
the temporary employee and the TWA, while the 
TWA concludes a different type of contract with 
the final user. Contracts between the temporary 
employee and the TWA may be entered into for an 
unlimited duration, with no restrictions on the 
number of renewals and prolongations. Contracts 
between the TWA and the final user have a 
maximum duration of two years. Existing 
regulations ensure equal treatment of regular 
workers and agency workers at the user firm. 
The reform of the labour code introduced in 2003 
eased the procedures for collective dismissals. 
However, in practice it did not add much to labour 
market flexibility. As a result, employers still 
typically use temporary contracts to adjust labour 
input, which results in a high share of temporary 
workers. Alternatively, employers contract out 
arrangements to "independent" (bogus self-
employed) workers who are in fact engaged in 
regular activities with a single employer. The 2003 
reform also partly reduced incentives for self-
employment, as the more favourable treatment of 
self employment for social security purposes was 
reduced to converge to the regular dependent 
employees' treatment. However, the share of self-
employed in non-agricultural sector remains 
relatively high (12% in 2008). Besides legislation 
rigidities concerning hiring and firing, also the 
implementation of procedures is cumbersome, thus 
reducing the effectiveness of workers' protection 
and further increasing dismissal costs for 
employers.  Despite the 2003 reform also provided 
for more flexibility in the use of fixed-term 
contracts and expanded the scope for flexibility in 
collective agreements at the firm level regarding 
dismissal rules, EPL for fixed-term contracts 
continues to be relatively high and to hamper the 
labour market entrance of young, who experience 
high unemployment rates in Portugal. Cross 
country-comparison shows that in particular low 
educated young find it more difficult to find 
permanent jobs. (189) More recently, the possible 
duration of temporary agency work was extended 
to 24 months (from previously 12 months) in 2007, 
while the new Labour Code adopted in 2008, has 
eased and simplified the procedural requirements 
for the dismissal of employees. As of January 
2009, the individual dismissal procedure consists 
of three steps (worker notification; worker defence 
allegations; employer's final decision). Also, the 
maximum duration of fixed-term contracts has 
been fixed at three years when there is a fixed date 
of termination of the contract, and at six years 
where there is no fixed date of termination (e.g. for 
completion of a particular task). 
(189) OECD, 2008, Economic Surveys, Portugal. 
243 
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
13.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (190)   
In Portugal, only less than 25% of workers do not 
have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, for 75% of 
persons in employment their working hours are set 
by the company with no possibility of changes. 
This indicates a low incidence of flexible working 
time arrangements (56% at the EU27 average), in 
particular if compared with Sweden (34%), 
Netherland (36%) and Denmark (41%). Only one 
fifth of persons in employment can adapt working 
hours within certain limits or determine working 
hours entirely by themselves, compared to 60% in 
Sweden, 53% in the Netherlands and 50% in 
Denmark. Furthermore, only 13% of workers do 
not work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. The 
incidence of atypical work, such as working in the 
night, in the evening and on weekends is among 
the lowest in the EU. Work complexity is 
somewhat lower than in the EU27 - as about 55% 
of workers perceive their work to involve complex 
tasks (60% at the EU27 average) - as also 
autonomy at work as measured by the ability to 
choose or change the order of tasks, methods of 
work and speed or rate of work. Finally, the 
incidence of team work and rotation of tasks is 
among the lowest in the EU and teams and 
workers involved in tasks rotation are considerably 
less autonomous in their division of tasks than in 
the rest of the EU.    
Portugal has the highest share of companies 
characterized by low working-time flexibility 
(39% of all companies). This company type is also 
the most prevalent relative to the EU average 
distribution of companies. 
Existing restrictions on the flexibility of working 
hours and low adaptability of practices in the 
workplace have lead to scarce internal flexibility, 
which may be impinging on firms' productivity, 
whereas some margins for companies to adopt 
flexible working hours had been created in 2003. 
(190) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
The new Labour Code adopted in 2008, besides 
facilitating and streamlining the procedural 
requirements for dismissal, also facilitates internal 
flexibility for companies, rationalise collective 
bargaining and encourages firm-level agreements, 
by giving more room for manoeuvre to agreements 
at the enterprise level. On working time, the new 
labour code has introduced annual ‘working time 
accounts’ of 200 hours and more adaptability at the 
workplace, there including the possibility to work 
on ‘concentrated schedules’. 
13.1.3. Wage setting and wage bargaining 
systems 
Wage formation in the private sector is largely 
underpinned by collective bargaining, mainly at 
branch level. The government plays a role in wage 
setting directly by extending collective agreements 
if both signatory parties ask for it, and indirectly 
by publishing official previews of the expected 
inflation, which is also used for wage negotiations. 
Changes in the collective bargaining procedure, to 
enhance the responsiveness of wage settings to 
productivity and skill differentials across sectors, 
were introduced in 2003 and further on in 2006.  
Due to the numerous small companies in the 
majority of sectors, wages agreed upon in these 
branch agreements tend to be considerably below 
the effectively paid remunerations in larger 
companies and in companies with high 
productivity. 
13.1.4.  Tax and benefit system (191) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
close to the EU average (1.1% of GDP, 1% of 
GDP at the EU27 average). The benefit coverage 
of unemployed is somewhat above the EU27 
average (more than 50 persons out of 100 persons 
wanting to work are recipients of unemployment 
benefits; 44 persons at the EU27 average). 
Unemployed persons benefit from both generous 
unemployment benefits, as demonstrated by high 
(191) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
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initial net replacement rates (78% for low wage 
persons, 84% for average wage persons and 75% 
for one-earner couples with children), as well as 
generous severance payments in case of dismissal 
on regular contract. This is in line with Portugal 
having a relatively low (and below the EU15) 
average risk of poverty rate among the 
unemployed. However, after unemployment 
benefits are exhausted, the net replacement rates 
drop to zero, unless they are topped up with the 
social assistance (amounting only 24% for low 
wage persons, 17% for average wage persons and 
47% for one-earner couples with children). As 
long-term unemployment rate in Portugal is high 
(almost 50%), this may increase overall at-risk-of-
poverty rates in the country. To partly overcome 
these limitations in the social safety net, the 
minimum guaranteed income was replaced in 2003 
by the social insertion income, a scheme with 
increased benefits for large households and 
stronger activation measures for the beneficiaries. 
Temporary workers are only partially eligible for 
unemployment benefits (and unemployment 
assistance) which leads to their considerable 
disadvantage compared to permanent workers.  
Tax wedge is relatively low, for the low-wage 
person at 33% (37% at the EU27 average) and for 
the average-wage person at 37% (41% at the EU27 
average). However, marginal effective tax rates are 
relatively high for certain population groups. To 
improve the incentives to work and to facilitate the 
transition from unemployment to work, Portugal 
reformed its unemployment benefits system in 
2006, by tightening eligibility criteria, establishing 
a closer link between the duration of benefits and 
the contribution period, strengthening availability 
to work conditions (with the introduction of an 
obligation to report to the PES every two weeks) 
and by introducing stricter sanctions for fraud/non-
compliance. The way benefits are calculated was 
modified to avoid situations where benefits were 
higher than the net reference wage. Stricter rules 
were also introduced for the long-term 
unemployed to limit the current high access to 
earlier retirement without pension cuts. 
Unemployment insurance (192)  
Eligibility conditions 
To benefit from unemployment insurance, the 
claimant must have at least 450 days of salaried 
work and contribution payment, or assimilated 
situation, in the past 24 months. There is no 
possibility of voluntary insurance. Those 
unemployed who do not qualify for unemployment 
insurance can still benefit from the means-tested 
unemployment assistance if they have done at least 
180 days of salaried work in the past 12 months; 
have a monthly household income per capita not 
exceeding 80% of the Social Support Index (IAS); 
and have exhausted entitlement to primary benefit 
or don't have completed the qualifying period for 
unemployment benefit. 
Replacement rates 
The unemployment benefit amounts to 65% of 
reference earnings up to a limit of 3 times the IAS. 
The unemployment benefit cannot be superior to 
the reference earnings minus workers' social 
contributions and withhold tax. The reference 
earnings is defined as R/360, where R = total 
registered earnings within the first 12 months prior 
to the 2nd month preceding the date of 
unemployment. The minimum payable is equal to 
the level of the IAS except where previous 
earnings were lower than this level. Concerning 
the self-employed, if during the qualifying period 
the employee had simultaneously also a self-
employed activity with revenue inferior to 50% of 
IAS, then once in unemployment (from the 
salaried work), eligibility to unemployment 
insurance still prevails. Unemployment assistance 
amounts to 80% of the IAS for persons without 
dependents and 100% for those with dependents. 
The reference earnings is defined as R/180, where 
R = total registered earnings within the first 6 
months prior to the 2nd month preceding the date 
of unemployment. The amount of the 
unemployment assistance granted after the 
exhaustion of the primary benefit cannot be 
superior to the amount of the precedent primary 
benefit. 
(192) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
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Benefit duration  
The duration of benefits is proportional to age and 
length of contribution (between 9 and 30 months). 
The duration of unemployment assistance is the 
same as for primary benefit; if unemployment 
assistance is granted after the exhaustion of 
primary scheme benefit, then the assistance is 
restricted to half of the period. 
13.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Portugal spends 0.4% of GDP on active labour 
market policies (0.5% at the EU27 average) and, 
per beneficiary, it spends less on active than on 
passive measures. About half of expenditures on 
active labour market policies are directed towards 
training and about one third on employment 
incentives. The coverage of persons wanting to 
work in regular activation measures is somewhat 
below the EU27 average as about 29 out of 100 
persons wanting to work benefit from regular 
activation (36 persons at the EU27 average). As it 
is also the case in other Southern Europe countries, 
Portugal has also relatively low expenditures on 
labour market policy services (which cover the 
costs of providing services for jobseekers together 
with all other expenditure of the public 
employment services, including overheads and 
functions such as benefit administration where 
relevant), despite an increased inflow into 
unemployment since 2001 (0.12% of GDP 
compared to 0.19% of GDP at the EU27 average). 
(193)  
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
(193) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(194) 
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Applicant for unemployment benefits must register 
at the Employment Centre within 90 days from the 
beginning of unemployment, and then apply for 
unemployment benefits at the Social Security 
Centre. Unemployment benefits are paid as from 
the date of the application for benefit. While 
determining the rights to benefit, PES has an 
obligation to check whether there are not any 
suitable vacancies, apprenticeships, appropriate 
training slots or other active labour market 
programmes available for the jobseeker. 
Job-search requirements 
Benefit recipients need to regularly present 
themselves either at the placement service, the 
benefit office or another competent administrative 
office. Independent job search is compulsory since 
2007, but the terms of the required proofs vary 
from one beneficiary to another, depending mainly 
on their personal employment plan. There is no 
minimum required intensity job-search activities 
set by law. The PES and the beneficiary jointly 
define in the personal employment plan the job-
search activities to be undertaken in a given 
period. When jobseekers participate in labour 
market programmes, they are no longer considered 
available for taking up employment and therefore 
have no longer to comply with job availability 
requirements. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs 
Candidates are convened by the PES in order to be 
given information on suitable job offers and to 
verify qualifications, experience and personal 
abilities in relation to specific job requirements. 
When the candidate and the employment 
counsellor agree on a suitable offer, the candidate 
(194) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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is referred to the employer. The employer’s contact 
details are generally not made public. The PES is 
working at increasing the degree of “openness” of 
vacancies by expanding available on-line services. 
Intensive interview  
Whenever possible, the first interview takes place 
during the initial registration for placement, when 
the client’s occupational profile and life history are 
identified, and his/her employability assessed. 
Jobseekers are asked for an interview as often as 
necessary to comply with the various stages 
defined in their personal employment plan. The 
number of interviews depends on the client’s 
employability profile and his/her distance from the 
labour market.  
Action Plan  
Unemployed persons are convoked to define their 
personal employment plan three months (in case of 
youth) or six months (in case of adults) at the 
maximum after registration at the PES. Depending 
on the individual characteristics of each candidate, 
the personal employment plan may be defined 
either collectively or individually. Usually, the 
action plan is defined in one intervention only. 
Whenever necessary (for example in situations of 
unemployment persistence at 6 or 12 months) 
additional individual interviews can be held. 
Referral to active labour market policies  
Jobseekers are required to agree to participate in 
active employment policies proposed by the PES, 
regardless of their classification in any target 
group. While targeted jobseekers such as young 
public are given priority, the intensity of 
interventions is rather similar to ordinary 
unemployed. 
13.1.6.  Lifelong learning 
Portugal scores relatively poor in terms of human 
capital investment, implying relatively low 
employability of workers and poor adoption of 
new technologies (harmful for productivity 
growth). It has a significantly low educational 
attainment of adults (more than 70% of adults have 
at most the lower secondary education) and a high 
share of early school dropouts (above 40% of 
young have at most lower secondary education and 
are not in further education or training) implying 
persisting gap in human capital compared to the 
other EU countries. A low employability of 
workers is further emphasized by low participation 
in life-long-learning (LLL), low and declining 
(over 1999-2005) participation in continual 
vocational training (CVT), low investment by 
enterprises in training of adults and poor pupils' 
performance according to the PISA study. 
However, the public expenditures on education (as 
a % of GDP) are slightly above the EU average.  
To tackle the shortage of human capital, coupled 
with a poor catch-up pace, Portugal has launched 
several reform measures, including the New 
Opportunities Initiative, started in 2001. The 
programme aims to improve the employability of 
adult workers and reduce the number of school 
dropouts through widening the options in 
vocational education and providing double-
certification courses (general and professional). 
The initiative could play an important role in 
facilitating labour market adjustment, provided it 
is implemented on a large scale and effectively. 
The aims, tools and methods of the initiative have 
been confirmed in the tripartite agreement on 
vocational education and training (VET) signed in 
2007. This agreement paves the way for a much 
needed reform of the Portuguese VET, largely 
amending the basic law on vocational education 
and training dating from 1991. The agreement has 
defined the strategic objectives of the system, 
introduced new tools and redesigned the 
institutional framework of vocational training. A 
National Catalogue of Qualifications has been 
created, including occupational profiles and 
training guidelines, as well as an Individual 
Competences Notebook registering all the 
competences acquired over the life course. The 
system of national certification has been also 
reformed, with the setting-up of a National System 
of Qualifications, and the creation of a ‘vocational 
training cheque’, a public tool for the direct 
funding of individual training needs aimed at 
ensuring the right to individual vocational training. 
From its part, the Labour Code passed in 2003 
stipulates that the employer has to ensure that 
every year 10% of workers with permanent 
contracts take part in a training activity, and that 
workers have the right to take a minimum of 35 
hours of VET per year.  
14. SLOVAKIA 
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14.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
14.1.1. Employment protection legislation (195) 
Employment protection legislation was liberalized 
in 2003 for workers on both permanent and 
temporary contracts. The valid cases for fixed-term 
contracts, the number of possible renewals and the 
maximum overall duration of temporary 
employment were increased, while the valid 
reasons to terminate a work contract and the 
regulations for collective dismissals were both 
relaxed. EPL index for regular contracts (2.4) is 
close to the EU average and is pushed up by 
regular procedural inconveniences, notably long 
notice period, and relatively high severance 
payments for workers with short job tenure. 
However, as worker capability or job redundancy 
are adequate and sufficient ground for dismissal, 
unjustified dismissals with a reinstatement apply 
only in cases discriminating on the basis of the 
race, etc. EPL strictness for collective dismissals is 
relatively high (3.8) as procedures involve the 
notification of third parties, thus producing 
significant delays and related costs. EPL strictness 
for temporary contracts is low (1.2) as hiring 
regulations for both fixed term contracts and 
contracts with temporary work agency are loose.  
Individual dismissals 
Individual dismissals are allowed for redundancy 
on the basis of economic and organizational 
reasons as well as personal reasons (such as 
continual minor breaches of work discipline or 
unsatisfactory work results). In the latter case, 
notice can be given to an employee, provided that 
he was, in the last six months, advised of the 
possibility of notice in writing, in conjunction with 
the breach of work discipline or unsatisfactory 
work results. Notice periods are among the longest 
in the EU for workers with short job tenures as 
they stand at 2 months for workers with between 9 
months and 4 years of job tenure (3 months for 
workers above 5 years of job tenure), regardless of 
underlying reasons for dismissal. Also severance 
payments which apply for workers dismissed on 
(195) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
the grounds of redundancy are relatively high for 
workers with short job tenure and amount 2 
average monthly earnings for workers with 
between 9 months and 4 years of job tenure (3 
average monthly earnings for workers above 5 
years of job tenure). The employee is entitled to 
severance payments if he/she agrees with the 
termination of employment relationship before the 
commencement of the notice period. An employee 
who is made redundant or whose employment is 
terminated due to organisational or health reasons 
is entitled to receive severance pay which is equal 
to at least double his/her average monthly 
earnings. After 5 years of tenure with an employer, 
such employee is entitled to receive severance pay 
which is equal to at least triple his/her average 
monthly earnings. Higher severance pay may be 
agreed in an employment contract or collective 
labour agreement. An unfair dismissal claim can 
be made no later than 2 months from the date upon 
which the employment was to terminate. 
Compulsory compensation for unfair dismissal 
equals to 12 monthly wages. Further compensation 
is to be determined by the courts if an employer 
does not allow the employee to work or if a law 
suit in respect of unfair dismissal takes longer than 
12 months.  
The trial period may be agreed in the employment 
contract for a maximum of three months and may 
not be prolonged. The contracting parties may 
agree on a longer notice period and higher 
severance pay in an employment contract, as well 
as in a collective labour agreement. Most 
collective agreements contain provisions that are 
about the same as those in legislation, with the 
exception of those in the mining, manufacturing 
and electricity, gas and water supply industries 
where provisions are slightly more generous. 
However, collective bargaining coverage is very 
low (less than 5% of employees) in these 
industries. 
Collective dismissals 
Procedures for collective dismissals are quite 
cumbersome, in particular as they involve the 
notification of third parties. Collective dismissals 
apply from 20 workers onwards in the course of 90 
days, and require the written notification of 
employee representatives (with full information 
about reasons, number and categories of workers 
Annex - Description of labour market institutions - EA country fiches 
14. Slovakia 
to be dismissed, selection criteria) and public 
authorities (National Labour Office).  The 
employee representatives may submit comments to 
the National Labour Office and an employer shall 
negotiate with the National Labour Office the 
measures enabling the prevention or limitation of 
collective redundancies (in particular, negotiation 
over conditions for maintaining employment; 
possibilities of employing discharged employees 
with other employers; possibilities of discharged 
employees applying themselves at work in the 
event of their retraining). Only after agreement 
with employee representative is reached, which 
produces a delay of at least one month, the notice 
period can start. No special regulations apply for 
collective dismissals concerning the severance pay. 
Temporary employment 
A fixed term employment may be agreed, extended 
or renewed for a maximum of three years without 
specifying an objective reason. It can only be 
extended or renewed once within the 3-year 
period. Another extension or renewal of fixed-term 
employment may only be agreed for material or 
objective reasons. The cumulated 36-month 
maximum duration of successive fixed-term 
contracts shall not apply if fixed-term contracts are 
concluded for material or objective reasons. 
Temporary work agency (TWA) employment is 
generally allowed with no restrictions on types of 
work, number of renewals and cumulated duration 
of temporary work agency contracts. However, the 
set up of a temporary work agency appear be 
cumbersome as it requires both special 
administrative authorisation and reporting 
requirements. Working conditions, including wage 
conditions and employment conditions for TWA 
workers must be equally favourable to those of 
comparable workers at the user fir, with the 
exception of wage conditions which do not need to 
be equally favourable during a three month period. 
14.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (196)  
Slovakia has low incidence of flexible working 
time arrangements, intermediate incidence of 
atypical work, high work intensity and irregularity, 
intermediate to high incidence of rotation and team 
work, low work autonomy and intermediate work 
complexity. In Slovakia, about 35% of workers do 
not have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 
40% at the EU27 average) and do not work the 
same number of days every week (slightly more 
than 25% in the EU27). However, for 70% of 
persons in employment working hours are set by 
the company with no possibility of changes. This 
indicates a low incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements (56% at the EU27 average), in 
particular if compared with Sweden (34%), 
Netherland (36%) and Denmark (41%). Only one 
fifth of persons in employment can adapt working 
hours within certain limits or determine working 
hours entirely by themselves, compared to 60% in 
Sweden, 53% in the Netherlands and 50% in 
Denmark. Atypical work, in particular working in 
the night, in the evening and during the weekend, 
however, is more widespread than in the EU 
average. Work complexity as measured by the 
share of workers perceiving their work to involve 
complex tasks is close to the EU27 average (62%). 
Autonomy at work is low as measured by the 
ability of workers to choose or change the order of 
tasks, methods of work and speed or rate of work 
as well as solve unforeseen problems on their own. 
The incidence of team work and rotation of tasks, 
on the other hand, is above the EU average; 
however teams and workers involved in tasks 
rotation are much less autonomous in their division 
of tasks than in the rest of the EU.    
To increase labour-market flexibility, the 2003 
Labour Code deregulated working time. Maximum 
working time with one employer is set at 48 hours 
per week, including over time. The new law also 
allows more flexible working hours as employers 
can design working time either evenly or unevenly 
across weeks. Maximum limit for required 
(196) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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overtime is set at 150 hours a year and an 
additional overtime can be agreed upon with 
employees, up to 250 hours a year. 
In the same vein, the new legislation adopted in 
2003 restricted the protection of employees in the 
case of termination of employment concluded for a 
working-time shorter than 20 hours a week. This 
relation may be terminated by both employers and 
employees for any reason or without statement of 
reason. The notice period is 15 days (compared 
with 2-3 months for regular employees) and the 
employee is not covered by employment protection 
provisions relating to permanent or fixed-term 
contracts or collective redundancies. However, this 
employment protection exemption for part-time 
workers has had little impact on the use of part-
time work as low average wages, a weak network 
of family service and traditions render part-time 
work unattractive for workers.(197) 
14.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining system 
The Slovak wage formation system is a mixture of 
different approaches. Approximately 30% of all 
employees are covered by collective agreements, 
the higher share of them working in the public 
sector. State authorities play a role mainly in 
defining the minimum level of wages and in 
defining the wage of civil servants and certain 
other public employees. While collective 
bargaining is predominant at the sectoral level in 
both the public and the private sector, in the latter 
collective bargaining can also take place at the 
company level. 
Nation-wide sectoral wage agreements can be 
legally extended to companies that are not covered 
by these agreements or did not participate in the 
bargaining process. While legal extensions have 
existed in the Slovak Republic since 1991, they 
were first abolished (i.e. made conditional upon 
written consent of non-participating firms) in 
2004, and then reintroduced in 2007 with the 
possibility for individual employers to request 
exoneration from legal extension on grounds of 
firm characteristics or local labour market 
conditions. On the occasion of the entry of 
Slovakia into the euro area on 1 January 2009, it 
was agreed by the government and the social 
(197) See Vagac, 2006, Contribution to the EEO Autumn Review 
2006 "Flexicurity", European Employment Observatory.  
partners that in future the indicators of labour 
productivity growth would have been respected as 
a decisive factor for their wage policy. 
14.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (198) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies 
(0.3 % of GDP in 2007) are among the lowest in 
the EU (at 1.0% of GDP at the EU27 average), 
despite a high unemployment rate, including very 
high long term unemployment rate. The reason is 
very low benefit coverage of unemployed persons 
as only about 20 out of 100 persons wanting to 
work are recipients of unemployment benefits (44 
persons at the EU27 average). Initial net 
replacement rates are 61%, 64% and 58% for the 
low wage, average wage person and one earner 
couple with two children (66%, 59% and 67%, 
respectively at the EU27 average), however, they 
drop to 0% after 6 months, reaching the net 
replacement rate of 28%, 20% and 44% 
respectively, only if topped up with the social 
assistance.  
Slovakia has introduced substantial reforms of its 
social assistance, unemployment insurance and 
taxation systems. The Social Insurance Act of 
2004 introduced somewhat stricter eligibility 
criteria (required contribution period of 3 years 
within the past 4 years instead of 2 years within the 
past 3 years)(199), reduced unemployment benefit 
replacement rates (to 50% of the assessment base 
over the entire unemployment spell) and benefit 
duration (unified to 6 months from previously 6-9 
months). Also means-tested benefits were 
substantially reduced, in particular benefit 
replacement rates after expiry of unemployment 
benefits. A new set of motivating benefits were 
introduced instead, which are conditional on the 
activity of the recipient (e.g. means-tested 
activation benefits granted to persons who take 
part in education and retraining or small municipal 
works). Also, the tax wedge decreased 
(198) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
(199) In 2006, the required contribution period for fixed term 
employees was reduced to 2 years within the last 4 years, 
with lower unemployment benefit duration (4 months).   
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substantially, for low wage persons by 4.9 pps. to 
35.6% (37% at the EU27 average), and for average 
wage persons by 3.2 pps. to 38.5% (41% at the 
EU27 average), in particular as a result of a 
reduction in social security contributions paid by 
employer. Furthermore, in 2003 a comprehensive 
tax reform introduced a flat 19% income tax rate, 
which strongly increased the incentives to work, in 
particular for higher-wage single persons and one 
earner couple (with or without children). This has 
reduced the unemployment and inactivity traps 
from the highest levels in the EU to levels 
considerably below the EU median. To decrease 
the effective tax burden of low-income tax payers 
and therefore support transitions from inactivity to 
work, since January 2009 an Employee Tax Bonus 
is being granted as a tax credit to employees on 
regular job contracts for a period of at least 6 
months and with salaries close to the minimum 
wage (which benefits at most one working parent 
who earns more than 50% of the earnings of a full 
time worker earning the minimum wage).   
Unemployment insurance (200)   
Eligibility conditions 
Unemployment benefits are paid to laid off 
workers who have paid contributions for at least 3 
years of employment (2 years in case of temporary 
employment) during the last 4 years. Unemployed 
should be capable for work and available for the 
labour market without any restrictions. Therefore 
they should register as job seeker and to be at the 
disposal and actively seek employment. 
Furthermore, unemployment benefits could be 
combined with work if not exceeding 64 hours a 
month with an upper threshold of SKK 3,200 (€ 
106.2 95) per month.  
Replacement rates 
Unemployment benefits amount 50% of the 
average gross earnings over the period of the last 3 
years (or 2 years in case of temporary 
employment). The ceiling for the calculation of the 
benefit is 3-times the national average monthly 
wage. 
(200) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
Benefit duration 
Unemployment benefits are uniform and paid for 6 
months (4 months in case of temporary 
employment). 
14.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies (0.1 
% of GDP) are among the lowest in the EU (0.5% 
of GDP at the EU27 average). About 70% of 
expenditures are devoted equally to start-up 
incentives and direct job creation and less than 5% 
to training. The coverage of persons wanting to 
work in regular activation measures is relatively 
low (about 25 persons out of 100 persons wanting 
to work benefit from regular activation compared 
to 36 persons at the EU27 average) considering a 
high unemployment rate, in particular of low 
skilled persons. Public expenditures on labour 
market policy services (which cover the costs of 
providing services for jobseekers together with all 
other expenditures of the public employment 
services, including overheads and functions such 
as benefit administration where relevant) are at 
0.11% of GDP (0.19% at the EU27 average). (201) 
ALMPs saw a substantial transformation in recent 
years, as part of a wider reform of labour market 
and social policies. Activation policies and 
incentives to work were step up and the focus on 
disadvantaged groups increased. The first step of 
the 2003 reform included a reorganisation of 
public administration in the area of PES and social 
affairs and the formation of a network of offices of 
labour, social affairs and family. The Employment 
Service Act of 2003 also introduced a new set of 
ALMPs measures to motivate job seekers to 
activity. The 2008 comprehensive amendment to 
this Act has further strengthened the 
implementation of the 2007 life-long learning 
strategy by better linking it to the needs of the 
labour market, extended the competency of the 
PES and introduced a new set of active measures 
targeted at the prevention of the labour market 
exclusion of specific groups, there including 
allowances for training disadvantaged jobseekers, 
(201) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
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and support for maintaining a job in the case of 
low-wage employees and for self-employment. 
However, reforms have so far overall largely failed 
to reduce existing high long-term unemployment 
rates. Therefore, there remains a strong need for 
active labour market policies to address the skills 
mismatch of long-term unemployed by a greater 
emphasize on education and training programmes. 
Special attention require in particular young, low 
skilled and older persons.  
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply. (202)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
Registration for placement at the PES is a 
prerequisite for the award of unemployment 
benefit by the Social Insurance Agency. If the 
person has satisfied the contribution conditions for 
unemployment insurance, benefit entitlement 
arises from the date the person was placed on the 
Jobseeker Register. Applying for vacancies is not a 
condition for benefits. However, during initial 
registration the availability of applicants is 
checked by the PES, and vacancies may also be 
offered.  
Job-search requirements 
The unemployed must prove their job-search 
actions in person to the PES by means of employer 
(202) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
statements that the jobseeker applied, job 
applications countersigned by the employer, copies 
of mailed job applications and similar documents, 
depending on the particular requests by the PES 
office. Long-term unemployed must report on their 
job-search activities four times a month, other 
groups of registered unemployed every two weeks 
(once a month if participating in an activation 
measure). Participants in the public job creation 
programme are required to report to the Offices for 
Labour every month, whereas non-participants are 
required to report to the Labour Offices every 
week. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs 
Both open and semi-open vacancy types are 
available. As a rule, however, the employer’s full 
contact details are not publicised unless he wishes 
potential jobseekers to contact him directly. In 
most cases, employers want the PES to make a 
pre-selection for them and send the profiles of 
suitable candidates. Therefore, the majority of 
vacancies are handled using the procedure of direct 
referrals, i.e. the jobseeker is selected for a 
particular vacancy and must directly apply to the 
employer. There can be up to 24 direct referrals 
per registered unemployed person, depending on 
personal and local labour market characteristics. 
Intensive interview  
The first intensive interview occurs at initial 
registration at the PES. Intensive counselling 
interviews are conducted by vocational counsellors 
within six months, when an individual action plan 
is established. Over the unemployment spell, 
intensive interview should occur at least once a 
month.  
Referral to active labour market policies 
Participation in active labour market policies after 
having experienced certain unemployment spell is 
not compulsory, even if it is referred by the PES. 
However, job search requirement and its 
verification apply also during participation in 
active labour market policies as participants need 
to attend the PES once a month.  
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14.1.6.  Lifelong learning 
Slovakia scores somewhat more favourable in 
terms of human capital than the EU27 
average. (203)    
Slovakia spent relatively little on education in 
2005 (below 4% compared to 5% at the EU27 
average, 8.3% in Denmark, around 7% in Sweden 
and Cyprus). A large majority of adults has a 
medium education (75%, 47% at the EU27 
average) with only 14% of adults having high 
education (24% at the EU27 average) and 11% of 
adults having low education (29% at the EU27 
average). The share of early school leavers (young 
persons with at most lower secondary education 
and not in further education or training) is among 
the lowest in the EU27 (6% versus 15% 
respectively).  
Participation in lifelong learning declined by 5 pps. 
to one of the lowest in the EU (4%; 10% at the 
EU27 average), thus further widening the gap with 
best performers such as Sweden (33%), Denmark 
(29%) and the UK (27%). Participation in lifelong 
learning is below the EU27 regardless of 
educational attainment, economic activity and age. 
Participation in lifelong learning of persons with 
high education is 11% (19% at the EU27 average) 
while participation in lifelong learning of persons 
with low education is only 2% (204) (4% at the 
EU27 average). Also participation in lifelong 
learning for employed, unemployed and inactive is 
very low, at 5%, 3% and 2% which is considerably 
less than 11%, 9% and 7%. Finally, employability 
of older workers is low as only 2% of them 
participate in lifelong learning (5% at the EU27 
average). 
(203) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Slovakia above the EU27 average 
in terms of on-the-job employability as measured by 
learning, training and task rotation. 
(204) The participation in LLL persons with low education refers 
to 2002. 
Almost 40% of firms provide CVT courses (almost 
50% at the EU27 average, more than 80% in 
Denmark, around 70% in Sweden, France, the 
Netherlands and Finland) and they spend on 
average 1.8% of total labour costs on CVT (1.6% 
at the EU27 average). Furthermore, almost 40% of 
workers participate in CVT courses (one third in 
the EU27) and they spent on average 12 hours in 
2005 on CVT courses (9 hours at the EU27 
average). 
Reforms in the education system are essential for 
improving structural functioning of the labour 
market. Education and training reform has 
progressed by the recent adoption of the new 
School Act establishing rules for functioning of 
primary and secondary education (including 
vocational education and training at secondary 
level), and introducing the national and school 
educational programmes. The latter ones are to be 
designed by schools so that they better matched 
with the needs of the labour market. In 2007, the 
Government also adopted the Strategy of Lifelong 
Learning and Lifelong Career Counselling, and an 
act on vocational education and training is planned 
for adoption by 2009, involving among others the 
creation of a coordinated system of lifelong 
programmes and career counselling for labour 
market needs. 
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15.1. DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
15.1.1.  Employment protection legislation (205) 
Employment protection legislation for regular 
contracts is among the strictest in the EU (at 3), 
being higher only in Portugal. It is notably 
characterized by high procedural inconveniences 
and restrictive definition of unfair dismissals, 
which often result in reinstatements. On the other 
hand, the employment protection legislation for 
temporary workers is at the EU average. The 
labour code reform of 2007 liberalized the use of 
fixed term contracts and simplified the rules on 
termination of permanent contracts. (206)  
Individual dismissals 
Individual dismissals are cumbersome as the 
employer cannot proceed to dismissal without 
authorisation from a third party. In case of 
dismissals for business reasons, the employer must 
notify the worker in writing of an intended 
dismissal. Where the worker so requests, the 
employer must notify in writing the union to which 
the worker belongs at the beginning of the 
procedure of an intended dismissal for reasons of 
incapacity or for business reasons. The union may 
give its opinion (within a deadline of eight days) 
and may oppose the dismissal if it believes that 
there are no justified reasons for it or that the 
procedure was not carried out in accordance with 
legal requirements. Notice period is relatively long 
for short job tenures amounting 30 days if the 
employee has less than 5 years of tenure with the 
(205) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008); detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
(206) This notably includes: a) standardising and shortening the 
minimum periods of notice in both cases when the 
employment contract is terminated by the employer due to 
business reasons or due to reasons of incapacity; b) 
introducing unambiguous and more effective regulation of 
the procedures which an employer must follow when 
terminating an employment contract; and c) exempting the 
previous employer from paying the severance pay when the 
employer terminates the employment contract and during 
the notice period the worker accepts a new employment 
contract with another employer. This rule only applies if 
the new employer agrees in the new contract to take into 
account the worker’s years of service under the previous 
employer when determining the minimum period of notice 
and severance pay. 
employer. Severance payments are relatively high 
for dismissed workers with longer job tenure 
though they are capped to 10 months pay. (207) The 
severance payment, however, may be reduced in 
the case of forced settlement if a large number of 
jobs at the employer would be threatened. 
Definition of unfair dismissals is restrictive and is 
often followed by the reinstatement. If there is no 
reinstatement, the court may grant the worker 
tenure and other rights from the employment 
relationship and appropriate monetary 
compensation up to a maximum amount of 18 
months of average wages paid in the last three 
months prior to dismissal. The probation period 
(the period within which regular contracts are not 
fully covered by employment protection provisions 
and unfair dismissal claims can usually not be 
made) can last maximum six months. It can be 
extended in the event of temporary absence from 
work. Unsuccessful completion of the probation 
period is a reason for extraordinary dismissal 
without notice period. 
Collective dismissals 
In Slovenia, collective dismissal procedures apply 
from 10 dismissals onwards (at least 10 workers at 
an employer employing 20-99 workers; at least 
10% of workforce at an employer employing 100-
299 workers; at least 30 workers at an employer 
employing 300 or more workers) in a period of 30 
days. In case of collective dismissal, the employer 
is obliged to inform and consult with the unions 
and to notify the Employment Service (PES). The 
employer may dismiss redundant workers in 
accordance with the programme of redundancies 
not prior to the expiry of a 30-day period from 
fulfilment of the obligation to notify the PES. The 
employer is bound to take into account possible 
proposals from the PES on measures to prevent or 
limit the termination of employment of workers 
and on measures to mitigate the consequences of 
such dismissals. An employer who dismisses a 
large number of workers for business reasons is 
also bound to formulate a worker redundancy 
programme that must be financially validated, 
besides dealing with and taking into account 
possible proposals from the PES. 
(207) However, Vodopivec, et al (2009) report that about one-
third of dismissed workers did not receive the severance 
pay to which they were entitled.  
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Temporary employment 
Legislation concerning fixed term contracts is 
relatively loose. Employment contracts may be 
concluded for a fixed term in the cases provided 
for by law, firm-level collective agreements or 
sector-level collective agreements for SMEs. There 
are no limits to the number of successive renewals 
of fixed-term contracts, within a 2-year period. 
With the exception of individual cases set out by 
law (such as project work, substitution, 
management workers), there including a 3-year 
time limit applicable to SMEs up to 2010, 
employers may not conclude one or more 
successive fixed-term contracts with the same 
worker for the same job for an uninterrupted 
duration longer than two years. Temporary work 
agency employment is generally allowed, apart 
from few specific exceptions (e.g. substituting for 
striking workers; where the user has laid off large 
numbers of workers in the previous 12 months; in 
cases involving hazardous work that is performed 
for shorter durations). There are no restrictions to 
the number of renewals, within a maximum 
cumulated duration of one year. 
Temporary agencies may not employ a same 
agency worker without interruption, or with 
interruptions of up to one month, for longer than a 
year if this involves for the entire period the 
performance of the same work with the same user 
company. The setup of temporary work agency 
requires both authorisation and reporting 
requirements. Furthermore, regulations fully 
ensure equal treatment of regular and agency 
workers at the user firm. The level of pay and 
compensation, as set in the agency work contract, 
will depend on the actual performance of work at 
the user firm, taking into account collective 
agreements and general acts binding on the user 
firm. 
15.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (208)   
Slovenia has intermediate to low incidence of 
flexible working time arrangements, high 
incidence of atypical work, relatively high work 
intensity and irregularity, high incidence of 
rotation and team work and intermediate to low 
incidence of work autonomy and complexity.  
In Slovenia, more than 40% of workers do not 
have fixed starting and finishing time (almost 40% 
at the EU27 average) and 30% of workers do not 
work the same number of days every week 
(slightly more than 25% at the EU27 average). 
However, for 65% of persons in employment 
working hours are set by the company with no 
possibility of changes. This indicates a relatively 
low incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements (compared to 56% at the EU27 
average), in particular if compared with Sweden 
(34%), Netherland (36%) and Denmark (41%). 
Also, only one third of persons in employment can 
adapt working hours within certain limits or 
determine working hours entirely by themselves, 
compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% in the 
Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. Atypical work, 
in particular working in the night, in the evening 
and on Saturdays, however, is among the highest 
in the EU. Work complexity as measured by the 
share of workers perceiving their work to involve 
complex tasks is close to the EU27 average (61%). 
Autonomy at work is relatively low as measured 
by the ability of workers to influence the order of 
tasks, methods of work and the timing of break. 
Team work and rotation of tasks, on the other 
hand, tend to be the most widespread in the EU. In 
particular, about 85% of workers are involved in a 
team work and more than 70% of workers rotate 
tasks with colleagues compared to about 55% and 
45% at the EU average. However, teams and 
workers involved in tasks rotation are relatively 
less autonomous in their division of tasks than in 
the rest of the EU.  
(208) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
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In terms of practices to organize working time 
flexibly, Slovenia has the highest share of 
companies characterized by low flexibility (27% of 
all companies). Relative to the EU average 
distribution of companies, Slovenia also has a 
relatively high share companies with intermediate 
flexibility, in particular concerning the incidence 
of overtime work.  
Despite a relatively low incidence of flexible 
working time arrangements, the rules about 
allocation of the weekly working time are flexible 
by most international standards. (209) () A full-time 
work schedule, to be set up annually, should cover 
four to six days per week if the working time is 
evenly distributed. But uneven distributions are 
generally allowed within a limit of 56 hours in any 
week. Employers can also impose a temporary 
redistribution of the working time, having only to 
give one to three days’ notice. The 2007 labour 
law reform enhanced the internal flexibility of 
companies by allowing for employment contracts 
with broader rather than detailed job descriptions. 
Employees can now also request a different 
allocation of working time for family reasons, 
while employers can refuse such requests for work 
process reasons, but they must motivate their 
decisions in writing. Since 2007, overtime can be 
extended to 230 hours per year, with the written 
consent of the worker. The 2007 reform also 
ensured a better implementation of the principle of 
proportionality concerning the rights of part-time 
employees, there including the right to receive pay 
for annual leave and a retirement bonus. 
15.1.3.  Wage settings and bargaining system 
Slovenia is characterized by high coverage of trade 
unions and collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining is highly coordinated which has 
supported employment growth.  
Collective bargaining on wage setting takes place 
at sectoral level in the private sector, and at 
national level in the public sector. The wage 
system in the private sector is still largely based on 
basic wages and not calculated according to 
productivity, despite recent developments in this 
direction. The system is regulated by the 
intersectoral Collective Agreement on the Pay 
(209) See OECD, 2009, Accession review of labour market and 
social policies of Slovenia. 
Adjustment Method, the Refund of Work-related 
Expenses and the Annual Leave Bonus, which is 
negotiated by seven representative trade union 
confederations and four employers` organisations 
at the central level. The most recent intersectoral 
agreement, on Extraordinary Pay Adjustment for 
2007 and on the Pay Adjustment Method, the 
Refund of Work-related Expenses and the Annual 
Leave Bonus for 2008 and 2009, was reached in 
May 2008, after several negotiation rounds. The 
agreement covers around 40,000 mainly private 
sector workers who are not covered by a relevant 
sectoral collective agreement. The agreement 
foresees that those companies that are operating at 
a deficit are allowed to postpone the basic pay rise 
by six months in agreement with the trade unions 
represented in the company. Moreover, the social 
partners are to incorporate a provision on 
productivity growth into the sectoral collective 
agreements.  
From its part, the broader tripartite Social 
Agreement, setting the overall private-sector pay 
policy for the period 2007-2009, provided that: (1) 
pay growth in real terms is maintained at a steady 
level so that levels of pay in Slovenia gradually 
approach those in more developed countries; (2) 
pay growth takes into account inflation and 
productivity; (3) the pay adjustment (pay growth 
rate) – taking into account inflation and 
productivity – may be agreed at the following three 
levels: in sectoral collective agreements; in the 
private sector’s intersectoral collective agreement 
on the pay adjustment method, on the refund of 
work-related expenses and on the annual leave 
bonus; and in company collective agreements; (4) 
due to the specific situation of individual 
companies, conditions may be agreed in sectoral 
collective agreements and in the intersectoral 
collective agreement under which it is possible for 
the company-level pay adjustment to diverge from 
the provisions of the two higher levels of 
agreement. 
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15.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (210) 
Expenditures on passive labour market policies are 
among the lowest in the EU (about 0.3% of GDP 
compared to 1% at the EU27 average); as a result 
of relatively low unemployment rate as well as a 
low benefit coverage of unemployed. Only about 
17 persons out of 100 persons wanting to work (44 
persons at the EU27 average) and about one fourth 
of registered unemployed are recipients of 
unemployment benefits. This reflects very strict 
eligibility criteria as persons have to be employed 
for at least 12 months during the last 18 months 
and relatively short duration of unemployment 
benefits for persons with a shorter contribution 
period (unemployed persons with 1-5 years of 
contribution period are eligible for only 3 months 
of unemployment benefits). Furthermore, persons 
working via "student work" (status of student is 
required) obtained through special employment 
agencies are not covered by the unemployment 
insurance scheme as neither the employer nor the 
student pay any social and pension contributions 
and the income is not subject to taxation until a 
certain limit. As a result, a large share of 
unemployed receives either social benefits (38%) 
or no benefits at all (39%). The unemployment 
insurance scheme is, however, relatively generous 
for persons with longer job tenure and may last up 
to 2 years for older persons. As a result, the 
composition of unemployment benefit recipients is 
strongly skewed towards older unemployed 
persons and those with longer job tenure. (211) 
These data point to a limited ability of automatic 
stabilizers to act as shock absorbers and relatively 
(210) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.  
(211) In fact, persons aged less than 40 years represent two thirds 
of registered unemployed persons and only 21% of 
unemployment insurance beneficiaries. Only 4% of 
registered young unemployed and only 8% of registered 
prime age unemployed (in the age of 25-39) receive 
unemployment benefits compared to 56% registered 
unemployed in the age above 40. Related, persons with less 
than 10 years of work represent half of registered 
unemployed persons and only 15% of unemployment 
insurance beneficiaries. Only 7% of persons with less than 
10 years of work receive unemployment benefits compared 
to 74% of registered unemployed with more than 30 years 
of work experiences (See the Table 2.5 in OECD, 2009). 
low income protection when experiencing 
transitions.   
Initial net replacement rates are relatively 
generous, at about 72% (66% at the EU27 average) 
for low wage persons, 62% (59% at the EU27 
average) for average wage persons and 82% (67% 
at the EU27 average) for one-earner couples with 
children. In the 13th month of unemployment 
spell, net replacement rates drop to 48%, 33% and 
69%, respectively. Tax wedges are relatively high, 
at 40% for the low wage person (37% at the EU27 
average) and at 44% for the average wage person 
(41% at the EU27 average). Tax wedge for the low 
wage person saw a slight reduction since 2001 (by 
1.2 pps.), in particular due to a reduction in 
personal income taxation. Also the gradual 
reduction of payroll taxes since 2005, which were 
completely phased out in 2009, contributed to a 
reduction in the tax wedge. In 2007, a new law on 
personal income tax replaced the 5 tax rates (from 
16% to 50%) with 3 tax rates (16%, 27% and 
41%), which however mostly reduced the tax 
burden on high-wage persons. In 2008, the level of 
general and special personal income tax 
allowances was also raised, lowering the tax 
burden, in particular for low income earners, and 
the existing special allowances were reduced and 
simplified. Financial incentives to take up low-
paid work (at 67% of average wage) tend to be low 
for unemployment benefit recipients (previously 
earning 67% of average wage) regardless of the 
family type, as their net financial reward is only 
20% of gross earnings and even less, 10%, for 
single parents with children. Inactivity trap 
exceeds 80% for a spouse in the jobless household 
with children taking up low-paid work at 67% of 
average wage and is among the highest in the EU 
for second-earner couples. Also the low wage trap 
is among the highest in the EU for one-earner 
couples who would like to increase their wages 
from 67% of average wage to 100% of average 
wage. 
In 2006, stricter rules were introduced regarding 
the obligations of the unemployed: they are 
obliged to actively search for employment and 
after three (six) months of unemployment they 
have to accept a job offer from the PES for which 
the education is one level (two levels) below the 
education level of the unemployed person. If the 
unemployed person does not comply with these 
rules the cash benefit is cut in half for a period of 
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two months. While the level of unemployment 
benefits has not changed over recent years, the 
unemployment assistance was abolished in 2006. 
Instead, the unemployed can get means-tested 
social assistance after the expiration of 
unemployment benefits. The 2006 reform therefore 
substantially decreased the traps for unemployed 
persons who exhaust their entitlements to 
unemployment benefits as they are not anymore 
eligible for the unemployment assistance, but 
rather for the social assistance. (212) 
Unemployment insurance (213)   
Eligibility conditions 
Unemployment benefits are paid to laid off 
workers who have paid contributions for at least 12 
months of employment (full time equivalent) 
during the previous 18 months. Temporary jobs 
obtained through special employment agencies for 
students and participation in public work are not 
covered by the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Unemployment insurance contributions are 
mandatory for employees and voluntary for self 
employed. 
Unemployment insurance benefits are not paid 
when a dismissed claimant receives severance pay 
or financial compensation instead of a notice 
period and during education or on-the-job training 
under active labour market policies. 
Replacement rates 
Unemployment benefits amount to 70% of the 
reference wage during the first three months and 
they drop to 60% of the reference wage for the 
remaining entitlement period. The lower limit and 
the upper ceiling are set at 45.56% and 137% of 
the minimum wage, respectively. Reference wage 
is defined as the average monthly earnings (no 
ceiling) received during the 12 months before the 
termination of employment, including social 
(212) While unemployment benefits were taxed and subject to 
social security contributions, unemployment assistance was 
free of both deductions. As a result, persons who exhausted 
their entitlements to unemployment benefits, and were 
entitled to unemployment assistance experienced a 
financial windfall and their METRs sharply increased.  
(213) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
security contributions for health and invalidity 
insurance and old-age insurance.  
Concerning earning disregards, a benefit recipient 
may have supplementary income from work if 
declared to the PES. The benefit is then reduced by 
50% of that income, unless it is lower than EUR 
41.73 per month. In this case, however, in presence 
of children, the benefit is increased by 10% of the 
full benefit amount for every child below 18 who 
is in regular schooling, though it cannot exceed the 
full benefit amount. 
Benefit duration 
Depends upon length of insurance and amounts to 
3 months for insurance period of 1 to 5 years, 6 
months for insurance of 5 to 15 years, 9 months for 
insurance of 15 to 25 years, 12 months for 
insurance of 25 years or more, 18 months for 
insured persons over 50 years of age and insurance 
period of more than 25 years and 24 months for 
insured persons over 55 years of age with an 
insurance period of more than 25 years. In the 
period 1998-2006, unemployed who exhausted 
their entitlements to unemployment benefits could 
receive means-tested unemployment assistance 
(UA) for additional 15 months. Since 2007, UA 
scheme was removed and merged with social 
assistance.  
15.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Expenditures on active labour market policies are 
among the lowest in the EU (about 0.1% of GDP 
compared to 0.5% at the EU27 average). Almost 
50% of expenditures are devoted to direct job 
creation, followed by training (30%) and 
employment incentives (17%). The coverage of 
persons wanting to work in regular activation 
measures is relatively low as only 12 out of 100 
persons wanting to work benefit from regular 
activation (36 persons at the EU27 average). 
Public expenditures on labour market policy 
services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditures of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
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administration where relevant) are at 0.09% of 
GDP (0.19% at the EU27 average). (214) 
Despite active labour market policies have been 
reinforced with the recent modernisation of the 
PES and have been redirected towards more 
extensively addressing the problems of people 
aged 55-64 and other disadvantaged groups, (215) 
there is a strong need for effective active labour 
market programmes, in particular re-training 
courses to effectively monitor and support the 
transition into employment of older and long term 
unemployed persons. 
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability, while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level of training, job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour supply. 
(214) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
(215) The Active Labour Market Policy Programme for the 
period 2007-13 envisages measures in four areas: i) 
counselling and assistance for employment; ii) training and 
education; iii) promotion of employment and self-
employment; and iv) programmes for increasing social 
inclusion. The programme is complemented by action 
plans which are confirmed by the government for each 
budget period. New ALMP envisaged for 2009 include a 
subsidy programme to promote employment of young 
people with tertiary education and of older and long-term 
unemployed persons; the promotion of part-time work; and 
education and training programmes for unemployed who 
wish to become self-employed and for employees of micro 
and small firms and of firms with subsidised full-time 
employment. See OECD, 2009. 
A worker who becomes unemployed should 
register at the PES within 30 days. The right to 
unemployment benefits begins on the first day of 
unemployment. The profile of job seeker is 
established on the basis of a questionnaire which is 
taken into account for setting the timetable for the 
first interview. By law, the first interview is 
envisaged within 2 months; however, in practice, it 
is set within 2 weeks for persons without 
employment obstacles. During the first interview 
an individual action plan is set, which is relatively 
early compared to other OECD countries, as at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell many 
unemployed can find a job by themselves. Further 
interviews for youths and unemployment benefit 
recipients are foreseen every two months and for 
the others every three months. (216) PES also 
organises for youth after four months of 
unemployment and for the others after nine months 
of unemployment "team reviews" which allow for 
a joint discussion of individual cases. The PES 
partially subcontract employment services to 
private agencies, however only for unemployment 
benefit recipients aged over 50 and those with 
three months of unemployment, provided that the 
jobs last at least 12 months.  
The job availability requirement index (which 
illustrates the strictness of availability criteria, 
primarily on the basis of formal rules in the labour 
market policy legislation) calculated for 2004, 
points that Slovenia has very strict activation 
strategy. Every registered unemployed person must 
be available three hours a day to receive job offers 
from the PES. Sanctions for non-compliance are 
very severe as they include a six months 
withdrawal of unemployment benefit 
payments. (217)  
(216) However, this target is under current circumstances quite 
unrealistic considering a lack of front-line office staff and 
workload. OECD emphasizes the need to sharpen the work 
focus of the PES and reduce administrative burden of job 
counsellors to free their time for job counselling. See 
OECD, 2009. 
(217) In the first three months of benefit receipt, a job can be 
refused if it does not match the qualification level of the 
job held for most of the last 12 months. For labour-market 
entrants the actual education attainment is considered. 
Commuting times longer than an hour in one direction can 
also be refused in the first three months. The acceptable 
qualification level is reduced by one step (according to an 
official scale) after three months and by another step after 
six months of unemployment. Commuter times of up to 1½ 
hour in one direction must also be accepted after three 
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15.1.6.  Lifelong learning (218)   
Slovenia scores favourable in terms of human 
capital, implying good employability of 
workers. (219)    
Slovenia spent almost 6% of GDP on education in 
2005 (5% at the EU27 average, 8.3% in Denmark, 
around 7% in Sweden and Cyprus). About 60% of 
adults have medium education (47% at the EU27 
average) while the shares of adults with low or 
high education are considerably lower, at 18% and 
22% respectively (at 29% and 24% at the EU27 
average). The share of early school leavers (young 
persons with at most lower secondary education 
and not in further education or training) is among 
the lowest in the EU (5%, 15% at the EU27 
average).  
The Slovenian educational and the lifelong 
learning system improved remarkably since 2000. 
The young stay longer in education also on the 
tertiary level. In the year 2000 the certification 
system was introduced for enabling dropouts and 
older workers without vocational qualifications to 
acquire it through the system of assessing and 
certificating previous acquired knowledge and 
experience. There are two separate networks for 
career guidance and career counselling. One is 
operating through the National Employment 
Service network and is intended mostly for the 
unemployed population, while the second is 
established by the National Institute for Adult 
Education and is intended for the whole adult 
population. 
months, except if the claimant has children. See OECD, 
2009. 
(218) Indicators on continuous vocational training (CVT) in this 
section refer to 2005 while most of other indicators refer to 
2007 unless stated otherwise.   
(219) See also Pacelli et al (2008) for a construction of an 
indicator, which scores Slovenia above the EU27 average 
in terms of on-the-job employability as measured by 
learning, training and task rotation. 
Participation in lifelong learning strongly 
increased since 2000, by 7.5 pps. to 15%, which is 
above the EU27 average (10%), however much 
less than in Sweden (33%), Denmark (29%) and in 
the UK (27%). Yet, lifelong learning is largely 
addressed to already-qualified workers for up-
skilling (participation in lifelong learning for 
workers with high education is 26%; 19% at the 
EU27 average; for workers with medium education 
is 14%; 9% at the EU27 average), while workers 
with low educational attainment participate much 
less in lifelong learning (4%, which is also at the 
EU27 average). Furthermore, while participation 
in life-long learning is similar for employed and 
unemployed (at about 17%; 11% and 9%, 
respectively at the EU27 average), it is 
considerably lower for inactive (about 8%, 7% at 
the EU27 average). Finally, employability of older 
workers is considerably lower as only 5% of older 
workers participate in lifelong learning (also 5% at 
the EU27 average). 
More than 60% of firms provide continuous 
vocational training courses (compared to almost 
50% at the EU27 average, more than 80% in 
Denmark, around 70% in Sweden, France, the 
Netherlands and Finland) and they spend on 
average 2% of total labour costs on continuous 
vocational training (1.6% at the EU27 average). 
About 50% of workers participate in continuous 
vocational training courses (one third at the EU27 
average) and they spent on average 14 hours on 
continuous vocational training courses in 2005 (9 
hours at the EU27 average).  
16. SPAIN 
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16.1.  DESCRIPTION OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS  
Spain belongs to the group of Mediterranean 
countries with low flexibility/adaptability and 
relatively low security/income protection. Past 
two-tier reforms have produced significant labour 
market segmentation. Although fixed-term 
contracts have been instrumental in increasing 
employment, a high segmentation between 
permanent and temporary workers has been 
implying negative spillovers in human capital 
investment. The generalised use of fixed-term 
contracts, coupled with a high turnover rate of 
temporary jobs, give in fact little incentives to 
employers to invest in human capital.   
16.1.1.  Employment protection legislation (220) 
Tackling labour market segmentation is indeed a 
major challenge for Spain. The country inherited 
rigid labour market legislation from the Franco 
period. The 1984 reform, which as a response to 
the high unemployment rate after the second oil 
shock eliminated most of the previous restrictions 
to the use of temporary contracts, contributed to 
serious labour market segmentation, with the share 
of temporary workers rapidly increasing and 
reaching levels above 30% already in the early 
Nineties. The persisting high rate of temporary 
contracts (twice as much as the European average 
level) tends to be concentrated on disadvantaged 
groups such as low qualified workers, youth and 
women. 
A large share of temporary workers in the mid-90s 
would have provided a good opportunity for 
reforming of employment protection legislation of 
regular workers, to stimulate the use of open-ended 
contracts and the conversion of temporary 
contracts into permanent ones. However, reforms 
in 1994 and 1997 only partially increased the 
attractiveness of regular contracts to employers, 
and the difference in dismissal costs between 
different types of contracts still remains large. 
While the 1994 reform lifted important restrictions 
on part-time work, the 1997 labour reform mainly 
introduced a new type of contract, the so-called 
(220) The information in this section is taken from the OECD 
(2008), Detailed description of employment protection in 
OECD and selected non-OECD countries. 
"permanent employment promotion contract" 
(PEPC), with a reduced compensation payable for 
dismissal. The use of these special open-ended 
employment contracts was consolidated on a 
permanent basis and extended to further cases in 
2001. The 2001 reform introduced further 
flexibility in the use of part-time work. Finally, the 
reform of 2006 extended the possibilities to hire 
temporary workers under PEPC and expanded the 
financial incentives to convert temporary contracts 
into PEPC, so as to stimulate hires in particular for 
low-wage workers. The use of temporary contracts 
was also restricted to two consecutive contracts on 
the same post, covering no more than 24 months 
within a period of 30 months, after which the 
employee is entitled to an open-ended contract. 
Bentolila et al. (2008) document the success of 
these reforms in reducing the share of temporary 
contracts since 2006. However, they also 
acknowledge their short-lived impact. (221)   
Furthermore, the introduction of incentives to 
convert temporary contracts into regular ones has 
not succeeded in bringing the share of temporary 
workers below 30%, insofar as such reforms have 
not substantially modified the heavy protection 
provided to those on permanent contracts.  
Today, three types of contracts coexist: two 
permanent contracts - namely regular contracts 
(with a severance payment of 45 days' wages per 
year of seniority up to a ceiling of 42 months in 
case of "unfair dismissal", see below) and the so-
called "permanent employment promotion 
contract" (with a severance payment of 33 days' 
wages per year of seniority) - and a fixed term 
contract with a severance payment of 8 days' 
wages per year of seniority. 
Individual dismissals are deemed to be fair if based 
on a set of well defined 'objective grounds', 
including economic conditions, absenteeism and 
lack of skill for the job. When none of the above 
pre-defined causes is proven, the dismissal is 
considered as unfair. Dismissals based on 
discrimination or carried out with violation of 
fundamental rights, as well as those based on 
situations derived from maternity, are null and 
void. There is no legal provision on the duration of 
the trial period, which can vary according to 
collective agreements. In any case, this period may 
(221) See Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2008, CESifo.  
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not be longer than six months for qualified experts 
or two months for other workers (three months in 
enterprises with less than 25 workers). The 
notification procedure involves a reasoned written 
notice addressed to the employee and a notification 
to workers’ representatives. In the case of 
disciplinary dismissal, the notice of dismissal will 
contain the facts on which the dismissal is based 
and the date of effect. The notice period is of 30 
days for all workers under open-ended contract. 
The severance pay for workers dismissed on 
'objective grounds' amounts to 2/3 of a month’s 
pay per year of service up to a maximum of 12 
months. When the employer acknowledges unfair 
dismissal, he can deposit 45 days pay per year of 
service up to a maximum of 42 months’ wages to 
the Labour Court within two days of giving notice, 
thus avoiding the possibility of paying back to 
workers if the dismissal is subsequently found to 
be unfair by the courts. For the new permanent 
employment promotion contract after 1997, 
severance pay in case of unfair dismissal amounts 
to 33 days pay per year of service, with a 
maximum of 24 months pay. The employee can 
apply immediately for unemployment benefits 
because the dismissal is assumed to be unfair. In 
the case where the dismissal has been declared 
unfair, the employer has a choice between 
reinstatement and compensation, except where the 
dismissed employee is a legal representative of the 
workers or a union delegate, in which case the 
employee can choose between reinstatement and 
compensation. If the dismissal was found to be 
discriminatory, the worker should always be 
reinstated.  
As a result of these rigid EPL binds, the data show 
that about 90% of cases at courts are found to be 
unfair dismissals. At the same time, the long and 
variable delays that characterise the administrative 
and judicial procedures used to implement EPL 
tend to increase the costs beard by firms for 
adjusting their workforce.  
The procedure involving a collective dismissal is 
launched when 10 or more workers are dismissed 
within 90 days in firms with less than 100 
employees, when at least 10% of workforce is 
dismissed in firms with 100-299 employees or at 
least 30 workers in firms seized 300+ employees. 
In this case, the employer must inform and consult 
with works council or trade union delegates on the 
grounds for labour force adjustment plan and on 
the possible avoidance or reduction of their effects, 
as well as on the measures needed to alleviate their 
consequences for the affected workers and to allow 
for the continuity and feasibility of the business. 
The employer must also apply for authorisation 
with the local labour authority. If the 30 days 
period of consultation (15 days in enterprises of 
less than 50 workers) with employee 
representatives ends with an agreement, the labour 
authority issues a resolution within 15 days 
authorising the expiry of the contracts. If no 
agreement has been reached, the resolution, issued 
within 15 days, will accept or reject the expiry of 
all of part of the contracts applied for. No 
additional regulations apply for collective 
dismissal concerning severance pay or possible 
selection criteria. 
Temporary employment 
Fixed-term contracts can be used for objective 
reasons (for specific work, due to accumulation of 
tasks, replacement, etc.) or for one of the following 
purposes: training contracts; to hire workers with 
disabilities; to cover the part of the working day 
left uncovered by an employee close to retirement. 
No notice period applies in case of dismissal under 
contracts shorter than one year. When the fixed-
term contract has lasted at least one year, the 
notice period is of 15 days. The severance pay 
amounts to 8 days per year of service except for 
replacement contracts. Concerning the duration 
and maximum number of renewals the following 
rules apply: a) in case of fixed-term contracts for a 
temporary increase in workload, the maximum 
duration is six months, which may be extended to 
12 months through collective agreement. One 
renewal is possible within this maximum duration 
limits; b) in case of contracts drawn for other 
objective reasons, no limits on duration apply as 
long as the objective reasons continue to exist. 
However, for those workers who have been under 
contract for more than 24 months within a period 
of 30 months (continuously or not, in the same job 
and in the same enterprise, with two or more 
temporary contracts regardless of whether they 
have been directly hired or hired through a 
temporary work agency) the contract will become 
permanent; c) training contracts may be extended 
for six months up to maximum two years. This 
time limit can be further extended to three years by 
collective agreement and up to four years if the 
training contract is drawn up with a worker with 
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disabilities; d) all workers with disabilities may be 
hired for minimum periods of one year up to 
maximum three years, therefore allowing for two 
extensions; e) contracts for the replacement for 
workers close to retirement can last maximum five 
years, extendable in yearly periods if the partially 
retired worker decides to continue his/her activity 
after the age of 65, with the contract expiring when 
the replaced worker reaches the age of full 
retirement. 
Temporary work agency (TWA) employment is 
allowed in case of broadly defined "objective 
situations". There is no maximum cumulated 
duration in case of substitution and for contracts 
related to a specific task, while a time limit of 6 
months applies for temporary increase in 
workload, and 3 months is the maximum duration 
allowed to cover temporarily a post while carrying 
out a selection process. TWA workers are entitled 
to receive at least the total remuneration 
established for the work to be performed in the 
statutory collective agreement applied to the user 
enterprise. Remuneration should include, if 
appropriate, the proportionate part corresponding 
to the weekly days off, extra payments, public 
holidays and annual leave. Severance pay: 
Workers under temporary contracts: workers under 
contract with temporary agencies and the handicap 
get 12 days per year of service. 
16.1.2.  Working time and work 
organization (222)   
Spain has a low incidence of flexible working time 
arrangements, low work intensity and irregularity 
and low incidence of rotation and team work as 
well as low work autonomy and complexity.   
Only 30% of workers do not have fixed starting 
and finishing time (almost 40% at the EU27 
average). For two thirds of persons in employment, 
working hours are set by the company with no 
possibility of changes. This indicates a low 
incidence of flexible working time arrangements 
(56% at the EU27 average), in particular if 
(222) Indicators in this section are taken from the fourth 
European Working Condition Survey (EWCS), which was 
carried out in 2005 and Establishment Survey on Working 
Time (ESWT), which was carried out in 2004 for the EU15 
and in 2005 for the NMS6. Furthermore, this section uses 
also input from Chung et al (2007) and Employment in 
Europe (2007). 
compared with Sweden (34%), Netherland (36%) 
and Denmark (41%). Only one-fourth of 
employees can adapt working hours within certain 
limits or determine working hours entirely by 
themselves, compared to 60% in Sweden, 53% in 
the Netherlands and 50% in Denmark. 
Furthermore, only about 17% of workers do not 
work the same number of days every week 
compared to more than 25% in the EU27. The 
incidence of atypical working time, in particular 
working in the night and in the evening, is 
somewhat more frequent than in the EU27 average 
while working on weekends is less widespread 
than in the EU27 average. Work complexity is 
among the lowest in the EU as only 40% of 
workers perceive their work to involve complex 
tasks (60% at the EU27 average). Also autonomy 
at work is relatively low as measured by the ability 
to choose or change the order of tasks, methods of 
work and speed or rate of work. Finally, the 
incidence of team work and rotation of tasks is 
among the lowest in the EU and teams and 
workers involved in tasks rotation are less 
autonomous in their division of tasks than in the 
rest of the EU. 
By distribution of companies according to their 
practices to organize working time flexibly, Spain 
has the highest share of companies characterized 
by low flexibility (40% of all companies). This 
company type is also the most prevalent relative to 
the EU average distribution of companies. 
Following the changes in the legal regime for part-
time contracts introduced in 2001, to make them 
more flexible, a contract is now considered part-
time when the number of hours contracted is less 
than that of a comparable full-time worker; 
regulation for working hours additional to the 
agreed part-time hours has also been made more 
flexible, as they can be distributed over the year, 
with seven days' notice given to the worker. 
16.1.3.  Wage setting and bargaining systems 
The Spanish wage bargaining system does not help 
to ensure an efficient allocation of labour and does 
not allow wage agreements to properly reflect 
firm-level conditions. Wage negotiations are done 
mainly at the industry or at the regional 
(provincial) level, but legal extension clauses for 
many agreements result in their application to all 
firms and regions, including firms that do not take 
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part in the negotiations. Collective agreements are 
in fact “generally effective”, i.e. the conditions 
agreed collectively are applied to all workers and 
companies included in the area defined in the 
agreement, regardless of their relationship with the 
signatories. Moreover, wage bargaining 
agreements provide for full ex-post indexation to 
inflation shocks.  
Pay negotiations at either the company or national 
level are rare. Whereas company agreements 
represent about 75% of collective agreements in 
2008, they only include about 13% of all workers 
covered by collective bargaining. Agreements 
reached above the firm level contain opt-out 
clauses that allow individual firms to deviate from 
the conditions set in the agreement, but in practice 
these clauses are subject to restrictive conditions 
on firm performance and have been rarely used by 
firms. The agreements at levels higher than the 
company are more important in wage bargaining 
and have traditionally achieved the highest pay 
rises. Provincial sectoral agreements - an 
intermediate level between the company and the 
sector at national level - represent 20% of all 
agreements and affect more than half of the 
workers covered by collective bargaining.  At 
national level, pay bargaining falls within the 
framework of the inter-sectoral agreements for 
collective bargaining (AINC), signed annually 
since 2002 by the most representative social 
partners. These agreements establish the criteria 
that should guide collective bargaining at the lower 
levels. 
16.1.4.  Tax and benefit systems (223) 
Spain's expenditures on passive labour market 
policies are above the EU average (1.4% of GDP; 
1% at the EU27 average). The benefit coverage of 
unemployed is close to the EU27 average (45 
persons out of 100 persons wanting to work are 
recipients of unemployment benefits). Relatively 
high initial net replacement rates - for low wage 
persons at 78% (66% at the EU27 average), for 
(223) In this section,  expenditures on passive labour market 
policies, benefit coverage of unemployed, tax wedge data 
and marginal effective tax rates refer to the year 2007 
unless stated otherwise. Marginal effective tax rates, tax 
wedges and net replacement rates are calculated for a 
person, 40 years old and with 22 years of uninterrupted 
employment record, living in a household without or with 
two children.   
average wage at 62% persons (59% at the EU27 
average) and for one-earner couples with children 
at 75% (67% at the EU27 average) - decline 
gradually over the unemployment spell. However, 
after unemployment benefits are exhausted, the net 
replacement rates drop to zero, unless they are 
topped up with the social assistance (amounting 
33% for low wage persons, 24% for average wage 
persons and 41% for one-earner couples with 
children). Temporary workers are not 
disadvantaged in the access to unemployment 
benefits compared to permanent workers.  
Tax wedge is close to the EU27 average, for the 
low-wage person at 36% (37% at the EU27 
average) and for the average-wage person at 39% 
(41% at the EU27 average). However, marginal 
effective tax rates (METR), in particular the 
unemployment trap, are relatively high in Spain, 
implying potential disincentives for unemployed 
persons to take-up work. For example, for a single 
unemployed person (with or without children) 
previously employed at a low wage level of 67% 
of average wage and taking up a new job at the 
same wage level as before unemployment, the net 
financial reward is only 20%. To avoid potential 
underutilization of labour, unemployment benefits 
should be conditional on effective job search. For 
that a better coordination between the 
administration of unemployment benefits and 
activation policies to ensure incentives to work is 
needed. A partial reform of the personal income 
tax to reduce the tax burden on workers, in 
particular those with the lowest incomes, was 
introduced in 2002. 
Unemployment insurance (224)   
Eligibility conditions 
To access unemployment benefits, applicants must 
have worked at least 360 days of contributory 
employment during the previous 6 years. For part-
time workers in contributory employment, each 
day worked is considered as a day of contribution, 
whatever the duration of the working day. When 
the worker has 2 part-time jobs and loses one of 
them, he/she is entitled to the corresponding 
unemployment benefits. The law however restricts 
(224) The information in this section is based on the Joint 
European Commission-OECD project and Labour Market 
Reforms Database LABREF. 
264 
Annex - Description of labour market institutions - EA country fiches 
16. Spain 
unemployment benefit payments to those on 
permanent intermittent employment ("contratos 
fijos discontinuos"), used in the sector of seasonal 
activities with uncertain duration and date within 
the normal volume of activity of the company. 
Although in most countries unemployment 
benefits are not payable in the absence of a 
minimum employment record or period of 
unemployment insurance contributions, young 
unemployed over 20 years old are nevertheless 
eligible for benefits of last resort such as social 
assistance. Minimum age requirements in France 
and Spain are set at 25 and 24 respectively, thus 
stricter than standard rules in other European 
countries. Thus unemployed people below that age 
who have no employment history are eligible for 
neither unemployment benefits nor social 
assistance and depend on the family support 
networks when they exist.  Those persons, whose 
rights to contributory benefits have been exhausted 
or who do not qualify for insurance and do not 
have income from any source exceeding 75% of 
the minimum wage, can qualify for unemployment 
assistance. To qualify for unemployment 
assistance, persons without rights to contributory 
benefits have to fulfil a basic requirement of 3 
months of contributions if they have family 
responsibilities, 6 months if without family 
responsibilities or 6 years if over 52 of age. 
Replacement rates 
The replacement rates are 70% of reference 
earnings (average gross earnings over the last 180 
days) for the first 180 days, 60% thereafter. The 
upper threshold linked to multiples of minimum 
wage and affected by number of dependent 
children (from 175% to 220%), while the 
minimum amount equals 107% of minimum wage 
if the recipient is with children, 80% if not. Rates 
for part-time workers are calculated in proportion 
to the number of day-equivalents worked. 
Unemployment assistance benefits are flat-rate and 
equivalent to 80% of the minimum wage. 
Benefit duration 
 
                                                          The benefit duration varies from 4 months to 2 
years, depending on the duration of the 
contribution period over the past 6 years (in 
principle benefits are payable for 1/3 of the 
contribution period), one of the longest in the EU 
(maximum benefit duration for an unemployed 
person with a long employment history is the 
longest in Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal 
and Spain). On the other hand, unemployment 
assistance is time limited and normally payable for 
6 months, extensible to 18 months. 
16.1.5.  Active labour market policies 
Spain spends 0.6% of GDP on active labour 
market policies (0.5% at the EU27 average). 
However, their structure is markedly biased 
towards employment and wage subsidies, mostly 
for the promotion of permanent contracts for 
unemployed people and for the conversion of 
temporary contracts into permanent ones (about 
50% of all ALMP expenditures in 2007). As a 
result, the number of persons benefiting from 
regulation intervention exceeds the number of 
persons wanting to work. As it is also the case in 
other Mediterranean countries, Spain has also 
relatively low expenditures on labour market 
policy services (which cover the costs of providing 
services for jobseekers together with all other 
expenditure of the public employment services, 
including overheads and functions such as benefit 
administration where relevant), about 0.1% of 
GDP (0.2% of GDP at the EU27 average). (225) 
Services for jobseekers, such as job-search 
assistance and counselling, seem to need to be 
further developed. The decentralized structure of 
the Spanish administration is one of the main 
features concerning the organization of ALMPs, 
where the Autonomous Communities are 
responsible for managing the main actions through 
their own Public Employment Services, whereas 
the central administration plays an important role 
in coordination, planning and budgetary issues. 
Indeed, while the central government level is 
responsible for financing unemployment benefits 
and part of the PES' activities, since 2002 regional 
governments run the placement services. It has 
been argued that this split in the assignment of 
responsibilities risks weakening incentives for 
effective placement. 
(225) The data in this section concerning ALMP expenditures as 
% of GDP, their breakdown by main components, the share 
of persons wanting to work who participate in activation 
measures and expenditures on labour market policy 
services as % of GDP refer to the latest available data in 
2007, unless stated otherwise. 
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The Spanish government has recognised the 
importance of ALMPs and has been working over 
recent years to improve activation policies and to 
increase resources for the public employment 
services. A broad reform of the PES was adopted 
in 2003, so as to provide more efficient 
employment services and a better coordination 
between central and regional employment services. 
The reform included the introduction of 
personalized and preventive ALMPs, and stricter 
job availability requirements for job-seekers at 
both the modernisation plan for the PES adopted in 
2006 and the 2008 special plan for the activation 
of unemployed workers, aimed at increasing the 
capacity and efficiency of the PES, and reinforcing 
training and other insertion measures.  
Yet, there is scope to further improve the 
effectiveness of ALMPs, by means of a reduction 
in expenditures on employment subsidies and their 
redirection towards better targeted ALMPs, greater 
evaluation of active labour market programmes, 
better coordination between the administration of 
unemployment benefits and the activation policies 
to ensure proper incentives to work and to job 
mobility, increased efficiency of central 
government and regions in managing ALMPs. (226)   
Furthermore, as in segmented labour market the 
flexibility is typically achieved at the margin, 
ALMPs should be directed towards increasing 
employability of temporary workers who face a 
high labour turnover and potentially low on-the-
job training. ALMPs should also be tailored to 
immigrants' needs as they are increasingly 
important on the labour market.  
Activation policies 
Activation strategies should enhance the search 
effort of job seekers and facilitate their 
employability while reducing their welfare 
dependency and easing transitions from 
unemployment and inactivity to a working status. 
These strategies are based on the principle of 
mutual obligations, whereby benefit recipients are 
required to accept job or training offer as pre-
conditions to get benefits, while receiving an 
adequate level training, of job-search assistance 
and counselling. Early intervention by PES with 
non-working individuals, monitoring work 
availability and search actions, mandatory job-
(226) See OECD, 2008, Economic surveys, Spain. 
search requirements and sanctions, referral of 
unemployed to vacant posts and to active 
programmes represent the core elements of 
strategies aimed at mobilising the labour 
supply. (227)   
Registration procedures and benefit entitlement 
In order to entitle for contributory unemployment 
benefit, the unemployed person must introduce an 
application for benefits and register as a job-seeker 
with the regional public employment services 
office (PES) within 15 working days from the start 
of the legal status of unemployed. Benefits are 
paid from the first day of unemployment, with no 
waiting period, and back pay is available for up to 
two weeks from the initial time of registration.  
Job-search requirements 
When applying for benefits the unemployed must 
subscribe to an activity agreement undertaking to 
actively seek work, accept appropriate job offers 
and return proof of a job referral to the regional 
PES office. Unemployment benefit recipients are 
obliged to personally communicate situations that 
suspend their entitlement, including job placement. 
Regular controls are made via personal visits to 
PES once every three months. Entitlement can be 
suspended when the PES learns through a data 
match of a placement. Benefits cease at the same 
time as cancellation of jobseeker registration. 
Following cessation of employment, the worker 
must reapply for jobseeker registration and request 
the restoration of benefit entitlement within 15 
working days. There is a general requirement of 
active job search, and relevant job-search actions 
are reported and discussed during intensive 
interviews. 
Direct referrals to vacant jobs  
In Spain, most vacancies are “closed” – that is, 
they are not advertised and are directly offered to 
the job-seeker by the regional PES administrator. 
In general, the PES sends vacancy notices to pre-
selected candidates apt for the vacancy after 
consultation of its data bank. However, it can also 
carry out interviews and skill or psycho-technical 
(227) This section is based on information collected in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (2007), chapter 5. 
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tests, or do further pre-selection at the 
Employment Office. 
Intensive interview 
A first detailed interview is done in most cases 
within two weeks of registration, after which a 
level of employability is determined and an 
individual action plan is drawn up. The individual 
plan can contain, inter alia, the following: a 
personal training and employment plan, 
counselling to improve self-esteem and motivation, 
and active job search (classes on job-search and 
interview skills). The actions included in the 
personalised plan are compulsory and, in case of 
non-compliance, benefits can be cut or, for those 
not receiving any, access to public employment 
services can be suspended. Newly-registered 
unemployed are asked to participate in collective 
information sessions only in certain regions. Other 
intensive interviews take place at a later stage in 
the unemployment spell, depending on 
participation in programmes, and with an average 
of six interviews per year. There is also a wide 
offer of guidance services, including those of non-
profit organisations collaborating with the PES, 
and a large number of intensive interviews at these 
services are requested by the jobseeker. 
Referral to ALMPs 
Individual action plans are generally offered after 
six months (youths) or 12 months (adults) of 
unemployment. There is an average of four 
interviews per individual action plan. Beneficiaries 
must agree on an obligation to participate in 
ALMPs and can incur in sanctions in case of non 
respect of their commitment. When a job seeker 
starts a training action, the job search is suspended 
and the participation in a training action is enough 
to demonstrate active job search. 
16.1.6.  Lifelong learning 
Spain scores relatively poor in terms of human 
capital development, implying relatively low 
employability of workers and poor adoption of 
new technologies (harmful for productivity 
growth). It has a relatively low educational 
attainment of adults (about 50% of adults have at 
most lower secondary education) and a high share 
of early school dropouts (30% of young have at 
most lower secondary education and are not in 
further education or training), implying persisting 
gap in human capital compared to the other EU 
countries. While progress in the last years has been 
very modest, the school leaving rates have been 
even worsening since 2007. In this respect, the 
new education law (LOE), which entered into 
force in April 2006, aims to raise quality and 
increase equality in education. It contains 
measures to reduce early school leaving and 
improve the integration of immigrant pupils at 
school, and foresees free pre-school education for 
children between three and six years old. Its 
effective implementation, notably at regional level, 
is crucial. 
With the exception of participation in life-long 
learning, which is at about the EU27 average, most 
of the other indicators providing some information 
about employability of workers  see Spain 
performance below the EU27 average: 
participation in continual vocational training is 
relatively low and declining over 1999-2005, 
investment by enterprises in training of adults and 
public expenditures on education (as a % of GDP) 
are relatively low and pupils' performance 
according to the PISA study is poor. Furthermore, 
returns of education are relatively low as labour 
market segmentation hampers the transition from 
temporary to permanent contracts for better trained 
young cohorts. 
The Spanish system of continuous vocational 
training has developed in the framework of the 
social dialogue since its creation in 1993. 
Following the third tripartite agreement (December 
2000) on renewing the institutional framework of 
vocational training for employed people, a first 
reform of continuous vocational training was 
adopted in 2003, aimed at streamlining the system 
and introducing a flexible funding system for 
company-led training. The reform also established 
a National List of Professional Qualifications, 
which includes the professional qualifications that 
form the basis for drawing up training programmes 
and for recognising and accrediting the skills 
acquired. 
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A new regulation to integrate vocational training 
for unemployed and employed workers and to 
establish the framework for a more efficient use of 
financial resources was passed in 2007, following 
the 2006 tripartite agreement on vocational 
training. The 2007 reform led to the recognition of 
the right to continuous training for all workers, 
whether occupied or unemployed, through the 
integration of continuous and occupational training 
into a single system of vocational training for 
employment. By establishing that all workers, 
whether occupied or unemployed, and even those 
who do not pay vocational training contributions, 
are eligible for the training, the single framework 
of regulation aimed at fostering access to the 
different possibilities of continuous training.  
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Table 1.1: Main indicators - AT 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 8045 8109 8155 8191 8220 0.4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5485 5516 5532 5551 5576 0.5 %
as % of total population 68.2 68.0 67.8 67.8 67.8 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 3911 3994 4077 4148 4182 0.8 %
Male 2141 2177 2215 2257 2259 0.1 %
Female 1770 1816 1862 1891 1923 1.7 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 71.3 72.4 73.7 74.7 75.0 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 57.4 59.2 59.4 60.8 60.8 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.3 86.4 87.1 87.4 87.3 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29.9 33.0 36.8 39.8 41.9 2.1 p.p.
Male 78.5 79.3 80.5 81.7 81.4 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 61.7 63.6 63.9 65.0 64.6 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.9 92.8 93.2 93.7 93.0 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40.6 43.0 47.3 51.3 52.8 1.4 p.p.
Female 64.2 65.6 67.0 67.8 68.6 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 53.3 54.8 55.1 56.7 56.9 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.6 79.9 80.9 81.1 81.5 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19.9 23.5 26.9 28.9 31.6 2.7 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 67.8 68.6 70.2 71.4 72.1 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 51.9 53.1 54.0 55.5 55.9 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82.6 82.6 83.5 84.0 84.4 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28.8 31.8 35.5 38.6 41.0 2.4 p.p.
Male 74.9 75.4 76.9 78.4 78.5 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 56.0 56.8 58.2 59.6 59.5 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89.4 89.1 89.9 90.6 90.2 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38.9 41.3 45.3 49.8 51.8 2.0 p.p.
Female 60.7 62.0 63.5 64.4 65.8 1.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.9 49.4 49.9 51.5 52.3 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75.8 76.0 77.0 77.5 78.6 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19.3 22.9 26.3 28.0 30.8 2.8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 3716.4 3786.3 3881.3 3963.2 4019.8 56.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55.0 54.7 54.6 54.7 54.2 -0.5 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.0 45.3 45.4 45.3 45.8 0.5 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -1.3 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.4 p.p.
Male -1.6 1.3 2.3 2.3 0.5 p.p.
Female -0.8 2.6 2.7 1.8 2.6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 -0.2 p.p.
Male 7.7 7.3 7.3 6.9 6.9 0.0 p.p.
Female 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.8 -0.5 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 9.7 9.1 9.0 8.9 9.0 0.0 p.p.
Male 10.2 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.9 0.0 p.p.
Female 9.0 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.1 0.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 19.6 20.8 21.3 21.8 22.6 0.7 p.p.
Male 4.5 5.6 5.8 6.2 6.9 0.7 p.p.
Female 37.9 39.1 39.9 40.7 41.1 0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.8 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9.7 10.3 9.1 8.7 8.0 -0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.2 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.3 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.0 2.1 -0.9 p.p.
Male 4.5 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.6 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9.3 10.7 8.9 8.3 7.9 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.1 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.2 4.1 4.3 2.9 1.8 -1.1 p.p.
Female 5.4 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.1 -0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10.1 9.9 9.3 9.1 8.2 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.5 3.6 -0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.1 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.5 -0.6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 27.5 25.2 27.5 26.8 24.2 -2.7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.3 38.7 38.5 38.0 37.7 -1.0 %
Male 43.3 42.7 42.6 42.2 41.7 -1.1 %
Female 34.0 33.5 33.2 32.8 32.5 -0.7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 5.0 7.4 -2.4 -4.4 -1.5 p.p.
Building and construction 1.3 0.8 0.0 2.0 0.8 p.p.
Services 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0.1 -0.5 2.2 2.3 1.8 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
272 
Table 1.2: Indicator board on wage developments - AT 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 0.9 2.4 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.3
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 0.7 3.2 4.2 4.2 3.6 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) -1.3 3.9 2.2 3.5 3.0 5.1 3.2 4.5  :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -0.2 1.4 1.0 1.3 2.9 1.6 2.0 1.9 4.3
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 3.7
Wage and salaries 1.6 1.4 3.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity -0.6 1.4 0.9 1.3 3.1 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 65.2 64.6 63.9 63.5 64.0 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 27.1 27.0 27.3 27.2 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 72.9 73.0 72.7 72.8 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 63.4 63.5 63.2 63.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 48.1 47.9 48.1 48.5 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.0 42.9 43.2 43.9 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 24.2 24.2 24.5 24.3 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.1 1.0 2.0 1.7 0.3 1.7 1.1 1.2 -1.9
Hourly Labour Productivity 1.3 2.0 3.0 2.6 0.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.0 3.4 3.0 2.3 -0.3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -1.4 -0.5 1.2 2.7 2.9 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.2 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.7 2.2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.5
GDP deflator 1.7 2.1 1.6 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.2 0.6
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 0.0 13.4 -2.5 -12.0 1.4 -1.8 -6.1 -1.6 2.9
Industry excluding construction -2.2 -1.6 -3.7 -0.3 0.1 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0 5.1
of which: manufacturing -1.3 -2.0 -3.9 -1.7 0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.9 5.0
Construction 0.0 1.0 2.2 2.2 4.1 -1.0 0.7 4.3 5.3
Trade, transport and communication 0.1 2.1 2.9 1.3 4.1 1.9 4.4 5.3 7.1
Finance and business services -1.1 -1.3 2.6 0.8 5.2 2.5 4.3 4.8 6.0
Non-market related services 2.1 1.8 2.5 4.0 3.3 3.6 2.3 2.2 1.5
Market-related sectors -1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 3.0 0.5 1.6 2.4 5.6
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 0.9 2.4 3.0 2.3 3.0 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 2.6 3.8 -0.3 0.0 3.5 6.4 1.0 6.5 1.3
Industry excluding construction 1.7 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.2 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.7
of which: manufacturing 1.4 3.0 2.6 3.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 3.5 3.5
Construction 0.2 1.5 2.6 2.8 3.3 4.7 3.8 4.5 2.9
Trade, transport and communication 0.9 3.0 3.1 1.8 3.0 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.6
Finance and business services -0.9 0.8 2.3 1.6 4.1 4.1 4.8 4.4 3.7
Non-market related services 1.6 2.5 3.5 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.1
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 2.7 -8.5 2.3 13.5 2.1 8.3 7.5 8.2 -1.5
Industry excluding construction 3.9 4.2 6.9 2.6 2.1 4.0 3.9 3.7 -2.3
 of which: manufacturing 2.7 5.1 6.8 5.1 2.1 2.7 2.9 4.4 -1.4
Construction 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 -0.8 5.8 3.1 0.2 -2.2
Trade, transport and communication 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.5 -1.1 0.4 -1.5 -1.8 -3.2
Finance and business services 0.2 2.2 -0.3 0.8 -1.0 1.6 0.4 -0.4 -2.1
Non-market related services -0.5 0.7 1.0 -1.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.6 0.6 1.5
Market-related sectors 1.7 1.8 2.6 2.0 0.2 2.3 1.5 1.1 -2.3
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 2.1: Main indicators - BE 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10396 10477 10546 10614 10708 0.9 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 6818 6876 6941 7008 7073 0.9 %
as % of total population 65.6 65.6 65.8 66.0 66.1 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 4493 4589 4616 4701 4747 1.0 %
Male 2528 2557 2562 2595 2609 0.5 %
Female 1965 2032 2054 2106 2138 1.5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 65.9 66.7 66.5 67.1 67.1 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.3 35.0 34.7 33.9 33.4 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.4 84.6 84.5 85.3 85.7 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.2 33.3 33.6 35.9 36.1 0.2 p.p.
Male 73.4 73.9 73.4 73.6 73.3 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37.7 37.6 37.4 36.1 36.0 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.8 92.2 91.9 92.5 92.3 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40.4 43.4 42.7 44.4 44.4 0.0 p.p.
Female 58.2 59.5 59.5 60.4 60.8 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.8 32.3 31.9 31.6 30.8 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74.8 76.8 77.0 78.0 79.0 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 22.1 23.4 24.6 27.5 27.9 0.4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 60.3 61.1 61.0 62.0 62.4 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.8 27.5 27.6 27.5 27.4 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.3 78.3 78.4 79.7 80.5 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30.0 31.8 32.0 34.4 34.5 0.1 p.p.
Male 67.9 68.3 67.9 68.7 68.6 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.1 29.7 30.4 29.9 29.7 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.8 86.1 85.9 87.0 87.0 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.1 41.7 40.9 42.9 42.8 0.0 p.p.
Female 52.6 53.8 54.0 55.3 56.2 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25.4 25.2 24.7 25.0 25.0 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.5 70.4 70.7 72.3 73.8 1.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21.1 22.1 23.2 26.0 26.3 0.3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4113.6 4199.3 4232.9 4348.1 4413.7 65.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56.8 56.2 56.0 55.7 55.3 -0.4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43.2 43.8 44.0 44.3 44.7 0.4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.6 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.7 2.1 0.8 2.7 1.5 p.p.
Male 1.6 1.1 0.4 2.1 0.7 p.p.
Female 1.7 3.4 1.3 3.5 2.5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.5 -0.2 p.p.
Male 9.9 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.3 -0.1 p.p.
Female 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.3 -0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 8.7 8.9 8.7 8.7 8.3 -0.4 p.p.
Male 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.6 -0.3 p.p.
Female 11.7 11.4 10.9 10.8 10.2 -0.6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 21.2 21.7 22.0 21.9 22.4 0.5 p.p.
Male 6.6 7.1 7.0 7.1 7.5 0.4 p.p.
Female 40.4 40.4 41.0 40.5 40.8 0.3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 7.0 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.2 21.5 20.5 18.8 18.0 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.4 7.4 7.2 6.6 6.1 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.7 4.4 4.8 4.2 4.4 0.1 p.p.
Male 7.5 7.6 7.4 6.7 6.5 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.2 21.0 18.8 17.1 17.3 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.6 6.6 6.5 5.9 5.7 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.2 3.9 4.2 3.5 3.6 0.0 p.p.
Female 9.5 9.5 9.3 8.5 7.6 -0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.4 22.1 22.6 20.9 18.7 -2.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.4 8.4 8.1 7.4 6.6 -0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.8 5.5 5.7 5.3 5.5 0.2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 49.1 51.7 51.2 50.4 47.7 -2.6 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36.5 36.7 36.8 37.0 36.8 -0.7 %
Male 40.1 40.1 40.5 40.5 40.3 -0.6 %
Female 31.8 32.1 32.1 32.6 32.3 -0.8 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1.2 0.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 p.p.
Building and construction 0.0 1.3 3.8 4.0 2.3 p.p.
Services 1.4 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.0 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 2.2: Indicator board on wage developments - BE
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1.9 2.1 3.3 3.8 3.4 2.7 2.8 2.1 4.3
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.7 1.1 2.9 4.2 3.9 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.2 2.5 2.6 3.8  : 2.9 1.3 3.4  :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -0.4 1.5 1.7 2.8 3.9 3.2 2.3 2.4 5.6
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -2.7 -0.9 -0.6 0.4 2.2 1.4 0.6 0.7 3.9
Wage and salaries 1.4 1.9 3.1 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 0.0 1.8 2.1 3.2 4.5 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68.8 67.9 67.5 67.4 68.6 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 31.6 30.8 30.8 :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 68.4 69.2 69.2 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 59.9 60.7 60.7 : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 55.4 55.5 55.4 55.5 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 51.2 51.3 51.2 51.4 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 31.1 30.3 30.3 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.5 0.5 0.5 : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.3 0.5 1.6 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.3 -1.2
Hourly Labour Productivity 4.0 -0.5 1.2 1.3 -0.2 :   :  :   :
GDP 3.0 1.8 3.0 2.8 1.1 1.9 2.0 1.5 -1.0
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.3 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.3 0.5 1.6 2.5 1.9 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.8 4.5 3.8 5.0 5.6 3.6
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9
GDP deflator 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -0.8 11.3 10.0 2.8 3.7 1.8 4.8 8.1 15.6
Industry excluding construction -1.7 0.4 -0.7 1.4 2.4 3.2 -1.4 2.8 6.0
of which: manufacturing -2.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.9  : :   :  :   :
Construction -0.1 -1.8 -1.4 3.4 4.7 2.9 8.7 4.2 1.5
Trade, transport and communication 0.7 3.8 3.9 0.8 4.3 2.5 2.6 4.6 7.8
Finance and business services 0.5 -1.6 1.5 5.9 2.6 3.5 2.1 2.6 2.4
Non-market related services 1.5 3.5 3.2 3.4 4.9 4.0 4.2 4.9 6.5
Market-related sectors -0.2 0.5 1.3 2.9 3.1 3.1 1.6 3.4 4.8
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1.9 2.1 3.3 3.8 3.4 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 5.7 -1.7 6.6 7.6 1.8 6.0 4.8 4.6 6.3
Industry excluding construction 3.3 1.6 3.7 4.7 2.1 4.2 -0.6 3.1 2.0
of which: manufacturing 3.4 1.4 3.9 4.5  : :   :  :   :
Construction 3.5 0.6 3.1 3.0 4.2 2.7 7.3 5.5 0.6
Trade, transport and communication 1.8 1.3 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.9 3.1 4.4 3.9
Finance and business services 1.1 1.7 2.1 3.2 1.8 1.5 1.7 2.4 1.2
Non-market related services 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.4 4.8 3.9 4.0 4.7 6.4
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 6.5 -11.6 -3.1 4.6 -1.9 4.2 0.0 -3.2 -8.1
Industry excluding construction 5.0 1.3 4.5 3.2 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.4 -3.7
 of which: manufacturing 5.6 1.6 4.0 3.6  : :   :  :   :
Construction 3.5 2.4 4.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3 1.2 -0.9
Trade, transport and communication 1.1 -2.4 0.3 3.3 -0.5 1.4 0.5 -0.1 -3.6
Finance and business services 0.6 3.4 0.6 -2.6 -0.9 -2.0 -0.4 -0.2 -1.2
Non-market related services 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Market-related sectors 2.3 0.9 2.0 1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 -2.4
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 3.1: Main indicators - BG 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 7786 7747 7706 7673 7640 -0.4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5306 5283 5238 5198 5169 -0.6 %
as % of total population 68.1 68.2 68.0 67.7 67.7 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 3277 3281 3376 3448 3505 1.6 %
Male 1741 1751 1782 1820 1859 2.1 %
Female 1535 1530 1595 1628 1646 1.1 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 61.8 62.1 64.5 66.3 67.8 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28.9 27.9 28.9 28.9 30.1 1.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.9 80.2 82.3 84.5 85.5 1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 36.2 38.0 43.0 45.7 48.7 3.1 p.p.
Male 66.4 67.0 68.8 70.6 72.5 1.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.8 31.1 31.3 31.7 34.0 2.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82.9 83.3 85.1 87.5 88.8 1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.2 49.9 53.6 55.3 58.7 3.4 p.p.
Female 57.2 57.3 60.2 62.1 63.1 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25.9 24.5 26.4 26.0 26.1 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.8 77.2 79.4 81.4 82.1 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 26.8 27.8 33.9 37.2 40.2 2.9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 54.2 55.8 58.6 61.7 64.0 2.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.5 21.6 23.2 24.5 26.3 1.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71.2 73.0 75.7 79.4 81.3 1.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32.5 34.7 39.6 42.6 46.0 3.5 p.p.
Male 57.9 60.0 62.8 66.0 68.5 2.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23.2 23.9 25.4 27.1 29.3 2.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.5 75.7 78.6 82.5 84.7 2.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42.1 45.5 49.5 51.8 55.8 3.9 p.p.
Female 50.6 51.7 54.6 57.6 59.5 1.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.6 19.4 21.0 21.8 23.1 1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.8 70.3 72.8 76.2 77.9 1.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 24.2 25.5 31.1 34.5 37.7 3.2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2876.9 2947.0 3071.7 3208.8 3306.2 97.5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 52.8 53.2 52.9 53.0 53.1 0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 47.2 46.8 47.1 47.0 46.9 -0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 2.6 2.7 3.3 2.8 3.3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3.3 2.4 4.2 4.5 3.0 p.p.
Male 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.6 3.2 p.p.
Female 2.9 1.5 4.9 4.3 2.8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8.5 8.2 7.6 6.9 7.3 0.4 p.p.
Male 10.5 9.9 9.1 8.3 8.7 0.4 p.p.
Female 6.3 6.3 5.9 5.3 5.7 0.4 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 7.3 6.3 6.1 5.1 4.9 -0.2 p.p.
Male 7.7 6.6 6.2 4.8 5.5 0.6 p.p.
Female 6.9 6.1 6.0 5.4 4.4 -1.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 2.0 0.5 p.p.
Male 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.6 0.6 p.p.
Female 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.4 0.5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 12.1 10.1 9.0 6.9 5.6 -1.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25.8 22.3 19.5 15.1 12.7 -2.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.9 9.0 8.0 6.1 4.9 -1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 10.3 8.6 7.9 6.8 5.5 -1.3 p.p.
Male 12.6 10.3 8.7 6.5 5.5 -1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.0 23.4 18.9 14.5 13.7 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 11.3 9.1 7.7 5.7 4.7 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 10.7 8.8 7.6 6.4 5.0 -1.3 p.p.
Female 11.5 9.8 9.3 7.3 5.8 -1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.3 21.0 20.3 15.9 11.4 -4.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.4 9.0 8.3 6.5 5.2 -1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9.6 8.3 8.3 7.4 6.1 -1.3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 59.5 59.9 55.8 59.2 51.8 -7.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.6 41.1 41.1 41.0 -0.2 %
Male 41.1 41.1 41.6 41.7 41.6 -0.1 %
Female 40.1 40.2 40.4 40.5 40.4 -0.3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -0.8 -1.5 -1.3 -0.9 0.9 p.p.
Building and construction 7.3 17.0 25.1 9.7 11.7 p.p.
Services 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.6 4.3 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 2.2 2.2 3.3 2.8 1.2 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in 2008 
276 
Table 3.2: Indicator board on wage developments - BG 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 4.9 5.9 7.4 17.9 19.3  : 22.8 16.9 :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.7 7.3 8.7 18.4 19.7 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.7 5.7 5.5 17.5 19.4 18.8 20.3 18.9 18.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.0 2.4 4.4 14.2 16.2 :  18.8 12.8  :
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -4.0 -1.3 -3.8 5.9 4.3 :  4.9 2.0  :
Wage and salaries 7.6 13.9 10.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 56.0 56.0 54.5 56.8 59.5 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 27.5 24.9 21.5 20.0 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 72.5 75.1 78.5 80.0 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 61.9 65.3 69.0 71.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.9 38.9 35.4 36.5 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.9 32.4 29.4 31.4 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 25.2 24.0 20.9 19.9 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.3 0.9 0.7 0.1 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3.9 3.5 2.9 3.3 2.7 2.0 3.4 3.6 1.7
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.5 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.7 :   :  :   :
GDP 6.6 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 7.0 7.1 6.8 3.5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 12.6 10.9 9.4 8.1 7.3 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 12.0 12.4 14.0 12.5 9.0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 5.9 3.6 8.1 8.2 12.0 12.1 13.8 12.5 9.6
GDP deflator 5.1 3.8 8.5 7.9 11.4 11.6 13.2 10.6 10.5
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 2.1 21.1 8.5 56.0 0.2 20.4 16.0 -11.1 -1.3
Industry excluding construction 0.4 4.9 5.7 8.7 19.4 18.3 17.5 19.6 22.8
of which: manufacturing 2.1 3.4 2.6 :   : 17.5 16.4 21.7 20.6
Construction -5.1 3.0 15.0 :   : 31.2 35.0 29.0 27.1
Trade, transport and communication 0.4 0.6 1.9 :   : 12.0 18.0 12.3 16.4
Finance and business services 12.1 12.7 11.9 :   : 17.8 27.8 14.6 23.4
Non-market related services 7.4 2.6 8.8 :   : 29.9 22.6 16.6 22.4
Market-related sectors 0.5 4.5 5.1 203.0 17.4 14.7 18.5 10.7 17.6
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 4.7 5.8 7.4 17.9 19.3 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 5.4 11.2 8.8 10.6 23.7 18.8 28.8 25.4 23.9
Industry excluding construction 1.5 6.6 9.0 19.9 20.1 23.4 23.5 19.0 15.6
of which: manufacturing 1.7 8.0 10.5 21.2 19.7 23.1 22.7 19.6 14.6
Construction -1.0 -3.3 1.2 25.3 27.2 32.0 30.4 25.7 21.0
Trade, transport and communication 1.6 5.0 5.2 17.1 10.6 9.4 13.8 6.8 12.9
Finance and business services 6.7 18.7 14.3 15.9 26.1 26.1 36.3 18.3 27.1
Non-market related services 9.8 3.6 6.3 16.4 20.9 18.6 19.7 22.1 23.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 3.2 -8.1 0.2 -29.1 23.4 -1.3 11.1 41.1 25.6
Industry excluding construction 1.1 1.6 3.1 10.3 0.6 4.3 5.1 -0.5 -5.9
 of which: manufacturing -0.4 4.5 7.7 :   : 4.8 5.4 -1.7 -5.0
Construction 4.2 -6.1 -11.9 :   : 0.6 -3.4 -2.6 -4.8
Trade, transport and communication 1.1 4.4 3.3 :   : -2.3 -3.6 -4.9 -3.0
Finance and business services -4.8 5.3 2.1 :   : 7.1 6.7 3.2 3.0
Non-market related services 2.3 0.9 -2.3 :   : -8.6 -2.4 4.7 1.0
Market-related sectors 2.0 2.4 2.9 -60.8 1.2 4.4 3.9 4.5 0.1
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 4.1: Main indicators - CY 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 711 727 737 752 758 0.8 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 476 494 500 518 524 1.0 %
as % of total population 66.9 67.9 67.9 68.9 69.1 0.2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 345 357 365 383 386 0.6 %
Male 191 199 202 209 210 0.4 %
Female 155 159 164 174 176 0.9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72.6 72.4 73.0 73.9 73.6 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.7 42.6 41.5 41.7 41.7 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 85.7 86.2 86.7 86.5 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52.7 52.4 55.5 57.7 56.6 -1.1 p.p.
Male 83.0 82.9 82.7 82.9 82.0 -1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45.7 46.6 44.9 43.9 43.1 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 95.4 95.3 95.3 95.0 94.0 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 74.4 73.2 74.1 74.9 73.0 -1.9 p.p.
Female 62.9 62.5 63.8 65.4 65.7 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.3 39.0 38.3 39.7 40.5 0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.4 76.5 77.4 78.7 79.1 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32.0 32.7 37.8 41.5 41.0 -0.5 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 69.1 68.5 69.6 71.0 70.9 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37.3 36.7 37.4 37.4 38.0 0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82.7 81.8 82.6 83.8 83.7 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.1 50.6 53.6 55.9 54.8 -1.1 p.p.
Male 80.0 79.2 79.5 80.0 79.2 -0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.4 40.5 41.0 39.1 39.3 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.8 91.8 92.0 92.4 91.4 -1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 71.0 70.8 71.7 72.5 70.9 -1.6 p.p.
Female 59.0 58.4 60.3 62.4 62.9 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33.6 33.3 34.0 36.0 36.8 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.1 72.2 73.6 75.5 76.3 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30.4 31.4 36.6 40.2 39.4 -0.8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 328.6 338.0 348.3 367.9 371.1 3.2 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55.9 56.1 55.6 54.8 54.7 -0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44.1 43.9 44.4 45.2 45.4 0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3.8 3.6 1.8 3.2 2.6 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3.7 2.9 3.0 5.6 0.9 p.p.
Male 5.9 3.1 2.1 4.2 0.6 p.p.
Female 0.9 2.5 4.3 7.4 1.3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.8 12.4 12.1 11.6 11.7 0.0 p.p.
Male 16.6 15.1 14.5 14.4 14.4 0.1 p.p.
Female 8.1 8.9 9.1 8.2 8.3 0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13.0 14.0 13.2 13.3 14.0 0.7 p.p.
Male 8.6 9.0 7.9 7.6 8.2 0.6 p.p.
Female 17.6 19.5 19.0 19.2 20.0 0.8 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 7.4 7.6 6.6 6.4 6.8 0.4 p.p.
Male 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.5 0.4 p.p.
Female 12.7 13.2 11.3 10.4 10.8 0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4.7 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.8 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10.6 13.9 10.0 10.2 8.9 -1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.0 4.5 4.1 3.4 3.2 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.8 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.2 0.1 p.p.
Male 3.6 4.3 4.0 3.4 3.3 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9.3 13.0 8.8 11.0 8.8 -2.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 2.7 3.6 3.5 2.7 2.8 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.7 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.9 -0.3 p.p.
Female 6.0 6.5 5.4 4.6 4.3 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12.3 14.5 11.2 9.2 9.2 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.1 3.6 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.0 4.1 3.2 3.1 3.9 0.8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 27.4 23.4 19.6 18.9 13.5 -5.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.7 39.2 39.2 39.0 39.0 -0.1 %
Male 41.9 41.3 41.1 40.8 40.8 -0.1 %
Female 36.9 36.3 36.7 36.7 36.6 -0.4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 3.5 -5.6 -14.1 10.7 -4.0 p.p.
Building and construction 5.9 5.9 3.9 4.9 3.2 p.p.
Services 3.7 4.4 2.6 2.9 3.1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 2.5 0.6 1.0 1.0 -1.0 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 4.2: Indicator board on wage developments - CY
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1.9 1.8 3.0 2.1 4.0 6.6 10.4 8.9 6.4
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.5 7.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.1 3.9 4.7 6.8 6.4 5.0 5.7 6.2 7.2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.5 1.4 0.6 0.9 3.0 5.1 8.1 5.9 3.8
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.7 -0.9 -2.3 -2.4 -1.8 -0.3 2.8 0.9 -0.1
Wage and salaries 1.6 0.3 3.6 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68.5 68.3 67.3 67.5 66.3 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 15.5 15.6 15.1 :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 84.5 84.4 84.9 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 84.5 84.4 84.9 : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 18.6 13.6 14.1 13.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 16.8 12.0 12.6 12.5 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 15.5 15.6 15.1 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.0 0.0 0.0 : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0.4 0.3 2.3 1.2 1.0 1.4 2.2 2.9 2.6
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.5 0.9 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.4 3.7 4.3 3.8 3.4 2.8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.8 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.4 -0.3 0.5 1.9 2.2 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.1 3.3
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.8
GDP deflator 3.3 2.4 3.0 3.4 4.8 5.4 5.2 4.9 3.9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -16.9 14.7 33.3 -3.7  : 4.0 10.6 -1.9 2.5
Industry excluding construction 6.3 2.3 9.7 0.5  : 2.9 3.5 2.4 5.2
of which: manufacturing 4.3 4.3 6.9 3.2  : :   :  :   :
Construction 2.3 -1.7 1.9 -3.6  : 1.8 4.2 2.5 -0.8
Trade, transport and communication 1.9 -1.2 -2.9 -0.8  : 1.2 3.9 2.2 -0.1
Finance and business services 9.5 7.0 1.5 -3.7  : -0.5 6.4 -1.4 -0.7
Non-market related services 0.6 3.1 3.7 2.8  : 6.5 7.3 4.8 3.0
Market-related sectors 3.5 2.0 -0.2 -1.5 1.6 1.0 4.5 1.0 -0.2
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2.2 2.9 3.0 0.9 3.4 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -19.1 17.4 35.0 -12.3  : 10.7 14.4 -2.9 5.2
Industry excluding construction 5.5 2.0 4.3 2.1  : 6.9 6.8 5.4 4.4
of which: manufacturing 2.9 2.8 1.4 3.1  : :   :  :   :
Construction 1.3 -3.3 6.3 -2.0  : 2.6 3.3 3.9 3.5
Trade, transport and communication 5.4 0.1 -0.9 1.3  : 2.7 4.9 1.1 0.2
Finance and business services 7.3 7.8 7.3 -3.7  : 2.8 9.6 1.3 2.9
Non-market related services -0.4 0.9 5.1 2.2  : 6.3 7.0 2.5 1.4
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -2.7 2.4 1.3 -8.9 -1.9 6.4 3.4 -1.0 2.6
Industry excluding construction -0.7 -0.3 -4.9 1.6 1.2 3.9 3.1 2.9 -0.7
 of which: manufacturing -1.3 -1.5 -5.1 0.0  : 2.3 3.1 2.5 0.3
Construction -1.0 -1.6 4.3 1.7 1.9 0.8 -0.9 1.3 4.3
Trade, transport and communication 3.4 1.3 2.1 2.2 0.4 1.4 1.0 -1.1 0.4
Finance and business services -2.1 0.7 5.7 0.0 4.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.6
Non-market related services -1.0 -2.2 1.3 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -2.1 -1.5
Market-related sectors 0.7 1.1 2.8 1.7 1.7 2.6 1.7 0.9 1.9
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 5.1: Main indicators - CZ 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10196 10229 10265 10320 10422 1.0 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7231 7270 7307 7347 7410 0.9 %
as % of total population 70.9 71.1 71.2 71.2 71.1 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 5063 5119 5140 5132 5163 0.6 %
Male 2815 2857 2873 2888 2922 1.2 %
Female 2248 2262 2267 2244 2241 -0.2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70.0 70.4 70.3 69.9 69.7 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.2 34.0 33.5 31.9 31.1 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.3 88.2 87.8 87.3 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 45.1 46.9 47.7 48.2 49.5 1.3 p.p.
Male 77.9 78.4 78.3 78.1 78.1 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.7 38.9 37.7 36.7 35.9 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94.6 94.8 94.8 95.0 94.8 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60.2 62.1 62.7 62.5 64.2 1.7 p.p.
Female 62.2 62.4 62.3 61.5 61.0 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.5 28.9 29.2 26.9 26.1 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 81.6 81.3 80.3 79.6 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.3 32.9 34.0 35.2 36.1 0.9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64.2 64.8 65.3 66.1 66.6 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.8 27.5 27.7 28.5 28.1 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.4 82.0 82.5 83.5 83.8 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42.7 44.5 45.2 46.0 47.6 1.6 p.p.
Male 72.3 73.3 73.7 74.8 75.4 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.1 31.3 31.4 32.8 32.4 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89.2 89.8 90.4 91.7 92.1 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57.2 59.3 59.5 59.6 61.9 2.3 p.p.
Female 56.0 56.3 56.8 57.3 57.6 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25.4 23.4 23.7 23.9 23.5 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.4 74.0 74.5 74.9 75.2 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29.4 30.9 32.1 33.5 34.4 0.9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4638.5 4710.0 4769.4 4855.9 4933.5 77.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56.4 56.7 56.7 56.9 57.2 0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43.6 43.3 43.3 43.1 42.8 -0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.3 1.0 1.9 2.7 0.9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0.2 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.6 p.p.
Male -0.2 2.2 1.2 2.2 2.0 p.p.
Female -0.2 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.1 11.4 11.3 11.7 11.7 0.0 p.p.
Male 15.5 14.7 14.3 14.8 14.8 0.0 p.p.
Female 7.7 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.6 0.0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 8.4 7.9 8.0 7.8 7.2 -0.6 p.p.
Male 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.5 5.7 -0.8 p.p.
Female 10.0 9.2 9.4 9.4 9.1 -0.3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 -0.1 p.p.
Male 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 p.p.
Female 7.7 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8 -0.1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.3 7.9 7.2 5.3 4.4 -0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.0 19.2 17.5 10.7 9.9 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.3 7.1 6.4 4.9 4.0 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.4 5.2 5.3 4.6 3.9 -0.8 p.p.
Male 7.1 6.5 5.8 4.2 3.5 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.2 19.3 16.6 10.6 9.8 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.6 5.3 4.7 3.5 2.8 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.9 4.5 5.1 4.5 3.5 -1.1 p.p.
Female 9.9 9.8 8.9 6.7 5.6 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.5 19.1 18.7 11.0 9.9 -1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.3 9.3 8.3 6.7 5.4 -1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6.1 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.6 -0.3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 51.0 53.0 54.3 52.2 49.3 -2.8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.7 41.7 41.4 41.3 41.3 0.1 %
Male 43.7 43.6 43.3 43.1 43.2 0.1 %
Female 39.0 39.1 38.9 38.8 38.8 -0.1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3.9 -3.5 -0.7 -1.1 -4.6 p.p.
Building and construction 1.9 0.1 2.0 4.3 -1.0 p.p.
Services 0.6 1.6 2.0 3.3 1.4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0.3 1.3 2.3 1.8 1.5 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 5.2: Indicators board on wage developments - CZ
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 5.7 4.9 5.9 6.3 6.7 9.9 8.0 6.9 5.7
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 5.7 5.1 6.3 7.2 6.7 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6.2 3.5 6.4 7.9 7.9 9.7 7.9 5.2 8.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.5 -0.3 1.1 2.9 4.5 8.2 4.8 4.1 7.8
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -2.9 0.0 0.0 -0.5 2.7 5.6 3.5 3.3 5.9
Wage and salaries 5.7 5.3 6.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 58.1 58.1 57.7 57.6 59.5 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 28.1 27.5 27.4 27.7 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 71.9 72.5 72.6 72.3 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 63.0 63.8 64.0 63.2 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.5 43.8 42.6 42.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.5 40.5 39.4 37.4 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 26.9 26.2 26.1 26.9 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 4.1 5.2 4.8 3.4 2.1 1.6 3.0 2.6 -1.9
Hourly Labour Productivity 3.7 4.6 5.2 4.0 2.3 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.1 3.0 3.5 4.9 4.1 -0.6
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.6 6.2 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -1.6 0.9 3.8 5.9 5.3 :   :  :   :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.6 1.6 2.1 3.0 6.3 7.6 6.7 6.5 4.4
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.5 0.9 0.9 3.1 5.8 6.9 6.2 5.9 4.3
GDP deflator 4.5 -0.3 1.1 3.4 1.7 2.4 1.3 0.8 1.8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -4.2 -3.6 28.2 24.5 1.1 49.5 81.2 35.4 -39.5
Industry excluding construction -5.4 2.9 -0.4 1.9 12.8 15.7 14.3 16.5 10.0
of which: manufacturing -5.3 -5.3 -6.0 -0.2 0.6 15.3 15.3 16.6 7.5
Construction 0.7 13.8 8.6 5.3 27.7 48.3 44.4 29.6 21.1
Trade, transport and communication 7.6 4.8 3.6 7.0 13.0 13.7 18.2 19.8 14.4
Finance and business services 3.6 8.4 14.4 3.9 22.9 19.7 24.5 28.3 22.5
Non-market related services 5.0 13.5 11.0 9.5 17.3 12.7 16.6 19.3 10.2
Market-related sectors 1.2 4.9 4.7 4.9 16.7 18.4 20.5 21.5 13.1
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5.5 12.4 11.7 8.6 18.3 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 7.5 11.0 10.9 11.5 20.5 19.9 21.6 26.6 12.1
Industry excluding construction 6.6 12.0 11.3 8.1 18.4 22.4 23.5 23.8 10.6
of which: manufacturing 7.0 4.6 5.2 7.1 6.1 22.1 23.7 23.5 9.9
Construction 4.5 12.2 12.0 7.9 18.7 24.5 25.2 26.2 13.8
Trade, transport and communication 6.5 11.5 12.2 9.2 19.5 18.5 24.7 27.3 15.2
Finance and business services 4.5 11.0 12.4 7.7 21.1 22.0 24.0 26.4 18.9
Non-market related services 3.4 13.8 10.8 8.5 14.6 13.2 17.3 19.0 10.9
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 12.1 15.1 -13.5 -10.4 19.2 -19.8 -32.9 -6.5 85.3
Industry excluding construction 12.7 8.8 11.7 6.1 5.0 5.7 8.1 6.2 0.5
 of which: manufacturing 12.9 10.5 12.0 7.3 5.5 5.8 7.2 5.9 2.2
Construction 3.7 -1.4 3.1 2.4 -7.1 -16.0 -13.3 -2.6 -6.0
Trade, transport and communication -1.0 6.3 8.3 2.1 5.7 4.3 5.5 6.3 0.7
Finance and business services 0.9 2.3 -1.7 3.6 -1.5 1.9 -0.4 -1.4 -2.9
Non-market related services -1.5 0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -2.3 0.4 0.5 -0.2 0.6
Market-related sectors 5.1 6.6 6.5 3.7 3.7 2.7 3.2 3.6 0.6
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 6.1: Main indicators - DK 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5379 5396 5415 5431 5483 1.0 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3559 3566 3569 3573 3591 0.5 %
as % of total population 66.2 66.1 65.9 65.8 65.5 -0.3 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 2852 2846 2875 2866 2902 1.2 %
Male 1511 1504 1516 1513 1528 1.0 %
Female 1342 1341 1360 1353 1374 1.5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 80.1 79.8 80.6 80.2 80.8 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 67.9 68.1 69.9 70.9 72.5 1.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 88.1 88.9 89.0 90.2 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 63.9 62.8 63.2 60.8 58.7 -2.1 p.p.
Male 84.0 83.6 84.1 83.9 84.4 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 69.7 70.0 70.5 72.3 73.3 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.5 91.7 92.3 92.5 93.4 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 71.3 68.7 69.6 67.0 66.0 -0.9 p.p.
Female 76.2 75.9 77.0 76.4 77.1 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 66.0 66.2 69.3 69.4 71.7 2.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84.8 84.5 85.4 85.4 87.0 1.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56.5 56.8 56.7 54.6 51.5 -3.1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 75.7 75.9 77.4 77.1 78.1 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 62.3 62.3 64.6 65.3 67.0 1.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.7 84.5 86.1 86.3 88.0 1.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60.3 59.5 60.7 58.6 57.0 -1.6 p.p.
Male 79.7 79.8 81.2 81.0 81.9 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 63.4 63.9 65.0 66.3 68.3 1.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 88.3 90.0 90.2 91.3 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 67.3 65.6 67.1 64.9 64.3 -0.6 p.p.
Female 71.6 71.9 73.4 73.2 74.3 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 61.1 60.5 64.1 64.2 65.7 1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.8 80.6 82.0 82.4 84.6 2.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53.3 53.5 54.3 52.3 49.8 -2.5 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2693.4 2706.3 2761.7 2756.5 2804.0 47.5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 53.2 53.1 53.0 53.0 52.8 -0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46.8 46.9 47.0 47.0 47.2 0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.6 1.0 2.0 2.7 0.8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.0 0.5 2.0 -0.2 1.7 p.p.
Male 0.2 0.3 1.9 -0.3 1.4 p.p.
Female 2.0 0.7 2.2 -0.1 2.0 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 0.1 p.p.
Male 5.8 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.7 0.2 p.p.
Female 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 9.4 9.8 8.9 8.7 8.3 -0.4 p.p.
Male 8.6 8.4 7.9 7.5 7.6 0.1 p.p.
Female 10.3 11.3 9.9 9.9 9.1 -0.9 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 21.5 21.5 22.9 23.4 23.9 0.4 p.p.
Male 11.2 11.7 12.3 12.5 13.1 0.6 p.p.
Female 33.3 32.5 34.9 35.8 36.0 0.2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.8 3.3 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8.2 8.6 7.7 7.9 7.6 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.1 4.1 3.2 3.0 2.5 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.6 5.2 3.9 3.5 2.9 -0.7 p.p.
Male 5.1 4.4 3.3 3.5 3.0 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9.0 8.6 7.9 8.2 6.9 -1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.3 3.7 2.4 2.6 2.3 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.6 4.6 3.5 3.1 2.6 -0.5 p.p.
Female 6.0 5.3 4.5 4.2 3.7 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 7.4 8.6 7.5 7.5 8.4 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.8 4.5 4.0 3.5 2.7 -0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.6 5.8 4.3 4.1 3.2 -0.9 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 21.6 23.5 20.9 16.1 13.7 -2.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 34.7 35.1 34.9 34.9 34.7 -0.5 %
Male 37.6 37.9 37.7 37.6 37.2 -1.1 %
Female 31.3 31.7 31.4 31.6 31.7 0.2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -4.5 -1.2 -2.4 1.2 1.2 p.p.
Building and construction 0.0 6.8 5.8 4.9 -1.0 p.p.
Services 0.3 1.3 2.3 2.7 0.8 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -4.3 -2.3 -0.3 1.8 1.8 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 6.2: Indicator board on wage developments - DK
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.1 4.9 5.7 3.4 3.3 2.9
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.4 3.8 3.4 2.1 4.4 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.6 4.1 3.3 4.0 3.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0.4 2.2 2.2 4.2 7.1 6.9 4.5 7.2 9.1
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.9 -0.7 0.3 2.2 3.0 2.8 0.3 2.4 5.9
Wage and salaries 2.1 3.6 5.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1.2 2.5 2.5 4.3 7.6 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 67.1 67.0 67.4 68.8 70.4 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 13.0 13.3 14.2 :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 87.0 86.7 85.8 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 70.6 70.3 69.4 : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.3 41.4 41.3 41.3 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.9 38.1 37.9 38.1 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 10.2 10.9 11.6 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.8 2.4 2.6 : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.9 1.4 1.3 -1.0 -2.0 -1.1 -1.1 -3.7 -5.7
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.7 1.4 0.9 -1.9 -2.5 :   :  :   :
GDP 2.3 2.4 3.3 1.6 -1.2 -0.2 0.8 -1.5 -3.8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.2 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.2 0.8 2.4 2.4 -0.2 :   :  :   :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 0.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.6 3.0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.6 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.5 2.9
GDP deflator 2.3 2.9 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.9 4.2 4.7 3.0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 0.2 9.0 8.8 32.6 -13.2 4.3 -11.5 -9.4 21.6
Industry excluding construction -2.1 2.6 3.9 6.8 6.3 12.1 5.1 9.4 8.4
of which: manufacturing -2.0 2.5 0.5 2.2 8.4 11.6 5.5 9.2 7.5
Construction 2.9 6.3 -5.6 4.8 10.4 11.7 11.2 12.9 11.2
Trade, transport and communication 1.3 3.4 0.3 3.3 8.8 8.3 5.8 8.6 14.4
Finance and business services 0.4 3.0 5.7 6.2 7.6 4.1 6.2 5.7 6.2
Non-market related services 3.5 2.7 3.1 1.6 4.7 2.4 2.7 5.0 5.5
Market-related sectors 0.0 3.7 2.5 5.8 7.7 8.2 5.8 7.7 9.9
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.3 4.6 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 4.2 2.2 5.5 5.0 4.3 4.3 8.6 6.8 3.4
Industry excluding construction 4.1 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.0 2.7 5.7 5.4 5.0
of which: manufacturing 4.1 5.4 4.9 4.0 4.6 2.7 5.7 5.4 4.9
Construction 3.1 3.2 4.3 3.8 4.5 6.8 6.7 5.6 5.9
Trade, transport and communication 2.2 4.5 2.1 2.6 4.7 7.2 6.1 4.1 5.4
Finance and business services 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.8 4.0 2.6 4.0 3.9 3.0
Non-market related services 3.3 2.2 3.5 3.0 5.0 5.2 2.7 5.4 6.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 4.0 -6.2 -3.0 -20.8 20.2 0.0 22.7 17.9 -15.0
Industry excluding construction 6.4 2.4 0.8 -2.1 -2.2 -8.5 0.6 -3.7 -3.1
 of which: manufacturing 6.1 2.9 4.4 1.8 -3.5 -8.0 0.2 -3.4 -2.4
Construction 0.1 -3.0 10.5 -0.9 -5.3 -4.4 -4.1 -6.5 -4.8
Trade, transport and communication 1.0 1.0 1.8 -0.7 -3.7 -1.0 0.3 -4.2 -7.8
Finance and business services 3.0 0.1 -2.6 -3.2 -3.4 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7 -3.0
Non-market related services -0.1 -0.5 0.4 1.4 0.3 2.7 0.0 0.4 1.0
Market-related sectors 3.1 0.6 0.8 -2.3 -2.7 -3.2 -0.3 -2.9 -4.8
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 7.1: Main indicators - EE 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 1348 1343 1339 1338 1336 -0.1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 910 910 913 909 907 -0.2 %
as % of total population 67.5 67.7 68.1 68.0 67.9 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 636 638 661 663 671 1.3 %
Male 322 319 332 338 340 0.7 %
Female 314 319 329 325 331 1.9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70.0 70.1 72.4 72.9 74.0 1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34.7 34.6 35.9 38.3 41.4 3.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.5 86.0 89.1 88.5 88.1 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55.7 59.0 61.0 62.2 65.1 2.9 p.p.
Male 74.4 73.6 75.8 77.5 78.3 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.6 39.7 41.2 44.2 45.2 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90.1 89.2 92.8 93.6 92.9 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60.7 63.0 61.6 63.7 68.8 5.2 p.p.
Female 66.0 66.9 69.3 68.7 70.1 1.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.8 29.4 30.6 32.3 37.5 5.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.2 83.1 85.8 83.7 83.6 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51.9 56.0 60.5 61.0 62.3 1.3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 63.0 64.4 68.1 69.4 69.8 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.2 29.2 31.6 34.5 36.4 1.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78.8 79.6 84.2 84.8 83.8 -0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52.4 56.1 58.5 60.0 62.4 2.4 p.p.
Male 66.4 67.1 71.0 73.2 73.6 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.8 33.1 37.0 38.8 39.5 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.6 81.9 87.5 89.7 88.4 -1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56.4 59.2 57.5 59.4 65.2 5.8 p.p.
Female 60.0 62.1 65.3 65.9 66.3 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.6 25.1 26.1 30.0 33.2 3.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.2 77.5 81.1 80.2 79.6 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49.4 53.7 59.2 60.5 60.3 -0.2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 573.3 586.3 621.1 630.7 633.5 2.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 50.2 49.6 50.0 50.6 50.6 0.0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 49.8 50.4 50.0 49.4 49.4 0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.0 2.0 5.4 0.8 0.2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.1 2.3 5.9 1.6 0.4 p.p.
Male -1.5 1.1 6.9 2.7 0.3 p.p.
Female 1.7 3.5 5.0 0.4 0.5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6.0 5.1 5.2 5.5 4.3 -1.2 p.p.
Male 7.7 6.9 7.0 7.4 5.3 -2.1 p.p.
Female 4.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.1 -0.3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.5 0.3 p.p.
Male 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.1 3.5 0.3 p.p.
Female 2.2 2.5 2.7 : 1.8 : p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 6.9 6.6 6.7 7.2 6.4 -0.8 p.p.
Male 4.7 : : : 5.0 : p.p.
Female 9.1 9.1 9.7 10.6 9.3 -1.3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9.7 7.9 5.9 4.7 5.5 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.7 15.8 12.0 10.0 12.0 2.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.9 7.5 5.5 4.2 4.9 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.9 5.0 4.1 3.5 4.1 0.6 p.p.
Male 10.4 8.8 6.2 5.4 5.8 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.3 16.6 10.1 12.1 12.5 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.5 8.2 5.6 4.2 4.8 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.2 5.9 6.7 6.7 5.2 -1.5 p.p.
Female 8.9 7.1 5.6 3.9 5.3 1.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.4 14.8 14.8 7.2 11.3 4.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.3 6.8 5.4 4.3 4.9 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.9 4.2 2.2 0.9 3.2 2.3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 52.5 53.5 48.2 49.1 31.3 -17.8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39.8 39.9 39.9 39.6 39.2 -1.1 %
Male 41.3 41.3 41.2 41.0 40.3 -1.6 %
Female 38.2 38.5 38.5 38.2 38.0 -0.6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -5.3 -7.0 -2.5 -3.2 -17.0 p.p.
Building and construction 7.8 2.6 25.1 27.6 -3.8 p.p.
Services -3.4 4.6 7.0 -1.4 1.4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 5.0 -1.3 -2.3 -1.8 2.9 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 7.2: Indicator board on wage developments - EE
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 11.5 10.7 14.1 26.4 13.0 18.0 14.3 15.7 3.0
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 9.9 12.0 14.6 25.1 16.4 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6.3 10.6 16.8 20.2 13.8 17.6 16.3 13.2 8.5
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3.7 3.4 8.9 19.8 17.5 19.5 15.3 19.7 13.8
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0.4 -1.8 1.7 9.3 9.0 10.3 4.7 11.2 7.9
Wage and salaries 14.4 14.0 11.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 54.9 54.6 55.7 61.0 65.7 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26.7 26.6 26.4 :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73.3 73.4 73.6 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.3 41.1 40.2 40.1 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.0 38.3 37.9 38.1 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 25.3 25.3 25.1 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1.4 1.3 1.3 : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 7.6 7.0 4.7 5.5 -3.8 -1.3 -0.8 -3.3 -9.5
Hourly Labour Productivity 7.0 6.3 5.2 5.7 -2.3 :   :  :   :
GDP 7.5 9.2 10.4 6.3 -3.6 0.2 -1.1 -3.5 -9.7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9.4 8.6 8.0 7.6 7.5 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 1.6 4.4 8.8 10.4 3.3 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.6 11.3 11.5 11.0 8.7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.5 2.6 3.5 6.5 8.8 9.5 9.0 9.2 7.6
GDP deflator 3.3 5.3 7.0 9.6 7.8 8.4 10.0 7.6 5.5
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 16.0 15.2 10.4 45.7 -0.4 14.9 9.6 -2.3 -4.3
Industry excluding construction -0.6 2.6 4.4 13.1 16.0 11.7 12.2 24.2 15.8
of which: manufacturing -1.1 1.8 4.3 11.4 15.0 9.4 9.9 22.8 16.2
Construction 7.0 8.3 22.1 27.0 16.1 4.5 -1.9 9.0 0.5
Trade, transport and communication 5.8 0.2 5.8 21.1 14.4 26.6 24.0 21.1 10.0
Finance and business services 1.2 -0.5 20.5 22.2 27.0 21.7 13.6 24.1 16.1
Non-market related services 8.3 8.1 8.1 19.5 17.3 22.0 15.8 16.6 16.1
Market-related sectors 3.6 2.8 10.3 21.0 14.9 18.3 13.9 18.7 9.3
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 11.5 10.7 14.2 26.4 12.9 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 11.5 17.2 10.0 35.1 26.9 26.9 35.7 36.8 31.1
Industry excluding construction 1.2 14.4 18.4 25.5 8.4 15.6 -0.5 13.6 3.6
of which: manufacturing 4.4 14.6 19.5 23.8 7.3 13.7 -1.6 13.4 2.1
Construction 9.6 30.3 16.5 9.4 12.2 0.5 1.1 7.0 -4.2
Trade, transport and communication 18.5 4.1 11.8 31.9 4.0 20.6 26.0 13.0 -17.2
Finance and business services 23.3 -2.2 25.8 21.8 17.5 23.8 10.4 2.3 10.5
Non-market related services 12.0 10.9 6.8 27.3 22.3 19.0 23.7 27.4 20.3
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -3.8 1.7 -0.3 -7.3 27.3 10.5 23.8 39.9 36.9
Industry excluding construction 1.8 11.5 13.4 11.0 -6.5 3.5 -11.3 -8.5 -10.5
 of which: manufacturing 5.6 12.6 14.6 11.1 -6.7 3.9 -10.5 -7.7 -12.2
Construction 2.5 20.2 -4.6 -13.8 -3.4 -3.8 3.1 -1.8 -4.8
Trade, transport and communication 12.0 3.9 5.6 8.9 -9.0 -4.7 1.6 -6.7 -24.7
Finance and business services 21.7 -1.7 4.4 -0.3 -7.4 1.8 -2.8 -17.5 -4.8
Non-market related services 3.4 2.6 -1.2 6.6 4.2 -2.5 6.8 9.3 3.6
Market-related sectors 7.9 7.5 6.3 4.1 -5.1 -1.0 -2.2 -5.5 -11.0
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
8. FINLAND 
285 
Table 8.1: Main indicators - FI 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5205 5224 5242 5266 5289 0.4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3467 3476 3484 3497 3514 0.5 %
as % of total population 66.6 66.5 66.5 66.4 66.4 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 2574 2597 2620 2642 2669 1.0 %
Male 1332 1338 1350 1358 1376 1.4 %
Female 1242 1259 1270 1284 1293 0.7 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 74.2 74.7 75.2 75.6 76.0 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49.7 50.7 51.8 53.4 53.5 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.4 87.7 87.8 88.0 88.6 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54.9 56.6 58.5 58.8 59.7 0.9 p.p.
Male 76.4 76.6 77.1 77.2 77.9 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.5 50.9 52.6 53.3 53.4 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90.1 90.3 90.3 90.4 91.3 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55.6 56.9 58.8 59.1 60.6 1.5 p.p.
Female 72.0 72.8 73.3 73.8 73.9 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 48.9 50.4 51.0 53.6 53.5 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 85.1 85.3 85.6 85.9 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54.3 56.4 58.2 58.4 58.8 0.4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 67.6 68.4 69.3 70.3 71.1 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.4 40.5 42.1 44.6 44.7 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.0 81.7 82.4 83.4 84.3 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.9 52.7 54.5 55.0 56.5 1.4 p.p.
Male 69.7 70.3 71.4 72.1 73.1 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.4 40.4 42.6 44.5 44.3 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 84.4 85.2 86.0 87.3 1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51.4 52.8 54.8 55.1 57.1 2.0 p.p.
Female 65.6 66.5 67.3 68.5 69.0 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.4 40.6 41.6 44.7 45.1 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78.2 78.9 79.6 80.6 81.2 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.4 52.7 54.3 55.0 55.9 0.9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2344.8 2377.6 2416.1 2458.5 2497.2 38.7 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51.8 51.6 51.7 51.6 51.7 0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48.2 48.4 48.3 48.4 48.3 -0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.4 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.6 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.6 p.p.
Male 0.1 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.9 p.p.
Female -0.1 1.7 1.5 2.1 1.2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.6 8.0 0.4 p.p.
Male 9.8 9.9 10.2 9.7 10.0 0.3 p.p.
Female 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 6.0 0.5 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 16.1 16.4 16.3 15.8 14.9 -0.9 p.p.
Male 12.6 12.8 12.5 12.2 11.1 -1.2 p.p.
Female 19.5 20.0 20.0 19.4 18.7 -0.7 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 13.2 13.2 13.5 13.4 12.7 -0.7 p.p.
Male 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.3 7.9 -0.4 p.p.
Female 18.3 18.2 18.7 18.8 17.8 -1.0 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.8 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.4 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.7 20.1 18.7 16.5 16.5 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.3 6.8 6.1 5.3 4.9 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.3 5.4 -0.9 p.p.
Male 8.7 8.2 7.4 6.5 6.1 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.0 20.6 19.0 16.4 17.1 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.0 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.4 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.4 7.2 6.9 6.8 5.8 -1.0 p.p.
Female 8.9 8.6 8.1 7.2 6.7 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.3 19.5 18.4 16.6 15.8 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.6 7.2 6.6 5.8 5.4 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.1 6.6 6.7 5.9 5.0 -0.9 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 24.3 26.1 25.6 23.0 18.6 -4.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37.0 37.1 36.9 36.8 36.8 0.0 %
Male 39.2 39.2 39.2 39.0 38.9 -0.1 %
Female 34.5 34.6 34.3 34.2 34.3 0.3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2.0 -0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.3 p.p.
Building and construction 2.3 4.6 4.1 7.3 3.9 p.p.
Services 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2.5 0.2 0.8 0.5 -0.9 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 8.2: Indicator board on wage developments - FI 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.6 3.8 2.9 3.4 5.3 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.3
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.4 4.2 3.0 3.7 4.3 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.3 5.3 2.1 2.4 5.4 4.8 5.5 6.2 5.6
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0.3 2.3 -0.2 1.5 5.9 5.1 5.1 5.0 8.8
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.3 1.9 -1.6 -1.7 4.1 3.1 2.7 3.4 7.5
Wage and salaries 2.7 4.3 3.1 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 0.7 2.4 -0.2 1.5 6.1 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 62.1 63.4 62.2 60.9 63.3 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 22.2 22.1 22.0 21.8 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 77.8 77.9 78.1 78.2 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 65.8 66.0 66.1 66.2 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 44.5 44.6 44.1 43.7 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.2 41.5 41.1 40.7 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 21.0 20.9 20.7 20.6 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3.3 1.4 3.1 2.0 -0.6 0.2 0.5 0.7 -3.2
Hourly Labour Productivity 3.0 1.7 3.4 2.2 -1.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 3.7 2.8 4.9 4.2 1.0 2.6 2.5 1.7 -2.3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.4 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.3 -0.1 2.4 4.1 2.7 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6 3.9 3.4 3.9 4.5 3.8
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.9 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.6
GDP deflator 0.6 0.5 1.3 3.2 1.8 2.0 2.4 1.6 1.2
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -0.9 -2.7 -0.7 -6.5 10.0 2.2 4.9 8.8 4.3
Industry excluding construction -2.8 0.4 -5.2 -4.8 4.0 1.6 2.0 -0.3 10.7
of which: manufacturing -2.9 0.0 -6.0 -5.2 3.6 3.4 2.5 -0.3 8.9
Construction 1.8 6.0 2.4 4.8 11.6 7.1 8.9 12.9 13.2
Trade, transport and communication -1.3 0.2 -2.2 2.6 5.4 4.0 2.9 3.8 9.6
Finance and business services 1.4 5.4 4.5 5.4 7.7 9.9 9.7 9.8 10.7
Non-market related services 4.4 4.2 3.3 4.4 5.8 6.3 6.4 7.2 3.4
Market-related sectors -0.9 1.8 -1.5 0.3 6.3 4.8 5.0 4.7 11.4
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.5 3.8 2.8 3.4 5.6 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 2.3 1.8 1.4 3.9 -2.3 3.8 6.0 6.6 -2.5
Industry excluding construction 4.6 3.8 3.7 2.9 7.4 6.2 4.4 0.4 6.7
of which: manufacturing 4.7 3.8 3.9 2.8 4.3 6.2 4.5 0.3 6.8
Construction 2.9 2.7 3.0 4.3 7.5 3.7 3.6 10.3 9.5
Trade, transport and communication 2.8 3.3 2.0 2.8 7.5 3.7 4.3 6.0 6.6
Finance and business services 4.2 3.7 2.7 4.0 -0.3 1.8 8.5 9.8 6.5
Non-market related services 3.4 4.2 2.5 3.7 5.5 7.1 5.4 6.3 2.7
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 3.1 4.6 2.1 11.2 -11.2 1.6 1.1 -2.0 -6.5
Industry excluding construction 7.7 3.4 9.3 8.1 3.3 4.5 2.4 0.7 -3.6
 of which: manufacturing 7.8 3.8 10.4 8.4 0.7 2.7 2.0 0.6 -2.0
Construction 1.1 -3.0 0.6 -0.5 -3.7 -3.1 -4.8 -2.3 -3.3
Trade, transport and communication 4.1 3.1 4.3 0.2 2.0 -0.4 1.3 2.0 -2.7
Finance and business services 2.7 -1.6 -1.7 -1.4 -7.4 -7.4 -1.0 0.0 -3.8
Non-market related services -0.9 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7
Market-related sectors 4.6 1.7 4.5 3.0 -0.9 -0.8 0.3 0.7 -4.2
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 9.1: Main indicators - FR 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 59275 59605 59948 60283 60606 0.5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38777 38989 39274 39493 39677 0.5 %
as % of total population 65.4 65.4 65.5 65.5 65.5 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 27122 27322 27496 27719 27923 0.7 %
Male 14470 14531 14584 14628 14713 0.6 %
Female 12652 12792 12912 13091 13209 0.9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.9 70.1 70.0 70.2 70.4 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.3 38.5 38.4 38.8 39.3 0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.3 87.6 87.8 88.3 88.8 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.9 40.9 40.5 40.4 40.2 -0.2 p.p.
Male 75.4 75.4 75.1 74.9 75.0 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42.0 42.3 42.2 42.1 42.8 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94.0 94.0 94.2 94.2 94.5 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 43.8 43.9 43.1 42.8 42.7 -0.2 p.p.
Female 64.6 64.9 65.0 65.6 65.9 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34.6 34.6 34.6 35.4 35.7 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 81.3 81.7 82.5 83.3 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 36.2 37.9 38.0 38.1 37.8 -0.3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 63.7 63.9 63.8 64.6 65.2 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.8 30.7 30.2 31.5 32.2 0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.5 80.7 81.2 82.1 83.2 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37.6 38.7 38.1 38.3 38.3 0.0 p.p.
Male 69.4 69.3 69.0 69.3 69.8 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34.1 34.2 33.8 34.5 35.0 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 87.6 87.9 88.3 89.2 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.4 41.6 40.5 40.5 40.6 0.1 p.p.
Female 58.2 58.5 58.8 60.0 60.7 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.4 27.1 26.6 28.5 29.3 0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.6 74.0 74.7 76.2 77.4 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34.0 36.0 35.9 36.2 36.1 -0.1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 24716.3 24897.3 25068.1 25509.9 25863.6 353.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 53.9 53.7 53.5 53.1 53.0 -0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46.1 46.3 46.5 46.9 47.0 0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.4 0.5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.8 1.4 p.p.
Male 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2 p.p.
Female 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.6 1.6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5.3 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.2 -0.5 p.p.
Male 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.3 6.5 -0.8 p.p.
Female 3.5 3.7 4.1 3.9 3.7 -0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13.5 14.2 14.1 14.3 14.1 -0.2 p.p.
Male 12.3 13.4 13.4 13.3 13.0 -0.3 p.p.
Female 14.9 15.0 14.9 15.5 15.4 -0.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16.6 16.9 17.0 17.1 16.7 -0.3 p.p.
Male 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.6 0.1 p.p.
Female 29.8 30.1 30.1 30.2 29.3 -0.9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9.3 9.2 9.2 8.3 7.8 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.7 20.2 21.3 18.7 18.1 -0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.8 7.8 7.6 6.9 6.3 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.6 5.2 5.7 5.1 4.6 -0.5 p.p.
Male 8.4 8.4 8.5 7.8 7.2 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.8 19.1 20.1 18.0 18.2 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.6 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.4 5.3 5.9 5.3 4.8 -0.5 p.p.
Female 10.3 10.2 10.1 8.9 8.3 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.7 21.5 22.9 19.6 18.0 -1.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.9 8.9 8.5 7.6 7.1 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.9 5.1 5.6 4.9 4.4 -0.5 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 40.6 41.1 42.0 40.1 37.6 -2.6 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36.6 36.8 36.8 36.8 36.8 -0.1 %
Male 39.7 39.9 39.8 39.8 39.7 -0.3 %
Female 32.9 33.1 33.1 33.3 33.4 0.4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -0.6 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7 : p.p.
Building and construction 1.5 3.6 4.4 4.7 : p.p.
Services 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.7 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3.5 -2.0 -1.9 -1.4 : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 9.2: Indicator board on wage developments - FR 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.7 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.7
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 1.5 3.2 4.5 2.5 2.3 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.1 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.8 1.4 1.8 2.2 4.0
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 0.3 -1.2 -0.5 0.0 1.3
Wage and salaries 3.3 2.4 2.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.7 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66.2 66.2 65.9 65.3 65.3 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 33.0 33.0 32.8 32.8 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 67.0 67.1 67.2 67.2 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 59.2 59.7 59.9 59.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 49.9 50.1 50.2 49.2 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.2 46.4 46.5 46.2 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 28.7 28.7 28.5 28.5 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 -2.2
Hourly Labour Productivity 0.5 1.5 2.4 0.6 -0.5 :   :  :   :
GDP 2.5 1.9 2.2 2.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 0.4 -1.7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.1 9.1 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.2 1.7 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 3.2 3.3 3.7 3.6 2.0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1
GDP deflator 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.7
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -15.0 8.5 4.5 2.1  : 0.2 -2.7 -4.4 -4.1
Industry excluding construction 0.3 -0.4 1.3 0.4  : 2.3 1.6 4.1 8.5
of which: manufacturing 0.3 -1.0 1.1 :   : 1.6 0.8 3.5 9.9
Construction 4.5 3.2 4.6 3.9  : 4.6 5.5 7.4 9.6
Trade, transport and communication 2.0 1.8 0.7 1.7  : 1.6 1.8 3.0 4.5
Finance and business services 1.2 2.4 3.2 2.4  : 1.8 1.9 2.0 0.3
Non-market related services 1.6 2.9 2.8 2.8  : 2.0 2.1 2.1 3.0
Market-related sectors 0.8 1.7 2.0 1.8  : 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.9
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.9  : :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 3.1 3.7 5.4 2.1  : 4.2 2.6 2.0 1.3
Industry excluding construction 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.3  : 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.9
of which: manufacturing 4.9 3.3 4.2 :   : 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.7
Construction 4.6 2.5 4.0 2.4  : 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.0
Trade, transport and communication 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.7  : 2.7 2.9 3.2 2.7
Finance and business services 3.0 3.6 4.3 2.5  : 2.3 2.4 2.7 1.4
Non-market related services 3.0 3.0 1.8 2.1  : 2.0 2.6 2.8 3.5
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 21.3 -4.5 0.9 0.0  : 4.0 5.5 6.7 5.6
Industry excluding construction 4.6 3.3 2.6 3.0  : 1.2 1.6 -0.8 -5.2
 of which: manufacturing 4.6 4.3 3.0 2.7  : 1.7 2.2 -0.4 -6.5
Construction 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -1.4  : -1.1 -2.0 -3.4 -6.0
Trade, transport and communication 1.4 1.5 2.5 1.1  : 1.1 1.1 0.2 -1.7
Finance and business services 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.1  : 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0
Non-market related services 1.4 0.1 -1.0 -0.7  : 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.4
Market-related sectors 2.9 1.6 1.9 1.0  : 0.9 0.8 0.0 -1.6
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 10.1: Main indicators - DE 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 81563 81529 81489 81363 81265 -0.1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 54501 54765 54533 54226 54066 -0.3 %
as % of total population 66.8 67.2 66.9 66.6 66.5 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 39280 40706 41078 41207 41374 0.4 %
Male 21701 22210 22343 22317 22353 0.2 %
Female 17579 18496 18735 18890 19021 0.7 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72.1 74.3 75.3 76.0 76.5 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.5 49.9 50.3 51.4 52.5 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.9 87.1 87.6 87.8 87.9 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.5 52.1 55.2 57.5 58.8 1.4 p.p.
Male 79.0 80.6 81.3 81.8 82.1 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.5 52.5 52.9 53.7 54.8 1.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.9 93.6 93.8 93.8 93.6 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57.2 61.2 64.0 66.1 67.3 1.2 p.p.
Female 65.1 68.0 69.3 70.1 70.8 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44.4 47.3 47.6 49.0 50.0 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78.8 80.6 81.4 81.8 82.1 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37.9 43.1 46.6 49.1 50.6 1.5 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64.3 66.0 67.5 69.4 70.7 1.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.3 42.2 43.4 45.3 46.9 1.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.2 78.2 79.4 80.9 81.8 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.4 45.4 48.4 51.5 53.8 2.3 p.p.
Male 70.0 71.3 72.8 74.7 75.9 1.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42.7 43.7 45.1 47.0 48.8 1.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.1 83.7 84.9 86.4 87.2 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49.8 53.5 56.4 59.7 61.8 2.1 p.p.
Female 58.5 60.6 62.2 64.0 65.4 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.8 40.7 41.6 43.5 45.0 1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71.1 72.5 73.7 75.2 76.3 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33.1 37.5 40.6 43.6 46.1 2.5 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 35022.5 36137.6 36833.4 37611.5 38238.7 627.2 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.9 54.4 54.3 54.2 54.0 -0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.1 45.6 45.7 45.8 46.0 0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.4 -0.1 0.6 1.7 1.4 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -1.4 3.2 1.9 2.1 1.7 p.p.
Male -1.5 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.4 p.p.
Female -1.3 4.5 2.0 2.4 2.0 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5.5 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 -0.1 p.p.
Male 6.7 7.2 7.0 6.7 6.6 -0.1 p.p.
Female 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6 -0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 12.5 14.2 14.5 14.6 14.7 0.1 p.p.
Male 12.7 14.5 14.8 14.7 14.8 0.1 p.p.
Female 12.2 13.9 14.2 14.6 14.7 0.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 21.9 23.4 25.2 25.4 25.2 -0.2 p.p.
Male 5.9 6.9 8.5 8.5 8.4 -0.2 p.p.
Female 41.3 43.0 45.1 45.3 44.9 -0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9.8 10.7 9.8 8.4 7.3 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13.0 15.5 13.7 11.9 10.5 -1.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.2 10.3 9.5 7.9 6.9 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12.8 12.8 12.4 10.3 8.5 -1.8 p.p.
Male 10.3 11.2 10.2 8.5 7.4 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15.4 16.8 14.8 12.6 11.0 -1.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.5 10.6 9.5 7.8 6.9 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12.9 12.6 11.9 9.7 8.2 -1.5 p.p.
Female 9.1 10.1 9.4 8.3 7.2 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10.2 13.9 12.5 11.1 9.9 -1.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.8 10.0 9.4 8.0 7.0 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12.7 13.0 13.0 11.2 9.0 -2.2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 51.8 53.1 56.5 56.6 52.6 -4.0 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36.9 36.9 36.0 36.0 35.9 -0.3 %
Male 41.5 41.6 40.8 40.8 40.6 -0.7 %
Female 31.2 30.9 30.1 30.2 30.3 0.3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -0.8 -2.3 -3.2 2.3 1.3 p.p.
Building and construction -2.9 -3.1 -0.4 1.6 -0.7 p.p.
Services 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.6 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1.5 -1.6 -0.8 1.2 1.6 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 10.2: Indicator board on wage developments - DE
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 0.4 -0.1 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.1 2.0 1.3 0.7
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked -0.2 0.0 1.2 1.1 2.1 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1.3 0.7 1.6 1.2 2.5 1.8 0.8 2.9 4.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -0.4 -1.0 -1.2 0.4 2.0 1.3 -0.3 1.8 4.2
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.4 -1.6 -1.8 -1.4 0.4 0.0 -1.7 0.5 1.9
Wage and salaries 0.4 -1.1 0.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 0.2 2.1 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 64.5 63.6 62.6 62.2 62.4 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 23.8 23.5 23.8 23.3 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 76.2 76.5 76.2 76.7 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 64.3 64.6 64.4 64.8 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 53.2 52.4 52.5 52.2 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 48.8 48.0 48.1 47.9 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 23.4 23.1 23.3 22.9 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0.8 0.9 2.3 0.8 -0.1 -0.2 2.3 -0.6 -3.4
Hourly Labour Productivity 0.6 1.4 2.5 0.6 0.0 :   :  :   :
GDP 1.2 0.8 3.0 2.5 1.3 2.1 3.4 1.4 -1.7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8.8 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.4 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.9 -0.9 1.1 2.7 3.0 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.3 1.7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1.6 1.0 0.8 2.1 1.8 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.4
GDP deflator 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.2
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -25.0 16.8 1.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.6 -0.5
Industry excluding construction -4.0 -3.7 -2.9 -2.4 2.7 1.1 -3.1 1.9 10.6
of which: manufacturing -3.1 -4.3 -4.0 -3.0 2.2 1.1 -3.4 1.5 10.4
Construction 0.9 1.2 3.0 1.0 -2.3 -1.2 -5.9 -2.9 -1.1
Trade, transport and communication -2.9 -0.5 -3.1 2.2 1.5 -0.1 -1.7 3.9 4.3
Finance and business services 3.4 0.9 0.6 1.8 2.9 2.4 2.2 3.5 3.3
Non-market related services 1.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 2.1 1.6 2.6 1.4 3.4
Market-related sectors -1.6 -1.1 -1.4 0.1 1.8 0.9 -1.3 2.5 5.5
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 0.4 -0.1 1.0 1.1 2.0 :  :    :  :   
Agriculture and fishery -2.2 0.3 1.4 1.9 3.0 3.5 3.3 4.0 2.1
Industry excluding construction 2.0 0.6 3.8 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.5 0.8
of which: manufacturing 2.0 0.5 3.8 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.5 0.5
Construction 0.2 -0.7 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.8
Trade, transport and communication -1.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.7 1.2 1.2 5.3 2.9
Finance and business services -0.1 1.2 -0.7 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.2
Non-market related services 0.6 -1.5 -0.2 0.2 1.8 1.2 2.5 0.9 2.4
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 30.4 -14.2 0.0 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.1 3.5 2.6
Industry excluding construction 6.2 4.4 6.8 4.0 -1.0 0.9 4.6 -0.4 -8.9
 of which: manufacturing 5.2 5.0 8.1 4.8 -0.9 0.9 4.9 -0.1 -9.0
Construction -0.7 -1.9 -2.0 0.9 4.2 3.1 7.8 3.9 1.9
Trade, transport and communication 1.9 0.9 3.9 -1.1 1.1 1.2 3.0 1.4 -1.4
Finance and business services -3.4 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.1 -0.9 -0.7 -1.3 -1.1
Non-market related services -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9
Market-related sectors 1.9 1.6 3.0 1.4 0.0 0.8 2.8 0.3 -3.5
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 11.1: Main indicators - EL 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10616 10657 10710 10754 10780 0.2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7129 7132 7158 7208 7232 0.3 %
as % of total population 67.2 66.9 66.8 67.0 67.1 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 4740 4763 4799 4829 4851 0.4 %
Male 2801 2811 2825 2849 2860 0.4 %
Female 1938 1952 1974 1981 1991 0.5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 66.5 66.8 67.0 67.0 67.1 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36.7 33.7 32.4 31.1 30.2 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 81.5 82.0 81.9 82.0 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.3 43.2 43.9 43.9 44.2 0.3 p.p.
Male 79.0 79.2 79.1 79.1 79.1 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.0 37.1 36.1 34.7 34.3 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94.6 94.6 94.7 94.6 94.4 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 58.9 60.8 61.0 60.8 60.9 0.1 p.p.
Female 54.1 54.5 55.0 54.9 55.1 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33.4 30.4 28.7 27.6 26.1 -1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67.6 68.2 69.1 69.1 69.4 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 25.2 27.1 28.0 28.2 28.6 0.4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 59.4 60.1 61.0 61.4 61.9 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.8 25.0 24.2 24.0 23.5 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.5 74.0 75.3 75.6 76.1 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.4 41.6 42.3 42.4 42.8 0.3 p.p.
Male 73.7 74.2 74.6 74.9 75.0 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.3 30.1 29.7 29.2 28.5 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89.3 89.5 90.0 90.1 90.2 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56.4 58.8 59.2 59.1 59.1 0.1 p.p.
Female 45.2 46.1 47.4 47.9 48.7 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.3 19.8 18.7 18.7 18.5 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 57.6 58.5 60.5 60.8 61.9 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 24.0 25.8 26.6 26.9 27.5 0.5 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4234.8 4286.7 4365.3 4423.5 4473.7 50.2 Th.
Male (as % of total) 61.7 61.5 61.0 61.0 60.6 -0.4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 38.3 38.5 39.0 39.0 39.4 0.4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 2.3 1.0 2.1 1.3 1.2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.1 p.p.
Male 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.5 p.p.
Female 2.2 1.8 3.1 1.3 2.1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 21.7 21.5 21.2 20.7 20.5 -0.2 p.p.
Male 24.9 24.6 24.1 23.7 23.0 -0.7 p.p.
Female 16.6 16.6 16.6 15.9 16.6 0.6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 12.0 11.9 10.7 10.9 11.5 0.6 p.p.
Male 10.5 10.1 9.1 9.3 9.9 0.7 p.p.
Female 14.1 14.3 13.0 13.1 13.7 0.5 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 4.4 4.8 5.5 5.4 5.4 0.0 p.p.
Male 2.0 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.5 0.1 p.p.
Female 8.3 9.0 9.9 9.9 9.8 -0.2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 7.7 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.9 26.0 25.2 22.9 22.1 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.5 9.1 8.1 7.8 7.2 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.2 -0.1 p.p.
Male 6.6 6.1 5.6 5.2 5.1 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.1 18.7 17.7 15.7 17.0 1.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.5 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.2 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 0.0 p.p.
Female 16.2 15.3 13.6 12.8 11.4 -1.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36.3 34.8 34.7 32.1 28.9 -3.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 14.8 14.3 12.5 12.0 10.9 -1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.3 3.9 -0.4 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 53.2 52.1 54.4 50.0 47.6 -2.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.9 41.9 41.5 41.2 41.1 -0.3 %
Male 43.6 43.8 43.5 43.1 42.9 -0.4 %
Female 39.0 38.9 38.4 38.1 38.1 0.0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -11.9 -0.6 -1.5 -2.3 0.0 p.p.
Building and construction 1.3 3.2 0.2 8.9 -3.4 p.p.
Services 6.2 1.2 3.0 1.3 2.5 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -0.5 -0.4 1.4 -0.1 -2.5 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 11.2: Indicator board on wage developments - EL 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 5.1 4.9 1.0 9.1 7.5 7.6 7.9 7.9 7.7
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 9.6 3.9 -1.0 8.2 8.8 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 8.9 0.6 7.8 3.6 13.6 5.1 9.8  :  11.7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2.5 2.9 -1.3 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.9 6.0 6.2
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.8 -0.5 -4.4 3.3 2.2 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.1
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3.0 3.8 -0.8 7.2 6.3 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 60.1 59.8 57.5 59.5 60.5 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL : : : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) : : : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.2 41.0 41.8 43.3 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 39.7 40.6 41.4 43.4 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) : : : : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) : : : : : :  :    :  :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.5 1.9 2.3 2.7 1.7 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.4
Hourly Labour Productivity 5.1 1.1 -1.0 1.6 2.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.9 2.9 4.5 4.0 2.9 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.2
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9.7 9.5 9.3 9.2 9.0 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 2.2 1.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.0 4.2 4.3 4.8 4.8 3.1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.9 3.6 3.8 3.5
GDP deflator 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -1.7 -3.6 23.9 21.8 -0.8 3.9 1.3 -0.1 -3.8
Industry excluding construction 1.2 -15.1 3.0 6.5 4.2 5.7 5.4 2.6 3.6
of which: manufacturing -1.2 -17.6 0.3 3.9 2.8 3.6 2.8 2.1 3.1
Construction -0.2 -8.7 -6.4 24.2 13.8 9.1 18.7 30.3 0.7
Trade, transport and communication -4.9 18.5 1.5 3.1 2.9 0.3 2.6 3.2 5.4
Finance and business services 13.0 4.0 8.9 -7.0 11.2 15.5 10.9 8.8 11.0
Non-market related services 9.0 -1.4 -4.9 11.4 5.2 4.3 4.5 4.1 7.7
Market-related sectors -1.2 3.9 3.3 3.6 5.1 4.6 5.4 5.7 5.1
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5.1 4.9 1.0 9.1 7.5 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 17.1 -1.7 3.1 11.0 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.7 5.7
Industry excluding construction 6.8 -3.1 3.7 8.2 7.8 8.1 8.5 7.9 7.5
of which: manufacturing 6.6 -5.3 4.3 7.2 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Construction 2.8 -6.6 2.9 22.4 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Trade, transport and communication 2.7 11.8 2.6 11.1 6.8 6.5 6.8 7.1 6.9
Finance and business services 0.7 2.6 14.1 -6.8 7.0 7.4 8.2 7.1 6.7
Non-market related services 5.3 6.5 -5.2 12.0 8.0 7.8 8.1 8.9 7.3
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 19.2 1.9 -16.7 -8.9 5.2 1.0 3.8 5.9 9.8
Industry excluding construction 5.5 14.2 0.7 1.6 3.5 2.3 3.0 5.1 3.8
 of which: manufacturing 7.9 14.9 4.0 3.2 4.0 3.2 4.1 4.8 3.8
Construction 3.1 2.2 9.9 -1.4 -6.0 -2.0 -9.9 -17.9 6.3
Trade, transport and communication 8.0 -5.7 1.1 7.7 3.8 6.2 4.1 3.7 1.4
Finance and business services -10.8 -1.4 4.8 0.1 -3.8 -7.0 -2.4 -1.6 -3.9
Non-market related services -3.4 7.9 -0.3 0.5 2.7 3.4 3.4 4.6 -0.4
Market-related sectors 5.8 -0.1 1.8 3.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.6 2.3
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 12.1: Main indicators - HU 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 9944 9931 9921 9907 9893 -0.1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 6826 6815 6816 6800 6794 -0.1 %
as % of total population 68.6 68.6 68.7 68.6 68.7 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 4127 4180 4222 4209 4178 -0.7 %
Male 2239 2260 2286 2290 2267 -1.0 %
Female 1888 1920 1936 1919 1911 -0.4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 60.5 61.3 62.0 61.9 61.5 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.9 27.1 26.8 25.6 25.0 -0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.9 78.7 79.6 80.0 80.1 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32.0 34.3 34.9 34.5 33.1 -1.4 p.p.
Male 67.2 67.9 68.7 69.0 68.3 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.4 30.3 30.1 29.3 28.6 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.0 85.5 86.5 86.9 87.0 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.7 42.4 43.1 43.6 40.5 -3.1 p.p.
Female 54.0 55.1 55.5 55.1 55.0 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.3 23.8 23.4 21.8 21.3 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 70.9 72.1 72.9 73.2 73.3 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 25.8 27.7 28.2 27.3 27.0 -0.2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 56.8 56.9 57.3 57.3 56.7 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23.6 21.8 21.7 21.0 20.0 -1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.6 73.7 74.2 74.6 74.4 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.1 33.0 33.6 33.1 31.4 -1.6 p.p.
Male 63.1 63.1 63.8 64.0 63.0 -1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.3 24.4 24.5 24.2 23.2 -1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.5 80.3 81.0 81.3 81.0 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38.4 40.6 41.4 41.7 38.5 -3.2 p.p.
Female 50.7 51.0 51.1 50.9 50.6 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.8 19.2 18.8 17.8 16.8 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67.0 67.2 67.6 67.9 67.9 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 25.0 26.7 27.1 26.2 25.7 -0.5 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 3874.7 3878.6 3906.0 3897.0 3849.2 -47.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.2 54.2 54.3 54.5 54.4 -0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.8 45.8 45.7 45.5 45.6 0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.7 0.0 0.7 -0.1 -0.5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0.6 0.1 0.7 -0.2 -1.2 p.p.
Male -0.5 0.0 1.0 0.2 -1.5 p.p.
Female -0.7 0.3 0.4 -0.7 -0.9 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.6 6.6 0.0 p.p.
Male 9.5 8.8 8.1 7.8 7.9 0.1 p.p.
Female 5.7 5.5 4.9 5.2 5.0 -0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.3 7.8 0.6 p.p.
Male 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.7 8.6 0.9 p.p.
Female 6.1 6.4 6.0 6.8 7.0 0.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 4.4 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.3 0.4 p.p.
Male 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.5 3.0 0.5 p.p.
Female 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.8 0.2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15.5 19.4 19.1 18.0 19.9 1.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.4 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.1 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.1 3.9 3.9 4.2 5.0 0.8 p.p.
Male 6.1 7.0 7.2 7.1 7.6 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.3 19.6 18.5 17.6 19.1 1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.3 6.0 6.4 6.5 6.9 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.3 4.2 4.0 4.5 5.0 0.4 p.p.
Female 6.1 7.4 7.8 7.7 8.1 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 14.4 19.1 19.8 18.6 20.9 2.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.6 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.4 0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.8 3.5 3.9 3.9 5.1 1.2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 44.0 45.1 45.1 46.9 46.5 -0.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.3 40.2 39.9 40.0 0.1 %
Male 41.9 41.5 41.3 41.0 40.9 -0.2 %
Female 39.0 38.8 38.8 38.6 38.8 0.5 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -5.0 -5.2 -1.7 -4.1 -2.3 p.p.
Building and construction 3.2 1.9 1.7 2.6 -5.6 p.p.
Services 0.5 1.2 1.0 -0.3 2.5 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3.6 -2.9 -0.6 0.8 7.9 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 12.2: Indicator board on wage developments - HU
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 11.3 7.4 4.7 6.8 7.0 :   :  :   :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2.3 8.2 6.5 7.4 8.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 8.6 7.2 8.9 9.6 8.0 9.3 7.3 7.7 7.7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 5.6 3.3 1.4 5.4 5.8 :   :  :   :
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1.1 1.0 -2.5 -0.5 1.9 :   :  :   :
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 62.5 62.8 60.7 60.9 62.5 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 30.6 29.6 30.9 28.9 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 69.4 70.4 69.1 71.1 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 65.7 66.2 65.0 68.8 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 51.8 50.5 51.0 54.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 46.4 45.2 45.4 49.1 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 27.8 27.4 26.9 26.1 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.8 2.1 4.0 2.8 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5.4 3.9 3.3 1.4 1.1 3.4 4.1 1.9 -1.8
Hourly Labour Productivity -2.2 4.1 3.8 1.6 1.8 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.7 3.9 4.0 1.2 0.6 1.8 2.1 1.3 -2.5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5.7 6.2 6.9 7.8 8.6 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.9 1.6 3.6 3.3 3.0 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 6.8 3.5 4.0 7.9 6.0 6.9 6.8 6.3 4.2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 6.4 2.7 2.5 6.7 5.1 5.9 5.6 5.2 3.8
GDP deflator 4.5 2.3 4.0 5.9 3.8 4.5 5.0 2.3 3.8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -39.3 4.8 4.7 38.4  : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 7.1 4.4 -7.9 6.3  : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 4.8 1.2 -2.5 0.4  : :   :  :   :
Construction 10.0 9.0 1.4 14.4  :   :  :    :  :   
Trade, transport and communication 17.6 1.3 -5.9 8.3  : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services -1.2 9.7 -8.2 14.0  : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 9.2 5.2 -3.1 11.2  : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 12.2 8.9 -1.7 11.6 7.9 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -2.3 6.8 0.2 11.8  : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 15.2 10.8 -2.5 12.8  : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 13.0 9.6 4.3 7.3  : :   :  :   :
Construction 10.3 10.4 1.5 2.6  :   :  :    :  :   
Trade, transport and communication 23.1 1.7 -0.2 11.9  : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services -1.8 16.2 -4.3 14.9  : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 9.8 9.6 -2.7 10.3  : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 61.0 1.9 -4.3 -19.2 46.2 23.0 52.0 78.0 71.1
Industry excluding construction 7.5 6.1 5.9 6.1 -5.9 8.2 6.4 -1.0 -7.7
 of which: manufacturing 7.8 8.3 7.0 6.9 -8.2 6.6 5.3 -3.2 -10.9
Construction 0.3 1.3 0.1 -10.3 0.5 -12.9 2.0 0.8 9.3
Trade, transport and communication 4.7 0.4 6.1 3.3 -1.4 2.5 2.1 -0.9 -3.2
Finance and business services -0.6 5.9 4.2 0.8 -15.3 -4.3 -9.0 -11.5 -15.7
Non-market related services 0.6 4.2 0.4 -0.8 -0.3 0.4 3.1 1.3 1.5
Market-related sectors 7.9 3.5 4.4 0.9 -2.0 4.8 4.9 3.1 -2.5
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 13.1: Main indicators - IE
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 4059 4149 4253 4359 4440 1.9 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 2761 2831 2913 2993 3041 1.6 %
as % of total population 68.0 68.2 68.5 68.7 68.5 -0.2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 1919 2004 2092 2168 2189 1.0 %
Male 1108 1149 1198 1231 1235 0.4 %
Female 810 854 893 937 953 1.7 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.5 70.8 71.8 72.4 72.0 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 52.4 53.3 54.7 55.0 52.7 -2.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.9 80.9 81.5 82.0 81.6 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.8 53.1 54.4 55.2 55.4 0.2 p.p.
Male 79.9 80.6 81.5 81.4 80.7 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55.9 56.6 59.0 58.3 55.2 -3.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.8 92.1 92.1 91.6 91.3 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 66.9 67.7 68.7 69.7 68.5 -1.2 p.p.
Female 59.0 60.8 61.9 63.3 63.1 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 48.8 49.9 50.2 51.5 50.0 -1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.0 69.6 70.7 72.2 71.8 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34.4 38.2 40.0 40.4 42.1 1.7 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 66.3 67.6 68.6 69.1 67.6 -1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.7 48.7 50.0 49.9 46.0 -3.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.8 77.9 78.4 78.7 77.3 -1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49.5 51.6 53.1 53.8 53.6 -0.2 p.p.
Male 75.9 76.9 77.7 77.4 74.9 -2.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.7 51.5 53.6 52.5 46.8 -5.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.4 88.4 87.7 85.5 -2.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 65.0 65.7 67.0 67.9 66.0 -1.9 p.p.
Female 56.5 58.3 59.3 60.6 60.2 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44.7 45.9 46.2 47.4 45.2 -2.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 65.8 67.3 68.3 69.6 69.0 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33.7 37.3 39.1 39.6 41.0 1.4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 1830.2 1915.1 1998.8 2067.1 2055.1 -12.0 Th.
Male (as % of total) 57.5 57.2 57.2 56.6 55.8 -0.8 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 42.5 42.8 42.8 43.4 44.2 0.8 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3.1 4.7 4.3 3.6 -0.9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3.1 4.6 4.4 3.4 -0.6 p.p.
Male 2.9 4.0 4.3 2.4 -2.0 p.p.
Female 3.3 5.5 4.5 4.8 1.3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.9 10.1 0.2 p.p.
Male 15.1 14.6 14.2 14.6 14.8 0.2 p.p.
Female 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.7 4.1 0.4 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 4.1 3.7 3.3 7.3 8.4 1.1 p.p.
Male 3.7 3.1 2.9 6.0 7.1 1.1 p.p.
Female 4.7 4.3 3.9 8.6 9.8 1.2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16.5 16.5 : 17.7 18.1 0.4 p.p.
Male 5.6 5.7 : 6.6 7.3 0.8 p.p.
Female 31.2 30.8 : 32.1 31.7 -0.5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6 6.3 1.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8.9 8.6 8.6 9.1 12.6 3.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.0 5.2 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.2 0.8 p.p.
Male 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.9 7.5 2.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9.3 9.1 9.1 10.0 15.2 5.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.3 6.3 2.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.8 3.0 2.4 2.6 3.6 1.0 p.p.
Female 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.8 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8.5 7.9 8.0 8.1 9.7 1.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.6 0.6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 35.0 33.6 32.4 30.1 27.3 -2.8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37.3 37.3 37.1 36.8 36.3 -1.3 %
Male 41.5 41.5 41.1 40.9 40.3 -1.4 %
Female 31.4 31.4 31.3 31.0 30.8 -0.6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2.6 -0.9 1.2 0.0 : p.p.
Building and construction 10.4 14.2 9.8 3.6 : p.p.
Services 3.6 5.2 4.6 4.4 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1.6 -2.9 -0.9 0.9 : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 13.2: Indicator board on wage developments - IE 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 5.3 6.4 4.6 6.0 5.5 5.8 3.0 1.3 1.3
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 5.6 7.3 5.7 5.3 5.1 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5.0 4.4 4.4 5.1 3.0 4.5 2.1 2.8 2.8
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3.7 4.7 3.2 3.6 7.0 10.5 5.3 1.1 5.3
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1.7 2.3 -0.2 2.2 7.3 13.5 8.5 1.3 4.1
Wage and salaries 5.4 4.9  : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 4.7 5.3 4.0 4.6 9.0 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 54.1 55.5 55.9 56.8 60.0 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  : :  : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 25.0 23.5 23.1 22.3 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 20.1 18.3 17.8 16.8 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.6 1.6 1.4 2.4 -1.4 -4.3 -2.2 0.1 -3.8
Hourly Labour Productivity 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 -1.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.7 6.4 5.7 6.0 -2.3 -1.4 -1.6 -1.0 -8.0
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 3.6 4.0 4.8 5.9 7.6 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.8 1.9 2.7 5.0 0.8 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.3 2.1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.1 1.5 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.9 3.1 2.3 1.9
GDP deflator 2.0 2.3 3.4 1.4 -0.3 -2.6 -2.9 -0.1 1.1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 2.9 19.0 2.2 -14.1 19.4 14.7 -1.2 -14.9 -16.0
Industry excluding construction 0.3 3.6 -3.1 -6.0 7.7 7.6 0.4 1.9 13.1
of which: manufacturing 0.9 5.4 -1.6 -6.4  : :   :  :   :
Construction 5.1 9.8 4.4 8.7 7.7 10.5 1.0 0.2 2.1
Trade, transport and communication 3.9 6.2 5.6 5.0 9.9 10.7 7.0 6.7 4.2
Finance and business services 1.2 4.3 5.2 3.4 14.1 10.3 4.5 -5.3 -6.7
Non-market related services 6.9 6.3 6.1 6.8 3.2 6.1 4.0 5.4 8.9
Market-related sectors 2.6 6.5 3.1 -1.2 5.1 7.9 0.8 -2.0 1.5
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5.4 6.4 4.6 6.0 5.5 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 6.9 1.7 -3.6 18.4 15.5 9.0 -4.2 -17.1 -29.4
Industry excluding construction 4.7 9.2 2.1 4.2 10.6 13.5 10.6 9.2 2.8
of which: manufacturing 4.4 10.4 2.6 2.4  : 14.0 11.4 10.2 5.0
Construction 3.5 5.0 1.2 5.3 0.8 6.0 2.3 1.1 -1.1
Trade, transport and communication 4.2 7.0 6.7 6.4 5.9 5.9 3.2 4.6 4.9
Finance and business services 6.0 7.7 8.2 5.8 7.1 8.5 2.0 -1.0 -2.0
Non-market related services 5.0 3.2 4.2 6.8 4.6 3.9 2.6 1.6 2.5
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 3.9 -14.5 -5.7 37.8 -3.2 -5.0 -3.0 -2.5 -15.9
Industry excluding construction 4.3 5.4 5.4 10.8 2.7 5.5 10.2 7.2 -9.1
 of which: manufacturing 3.5 4.7 4.3 9.4  : :   :  :   :
Construction -1.5 -4.4 -3.1 -3.1 -6.4 -4.1 1.2 0.9 -3.1
Trade, transport and communication 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 -3.6 -4.3 -3.5 -2.0 0.6
Finance and business services 4.7 3.3 2.9 2.2 -6.1 -1.6 -2.3 4.5 5.0
Non-market related services -1.8 -2.9 -1.8 0.0 1.4 -2.0 -1.4 -3.6 -5.9
Market-related sectors 2.8 1.2 1.7 5.6 -1.6 -0.3 2.9 4.5 -1.0
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 14.1: Main indicators - IT 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 57442 58077 58435 58880 59336 0.8 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38292 38588 38726 38946 39182 0.6 %
as % of total population 66.7 66.4 66.3 66.1 66.0 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 24014 24099 24287 24350 24696 1.4 %
Male 14274 14360 14445 14483 14571 0.6 %
Female 9740 9739 9842 9867 10125 2.6 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 62.7 62.5 62.7 62.5 63.0 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36.1 33.8 32.5 30.9 30.9 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.5 77.4 77.8 77.6 78.1 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.8 32.6 33.4 34.6 35.5 0.9 p.p.
Male 74.9 74.6 74.6 74.4 74.4 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.5 38.7 37.8 36.1 35.9 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.4 91.2 91.3 91.0 91.0 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44.0 44.3 45.0 46.3 47.0 0.6 p.p.
Female 50.6 50.4 50.8 50.7 51.6 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.7 28.7 26.9 25.5 25.7 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 63.6 63.6 64.3 64.1 65.2 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 20.4 21.5 22.5 23.5 24.7 1.2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57.6 57.6 58.4 58.7 58.7 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.6 25.7 25.5 24.7 24.4 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 72.2 72.3 73.3 73.5 73.5 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30.5 31.4 32.5 33.8 34.4 0.7 p.p.
Male 70.1 69.9 70.5 70.7 70.3 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.1 30.4 30.6 29.6 29.1 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.7 86.6 87.2 87.3 86.7 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42.2 42.7 43.7 45.1 45.5 0.3 p.p.
Female 45.2 45.3 46.3 46.6 47.2 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23.1 20.8 20.1 19.5 19.4 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 57.8 57.9 59.3 59.6 60.2 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19.6 20.8 21.9 23.0 24.0 1.0 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 22059.7 22214.5 22618.5 22846.2 23010.5 164.3 Th.
Male (as % of total) 60.5 60.6 60.3 60.2 59.8 -0.5 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 39.5 39.4 39.7 39.8 40.2 0.5 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.4 0.6 2.0 1.2 0.3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.6 0.7 1.8 1.0 0.7 p.p.
Male -0.6 0.8 1.4 0.8 -0.1 p.p.
Female 5.2 0.5 2.5 1.3 1.9 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 17.7 17.1 16.9 16.7 16.2 -0.4 p.p.
Male 19.9 19.4 19.1 19.0 18.6 -0.3 p.p.
Female 14.2 13.6 13.5 13.2 12.7 -0.6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 11.8 12.3 13.1 13.2 13.3 0.1 p.p.
Male 9.9 10.5 11.2 11.2 11.6 0.4 p.p.
Female 14.5 14.7 15.8 16.0 15.6 -0.4 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 12.5 12.7 13.1 13.4 14.1 0.6 p.p.
Male 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.8 0.3 p.p.
Female 24.8 25.6 26.4 26.8 27.8 0.9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.1 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.8 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23.5 24.0 21.6 20.3 21.3 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.9 6.7 5.9 5.3 6.0 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.4 3.1 0.7 p.p.
Male 6.4 6.2 5.4 4.9 5.5 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.6 21.5 19.1 18.2 18.9 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.2 5.1 4.5 4.0 4.7 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.6 3.2 0.7 p.p.
Female 10.6 10.1 8.8 7.9 8.5 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.2 27.4 25.3 23.3 24.7 1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.2 8.9 7.8 7.1 7.7 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.0 3.2 2.9 2.1 2.9 0.8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 49.2 49.9 49.7 47.4 45.6 -1.8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38.1 38.1 38.0 38.0 37.7 -0.8 %
Male 41.0 41.0 40.8 40.9 40.6 -0.9 %
Female 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.3 33.1 -0.6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 1.3 -0.4 2.0 -2.4 -2.2 p.p.
Building and construction 2.1 4.5 1.3 3.3 -0.8 p.p.
Services 0.7 0.6 2.4 1.4 1.1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -0.9 -0.7 0.9 0.7 -1.2 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 14.2: Indicator board on wage developments - IT 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.4 2.4 2.5 0.6
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.1 4.6 2.8 2.3 4.3 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.4 2.8 0.9 2.0 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.8  :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2.2 2.8 2.1 1.6 4.2 4.6 3.9 4.0 3.9
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.5 0.7 0.3 -0.7 1.3 2.3 0.7 1.1 0.7
Wage and salaries 3.1 4.0 2.9 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2.6 3.0 1.8 1.7 4.3 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 61.7 62.3 63.0 62.4 62.6 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL : : : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) : : : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45.4 43.4 43.2 45.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.2 43.1 43.0 42.7 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) : : : : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) : : : : : :  :    :  :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 -1.4 -1.2 -1.4 -1.4 -3.2
Hourly Labour Productivity 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.5 :   :  :   :
GDP 1.5 0.7 2.0 1.6 -1.0 0.2 -0.2 -1.0 -3.1
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.1 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.5 0.6 1.9 2.6 0.9 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.1 2.9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8
GDP deflator 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.2 3.2 2.9 3.1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -10.0 8.7 4.4 0.7 -3.6 4.1 -6.5 -3.7 -3.5
Industry excluding construction 2.0 1.8 0.6 1.9 4.7 4.2 1.3 5.2 9.2
of which: manufacturing 2.5 1.9 0.5 1.7 6.3 6.2 2.8 7.1 9.9
Construction 4.2 3.6 1.8 6.5 3.8 2.4 -0.7 6.6 7.3
Trade, transport and communication 1.8 0.8 1.7 0.5 3.9 3.3 2.1 4.5 6.3
Finance and business services 3.2 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.9 10.0 0.3 4.5 1.8
Non-market related services 1.5 3.9 3.2 0.6 4.5 3.4 11.1 3.4 0.9
Market-related sectors 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.1 3.7 5.1 0.9 4.4 4.9
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.0 2.8 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 0.3 4.3 1.3 2.9 0.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.9 3.3
Industry excluding construction 4.0 2.3 2.9 3.0 2.7 5.0 2.2 3.2 0.8
of which: manufacturing 4.1 2.3 2.9 3.0 2.6 4.9 2.2 3.2 0.7
Construction 3.6 1.3 2.3 3.1 3.4 3.2 1.6 6.4 2.6
Trade, transport and communication 3.4 2.4 0.5 1.2 1.8 2.7 0.3 2.7 2.0
Finance and business services 2.1 3.1 3.3 2.7 2.3 5.0 -1.3 4.1 2.2
Non-market related services 3.4 4.1 2.4 0.9 3.4 3.3 7.7 3.4 0.3
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 11.5 -4.1 -3.0 2.2 4.7 -4.8 6.7 4.8 7.1
Industry excluding construction 1.9 0.5 2.2 1.1 -2.0 0.8 0.8 -1.9 -7.7
 of which: manufacturing 1.6 0.5 2.5 1.3 -3.5 -1.2 -0.6 -3.7 -8.4
Construction -0.6 -2.2 0.4 -3.2 -0.4 0.8 2.4 -0.2 -4.4
Trade, transport and communication 1.6 1.7 -1.2 0.7 -2.0 -0.5 -1.8 -1.7 -4.0
Finance and business services -1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.9 -1.5 -4.5 -1.6 -0.3 0.4
Non-market related services 1.9 0.2 -0.8 0.3 -1.0 -0.2 -3.1 0.0 -0.6
Market-related sectors 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 -1.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -3.1
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 15.1: Main indicators - LV 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 2319 2305 2294 2281 2271 -0.5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 1587 1583 1580 1573 1568 -0.4 %
as % of total population 68.4 68.7 68.9 69.0 69.0 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 1105 1101 1126 1145 1166 1.8 %
Male 568 567 581 591 597 1.0 %
Female 538 534 545 555 570 2.7 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.6 69.6 71.3 72.8 74.4 1.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37.3 37.7 40.8 43.0 42.9 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.3 85.6 86.4 87.2 88.9 1.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52.3 53.8 57.1 60.3 63.3 3.0 p.p.
Male 74.3 74.4 76.2 77.6 78.6 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43.3 43.8 47.8 48.9 48.8 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89.7 89.4 90.0 91.0 92.2 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60.4 61.0 64.4 67.9 68.7 0.8 p.p.
Female 65.3 65.1 66.7 68.3 70.5 2.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.0 31.3 33.6 36.8 36.7 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.1 82.0 82.9 83.6 85.7 2.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 46.1 48.5 51.6 54.6 59.2 4.6 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62.3 63.3 66.3 68.3 68.6 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.5 32.6 35.9 38.4 37.2 -1.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.9 78.4 81.1 82.3 82.6 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.9 49.5 53.3 57.7 59.4 1.7 p.p.
Male 66.4 67.6 70.4 72.5 72.1 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36.4 38.7 42.8 43.4 42.4 -1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.5 81.7 83.7 85.6 85.4 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55.8 55.2 59.5 64.6 63.1 -1.5 p.p.
Female 58.5 59.3 62.4 64.4 65.4 1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.4 26.3 28.7 33.1 31.9 -1.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75.5 75.3 78.6 79.1 79.9 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.9 45.3 48.7 52.4 56.7 4.3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 988.4 1001.9 1047.3 1075.1 1076.3 1.2 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51.3 51.4 51.3 51.3 50.9 -0.5 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48.7 48.6 48.7 48.7 49.2 0.5 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1.1 1.7 4.7 3.6 0.7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.7 1.4 4.5 2.7 0.1 p.p.
Male 0.7 1.7 4.2 2.8 -0.8 p.p.
Female 0.7 1.0 4.9 2.5 1.1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6.0 5.6 6.3 5.5 5.3 -0.2 p.p.
Male 6.9 6.4 7.3 6.7 6.4 -0.3 p.p.
Female 5.1 4.8 5.2 4.3 4.1 -0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 9.5 8.4 7.2 4.3 3.3 -1.0 p.p.
Male 11.6 10.6 8.9 5.7 4.7 -1.0 p.p.
Female 7.3 6.2 5.4 2.9 1.9 -0.9 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9.7 7.6 5.8 5.6 5.5 -0.1 p.p.
Male 7.1 5.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 -0.5 p.p.
Female 12.4 9.7 7.4 6.9 7.1 0.2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 10.4 8.9 6.8 6.0 7.5 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.1 13.6 12.2 10.7 13.1 2.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.7 8.4 6.1 5.6 7.1 1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 8.4 8.0 6.6 4.4 6.2 1.8 p.p.
Male 10.6 9.1 7.4 6.4 8.0 1.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.0 11.8 10.5 11.2 13.1 1.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.3 8.6 7.0 5.9 7.3 1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.6 9.4 7.6 4.8 8.2 3.4 p.p.
Female 10.2 8.7 6.2 5.6 6.9 1.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.3 16.1 14.7 10.1 13.1 3.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.2 8.2 5.2 5.3 6.8 1.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9.1 6.7 5.7 4.0 4.3 0.3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 43.7 45.8 36.3 26.1 26.0 -0.1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41.0 41.4 41.3 40.5 39.4 -2.7 %
Male 42.6 43.0 42.8 41.7 40.4 -2.9 %
Female 39.3 39.6 39.7 39.2 38.3 -2.4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -10.0 0.5 -3.1 -8.3 -18.0 p.p.
Building and construction 16.9 4.6 17.5 19.4 1.3 p.p.
Services 2.5 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.9 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2.5 -3.6 5.7 -0.4 2.0 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 15.2: Indicator board on wage developments - LV 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 14.3 25.3 23.6 34.8 16.7 21.5 16.8 17.8 12.5
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 15.7 28.9 23.6 38.7 18.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 10.7 15.1 23.3 30.3 23.4 30.9 25.2 21.1 17.7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 6.4 15.2 15.3 27.0 23.2 26.8 22.7 24.5 18.5
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.6 4.6 4.9 5.6 7.0 5.3 5.4 9.1 6.7
Wage and salaries 17.5 26.0 31.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 51.0 53.5 56.4 59.2 62.1 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 21.4 21.5 21.3 21.1 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 78.6 78.5 78.7 78.9 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 73.4 73.4 73.7 73.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.5 42.2 42.9 42.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.1 37.5 39.9 37.0 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 20.5 20.7 20.6 20.4 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 7.5 8.7 7.2 6.2 -5.3 -4.2 -4.8 -5.3 -5.1
Hourly Labour Productivity 8.7 10.3 7.2 7.9 -4.8 :   :  :   :
GDP 8.7 10.6 12.2 10.0 -4.6 0.5 -1.9 -5.2 -10.3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 10.2 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.7 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 1.3 4.6 10.1 15.0 6.6 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15.3 16.3 17.5 15.6 11.9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 5.8 5.5 5.1 9.7 13.8 15.6 15.8 13.7 10.2
GDP deflator 7.0 10.2 9.9 20.3 15.2 20.4 16.4 14.1 11.1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 1.6 11.0 24.5 30.4 1.5 16.0 1.6 -2.0 -2.2
Industry excluding construction -0.3 8.1 15.5 20.4 24.1 25.9 24.2 26.1 19.0
of which: manufacturing 3.3 13.1 16.4 25.2 22.1 24.5 20.8 23.5 17.7
Construction 11.9 63.5 28.7 46.1 15.8 21.4 15.0 15.5 6.0
Trade, transport and communication -2.5 7.1 14.7 21.8 23.6 24.4 22.7 23.8 21.4
Finance and business services 10.2 12.7 15.4 38.6 22.5 25.8 16.8 27.4 19.4
Non-market related services 8.4 8.8 15.1 29.0 21.6 31.4 26.7 24.8 6.5
Market-related sectors 0.7 11.0 16.9 28.2 19.0 23.0 18.0 20.5 15.7
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 10.2 19.6 23.5 34.2 16.2 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 17.3 20.4 22.0 53.8 22.8 37.4 27.7 25.1 14.6
Industry excluding construction 7.8 18.6 15.5 21.2 17.9 17.1 12.9 17.3 17.3
of which: manufacturing 12.9 24.3 17.0 26.3 11.9 11.4 7.5 12.3 14.4
Construction 8.9 80.2 33.8 40.7 11.9 25.6 8.9 7.5 16.8
Trade, transport and communication 4.6 18.2 26.1 27.3 14.9 20.1 13.5 15.3 11.5
Finance and business services 19.2 35.5 -5.3 46.4 13.3 13.1 11.3 7.0 -0.9
Non-market related services 12.3 9.0 28.5 35.7 17.3 23.2 22.4 21.6 6.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 15.4 8.4 -2.0 18.0 21.0 18.4 25.7 27.7 17.2
Industry excluding construction 8.1 9.7 0.0 0.7 -5.0 -7.0 -9.1 -6.9 -1.4
 of which: manufacturing 9.4 9.8 0.5 0.9 -8.4 -10.6 -10.9 -9.1 -2.9
Construction -2.7 10.3 4.0 -3.7 -3.4 3.5 -5.2 -6.9 10.2
Trade, transport and communication 7.2 10.3 9.9 4.5 -7.0 -3.4 -7.5 -6.9 -8.1
Finance and business services 8.2 20.2 -18.0 5.6 -7.5 -10.1 -4.7 -16.1 -16.9
Non-market related services 3.5 0.2 11.6 5.2 -3.5 -6.2 -3.4 -2.6 0.1
Market-related sectors 8.7 11.2 4.4 4.9 -3.1 -1.7 -3.5 -4.5 -2.9
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 16.1: Main indicators - LT 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 3434 3424 3403 3385 3366 -0.5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 2310 2322 2321 2319 2316 -0.1 %
as % of total population 67.3 67.8 68.2 68.5 68.8 0.3 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 1596 1587 1565 1575 1584 0.6 %
Male 811 807 790 796 801 0.6 %
Female 786 780 775 779 783 0.5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.1 68.4 67.4 67.9 68.4 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.2 25.1 26.3 27.4 30.8 3.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88.7 87.9 86.2 86.0 85.5 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52.6 52.8 52.9 55.6 55.6 0.0 p.p.
Male 72.8 72.1 70.5 71.0 71.4 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.9 29.5 29.3 31.8 35.4 3.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90.7 90.1 88.7 87.9 87.4 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 63.7 63.8 59.9 63.4 63.0 -0.4 p.p.
Female 65.6 64.9 64.6 65.0 65.5 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.4 20.5 23.1 22.8 26.0 3.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.8 85.8 83.8 84.2 83.8 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44.3 44.4 47.6 49.7 50.0 0.3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 61.2 62.6 63.6 64.9 64.3 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.3 21.2 23.7 25.2 26.7 1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.4 81.0 81.7 82.5 81.2 -1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.1 49.2 49.6 53.4 53.1 -0.3 p.p.
Male 64.7 66.1 66.3 67.9 67.1 -0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.0 24.8 26.4 29.6 30.9 1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 83.3 84.1 84.3 82.7 -1.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57.6 59.1 55.6 60.8 60.2 -0.6 p.p.
Female 57.8 59.4 61.0 62.2 61.8 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.5 17.4 20.8 20.5 22.2 1.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77.3 78.8 79.5 80.8 79.7 -1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.3 41.7 45.1 47.9 47.7 -0.2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 1413.1 1454.0 1475.9 1505.8 1490.2 -15.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51.0 50.9 50.4 50.5 50.4 -0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 49.0 49.1 49.6 49.5 49.6 0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.0 2.5 1.8 2.8 -0.5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.3 2.9 1.5 2.0 -1.0 p.p.
Male 1.6 2.7 0.5 2.4 -1.2 p.p.
Female -1.0 3.1 2.6 1.7 -0.8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 12.9 11.9 11.0 9.6 7.8 -1.8 p.p.
Male 15.2 14.2 13.1 11.8 9.8 -1.9 p.p.
Female 10.4 9.5 8.9 7.4 5.7 -1.6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 6.3 5.6 4.5 3.5 2.4 -1.1 p.p.
Male 8.8 7.6 6.5 4.9 2.9 -1.9 p.p.
Female 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.3 1.8 -0.5 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8.3 6.8 9.5 8.1 6.5 -1.6 p.p.
Male 6.4 4.9 7.5 6.5 4.7 -1.8 p.p.
Female 10.3 8.8 11.5 9.7 8.3 -1.5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 11.4 8.3 5.6 4.3 5.8 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.7 15.7 9.8 8.2 13.4 5.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10.4 7.8 5.2 4.0 5.1 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 10.4 6.8 6.1 3.8 4.4 0.6 p.p.
Male 11.0 8.2 5.8 4.3 6.1 1.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.6 15.9 9.9 6.9 12.6 5.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.9 7.5 5.2 4.0 5.4 1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9.7 7.4 7.2 4.1 4.4 0.2 p.p.
Female 11.8 8.3 5.4 4.3 5.6 1.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.9 15.2 9.6 10.1 14.6 4.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 11.0 8.2 5.1 4.0 4.9 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11.2 6.1 5.2 3.6 4.6 1.0 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 51.4 52.2 44.0 31.9 20.5 -11.5 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37.9 38.1 38.1 38.6 39.2 1.5 %
Male 38.9 39.4 39.2 39.5 40.1 1.5 %
Female 36.7 36.7 37.1 37.6 38.3 1.7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -11.5 -9.3 -9.9 -14.2 -23.8 p.p.
Building and construction 8.9 14.1 12.7 15.9 -2.4 p.p.
Services 3.6 4.1 3.6 4.6 3.9 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3.6 4.4 -0.6 1.7 -0.3 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 16.2: Indicator board on wage developments - LT 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 10.9 11.5 16.7 16.9 14.5 18.7 18.7 17.0 8.1
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 12.0 10.0 19.6 18.4 15.5 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.5 11.5 18.4 20.9 17.2 23.6 18.8 16.0 11.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3.3 6.0 10.1 10.3 10.6 11.0 11.5 12.0 9.3
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0.8 -0.6 3.4 1.4 0.3 -1.7 0.0 1.2 2.2
Wage and salaries 10.7 8.0 22.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 55.0 54.4 56.4 57.7 57.9 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 71.5 71.5 71.5 71.5 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 66.3 66.5 66.5 66.6 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.7 40.1 46.3 43.0 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.9 40.1 43.2 40.5 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 28.2 28.1 28.2 28.2 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 7.4 5.2 5.9 6.0 3.5 6.9 6.5 4.5 -1.1
Hourly Labour Productivity 6.0 1.7 6.9 4.7 1.9 :   :  :   :
GDP 7.4 7.8 7.8 8.9 3.0 7.0 5.2 2.9 -2.2
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 11.9 10.2 8.7 7.7 7.5 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 3.5 4.7 6.1 8.9 7.6 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 11.1 10.8 12.3 12.0 9.4
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0.7 1.3 2.4 5.2 9.3 9.0 10.6 9.8 7.8
GDP deflator 2.5 6.6 6.5 8.8 10.3 13.0 11.5 10.7 6.9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 7.5 -7.6 2.6 -6.1 -9.0 -7.2 -6.7 -14.3 0.0
Industry excluding construction 2.8 7.2 4.4 7.4 13.6 15.3 12.9 21.8 6.8
of which: manufacturing 3.6 6.0 3.2 6.6 13.2 13.8 12.4 21.9 3.8
Construction 15.2 18.6 23.7 17.6 12.6 11.3 14.6 16.8 8.3
Trade, transport and communication 5.2 7.7 16.3 11.8 8.2 11.1 9.4 5.6 8.8
Finance and business services 3.1 16.1 6.4 35.5 12.2 13.6 19.1 18.9 1.4
Non-market related services 7.0 7.0 13.9 10.4 18.9 19.0 19.4 19.8 17.4
Market-related sectors 3.0 6.6 9.4 11.5 7.6 8.5 8.4 9.6 5.6
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 10.9 11.5 16.7 16.9 14.5 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 20.8 4.0 2.4 23.8 21.6 34.0 28.2 21.1 5.4
Industry excluding construction 17.2 11.8 12.6 12.3 15.8 17.5 16.2 23.3 8.3
of which: manufacturing 20.1 10.2 13.7 12.7 16.0 20.6 14.8 21.0 6.6
Construction 12.7 16.7 32.2 23.1 16.7 20.9 14.7 23.6 12.5
Trade, transport and communication 7.6 16.9 15.1 19.7 9.1 17.4 11.8 7.4 2.6
Finance and business services 10.0 15.8 -0.3 39.1 -5.9 -4.4 2.8 -1.4 -16.4
Non-market related services 8.0 5.0 22.4 7.7 23.5 20.4 29.6 23.2 20.5
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 12.4 12.5 -0.2 31.9 33.7 44.4 37.4 41.4 5.4
Industry excluding construction 14.0 4.3 7.8 4.6 1.9 1.9 2.9 1.3 1.4
 of which: manufacturing 15.9 4.0 10.2 5.7 2.4 6.0 2.2 -0.8 2.7
Construction -2.2 -1.6 6.9 4.7 3.7 8.7 0.1 5.9 3.9
Trade, transport and communication 2.3 8.5 -1.1 7.1 0.8 5.6 2.3 1.7 -5.7
Finance and business services 6.7 -0.3 -6.3 2.7 -16.1 -15.8 -13.6 -17.1 -17.5
Non-market related services 0.9 -1.9 7.5 -2.5 3.9 1.2 8.5 2.8 2.7
Market-related sectors 9.1 7.3 4.2 8.0 3.5 7.2 4.6 4.5 -1.8
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 17.1: Main indicators - LU 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 446 450 456 465 467 0.6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 301 304 307 316 318 0.8 %
as % of total population 67.5 67.6 67.2 68.0 68.1 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 198 202 205 211 213 0.7 %
Male 115 116 115 118 120 2.4 %
Female 83 86 90 94 92 -1.4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 65.8 66.6 66.7 66.9 66.8 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28.1 28.8 27.8 26.5 29.1 2.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.0 83.9 84.5 84.8 83.4 -1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30.8 32.4 33.7 32.7 35.0 2.3 p.p.
Male 75.6 76.0 75.3 75.0 74.7 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29.3 32.2 30.5 30.7 31.0 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 95.3 95.5 95.3 94.9 93.7 -1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38.8 39.7 38.8 36.5 39.8 3.4 p.p.
Female 55.9 57.0 58.2 58.9 58.7 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.2 25.4 24.8 22.5 27.1 4.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 70.4 72.2 73.8 74.7 72.9 -1.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 22.6 25.1 28.7 29.1 30.4 1.3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62.5 63.6 63.5 64.2 63.4 -0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23.2 25.0 23.2 22.5 23.8 1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.3 80.6 81.0 81.9 80.0 -1.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30.3 31.8 33.1 32.0 34.1 2.1 p.p.
Male 72.8 73.3 72.7 72.3 71.5 -0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.2 28.4 25.6 26.5 27.0 0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.2 92.8 92.7 92.2 90.2 -2.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38.4 38.1 38.8 35.5 38.7 3.2 p.p.
Female 51.8 53.7 54.6 56.1 55.1 -1.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20.6 21.5 21.4 18.5 20.5 2.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66.2 68.4 69.4 71.7 69.6 -2.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 22.1 24.7 27.9 28.5 29.4 0.9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 188.0 193.2 194.9 202.6 201.8 -0.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 58.9 58.1 56.8 56.0 57.1 1.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 41.1 41.9 43.2 44.0 42.9 -1.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.5 4.7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.0 2.8 0.9 3.9 -0.4 p.p.
Male 0.2 1.4 -1.3 2.4 1.6 p.p.
Female 2.1 4.8 4.1 5.8 -2.8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.1 3.8 -0.3 p.p.
Male 5.4 5.0 5.2 4.2 3.3 -0.9 p.p.
Female 4.3 4.8 4.5 3.9 4.4 0.4 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 4.8 5.3 6.1 6.8 6.2 -0.6 p.p.
Male 4.1 4.9 5.7 6.2 5.9 -0.3 p.p.
Female 5.8 5.8 6.6 7.6 6.7 -1.0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) : : : 17.8 17.9 0.1 p.p.
Male : : : 2.8 3.8 1.0
Female : : : 37.1 38.2 1.1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.9 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17.6 13.4 16.4 15.1 18.0 2.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.5 3.9 4.1 3.4 4.1 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.5 0.6 p.p.
Male 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.0 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10.7 11.9 16.3 13.6 12.7 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.8 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1.1 4.2 0.0 2.6 2.8 0.2 p.p.
Female 6.8 6.0 6.0 5.1 6.0 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.5 15.4 13.8 17.8 24.5 6.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.0 5.3 5.9 4.0 4.6 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.0 1.7 2.8 1.8 3.1 1.4 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 21.0 26.4 29.5 28.5 32.9 4.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38.2 37.9 37.6 37.6 37.2 -1.0 %
Male 41.4 41.2 40.8 40.8 40.5 -0.8 %
Female 33.3 33.0 33.0 33.2 32.6 -1.7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.0 0.0 p.p.
Building and construction 2.9 3.4 4.5 5.1 4.3 p.p.
Services 2.7 3.3 4.2 5.1 5.2 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -0.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.4 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
p.p.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 17.2: Indicator board on wage developments - LU 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.7 3.7 3.1 4.3 1.5 6.4 4.2 6.8 9.5
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.8 5.2 3.7 4.1 1.9  :    :   : :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.3 4.2 2.6 2.1 3.5 2.7 3.6 3.1 4.2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.4 1.4 0.4 3.6 7.2 3.4 7.0 7.1 12.3
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.4 -2.9 -4.8 1.5 5.5 -0.7 6.2 5.3 12.1
Wage and salaries 3.7 2.1 5.4  :  :  :  : :   :  
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3.0 2.6 0.9 4.0 7.6  :    :   : :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 57.3 55.5 52.6 53.5 56.2  :    :   : :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 16.2 16.2 16.1 16.1 :  :  : :   :  
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 83.8 83.8 83.9 83.9 :  :    :   : :
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 71.0 71.0 71.2 71.2 :  :  : :   :  
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.4 34.2 34.8 35.8 :  :  : :   :  
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 25.5 26.5 27.2 28.5 :  :  : :   :  
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 15.4 15.4 15.2 15.2 :  :  : :   :  
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 :  :    :   : :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.3 2.2 2.7 0.7 -5.3 2.9 -2.7 -0.3 -2.5
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.2 3.5 3.1 0.3 -5.1  :    :   : :
GDP 4.5 5.2 6.4 5.2 -0.9 1.0 1.1 -0.9 -4.8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 3.9 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.3  :  : :   :  
Output gap (%) -0.5 0.9 3.9 5.6 1.2  :    :   : :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.2 3.8 3.0 2.7 4.1 4.2 4.8 5.1 2.2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.8
GDP deflator 1.9 4.5 5.4 2.0 1.6 4.1 0.7 1.7 0.2
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 81.5 16.1 -34.6 8.0 7.6 12.3 14.7 4.3 -7.2
Industry excluding construction -0.9 3.4 12.7 -1.0 7.5 2.3 1.7 -1.2 20.8
   of which: manufacturing -0.9 3.1 11.7 -1.4 8.1 3.8 1.5 -0.7 23.1
Construction 1.2 0.7 -1.3 6.7 2.9 6.8 3.2 1.6 5.1
Trade, transport and communication 0.9 3.0 -0.8 0.5 3.2 4.9 4.6 7.9 11.9
Finance and business services 1.4 0.8 -1.8 6.9 11.9 9.2 10.7 15.1 13.3
Non-market related services 5.8 1.3 1.1 3.8 4.5 4.0 5.1 3.3 5.3
Market-related sectors 0.6 1.8 -0.2 2.6 9.1 6.8 7.2 9.8 12.7
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.9 3.5 3.2 4.3 1.5  :  : :   :  
Agriculture and fishery 82.0 -0.5 -38.7 8.1 4.5 1.8 1.6 2.1 -0.5
Industry excluding construction 2.8 4.3 5.0 1.0 3.2 2.1 4.8 1.8 0.7
of which: manufacturing 3.2 4.3 5.3 0.7 1.5 1.7 4.6 1.6 0.4
Construction 3.7 2.0 0.6 4.6 2.9 2.0 2.6 3.3 2.1
Trade, transport and communication 4.7 3.9 1.4 5.9 -1.5 1.6 2.2 3.3 2.3
Finance and business services 2.6 4.7 2.9 4.3 0.9 0.5 1.4 2.3 1.4
Non-market related services 5.5 1.3 4.0 3.7 1.9 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 0.3 -14.3 -6.2 0.1 -2.9 -9.4 -11.3 -2.1 7.3
Industry excluding construction 3.7 0.9 -6.8 2.0 -3.9 -0.2 3.0 3.0 -16.7
of which: manufacturing 4.2 1.2 -5.8 2.1 -6.1 -2.0 3.0 2.2 -18.5
Construction 2.4 1.3 2.0 -2.0 -0.1 -4.5 -0.6 1.7 -2.9
Trade, transport and communication 3.8 0.9 2.2 5.4 -4.6 -3.2 -2.3 -4.3 -8.5
Finance and business services 1.2 3.8 4.8 -2.4 -9.9 -8.0 -8.4 -11.2 -10.5
Non-market related services -0.3 0.0 2.9 -0.1 -2.5 -2.3 -2.3 -1.0 -2.6
Market-related sectors 2.7 2.4 3.3 1.0 -6.2 -4.6 -4.1 -6.2 -9.6
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
18. MALTA 
305 
Table 18.1: Main indicators - MT 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 400 402 406 409 411 0.7 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 272 274 281 285 289 1.4 %
as % of total population 68.1 68.1 69.2 69.7 70.2 0.5 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 158 159 162 166 170 2.0 %
Male 110 109 111 112 113 0.2 %
Female 49 50 51 54 57 5.6 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 58.2 58.2 57.6 58.4 58.8 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55.3 54.4 52.5 53.1 52.2 -0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 65.3 65.7 67.9 69.7 70.8 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32.3 31.9 30.6 29.6 30.3 0.7 p.p.
Male 80.2 79.1 78.1 77.6 76.8 -0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 59.9 56.3 56.6 57.1 55.3 -1.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93.3 93.2 93.9 94.2 93.7 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54.8 53.1 50.5 47.3 47.9 0.6 p.p.
Female 36.0 36.9 36.5 38.6 40.1 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.6 52.4 48.2 48.9 49.0 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 36.8 37.6 40.8 44.0 46.8 2.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12.0 12.5 11.2 12.4 13.2 0.8 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 54.0 53.9 53.6 54.6 55.2 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 46.2 45.4 44.2 45.7 45.9 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 62.1 62.4 64.4 66.2 67.3 1.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.5 30.8 29.8 28.5 29.1 0.5 p.p.
Male 75.0 73.8 73.2 72.9 72.5 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.3 46.6 46.9 48.1 47.6 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88.8 88.9 89.6 90.0 89.5 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53.5 50.8 49.4 45.9 46.5 0.6 p.p.
Female 32.7 33.7 33.4 35.7 37.4 1.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.7 43.9 41.3 43.2 43.8 0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 34.8 35.4 38.1 41.2 44.1 2.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11.5 12.5 10.8 11.6 12.4 0.9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 146.9 147.6 150.7 155.5 159.4 3.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 69.8 68.9 69.3 67.9 66.7 -1.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 30.2 31.1 30.7 32.1 33.3 1.3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.6 1.3 1.3 3.1 2.5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.0 0.5 2.1 3.2 2.5 p.p.
Male 0.9 -0.7 2.7 1.1 0.6 p.p.
Female -2.0 3.3 0.9 7.9 6.5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.3 9.0 9.4 9.1 8.9 -0.2 p.p.
Male 11.5 11.2 11.5 10.8 10.9 0.1 p.p.
Female 4.1 6.0 4.4 5.5 4.8 -0.7 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 3.8 4.5 3.7 5.1 4.2 -0.9 p.p.
Male 3.4 3.6 2.6 3.7 3.3 -0.4 p.p.
Female 5.7 6.2 5.8 7.7 5.8 -1.9 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8.3 9.4 9.7 10.6 11.3 0.6 p.p.
Male 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.0 3.9 -0.2 p.p.
Female 19.0 20.9 21.4 24.6 26.1 1.5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 7.4 7.2 7.1 6.4 5.9 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.5 16.6 15.8 14.1 12.1 -2.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.9 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.3 3.4 2.7 3.6 3.9 0.3 p.p.
Male 6.6 6.4 6.3 5.9 5.6 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15.9 17.2 17.2 15.8 14.0 -1.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.3 4.3 2.1 2.9 2.9 0.0 p.p.
Female 9.0 8.9 8.7 7.6 6.5 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17.6 16.3 14.3 11.8 10.6 -1.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.5 5.9 6.8 6.3 5.6 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.9 0.0 3.3 6.4 5.7 -0.7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 46.7 46.4 40.6 41.8 42.2 0.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.0 39.2 38.7 38.9 39.0 0.1 %
Male 41.6 41.2 40.3 41.0 41.0 0.1 %
Female 36.2 34.4 34.9 34.3 34.7 1.2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture : : : : : p.p.
Building and construction : : : : : p.p.
Services : : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry : : : : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 18.2: Indicator board on wage developments - MT 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1.4 2.2 3.6 1.6 3.6 2.5 3.0 1.6 3.8
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 1.5 2.2 4.4 1.6 4.8 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index)  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -0.2 -0.4 1.6 0.5 3.5 2.1 0.3 1.8 6.5
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.8 -3.0 -1.4 -2.1 1.0 -0.4 -2.6 -0.2 3.8
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 59.7 58.1 57.1 55.9 56.3 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 7.9 8.0 6.9 : : :  :    :  :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 92.1 92.0 93.1 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 23.6 23.9 24.5 23.6 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 23.6 23.9 24.5 23.2 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 7.9 8.0 6.9 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.6 2.7 2.0 1.1 0.1 0.4 2.7 -0.2 -2.6
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.1 2.7 2.7 1.1 1.3 :   :  :   :
GDP 1.0 4.0 3.3 4.2 2.5 3.4 4.2 3.1 -0.3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.9 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -3.4 -1.5 -0.2 1.4 1.8 :   :  :   :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.7 2.5 2.6 0.7 4.7 4.0 4.2 5.3 5.2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.9 1.9 1.8 0.8 3.9 3.3 3.6 4.8 3.8
GDP deflator 1.6 2.6 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.6
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 0.8 2.3 3.0 1.8 3.4 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
 of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 19.1: Main indicators - NL 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 16119 16107 16142 16180 16190 0.1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 10960 10943 10964 10986 10970 -0.1 %
as % of total population 68.0 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.8 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 8398 8414 8484 8622 8704 1.0 %
Male 4650 4618 4636 4680 4705 0.5 %
Female 3747 3796 3848 3942 3999 1.5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 76.6 76.9 77.4 78.5 79.3 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 71.6 71.0 70.8 72.7 73.2 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.9 86.5 87.1 87.6 88.5 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 46.9 48.1 49.6 52.8 54.7 2.0 p.p.
Male 83.9 83.7 83.9 84.6 85.3 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 72.0 71.2 71.5 73.0 73.7 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93.7 93.8 94.1 94.0 94.5 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 59.1 59.5 60.4 64.0 65.9 1.9 p.p.
Female 69.2 70.0 70.7 72.2 73.3 1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 71.1 70.8 70.1 72.4 72.6 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78.0 79.0 80.1 81.2 82.5 1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34.4 36.5 38.6 41.4 43.5 2.1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 73.1 73.2 74.3 76.0 77.2 1.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 65.9 65.2 66.2 68.4 69.3 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82.5 82.9 84.2 85.4 86.8 1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 45.2 46.1 47.7 50.9 53.0 2.1 p.p.
Male 80.2 79.9 80.9 82.2 83.2 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 66.3 65.5 67.2 68.9 69.8 0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90.2 90.3 91.4 92.1 93.0 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56.9 56.9 58.0 61.5 63.7 2.1 p.p.
Female 65.8 66.4 67.7 69.6 71.1 1.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 65.4 64.9 65.1 67.9 68.8 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 75.5 77.0 78.7 80.5 1.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33.4 35.2 37.2 40.1 42.2 2.1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 8013.9 8013.4 8152.0 8345.1 8467.6 122.5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55.5 55.0 54.8 54.5 54.2 -0.3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44.5 45.0 45.2 45.5 45.8 0.3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.9 0.5 1.7 2.6 1.4 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0.3 0.0 1.7 2.4 1.5 p.p.
Male -0.7 -0.8 1.4 1.7 0.9 p.p.
Female 0.1 1.0 2.2 3.2 2.2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.1 8.4 0.3 p.p.
Male 8.1 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.5 0.2 p.p.
Female 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.2 0.4 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 14.6 15.4 16.4 17.9 17.9 0.0 p.p.
Male 13.3 14.1 15.2 16.5 16.2 -0.3 p.p.
Female 16.3 16.9 17.9 19.6 19.8 0.3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 45.1 45.7 45.8 46.3 46.8 0.5 p.p.
Male 21.5 21.8 22.1 22.5 22.8 0.3 p.p.
Female 74.6 75.0 74.5 74.8 75.2 0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.2 2.8 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8.0 8.2 6.6 5.9 5.3 -0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.0 4.1 3.3 2.5 2.0 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.2 -0.4 p.p.
Male 4.3 4.5 3.5 2.8 2.5 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 7.9 8.0 6.1 5.6 5.4 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.7 3.8 2.9 2.0 1.7 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.8 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.4 -0.5 p.p.
Female 4.8 5.1 4.4 3.6 3.0 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8.1 8.4 7.1 6.2 5.2 -1.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4.2 4.5 3.8 3.1 2.4 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 -0.3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 34.1 40.3 42.9 39.4 34.3 -5.1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 31.5 31.6 31.9 31.8 31.7 -0.3 %
Male 36.8 37.0 37.2 37.1 37.0 -0.3 %
Female 24.5 24.7 25.1 25.1 25.2 0.6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2.6 -1.9 -1.6 -1.1 -1.4 p.p.
Building and construction -1.8 0.1 1.9 1.2 1.9 p.p.
Services -0.4 1.0 2.1 3.2 1.6 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3.1 -2.1 : : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 19.2: Indicator board on wage developments - NL
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.4 1.1 2.2 2.8 3.6 3.8 4.6 3.9 2.4
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.2 1.3 2.1 3.0 3.6 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.4 1.3 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.4 4.2 4.9  :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0.2 -0.4 0.6 1.9 2.9 1.9 2.7 3.2 4.9
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.5 -2.8 -1.1 0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.7 0.3 0.9
Wage and salaries 0.4 0.5 2.1 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1.0 -0.3 0.8 1.6 3.5 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66.7 65.0 64.5 64.7 64.4 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 23.5 23.1  : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 76.5 76.9 : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 66.3 66.6 : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.8 38.9 44.4 44.0 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 35.9 35.9 41.5 40.9 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 21.4 21.0 : : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.1 2.1 : : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3.1 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.7 1.9 1.9 0.6 -2.4
Hourly Labour Productivity 3.3 2.0 1.5 0.8 0.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 2.2 2.0 3.4 3.5 2.1 3.6 3.2 1.9 -0.7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -1.4 -0.9 0.7 2.4 2.7 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.9 2.0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1.3 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.1
GDP deflator 0.7 2.4 1.7 1.5 2.7 2.1 1.9 3.0 4.0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -8.0 1.0 2.4 -0.9 3.4 3.7 8.0 4.8 4.5
Industry excluding construction -3.0 -1.6 0.8 1.1 2.3 -0.6 0.3 3.2 8.6
of which: manufacturing -2.4 -2.9  : :   : 3.5 3.9 4.0 8.1
Construction 5.5 -1.6 1.7 -0.9 -1.2 -2.5 -0.9 -0.4 2.8
Trade, transport and communication -0.9 -3.6 -2.0 0.8 4.2 1.8 3.5 3.9 5.7
Finance and business services 0.6 1.0 2.8 4.8 2.0 3.3 1.7 3.3 -0.7
Non-market related services 2.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 3.5 2.8 3.1 2.6 5.2
Market-related sectors -0.7 -1.2 0.9 2.1 2.6 1.4 1.9 3.2 3.8
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3.4 1.1 2.4 2.9 4.0 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -0.1 2.4 2.2 1.6 5.1 7.1 7.0 8.5 3.9
Industry excluding construction 3.8 0.9 3.2 3.1 3.6 5.3 4.8 3.7 1.4
of which: manufacturing 4.3 1.2  : :   : 5.3 4.6 3.7 1.0
Construction 4.3 1.5 2.3 3.6 4.3 5.3 6.2 4.8 3.0
Trade, transport and communication 3.7 1.0 2.7 2.3 3.5 2.4 3.2 4.0 2.7
Finance and business services 3.8 0.2 1.4 3.9 2.6 3.8 3.6 4.0 -0.6
Non-market related services 2.8 1.5 2.2 2.4 4.2 2.9 3.2 3.2 5.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 8.5 1.4 -0.1 2.5 1.7 3.3 -0.9 3.5 -0.5
Industry excluding construction 7.1 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.3 6.0 4.5 0.4 -6.6
 of which: manufacturing 6.8 4.2  : :   : 1.7 0.7 -0.3 -6.6
Construction -1.1 3.1 0.6 4.5 5.5 8.1 7.1 5.3 0.2
Trade, transport and communication 4.6 4.7 4.8 1.5 -0.7 0.6 -0.2 0.0 -2.8
Finance and business services 3.2 -0.8 -1.4 -0.8 0.5 0.5 2.0 0.7 0.2
Non-market related services 0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4
Market-related sectors 4.4 2.1 1.7 1.0 0.6 2.3 2.1 0.8 -2.5
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 20.1: Main indicators - PL 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 31123 31258 37446 37277 37158 -0.3 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 26142 26211 26325 26299 26266 -0.1 %
as % of total population 84.0 83.9 70.3 70.5 70.7 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 16727 16873 16679 16610 16765 0.9 %
Male 9077 9191 9127 9086 9170 0.9 %
Female 7651 7682 7552 7524 7595 0.9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 64.0 64.4 63.4 63.2 63.8 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.9 35.7 34.2 33.0 33.1 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.9 82.5 81.7 81.7 82.5 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29.6 30.5 30.7 31.8 33.3 1.5 p.p.
Male 70.1 70.8 70.1 70.0 70.9 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.7 39.5 37.5 36.5 36.5 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.8 88.7 88.2 87.9 88.8 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39.1 40.9 42.6 44.7 46.8 2.0 p.p.
Female 57.9 58.1 56.8 56.5 57.0 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.0 31.8 30.7 29.3 29.6 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.0 76.4 75.4 75.6 76.3 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21.4 21.5 20.3 20.6 21.6 1.0 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 51.7 52.8 54.5 57.0 59.2 2.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.7 22.5 24.0 25.8 27.3 1.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.2 69.6 71.8 74.9 77.5 2.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 26.2 27.2 28.1 29.7 31.6 1.9 p.p.
Male 57.2 58.9 60.9 63.6 66.3 2.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.8 25.4 26.9 29.2 31.0 1.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73.9 76.1 78.3 81.1 84.0 2.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34.1 35.9 38.4 41.4 44.1 2.6 p.p.
Female 46.2 46.8 48.2 50.6 52.4 1.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.6 19.6 21.0 22.4 23.7 1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 62.6 63.1 65.3 68.8 71.0 2.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19.4 19.7 19.0 19.4 20.7 1.3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 13503.5 13834.2 14338.5 14996.5 15557.4 561.0 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.8 55.2 55.3 55.1 55.1 0.0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.2 44.8 44.7 44.9 44.9 0.0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1.3 2.3 3.3 4.1 4.0 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 3.7 p.p.
Male 1.8 3.3 3.7 4.2 3.8 p.p.
Female 0.8 1.4 3.6 5.1 3.7 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 16.7 16.0 15.3 14.7 14.3 -0.4 p.p.
Male 19.3 18.6 17.9 17.2 16.7 -0.5 p.p.
Female 13.5 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.4 -0.3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 22.6 25.6 27.2 28.2 26.9 -1.3 p.p.
Male 23.6 26.4 28.4 28.4 26.2 -2.2 p.p.
Female 21.5 24.6 25.9 27.9 27.6 -0.3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9.8 9.8 8.9 8.5 7.7 -0.7 p.p.
Male 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.8 5.1 -0.7 p.p.
Female 12.9 13.3 12.2 11.7 10.9 -0.8 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 19.0 17.8 13.9 9.6 7.1 -2.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.5 36.9 29.8 21.7 17.3 -4.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 16.7 15.7 12.2 8.4 6.1 -2.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11.4 10.8 8.5 6.8 5.3 -1.5 p.p.
Male 18.2 16.6 13.0 9.0 6.4 -2.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37.7 35.7 28.3 20.0 15.2 -4.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 15.8 14.3 11.2 7.7 5.4 -2.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12.6 12.2 9.8 7.4 5.8 -1.6 p.p.
Female 20.0 19.2 14.9 10.4 8.0 -2.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42.0 38.3 31.6 23.8 19.9 -3.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 17.7 17.4 13.4 9.0 6.8 -2.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9.4 8.4 6.2 5.7 4.4 -1.4 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 54.1 57.7 56.2 51.2 33.5 -17.7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.4 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.1 -0.6 %
Male 42.7 42.5 42.5 42.4 42.1 -0.7 %
Female 37.5 37.4 37.5 37.6 37.5 -0.3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 1.3 2.3 3.3 : : p.p.
Building and construction 1.3 2.3 3.2 : : p.p.
Services 1.3 2.3 3.3 : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry 2.1 3.2 3.3 : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 20.2: Indicator board on wage developments - PL
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1.8 1.5 1.8 3.7 7.6 5.9 6.7 6.5 11.5
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2.6 2.3 3.9 5.7 8.1 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.4 3.8 5.8 11.2 10.9 13.2 10.2 9.4 10.0
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -2.1 0.3 -1.1 1.2 6.6 4.2 4.4 4.7 12.1
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -6.0 -2.3 -2.5 -2.7 3.5 0.4 0.7 2.3 9.4
Wage and salaries 4.5 :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 56.0 55.3 54.2 52.8 54.8 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 19.8 19.8  : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 80.2 80.2 : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 74.2 74.2 : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.3 43.6 43.7 42.8 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43.3 43.6 43.7 39.7 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 16.6 16.6 : : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 3.3 3.3 : : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 4.0 1.3 2.9 2.4 0.9 1.7 2.2 1.8 -0.6
Hourly Labour Productivity 4.0 0.7 3.2 2.6 1.0 :   :  :   :
GDP 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.6 5.0 6.3 5.8 5.5 2.4
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 17.4 16.2 14.4 12.6 11.0 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.6 0.1 1.7 3.4 3.5 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.4 3.6
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.8 1.2 0.6 2.0 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.1
GDP deflator 4.1 2.6 1.5 4.0 3.1 3.8 3.7 2.4 2.4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -7.7 16.5 -6.0 -0.9  : 32.9 21.8 31.6 -10.3
Industry excluding construction -7.2 13.0 0.0 3.1  : 11.7 11.8 19.5 10.8
of which: manufacturing -6.7 -1.7 -8.4 :   : 12.9 10.5 18.8 9.5
Construction -2.7 12.9 1.5 3.6  : 25.3 17.2 22.6 15.1
Trade, transport and communication -8.1 12.7 5.1 2.9  : 9.9 16.2 20.0 6.5
Finance and business services 1.6 9.9 9.2 11.1  : 19.0 20.0 18.9 5.0
Non-market related services -0.2 18.0 7.1 9.9  : 21.7 23.1 22.7 11.9
Market-related sectors -6.0 11.1 1.5 4.1  : 12.7 14.6 18.3 7.3
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries -1.0 14.5 5.1 6.8 16.0 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -0.4 16.9 -1.9 2.1  : 23.5 28.2 36.1 8.4
Industry excluding construction -0.5 13.6 4.9 5.5  : 11.9 16.3 20.6 8.9
of which: manufacturing 3.0 -0.8 3.0 :   : 13.0 17.1 20.3 8.5
Construction 1.0 14.8 3.8 5.2  : 8.8 17.7 25.1 9.3
Trade, transport and communication -4.8 14.0 6.0 3.6  : 13.2 14.5 20.3 5.7
Finance and business services -4.1 10.2 10.6 3.5  : 12.3 7.9 19.2 6.4
Non-market related services 1.5 16.8 3.5 12.8  : 15.1 21.0 24.7 15.3
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 8.0 0.4 4.4 3.1  : -7.1 5.3 3.4 20.9
Industry excluding construction 7.2 0.6 4.8 2.3  : 0.2 4.1 0.9 -1.6
 of which: manufacturing 10.4 0.9 12.5 :   : 0.1 6.0 1.3 -0.9
Construction 3.9 1.7 2.2 1.6  : -13.2 0.4 2.1 -5.0
Trade, transport and communication 3.6 1.2 0.8 0.7  : 3.0 -1.4 0.3 -0.8
Finance and business services -5.6 0.3 1.3 -6.9  : -5.6 -10.1 0.3 1.3
Non-market related services 1.7 -1.0 -3.3 2.6  : -5.4 -1.7 1.6 3.1
Market-related sectors 4.3 1.6 4.2 1.6  : -0.4 0.2 2.4 0.2
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 21.1: Main indicators - PT 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10504 10563 10586 10604 10623 0.2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7084 7114 7116 7135 7145 0.1 %
as % of total population 67.4 67.4 67.2 67.3 67.3 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 5170 5222 5258 5284 5299 0.3 %
Male 2768 2778 2796 2801 2811 0.4 %
Female 2403 2443 2462 2484 2488 0.2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 73.0 73.4 73.9 74.1 74.2 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43.8 43.0 42.7 41.9 41.6 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.3 87.1 87.7 87.8 88.0 0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53.2 53.8 53.5 54.4 54.4 -0.1 p.p.
Male 79.1 79.0 79.5 79.4 79.5 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.9 47.0 46.6 45.3 44.4 -0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.2 92.4 92.9 92.8 93.2 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 62.8 62.4 62.7 63.0 63.0 0.0 p.p.
Female 67.0 67.9 68.4 68.8 68.9 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.5 38.8 38.7 38.4 38.6 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 81.8 82.7 82.8 82.9 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44.8 46.1 45.1 46.7 46.6 -0.1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 67.8 67.5 67.9 67.8 68.2 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37.1 36.1 35.8 34.9 34.7 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.1 80.8 81.3 81.0 81.6 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.3 50.5 50.1 50.9 50.8 -0.1 p.p.
Male 74.2 73.4 73.9 73.8 74.0 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41.5 40.5 39.8 39.1 38.5 -0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.4 86.7 87.4 87.2 87.6 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 59.1 58.1 58.2 58.6 58.4 -0.1 p.p.
Female 61.7 61.7 62.0 61.9 62.5 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.5 31.4 31.6 30.6 30.8 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74.9 74.9 75.3 74.9 75.8 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42.5 43.7 42.8 44.0 43.9 -0.1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4806.3 4800.0 4830.3 4836.6 4872.2 35.6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.0 53.8 53.9 53.9 53.7 -0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46.0 46.2 46.2 46.1 46.3 0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.3 -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 p.p.
Male -0.1 -0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5 p.p.
Female 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.1 1.0 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 14.4 14.1 13.6 13.5 13.3 -0.2 p.p.
Male 14.1 13.5 13.2 13.6 13.0 -0.6 p.p.
Female 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.4 13.6 0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 19.9 19.6 20.6 22.4 22.9 0.5 p.p.
Male 18.7 18.7 19.6 21.8 21.7 -0.1 p.p.
Female 21.2 20.5 21.7 23.1 24.3 1.2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.8 8.6 -0.1 p.p.
Male 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.7 4.1 -0.6 p.p.
Female 13.2 13.2 12.7 13.6 13.9 0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6.7 7.7 7.8 8.1 7.7 -0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15.3 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.4 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.1 7.3 7.3 7.8 7.3 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.6 0.1 p.p.
Male 5.9 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.6 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13.5 13.6 14.5 13.5 13.3 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.1 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.0 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.9 6.9 7.3 7.1 7.3 0.1 p.p.
Female 7.7 8.8 9.1 9.7 9.0 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17.6 19.1 18.4 20.3 20.2 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.1 8.4 9.0 9.6 8.6 -1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.8 5.8 0.0 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 44.2 48.1 50.2 47.1 47.4 0.3 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38.4 38.4 38.3 38.0 37.9 -0.1 %
Male 40.2 40.2 40.0 39.6 39.7 0.2 %
Female 36.1 36.3 36.3 36.0 35.8 -0.4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3.9 -1.6 0.0 0.4 -0.9 p.p.
Building and construction -1.5 -3.9 -2.1 2.0 -2.9 p.p.
Services 1.9 1.4 1.6 0.6 2.0 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2.5 -2.9 -1.3 : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 21.2: Indicator board on wage developments - PT 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2.6 4.7 2.1 3.3 3.1 :   :  :   :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2.3 5.9 2.3 4.9 3.6 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.3 2.0 1.7 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.3 5.2 4.6
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.0 3.4 1.3 1.4 3.6 :   :  :   :
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.4 0.8 -1.5 -1.6 1.7 :   :  :   :
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1.8 4.2 1.7 2.0 4.0 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 70.6 71.8 71.3 70.1 70.7 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 22.5 22.5 22.5 :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 77.5 77.5 77.5 : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 71.6 71.6 71.6 : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.1 36.5 36.5 37.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 34.5 34.0 34.0 35.1 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 21.2 21.2 21.2 : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1.3 1.3 1.3 : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.6 1.2 0.9 1.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.5 -1.5
Hourly Labour Productivity 0.4 1.9 0.5 3.7 -0.4 :   :  :   :
GDP 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 -1.7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 6.1 6.7 7.2 7.8 8.2 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -1.1 -0.9 -0.2 1.3 0.8 :   :  :   :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.5 2.1 3.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.1 1.6
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.6 1.7 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.2
GDP deflator 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.2 1.4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  : :  -2.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :  0.8 :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 0.4 2.1 1.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :  4.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :  2.3 :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :  2.3 :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :  0.9 :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2.6 4.7 2.1 3.4 3.1 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery  : :  0.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :  4.3 :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 3.3 4.1 4.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :  3.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :  2.3 :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :  2.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :  0.6 :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 10.1 -4.0 2.5 -3.9 5.2 3.4 6.0 7.0 4.9
Industry excluding construction 3.3 1.7 3.4 4.6 -0.1 1.2 0.1 1.9 -3.4
 of which: manufacturing 2.8 2.0 3.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 1.3 0.8 -1.3 -0.4 -2.4 -3.5 -0.3 -1.0 -4.9
Trade, transport and communication 0.9 0.2 0.0 2.6 -2.3 -0.9 -3.1 -2.0 -3.0
Finance and business services -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.8 0.1 -1.7 1.6 0.3 0.6
Non-market related services 0.1 1.0 -0.3 1.6 0.0 0.1 -0.8 1.4 -0.5
Market-related sectors 2.3 1.1 1.5 2.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.7 -1.3
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 22.1: Main indicators - RO 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 21638 21609 21575 21551 21517 -0.2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 14964 15021 15035 15046 15042 0.0 %
as % of total population 69.2 69.5 69.7 69.8 69.9 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 9434 9355 9566 9483 9457 -0.3 %
Male 5195 5180 5287 5261 5294 0.6 %
Female 4239 4176 4278 4222 4164 -1.4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 63.0 62.3 63.6 63.0 62.9 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.8 31.2 30.6 30.5 30.4 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78.3 78.2 79.9 79.0 78.3 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37.9 40.4 42.8 42.4 44.2 1.8 p.p.
Male 70.0 69.4 70.7 70.1 70.6 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.5 35.9 35.1 35.9 35.9 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.7 85.8 87.1 85.9 85.8 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44.9 48.4 52.0 52.1 55.1 3.0 p.p.
Female 56.2 55.3 56.6 56.0 55.2 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31.0 26.5 25.9 24.9 24.7 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 70.9 70.7 72.6 72.0 70.7 -1.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.9 33.5 34.8 33.9 34.7 0.8 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57.7 57.6 58.8 58.8 59.0 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27.9 24.9 24.0 24.4 24.8 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 72.9 73.3 74.7 74.6 74.4 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 36.9 39.4 41.7 41.4 43.1 1.7 p.p.
Male 63.4 63.7 64.6 64.8 65.7 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30.7 28.2 27.3 28.3 29.1 0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79.2 80.0 80.8 80.6 80.9 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 43.1 46.7 50.0 50.3 53.0 2.7 p.p.
Female 52.1 51.5 53.0 52.8 52.5 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25.1 21.6 20.6 20.2 20.2 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66.6 66.5 68.6 68.5 67.8 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.4 33.1 34.5 33.6 34.4 0.8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 8635.0 8651.3 8837.6 8842.5 8882.2 39.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.5 55.0 54.7 55.0 55.4 0.5 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.5 45.0 45.3 45.0 44.6 -0.5 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -1.7 -1.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.4 0.2 2.2 0.1 0.4 p.p.
Male -0.3 1.2 1.6 0.6 1.3 p.p.
Female 1.2 -1.0 2.9 -0.6 -0.6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 16.0 17.2 16.6 17.0 16.8 -0.2 p.p.
Male 21.4 22.7 22.0 22.2 21.9 -0.4 p.p.
Female 9.6 10.5 10.1 10.6 10.6 -0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 2.5 2.4 1.8 1.6 1.3 -0.4 p.p.
Male 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.7 1.3 -0.4 p.p.
Female 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.1 -0.4 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9.5 9.2 8.6 8.6 8.6 0.0 p.p.
Male 9.3 9.1 8.7 8.3 8.1 -0.3 p.p.
Female 9.8 9.2 8.5 8.9 9.3 0.3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.1 7.2 7.3 6.4 5.8 -0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21.9 20.2 21.4 20.1 18.6 -1.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.9 6.4 6.4 5.6 5.0 -0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.5 0.2 p.p.
Male 9.1 7.8 8.2 7.2 6.7 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24.2 21.5 22.3 21.1 18.8 -2.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.6 6.7 7.2 6.2 5.8 -0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.0 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.8 0.3 p.p.
Female 6.9 6.4 6.1 5.4 4.7 -0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.9 18.4 20.2 18.7 18.3 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.2 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.0 -0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.0 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 58.9 56.7 57.7 49.9 41.3 -8.6 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.0 40.1 39.8 39.7 39.6 -0.4 %
Male 41.0 41.0 40.7 40.7 40.5 -0.4 %
Female 38.7 39.0 38.8 38.6 38.4 -0.6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -13.1 -1.5 -7.5 : : p.p.
Building and construction 11.2 5.8 8.1 : : p.p.
Services 6.6 0.0 5.6 : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry 2.7 -5.2 3.0 : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 22.2: Indicator board on wage developments - RO 
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 13.7 28.6 12.4 22.4 22.0 :   :  :   :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 24.9 25.1 15.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 16.1 14.6 19.0 21.1 21.4 19.2 22.5 21.6 21.2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3.1 21.6 4.9 15.7 14.3 :  :    :  :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -10.8 8.4 -5.1 2.6 0.2 :   :  :   :
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 60.4 66.4 62.7 64.6 64.5 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26.0 26.5 28.0 26.5 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 74.0 73.5 72.1 73.5 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 66.8 66.4 65.2 66.5 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45.8 44.0 43.7 43.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41.7 40.9 40.9 39.9 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 23.1 25.0 26.1 24.9 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.9 1.5 1.8 1.6 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 10.3 5.8 7.1 5.8 6.8 8.1 8.8 10.0 2.2
Hourly Labour Productivity 9.8 5.4 6.2 :   : :   :  :   :
GDP 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.2 7.1 8.2 9.3 9.2 2.9
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 2.2 2.1 5.4 6.6 8.5 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 11.9 9.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 8.0 8.6 8.2 6.9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 12.2 6.3 5.8 5.5 7.6 7.8 8.3 7.6 6.6
GDP deflator 15.5 12.2 10.6 12.7 14.0 14.9 14.3 13.4 14.1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -50.5 110.8 20.7 :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 3.3 34.9 6.9 :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 10.1 20.2 3.6 :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 17.4 29.6 -3.5 :  :   :  :    :  :   
Trade, transport and communication -1.1 25.6 3.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services 16.8 26.4 16.3 :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 15.1 36.1 38.5 :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5.4 43.8 15.5 29.5 10.6 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -32.4 77.2 34.9 :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 8.6 46.0 11.6 :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 17.3 31.4 8.4 :  :   :  :    :  :   
Construction 15.4 36.3 10.0 :  :   :  :    :  :   
Trade, transport and communication 2.7 40.2 11.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services 4.2 39.7 22.4 :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 9.0 40.1 20.5 :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 36.6 -15.9 11.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 5.2 8.2 4.4 :   : :   :  :   :
 of which: manufacturing 6.5 9.3 4.7 :   : :   :  :   :
Construction -1.7 5.2 14.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication 3.9 11.6 7.3 :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services -10.8 10.5 5.2 :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services -5.3 2.9 -13.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors 13.4 5.8 10.8 :   : :   :  :   :
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 23.1: Main indicators - SK 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5370 5379 5389 5391 5396 0,1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3792 3824 3862 3873 3892 0,5 %
as % of total population 71 71 72 72 72 0,3 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 2642 2636 2650 2646 2679 1,2 %
Male 1437 1452 1468 1464 1481 1,2 %
Female 1205 1184 1182 1182 1197 1,3 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70 69 69 68 69 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39 37 35 35 32 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89 88 88 87 88 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32 35 37 39 42 3,1 p.p.
Male 77 76 76 76 76 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43 41 40 39 38 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94 94 94 93 93 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52 55 55 57 60 2,9 p.p.
Female 63 62 61 61 61 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36 32 31 30 27 -3,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84 82 81 81 82 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 15 18 21 23 26 3,2 p.p.
5 Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57 58 59 61 62 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26 26 26 28 26 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75 75 77 78 80 2,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 27 30 33 36 39 3,6 p.p.
Male 63 65 67 68 70 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28 28 29 31 31 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80 81 84 85 86 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44 48 50 53 57 4,1 p.p.
Female 51 51 52 53 55 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25 23 23 24 21 -2,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 69 69 70 71 74 2,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 13 16 19 21 24 3,0 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2160 2207 2295 2350 2423 73,0 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55 56 56 56 56 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45 44 44 44 44 0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0 1 2 2 3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0 2 4 2 3 p.p.
Male 1 3 5 2 3 p.p.
Female -1 1 3 2 3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9 9 9 10 10 0,8 p.p.
Male 11 13 13 13 14 0,8 p.p.
Female 5 5 5 5 6 0,7 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 5 5 5 5 5 -0,5 p.p.
Male 6 5 5 5 4 -0,5 p.p.
Female 5 5 5 5 5 -0,4 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 3 2 3 2 3 0,1 p.p.
Male 1 1 1 1 1 0,3 p.p.
Female 4 4 5 4 4 -0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 18 16 13 11 10 -1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33 30 27 20 19 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 16 14 12 10 9 -1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 15 13 10 8 6 -1,8 p.p.
Male 17 16 12 10 8 -1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35 31 26 20 18 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 15 13 10 9 7 -1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 16 13 10 8 5 -2,4 p.p.
Female 19 17 15 13 11 -1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31 29 27 20 20 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 18 16 14 12 10 -1,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 15 14 10 9 8 -0,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
(as % of total unemployment) 65 72 76 74 69 -5,0 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41 41 40 40 40 -1,1 %
Male 42 42 41 42 41 -1,4 %
Female 39 40 39 39 38 -0,8 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 1 -2 -7 -6 6 p.p.
Building and construction 4 3 5 7 10 p.p.
Services 0 3 3 2 4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1 -1 1 3 3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 23.2: Indicator board on wage developments - SK
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 8,5 9,7 7,6 8,8 8,7 11,0 10,5 7,9 5,6
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2,5 6,7 7,3 8,3 8,6  :  :  :  :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5,8 8,5 7,4 7,3 5,8 5,5 7,6 5,3 5,1
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,9 4,3 1,5 0,6 5,2 4,4 5,3 5,8 5,9
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -2,8 1,9 -1,4 -0,5 2,2 1,0 2,1 2,8 3,7
Wage and salaries 9,2 8,3 11,9 :   :  :   :  :  :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   :  :   :  :  :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 46,7 48,0 46,7 46,6 47,1  :  :  :  :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26,3 24,7 25,0 25,1 :  :  :  :  :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,7 75,3 75,0 74,9 :  :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 62,8 65,1 64,5 64,4 :  :   :  :  :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,5 38,3 38,5 38,5 :  :   :  :  :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38,1 33,8 34,1 34,3 :  :   :  :  :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 25,1 23,7 24,1 24,2 :  :   :  :  :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,2 0,9 0,9 0,9 :  :  :  :  :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,4 5,1 6,1 8,1 3,3 6,4 4,9 2,0 -0,3
Hourly Labour Productivity 2,0 3,0 5,8 7,9 3,9  :   :  :  :
GDP 5,2 6,5 8,5 10,4 6,4 9,3 7,9 6,6 2,5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 16,7 15,5 14,2 13,1 12,3  :   :  :  :
Output gap (%) -1,6 -0,7 1,8 6,5 8,0  :   :  :  :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 7,5 2,8 4,3 1,9 3,9 3,4 4,0 4,5 3,9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 6,5 1,7 2,1 1,9 3,9 3,5 4,0 4,2 3,9
GDP deflator 5,9 2,4 2,9 1,1 2,9 3,3 3,1 3,0 2,1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 10,3 11,8 -6,3 9,4 8,5 -1,8 21,4 14,5 3,4
Industry excluding construction -7,2 2,0 -0,4 9,1 23,4 5,7 14,4 35,5 42,6
of which: manufacturing -11,2 -4,7 -0,5 -6,4 12,0 3,1 9,7 35,7 40,2
Construction 15,7 -7,3 0,9 15,9 -0,8 -4,0 4,5 6,5 -7,3
Trade, transport and communication 9,5 12,5 10,7 8,9 4,5 1,5 10,3 5,2 2,6
Finance and business services 24,8 22,5 -2,7 23,3 11,7 13,3 11,4 12,3 10,9
Non-market related services 16,3 11,3 10,9 7,0 14,9 16,4 13,2 15,8 15,1
Market-related sectors 5,2 8,1 2,0 12,0  : 4,9 12,5 19,7 19,1
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 12,4 13,7 11,6 19,9 17,7  :   :  :  :
Agriculture and fishery 7,5 17,6 12,2 28,6 14,2 3,6 16,2 20,2 17,9
Industry excluding construction 10,6 11,4 15,3 20,5 17,0 14,1 19,2 20,9 15,3
of which: manufacturing 6,2 7,9 11,3 8,6 7,8 14,3 19,3 21,7 15,9
Construction 20,4 9,1 16,1 16,1 5,0 -2,8 4,8 6,0 9,3
Trade, transport and communication 14,3 14,2 5,2 18,3 16,5 11,7 17,8 20,3 17,1
Finance and business services 14,1 12,1 8,8 30,3 17,5 15,8 16,0 21,2 18,0
Non-market related services 10,1 16,4 13,0 16,0 23,7 26,1 24,5 25,1 20,5
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -2,5 5,2 19,7 17,5 5,2 5,5 -4,2 5,0 14,0
Industry excluding construction 19,1 9,2 15,8 10,4 -5,2 7,9 4,2 -10,8 -19,2
 of which: manufacturing 19,6 13,2 11,9 16,0 -3,8 10,8 8,8 -10,3 -17,4
Construction 4,1 17,7 15,1 0,2 5,9 1,2 0,3 -0,4 18,0
Trade, transport and communication 4,3 1,5 -5,0 8,7 11,5 10,1 6,8 14,4 14,1
Finance and business services -8,6 -8,4 11,7 5,7 5,2 2,2 4,2 7,9 6,5
Non-market related services -5,3 4,6 1,9 8,4 7,7 8,4 10,0 8,0 4,7
Market-related sectors 7,7 4,2 9,1 8,2 1,6 6,6 3,8 -0,1 -2,7
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 24.1: Main indicators - SI 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 1997 1999 2006 2015 2033 0.9 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 1405 1402 1407 1412 1422 0.7 %
as % of total population 70.4 70.1 70.1 70.1 70.0 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 981 991 997 1007 1021 1.4 %
Male 530 535 537 547 554 1.4 %
Female 450 456 461 460 466 1.4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.8 70.7 70.9 71.3 71.8 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.4 40.5 40.6 41.8 42.9 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88.6 88.8 89.0 89.3 90.1 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29.9 32.1 33.4 34.6 34.2 -0.4 p.p.
Male 74.5 75.1 74.9 75.8 75.8 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45.1 44.5 44.4 47.6 47.7 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.0 91.1 91.0 91.3 91.6 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42.5 45.4 45.8 46.7 46.4 -0.3 p.p.
Female 65.0 66.1 66.7 66.6 67.5 0.9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.3 36.3 36.4 35.4 37.4 2.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 86.4 87.0 87.3 88.5 1.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 18.1 18.9 21.4 23.1 22.2 -0.9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 65.3 66.0 66.6 67.8 68.6 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33.8 34.1 35.0 37.6 38.4 0.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 83.8 84.2 85.4 86.8 1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29.0 30.7 32.6 33.4 32.8 -0.7 p.p.
Male 70.0 70.4 71.1 72.7 72.7 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.8 38.1 39.2 43.2 43.0 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.4 86.4 87.1 88.1 88.6 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40.9 43.1 44.5 45.2 44.7 -0.5 p.p.
Female 60.5 61.3 61.8 62.6 64.2 1.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28.6 29.8 30.3 31.4 33.2 1.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81.2 81.1 81.2 82.4 84.8 2.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 17.8 18.5 20.9 22.2 21.1 -1.1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 917.5 924.9 936.7 957.0 975.2 18.3 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54.3 54.3 54.4 54.8 54.5 -0.3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45.7 45.7 45.6 45.2 45.5 0.3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.3 -0.1 1.5 3.0 2.9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 4.4 0.8 1.3 2.2 1.9 p.p.
Male 4.0 0.7 1.5 2.9 1.4 p.p.
Female 4.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5.9 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.1 -0.6 p.p.
Male 7.8 8.2 9.5 8.8 8.1 -0.7 p.p.
Female 3.6 3.5 3.6 4.1 3.7 -0.4 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 17.6 17.2 17.1 18.4 17.3 -1.1 p.p.
Male 16.4 15.4 15.2 16.3 15.2 -1.1 p.p.
Female 18.9 19.2 19.1 20.7 19.6 -1.1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 7.9 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1 0.0 p.p.
Male 6.5 6.1 6.0 6.5 6.2 -0.3 p.p.
Female 9.7 9.8 10.4 10.0 10.4 0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6.3 6.5 6.0 4.9 4.4 -0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.2 16.0 13.9 10.1 10.4 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.4 5.6 5.4 4.4 3.7 -0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.2 4.2 2.6 3.3 4.0 0.7 p.p.
Male 5.9 6.1 4.9 4.0 4.0 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13.9 14.6 11.6 9.3 9.8 0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.1 5.2 4.4 3.4 3.3 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.8 5.0 2.7 3.1 3.7 0.6 p.p.
Female 6.9 7.1 7.2 5.9 4.8 -1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19.1 17.8 16.9 11.2 11.3 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.8 6.2 6.6 5.6 4.2 -1.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1.7 2.4 2.3 3.8 4.9 1.1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 51.4 47.5 49.4 45.6 42.2 -3.4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40.2 40.2 39.5 39.6 39.5 -0.3 %
Male 41.3 41.4 40.5 40.6 40.6 0.0 %
Female 38.9 38.7 38.2 38.2 38.0 -0.4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2.5 -2.6 -3.1 -2.3 -1.7 p.p.
Building and construction -1.6 4.4 6.9 10.9 12.0 p.p.
Services 1.8 0.7 3.2 3.9 3.8 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -0.8 -2.0 -1.6 0.8 -0.5 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 24.2: Indicator board on wage developments - SI
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 7.8 5.3 5.5 6.3 8.5 8.3 10.7 8.7 6.8
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 7.1 5.7 6.5 6.5 9.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 7.3 5.0 6.3 5.4 9.6 9.2 8.1 11.4 9.7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3.7 0.8 1.1 2.5 7.9 3.8 4.6 6.3 9.5
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0.3 -0.8 -0.9 -1.5 3.7 -1.4 0.3 2.6 6.3
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 72.2 71.5 70.3 68.9 71.1 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 17.5 17.8 17.4 17.3 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 82.5 82.2 82.6 82.7 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 65.8 65.6 65.9 66.0 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.6 42.4 44.0 : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40.2 39.2 38.6 : : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 13.0 13.2 13.4 14.0 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 4.5 4.6 4.0 3.3 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 4.0 4.5 4.3 3.7 0.6 4.3 5.8 2.3 -2.5
Hourly Labour Productivity 3.2 4.5 5.3 3.7 0.7 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.3 4.3 5.9 6.8 3.5 5.7 5.5 3.9 -0.8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -1.1 -0.4 1.7 4.5 3.2 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.7 2.5 2.5 3.8 5.5 6.5 6.4 6.2 3.1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3.7 1.3 1.5 3.4 5.0 5.4 5.7 4.8 4.0
GDP deflator 3.4 1.6 2.0 4.1 4.0 5.3 4.4 3.6 3.0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -5.8 -0.1 5.7 27.7 10.5 15.2 11.0 8.2 5.6
Industry excluding construction 0.3 0.0 -2.8 1.1 9.1 7.5 7.1 10.0 12.6
of which: manufacturing 2.9 0.1 -2.9 -0.2  : 7.2 6.7 9.8 13.9
Construction 6.7 5.0 -1.2 3.2 5.5 -3.7 8.3 6.5 11.9
Trade, transport and communication 3.1 -0.1 1.9 3.5 7.8 7.2 7.8 7.7 6.5
Finance and business services 2.9 -0.1 5.6 4.1 10.6 7.5 10.9 11.2 11.4
Non-market related services 2.8 0.6 4.1 3.7 9.2 6.3 7.1 10.8 12.0
Market-related sectors 1.4 0.8 0.4 2.4 8.5 6.2 8.1 8.9 10.1
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5.4 5.1 5.5 6.4 8.5 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 7.7 0.9 4.8 16.3 9.7 13.3 9.4 10.3 6.6
Industry excluding construction 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.7 8.2 8.7 10.3 9.7 4.5
of which: manufacturing 8.4 5.9 6.0 6.7  : 8.6 10.3 9.5 3.9
Construction 10.2 6.5 6.3 9.3 7.0 7.9 9.4 9.1 4.6
Trade, transport and communication 7.2 4.4 5.9 6.3 8.3 8.2 9.0 9.0 6.2
Finance and business services 3.4 6.1 5.5 9.3 7.8 8.6 9.5 9.0 4.7
Non-market related services 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.5 9.9 7.4 7.4 11.9 12.9
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 14.4 1.1 -0.8 -9.0 -0.7 -1.6 -1.5 1.9 0.9
Industry excluding construction 5.9 5.8 9.0 5.6 -0.8 1.1 3.1 -0.3 -7.2
 of which: manufacturing 5.4 5.8 9.2 6.9 -1.0 1.3 3.4 -0.2 -8.8
Construction 3.3 1.4 7.5 5.9 1.4 12.0 1.0 2.4 -6.5
Trade, transport and communication 4.0 4.4 3.9 2.7 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.2 -0.3
Finance and business services 0.5 6.3 0.0 5.0 -2.6 1.1 -1.3 -2.0 -6.0
Non-market related services 0.5 2.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.8
Market-related sectors 4.7 5.0 5.6 4.9 -0.3 2.2 1.5 0.5 -4.3
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 25.1: Main indicators - ES 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 42440 43141 43835 44630 45329 1.6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 29227 29755 30255 30808 31252 1.4 %
as % of total population 68.9 69.0 69.0 69.0 68.9 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 20073 20743 21435 22043 22689 2.9 %
Male 11834 12155 12432 12702 12933 1.8 %
Female 8239 8587 9003 9341 9756 4.4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 68.7 69.7 70.8 71.6 72.6 1.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45.1 47.7 48.2 47.8 47.7 -0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 80.9 82.0 82.8 83.8 1.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44.4 45.9 46.8 47.4 49.2 1.8 p.p.
Male 80.4 80.9 81.3 81.4 81.8 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50.2 52.3 52.2 52.1 51.5 -0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.5 92.4 92.5 92.6 92.6 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 62.7 63.2 63.5 63.1 65.1 2.0 p.p.
Female 56.8 58.3 60.2 61.4 63.2 1.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.8 42.9 43.9 43.3 43.7 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.3 69.0 71.2 72.7 74.7 2.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 27.2 29.6 31.0 32.5 34.2 1.7 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 61.1 63.3 64.8 65.6 64.3 -1.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.2 38.3 39.5 39.1 36.0 -3.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 72.7 74.4 75.8 76.8 75.3 -1.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.3 43.1 44.1 44.6 45.6 1.0 p.p.
Male 73.8 75.2 76.1 76.2 73.5 -2.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.8 43.5 44.4 44.2 39.3 -4.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 86.9 87.6 87.6 84.4 -3.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 58.9 59.7 60.4 60.0 60.9 0.9 p.p.
Female 48.3 51.2 53.2 54.7 54.9 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29.3 32.8 34.4 33.8 32.5 -1.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 58.9 61.5 63.7 65.6 65.9 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 24.6 27.4 28.7 30.0 31.1 1.1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 17861.2 18833.7 19600.3 20211.3 20102.8 -108.5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 60.8 60.0 59.4 58.8 57.8 -1.0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 39.2 40.0 40.6 41.2 42.2 1.0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3.5 4.1 3.9 3.0 -0.5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3.9 5.4 4.1 3.1 -0.5 p.p.
Male 2.7 4.0 3.1 2.1 -2.2 p.p.
Female 5.9 7.8 5.6 4.6 1.9 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 11.0 11.2 10.9 10.9 10.7 -0.2 p.p.
Male 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.5 -0.1 p.p.
Female 8.6 8.9 8.4 8.5 8.2 -0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 32.5 33.4 34.1 31.7 29.3 -2.4 p.p.
Male 30.6 31.7 32.1 30.6 27.7 -3.0 p.p.
Female 35.2 35.7 36.8 33.1 31.4 -1.8 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8.7 12.1 11.8 11.6 11.8 0.2 p.p.
Male 2.7 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.0 0.1 p.p.
Female 17.9 23.8 23.0 22.7 22.6 -0.1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 10.6 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 3.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22.0 19.7 17.9 18.2 24.6 6.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.8 8.0 7.5 7.2 10.2 2.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.1 6.1 5.7 5.9 7.3 1.4 p.p.
Male 8.0 7.1 6.3 6.4 10.1 3.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.7 16.7 15.0 15.2 23.7 8.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6.9 5.9 5.4 5.4 8.9 3.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.9 6.4 1.5 p.p.
Female 14.3 12.2 11.6 10.9 13.0 2.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26.4 23.4 21.6 21.9 25.8 3.8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 13.8 10.9 10.5 9.7 11.8 2.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9.4 7.5 7.4 7.7 8.9 1.2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 32.0 24.5 21.7 20.4 17.9 -2.6 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38.2 38.6 38.6 38.4 38.3 -0.4 %
Male 40.2 41.3 41.2 41.0 40.9 -0.2 %
Female 35.1 34.6 34.7 34.7 34.6 -0.1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1.4 0.2 -5.7 -2.0 -5.0 p.p.
Building and construction 5.8 7.7 6.0 6.0 -10.8 p.p.
Services 4.2 4.7 5.3 3.7 2.1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0.8 0.6 0.0 -0.6 : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 25.2: Indicator board on wage developments - ES
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.6 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.0 5.2
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3.3 4.5 4.5 5.1 5.6 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.6 4.2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.8 2.9
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.5 -0.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5
Wage and salaries 2.6 0.6 2.0 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.6 5.1 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 62.5 62.3 61.9 61.2 60.2 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26.6 26.6 26.6 26.7 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73.4 73.4 73.4 73.3 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 66.9 : : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38.7 38.9 39.1 38.9 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37.4 37.6 37.8 37.3 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 24.9 24.9 24.9 25.0 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) -0.3 -0.5 0.0 0.6 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.2 2.3
Hourly Labour Productivity 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.8 2.1 :   :  :   :
GDP 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.7 1.2 2.9 2.3 0.4 -0.8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9.9 9.7 10.1 10.8 12.4 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.5 -0.3 0.6 1.4 0.9 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.8 4.1 4.5 4.7 5.0 2.5
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.7 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.5 2.7
GDP deflator 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.6 2.4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 4.4 11.3 -2.2 -4.3 -1.0 -3.4 -1.7 0.2 0.1
Industry excluding construction 1.4 2.9 3.1 1.2 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.9 5.3
of which: manufacturing 1.7 2.9 2.7 1.3  : 6.7 6.1 6.8 5.7
Construction 4.7 7.6 7.2 4.8 -2.9 0.7 -0.1 -2.2 -9.4
Trade, transport and communication 1.8 2.6 1.4 1.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.8
Finance and business services 1.8 2.3 3.2 3.1 2.2 1.9 1.3 2.8 3.0
Non-market related services 3.4 3.7 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.6 4.1 3.8
Market-related sectors 2.2 3.7 2.8 2.0 2.5 3.3 2.7 2.9 1.6
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.6 5.1 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 3.5 2.0 6.3 0.5 3.6 4.4 2.4 3.2 3.8
Industry excluding construction 1.2 3.4 4.6 4.4 4.5 3.3 4.7 4.6 6.2
of which: manufacturing 1.4 3.3 4.7 4.6  : 3.3 4.6 4.7 6.3
Construction 4.0 5.1 6.2 2.3 5.3 5.2 6.7 5.7 5.6
Trade, transport and communication 0.4 1.7 -0.1 1.4 4.4 3.7 4.5 4.8 5.0
Finance and business services 1.2 2.3 2.9 1.6 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.7 4.3
Non-market related services 3.9 2.4 2.7 6.0 6.3 7.7 7.1 5.6 4.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -0.9 -8.4 8.7 5.1 4.7 8.1 4.2 3.1 3.7
Industry excluding construction -0.2 0.4 1.4 3.2 -0.8 -2.1 -0.6 -1.2 0.9
 of which: manufacturing -0.3 0.4 1.9 3.3  : -3.2 -1.3 -1.9 0.5
Construction -0.7 -2.3 -0.9 -2.4 8.5 4.5 6.9 8.1 16.5
Trade, transport and communication -1.4 -0.8 -1.5 0.0 -0.9 -1.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7
Finance and business services -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -1.5 1.4 1.7 1.6 0.9 1.3
Non-market related services 0.5 -1.2 -1.5 2.1 2.4 4.1 3.3 1.4 0.8
Market-related sectors -0.7 -0.6 0.4 0.6 1.9 0.8 2.0 1.8 3.4
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 26.1: Main indicators - SE 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 9006 9041 9084 9147 9203 0.6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5855 5898 5951 6002 6046 0.7 %
as % of total population 65.0 65.2 65.5 65.6 65.7 0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 4519 4614 4687 4750 4797 1.0 %
Male 2353 2411 2452 2482 2508 1.1 %
Female 2165 2203 2235 2268 2289 0.9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 77.2 78.2 78.8 79.1 79.3 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.2 49.9 51.3 52.2 52.8 0.6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 88.8 89.4 90.0 90.4 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 72.7 72.7 72.8 72.8 72.8 -0.1 p.p.
Male 79.1 80.5 81.2 81.4 81.7 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.1 49.0 50.8 51.8 52.6 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90.0 91.7 92.5 92.9 93.1 0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 75.6 76.4 76.0 76.2 76.5 0.3 p.p.
Female 75.2 75.9 76.3 76.8 76.9 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.3 50.8 51.9 52.7 53.1 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 85.9 86.3 87.1 87.6 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 69.7 69.0 69.6 69.4 69.0 -0.4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 72.1 72.3 73.1 74.2 74.3 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.2 39.0 40.3 42.2 42.2 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82.9 83.5 84.7 86.1 86.5 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 69.1 69.5 69.6 70.0 70.1 0.1 p.p.
Male 73.6 74.3 75.5 76.5 76.7 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.6 38.2 40.2 42.0 42.2 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85.0 86.1 87.8 89.1 89.4 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 71.2 72.4 72.3 72.9 73.4 0.5 p.p.
Female 70.5 70.2 70.7 71.8 71.8 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.7 39.7 40.4 42.3 42.1 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 80.8 81.5 83.0 83.5 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 67.0 66.7 66.9 67.0 66.7 -0.3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4220.3 4263.2 4351.9 4453.3 4493.8 40.5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51.9 52.2 52.4 52.4 52.4 0.1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48.1 47.8 47.6 47.6 47.6 -0.1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0.7 0.3 1.7 2.2 0.9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0.5 1.0 2.1 2.3 0.9 p.p.
Male -0.2 1.6 2.5 2.3 1.0 p.p.
Female -0.8 0.4 1.6 2.3 0.8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 0.0 p.p.
Male 8.4 8.2 8.1 7.7 7.5 -0.2 p.p.
Female 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 15.3 15.7 17.0 17.2 15.8 -1.4 p.p.
Male 13.3 13.6 15.0 14.7 13.2 -1.5 p.p.
Female 17.3 17.6 18.9 19.7 18.5 -1.2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 22.8 23.4 23.6 23.5 25.7 2.2 p.p.
Male 10.8 10.5 10.3 10.3 11.9 1.6 p.p.
Female 35.7 37.5 38.3 38.0 40.8 2.8 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6.3 7.4 7.0 6.1 6.2 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17.0 21.9 21.5 19.3 20.2 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.4 6.0 5.3 4.4 4.3 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.0 3.8 -0.2 p.p.
Male 6.5 7.5 6.9 5.8 5.9 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.0 22.0 21.0 18.8 19.7 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.6 6.0 5.2 4.1 4.0 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5.8 5.2 4.9 4.3 4.1 -0.3 p.p.
Female 6.1 7.4 7.2 6.4 6.5 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.0 21.8 22.0 19.8 20.7 0.9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5.2 5.9 5.5 4.7 4.7 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4.0 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.4 -0.1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 19.3 17.0 15.3 14.0 12.8 -1.2 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 35.4 35.6 35.5 35.5 35.5 -0.1 %
Male 37.9 38.3 38.1 38.1 38.0 -0.3 %
Female 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.4 32.5 0.2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3.7 -4.6 -2.1 3.3 -0.9 p.p.
Building and construction 0.6 3.2 6.5 5.7 5.1 p.p.
Services 0.2 0.5 2.0 2.2 1.0 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -4.5 -1.1 -0.8 0.5 -0.5 p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 26.2: Indicator board on wage developments - SE
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 4.0 3.1 2.1 5.1 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.9 0.6
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2.2 3.2 2.5 4.2 1.2 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.2 3.2 1.6 3.5 2.6 :   :  :   :
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -0.8 0.1 -0.4 4.7 2.6 2.3 0.7 2.1 5.9
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.1 -0.8 -2.1 1.7 -0.5 -0.8 -1.7 -1.3 2.0
Wage and salaries 2.3 3.9 3.6 :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 0.0 0.7 -0.2 4.8 3.2 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68.9 68.3 67.1 68.3 69.1 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 33.8 33.8 33.8 33.8 : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 66.2 66.2 66.2 66.2 : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 48.4 47.9 47.9 45.4 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45.5 45.2 44.8 42.4 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 30.6 30.6 30.6 30.6 : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 4.9 3.0 2.5 0.4 -1.1 -1.0 1.2 -0.2 -5.0
Hourly Labour Productivity 3.3 3.1 2.9 -0.6 -1.7 :   :  :   :
GDP 4.1 3.3 4.2 2.6 -0.2 1.0 3.0 0.6 -4.9
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.7 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.8 1.7 3.2 3.3 0.9 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.7 3.3 3.1 3.6 4.0 2.7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.0
GDP deflator 0.2 0.9 1.7 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.4 3.4 3.9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -5.4 4.0 -22.2 11.5 -6.3 -1.2 -2.3 -4.3 -13.8
Industry excluding construction -7.0 -3.6 -3.4 4.3 -0.4 1.3 0.2 -1.7 0.4
of which: manufacturing -7.2 -2.4 -6.6 4.5 4.6 1.9 0.2 -1.3 2.4
Construction -0.5 0.6 3.4 7.1 -0.9 1.9 0.6 3.2 -7.5
Trade, transport and communication -1.5 -3.4 -0.1 5.0 -1.6 -2.1 -2.0 -1.4 -2.4
Finance and business services 1.8 -0.8 0.9 5.9 -0.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 -5.1
Non-market related services 2.3 0.5 3.2 4.2 -2.6 -1.2 -2.1 -0.7 -6.9
Market-related sectors -2.4 -2.3 -1.4 5.4 -0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.4 -2.7
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 4.0 1.3 2.4 5.2 -2.3 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 5.9 3.8 -3.8 6.7 -1.7 0.5 1.8 2.9 -8.9
Industry excluding construction 6.1 1.5 1.9 6.3 -2.4 0.0 1.2 -0.4 -9.6
of which: manufacturing 6.1 3.2 1.5 6.4 1.5 0.1 0.9 -0.4 -9.4
Construction 3.9 1.9 0.8 6.3 -3.0 -1.3 2.2 -0.8 -10.6
Trade, transport and communication 3.3 1.0 2.4 4.5 -3.1 -3.3 0.9 -0.8 -9.1
Finance and business services 5.1 1.1 4.4 5.5 -5.1 -1.6 -2.5 -4.0 -11.5
Non-market related services 2.9 1.3 2.3 4.1 -0.9 -0.4 2.0 1.1 -5.6
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 11.9 -0.2 23.7 -4.3 4.9 1.7 4.1 7.6 5.7
Industry excluding construction 14.1 5.3 5.6 1.9 -2.0 -1.3 1.0 1.3 -9.9
 of which: manufacturing 14.4 5.8 8.7 1.8 -3.0 -1.8 0.7 0.9 -11.6
Construction 4.4 1.3 -2.5 -0.8 -2.2 -3.1 1.6 -3.8 -3.3
Trade, transport and communication 4.8 4.5 2.5 -0.5 -1.5 -1.2 2.9 0.6 -6.9
Finance and business services 3.3 1.9 3.5 -0.4 -4.9 -2.8 -3.9 -5.2 -6.8
Non-market related services 0.6 0.8 -0.8 0.0 1.8 0.8 4.1 1.8 1.4
Market-related sectors 7.3 3.6 4.1 0.0 -2.6 -2.0 0.2 -1.0 -7.5
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 27.1: Main indicators - UK 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 58815 59156 59518 59862 60310 0.7 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38821 39153 39540 39845 40097 0.6 %
as % of total population 66.0 66.2 66.4 66.6 66.5 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 29222 29511 29935 30089 30412 1.1 %
Male 15826 15951 16159 16260 16419 1.0 %
Female 13396 13561 13776 13829 13993 1.2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 75.3 75.4 75.7 75.5 75.8 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 63.2 62.3 62.5 61.7 61.7 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 84.1 84.5 84.5 84.9 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57.8 58.4 59.1 59.3 59.9 0.6 p.p.
Male 82.1 82.0 82.3 82.2 82.4 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 65.7 65.3 65.1 64.5 64.8 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.0 91.1 91.6 91.6 91.6 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 68.1 68.3 68.4 69.0 69.9 0.9 p.p.
Female 68.5 68.8 69.2 69.0 69.4 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 60.5 59.2 59.7 58.7 58.4 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.7 77.3 77.6 77.6 78.2 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.9 48.9 50.1 50.0 50.2 0.2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 71.7 71.7 71.6 71.5 71.5 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55.6 54.4 53.8 52.9 52.4 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 81.2 81.2 81.3 81.4 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56.2 56.8 57.3 57.4 58.0 0.6 p.p.
Male 77.9 77.7 77.5 77.5 77.3 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 57.0 56.0 54.9 54.4 53.8 -0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 87.8 87.9 88.2 87.7 -0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 65.7 65.9 66.0 66.3 67.3 1.0 p.p.
Female 65.6 65.8 65.8 65.5 65.8 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 54.1 52.7 52.6 51.4 51.0 -0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74.2 74.8 74.6 74.6 75.2 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47.0 48.0 49.0 48.9 49.1 0.2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 27834.8 28089.5 28306.7 28477.7 28673.5 195.8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 53.9 53.8 53.8 53.9 53.7 -0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46.1 46.2 46.2 46.1 46.3 0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7 p.p.
Male 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.4 p.p.
Female 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.4 1.1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.8 9.8 0.0 p.p.
Male 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.0 12.9 0.0 p.p.
Female 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.2 0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.3 -0.4 p.p.
Male 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.1 4.7 -0.5 p.p.
Female 6.5 6.2 6.4 6.4 5.9 -0.5 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 24.8 24.2 24.2 24.1 24.2 0.1 p.p.
Male 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.7 0.4 p.p.
Female 43.1 41.8 41.7 41.4 40.9 -0.4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4.7 4.8 5.4 5.3 5.6 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12.0 12.8 14.0 14.3 15.0 0.7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.5 3.4 4.0 3.8 4.1 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2.8 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.1 -0.1 p.p.
Male 5.1 5.2 5.8 5.6 6.1 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13.2 14.3 15.7 15.8 17.0 1.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.7 3.6 4.1 3.7 4.3 0.6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.7 -0.2 p.p.
Female 4.2 4.3 4.9 5.0 5.1 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10.6 11.0 12.0 12.5 12.7 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3.2 3.3 3.9 3.8 3.9 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.3 0.1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 20.4 21.0 22.2 23.7 24.2 0.5 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 35.8 35.8 35.7 35.8 35.5 -0.7 %
Male 40.5 40.4 40.3 40.3 39.8 -1.1 %
Female 29.9 30.2 30.3 30.3 30.3 -0.1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 2.6 : : : : p.p.
Building and construction 4.7 : : : : p.p.
Services 1.5 : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -4.3 -5.1 : : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 27.2: Indicator board on wage developments - UK
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3.8 3.3 4.2 4.9 2.3 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.8
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4.0 3.5 4.1 4.6 3.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6.9 3.5 3.6 5.3 4.7 6.0 4.4 2.8 6.1
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1.9 2.1 2.2 3.0 2.3 3.3 2.5 1.8 1.7
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0.6 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.9 :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 70.9 70.7 70.2 70.3 69.6 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : 20.4  : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 80.0 79.6 : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs) 69.0 71.0 : : : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 33.4 33.5 33.9 34.1 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 31.0 31.2 31.6 32.0 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs) 18.1 18.1 : : : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2.0 2.4 : : : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.9 1.1 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.9
Hourly Labour Productivity 2.2 0.9 2.4 1.8 0.6 :   :  :   :
GDP 3.0 2.2 2.9 2.6 0.7 2.0 1.4 0.7 -1.1
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.4 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 1.0 0.8 1.4 2.4 1.6 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.4 3.4 4.8 3.9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.2
GDP deflator 2.5 2.0 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.4 3.1 2.1 1.9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing -1.4 1.1  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 6.2 3.3 4.5 3.3 -10.8 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 5.3 6.4  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
 of which: manufacturing 6.8 5.2  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Finance and business services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Non-market related services  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 28.1: Main indicators - EA 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 305733 308088 309797 313603 316455 0.9 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 204548 206288 207201 209577 211280 0.8 %
as % of total population 66.9 67.0 66.9 66.8 66.8 -0.1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 141551 144654 146446 148931 151111 1.5 %
Male 79586 80801 81500 82564 83423 1.0 %
Female 61965 63852 64946 66367 67688 2.0 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.2 70.1 70.7 71.1 71.5 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43.9 44.7 44.6 44.7 45.0 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.5 84.0 84.5 84.8 85.2 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41.6 43.8 45.1 46.3 47.1 0.9 p.p.
Male 77.8 78.3 78.5 78.6 78.8 0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.4 48.2 48.1 48.0 48.2 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92.7 92.9 93.1 93.0 93.0 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52.3 53.8 54.7 55.6 56.4 0.8 p.p.
Female 60.6 61.9 62.8 63.5 64.2 0.7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.2 41.0 40.9 41.3 41.6 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74.1 75.1 75.9 76.5 77.4 0.8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.3 34.3 35.9 37.3 38.2 1.0 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62.8 63.8 64.8 65.7 66.1 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36.2 36.8 37.3 38.0 38.0 0.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.6 77.3 78.3 79.2 79.5 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38.3 40.6 41.8 43.3 44.4 1.0 p.p.
Male 71.3 71.9 72.7 73.4 73.4 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39.4 40.0 40.6 41.2 40.9 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86.1 86.4 87.1 87.7 87.5 -0.2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 48.4 49.9 50.9 52.3 53.3 0.9 p.p.
Female 54.3 55.7 56.8 58.0 58.8 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.9 33.5 33.8 34.7 35.1 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67.1 68.2 69.4 70.6 71.5 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28.6 31.7 33.1 34.7 35.9 1.2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 128527.7 131654.3 134191.9 137780.4 139722.4 1942.0 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56.8 56.4 56.2 55.9 55.6 -0.4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43.2 43.6 43.8 44.1 44.4 0.4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.8 0.8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.6 2.4 1.9 2.7 1.4 p.p.
Male 0.0 1.7 1.6 2.2 0.8 p.p.
Female 1.3 3.4 2.4 3.3 2.2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.2 -0.3 p.p.
Male 11.3 11.4 11.3 11.2 10.9 -0.3 p.p.
Female 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 -0.2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 15.3 16.3 16.8 16.8 16.4 -0.4 p.p.
Male 14.3 15.6 16.0 15.9 15.4 -0.5 p.p.
Female 16.5 17.2 17.7 17.8 17.6 -0.2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) : 18.4 18.9 19.1 19.3 0.1 p.p.
Male : 6.3 6.7 6.9 7.0 0.1 p.p.
Female : 33.9 34.4 34.7 34.7 -0.1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 7.5 0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17.5 17.6 16.4 15.0 15.4 0.5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.2 8.0 7.4 6.6 6.7 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.9 7.4 7.2 6.3 5.9 -0.5 p.p.
Male 7.9 8.1 7.4 6.6 6.9 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16.9 16.9 15.6 14.2 15.2 1.0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.2 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.9 0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.5 7.2 6.9 5.9 5.6 -0.3 p.p.
Female 10.0 9.9 9.4 8.4 8.2 -0.2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.2 18.5 17.5 16.0 15.7 -0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.5 9.2 8.6 7.7 7.6 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 8.5 7.7 7.8 6.9 6.2 -0.7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 43.8 44.5 45.4 43.5 38.7 -4.8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37.2 37.3 37.0 37.0 36.8 -0.5 %
Male 40.7 40.9 40.6 40.5 40.3 -0.6 %
Female 32.6 32.5 32.3 32.3 32.3 0.0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2.0 -0.6 -1.8 -1.3 : p.p.
Building and construction 1.3 2.7 2.6 4.0 : p.p.
Services 1.5 1.4 2.2 2.1 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1.4 -1.2 : : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 28.2: Indicator board on wage developments - EA
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.1 :   :  :   :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.6 :   :  :   :
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.8
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) :   : :   : : 2,84 2,87 3,44 3,58
Nominal Unit labour costs 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.6 3.2 :   :  :   :
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.7 0.9 :   :  :   :
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 64.4 64.1 63.7 63.2 63.4 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  : :  : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1.4 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.0 :   :  :   :
Hourly Labour Productivity 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.2 :   :  :   :
GDP 2.2 1.7 2.9 2.7 0.7 :   :  :   :
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.6 9.0 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) -0.1 0.0 1.4 2.5 2.0 :   :  :   :
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.8 2.3
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.1 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2
GDP deflator 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -11.1 8.7 3.1 1.6 -0.2 :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction -1.2 -1.1 -0.7 -0.5 3.5 :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing -0.7 -1.6  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.9 2.1 :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication -0.1 1.3 0.1 1.5 3.6 :   :  :   :
Finance and business services 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.0 :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.1 :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.2 3.0 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery 1.6 2.2 3.1 2.3 3.1 :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 2.9 1.7 3.5 2.3 2.9 :   :  :   :
of which: manufacturing 3.0 1.8  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 2.8 2.0 3.4 2.6 3.7 :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication 1.3 2.1 1.5 2.0 2.8 :   :  :   :
Finance and business services 1.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.3 :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 2.3 1.8 1.5 2.2 3.4 :   :  :   :
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 14.3 -6.0 0.0 0.7 3.3 :   :  :   :
Industry excluding construction 4.2 2.9 4.2 2.8 -0.6 :   :  :   :
 of which: manufacturing 3.7 3.4  : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -1.2 1.6 :   :  :   :
Trade, transport and communication 1.5 0.8 1.4 0.5 -0.7 :   :  :   :
Finance and business services -0.7 0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 :   :  :   :
Non-market related services 0.3 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.3 :   :  :   :
Market-related sectors 1.9 1.0 1.8 0.8 -0.1 :   :  :   :
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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Table 29.1: Main indicators - EU 
Changes
2007-2008 in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 475099 478036 486302 488327 490450 0.4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 323879 326312 327846 329164 330379 0.4 %
as % of total population 68.2 68.3 67.4 67.4 67.4 0.0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64)      1000 pers. 224168 227902 230453 232096 234389 1.0 %
Male 124251 125895 127003 127672 128608 0.7 %
Female 99917 102008 103450 104424 105781 1.3 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69.2 69.8 70.3 70.5 70.9 0.4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43.9 44.3 44.2 44.2 44.5 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83.4 83.8 84.3 84.4 84.8 0.4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 43.4 45.3 46.4 47.3 48.1 0.8 p.p.
Male 76.9 77.3 77.6 77.7 78.0 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47.4 47.8 47.6 47.6 47.9 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91.5 91.7 92.0 91.9 92.0 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53.9 55.3 56.2 57.1 57.9 0.9 p.p.
Female 61.5 62.4 63.0 63.4 63.9 0.6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40.3 40.7 40.7 40.7 41.0 0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75.2 75.9 76.5 76.9 77.6 0.7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33.6 35.8 37.2 38.1 38.8 0.8 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62.8 63.6 64.5 65.4 65.9 0.5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35.7 36.1 36.6 37.4 37.6 0.2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76.6 77.2 78.2 79.1 79.6 0.5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40.5 42.3 43.5 44.7 45.6 1.0 p.p.
Male 70.2 70.8 71.7 72.5 72.8 0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38.6 39.0 39.6 40.4 40.4 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 85.2 86.0 86.8 86.9 0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50.1 51.6 52.7 53.9 55.0 1.0 p.p.
Female 55.4 56.3 57.3 58.3 59.1 0.8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32.8 33.1 33.5 34.3 34.6 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68.4 69.2 70.3 71.5 72.3 0.9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31.4 33.6 34.9 36.0 36.9 0.9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 203337.9 207394.0 211410.4 215353.9 217845.6 2491.7 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55.8 55.6 55.5 55.3 55.1 -0.2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44.2 44.4 44.5 44.7 44.9 0.2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.0 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0.5 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.2 p.p.
Male 0.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 0.7 p.p.
Female 1.0 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.7 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.8 -0.2 p.p.
Male 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.1 11.9 -0.2 p.p.
Female 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.2 -0.1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13.2 14.0 14.4 14.5 14.0 -0.4 p.p.
Male 12.6 13.6 13.9 13.8 13.2 -0.6 p.p.
Female 13.9 14.5 15.0 15.2 14.9 -0.3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) : 17.1 17.4 17.5 17.6 0.1 p.p.
Male : 6.7 6.9 6.9 7.0 0.1 p.p.
Female : 30.2 30.4 30.6 30.6 0.0 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 7.0 -0.1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.5 18.5 17.3 15.4 15.5 0.1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8.2 7.9 7.2 6.2 6.1 -0.1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6.9 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.1 -0.4 p.p.
Male 8.5 8.3 7.6 6.6 6.6 0.0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.5 18.4 16.9 15.1 15.6 0.4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7.5 7.1 6.5 5.6 5.6 0.0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7.0 6.6 6.2 5.5 5.1 -0.4 p.p.
Female 9.8 9.6 8.9 7.8 7.5 -0.3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18.5 18.7 17.7 15.8 15.5 -0.3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9.1 8.8 8.1 7.1 6.7 -0.3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6.8 6.2 6.1 5.5 5.1 -0.5 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate
 (as % of total unemployment) 44.9 46.1 45.5 42.7 37.0 -5.7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37.6 37.7 37.5 37.4 37.3 -0.4 %
Male 40.9 41.0 40.7 40.6 40.4 -0.5 %
Female 33.4 33.5 33.3 33.3 33.3 -0.2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture : : : : : p.p.
Building and construction : : : : : p.p.
Services : : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry : : : : : p.p.
20082004 2005 2006 2007
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
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Table 29.2: Indicator board on wage developments - EU
annual percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 08-Q1 08-Q2 08-Q3 08-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2.7 2.8 2.7 3.5 3.5 0.1 0.2 -0.6  :
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2.7 3.1 3.2 :  :   :  :    :  :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3.5 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0.7 1.6 1.0 2.2 3.5 0.1 -0.6 -0.5  :
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1.7 -0.6 -1.2 -0.6 0.7 -0.8 -1.3 -1.0  :
Wage and salaries  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 65.5 65.2 64.7 64.4 64.4 :   :  :   :
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  : :  : : : :  :    :  :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour
costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45.2 44.7 44.9 44.8 : :   :  :   :
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42.0 41.7 41.9 41.6 : :   :  :   :
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total
labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  : :   : :  : :   :  :   :
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 -2.0
Hourly Labour Productivity 1.6 1.3 1.9 :   : :   :  :   :
GDP 2.7 2.2 3.3 3.0 1.1 2.0 2.1 1.0 -1.5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.5 :   :  :   :
Output gap (%) 0.1 0.3 1.5 2.6 2.0 :  :    :  :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.7 3.5 3.9 4.3 2.9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2.1 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.5
GDP deflator 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.8 0.9 0.7 0.5 -0.5
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -15.5 10.1 1.4 4.0 1.2 3.8 1.7 0.7 -0.7
Industry excluding construction -1.2 0.1 -0.2 0.4 2.3 0.9 -1.0 1.9 6.6
of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.6 0.1 0.6 -0.4 1.3 0.5
Trade, transport and communication 0.2 1.1 0.4 1.6 0.8 0.5 -0.3 1.0 1.9
Finance and business services 3.0 2.1 2.6 3.0 -0.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -1.5
Non-market related services 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 0.9 1.5 1.9 0.4 0.0
Market-related sectors 0.0 1.3 0.7 1.7 0.4 0.6 -0.6 0.7 1.7
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2.7 2.7 2.6 3.0 0.8 :   :  :   :
Agriculture and fishery -1.6 5.4 4.3 3.7 5.7 5.8 5.4 6.3 3.3
Industry excluding construction 3.1 2.9 3.3 3.0 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.3 0.2
of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction 3.5 1.5 3.1 2.8 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 0.6
Trade, transport and communication 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.7 0.3 0.8 0.0 1.1 -0.5
Finance and business services 2.7 3.3 2.9 2.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -1.4
Non-market related services 3.2 2.7 2.0 3.2 1.3 1.6 2.2 1.1 0.4
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 16.4 -4.3 2.8 -0.2 4.5 1.9 3.7 5.5 4.0
Industry excluding construction 4.3 2.8 3.6 2.6 -0.8 0.5 1.9 -0.6 -6.1
 of which: manufacturing  : :   : :   : :   :  :   :
Construction -0.1 -2.1 -0.4 -0.8 1.3 0.9 2.5 1.0 0.1
Trade, transport and communication 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.1 -0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 -2.3
Finance and business services -0.3 1.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.1
Non-market related services 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5
Market-related sectors 2.5 1.4 2.2 1.3 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.4 -2.1
Source: Ameco, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
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